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ABSTRACT 
 
James Franklin Williamson: Memory with “no clear answers:”  
Volkstrauertag, Opfer des Faschismus, and the Politics  
of Publicly Mourning the War Dead in Germany, 1945-1972 
 (Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
 
 Germans’ hesitance to completely remember the Nazi past after 1945 is well 
documented.  Yet there also exists much evidence of German society’s wide-ranging political 
and cultural reform across these decades, with the peaceful reunification of the two German 
states in 1990 and the nation’s strong preference for diplomacy over military engagement 
representing two recent examples. When considered together, this history of Germans’ success in 
building democracy across the post-war decades appears to complicate the other history of 
Germans’ silence and forgetting of their fascist past. 
 This dissertation presents a history of public holidays dedicated to mourning the war dead 
in West- and East Germany, in an attempt to reexamine the apparent tension between limited 
memories of the Nazi past and nearly complete recovery from that past.  Official remembrance 
ceremonies on Volkstrauertag in Bonn and the Gedenktag für die Opfer des Faschismus in East 
Berlin suggested to audiences how they should understand and remember the lives and deaths of 
the victims of the war, yet these interpretations were neither static nor unconditionally accepted.  
Situating official commemorations of the dead within the context of Germans revising their 
attitudes toward warfare sheds new light on Germans’ collective memory of the Second World 
War and the Nazi regime. 
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 While the history of public mourning holidays in post-war Germany does not dispute the 
conclusion that Germans only slowly and haltingly confronted their Nazi history, it does suggest 
that Germans rather quickly adopted a skepticism toward warfare and military institutions.  
Despite some exceptions, German leaders presented the war and the experience of wartime death 
to their audiences as negative, undesirable events.  To be sure, the shift away from remembering 
soldiers as models of patriotism and selfless sacrifices took place unevenly.  Yet the overall 
history indicates that by the early 1970s, Germans generally agreed that peace was preferable to 
war.  Germans had derived this conclusion partly from the pain of suffering so many dead 
casualties in the last war and partly from their certainty that another war would only bring the 
same fate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 On November 15, 2009, barricades lined the famous Berlin promenade, Unter den 
Linden, frustrating the efforts by pedestrians out for a stroll to easily take in the sights if the city.  
Middle-aged Germans wondered aloud what could cause such a disruption, answered only by 
more elderly Germans’ imperatives to be silent and respectful: it was Volkstrauertag, the holiday 
to remember “those who fell in war.”  Earlier incarnations of this holiday following the First 
World War had featured parades, mass crowds, and aggressive calls for Germany’s return to 
great power status.  Berliners’ apparent ambivalence toward remembering dead soldiers in 2009 
presented quite a contrast to the history of Germans publicly mourning their war dead in the 
1920s and 1930s.  Despite the Second World War’s enormous impact in human lives, material 
destruction, and political division only two generations earlier, the contemporary German public 
seemed only half-aware of the attention their leaders were still directing at publicly mourning the 
dead.  In short, German people today think differently than their grandparents did about the 
experience of war.   
 This is a dissertation about Germans remembering their history of war and dictatorship, 
remembering the dead victims of that history, and drawing lessons for the future from those 
memories.  Beyond the six million Jews murdered in the Holocaust and the five million Slavic 
peoples killed through a racial war of annihilation in Eastern Europe, four million German 
soldiers had also been killed in battle, one million German civilians had perished on the home 
front and two million more had died fleeing or being expelled from the eastern territories.  Thus, 
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beyond the violence deployed by German and German-allied forces, the war also affected 
German families in a very personal way, with the absences in German society spanning regional, 
social, and political boundaries.  The Cold War and division of Germany meant that Germans 
mourned their dead victims and remembered the Nazi dictatorship while the threat of a new war 
with even deadlier implications loomed over them.  For West Germans and East Germans, 
remembering the Second World War’s dead ultimately meant revising their understandings of 
“war” and “war dead,” so that while soldiers’ suffering continued to rank highly, so too did the 
deaths of the manifold other categories of war victims also warrant collective remembrance and 
mourning.  
 Although these processes did not occur evenly between the two Germanys, official 
holidays dedicated to publicly mourning the dead and remembering the war comprised one part 
of the larger process of reforming German society in the wake of the early twentieth century’s 
violence and extremism.  This dissertation will study the official ceremonies and practices 
informing Volkstrauertag [“National day of Mourning”] and the Gedenktag für die Opfer des 
Faschismus [“Memorial Day for the Victims of Fascism”], the state-designated holidays for , 
publicly mourning the war dead in the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, 
respectively.  The histories of these holidays and the many parties involved with them will serve 
as a mechanism for uncovering the changes and continuities in the ways German elites and their 
audiences understood wartime death and the experience of war, while also illustrating how these 
actors applied their understandings of the past to their contemporary post-War lives.  Four main 
questions will guide this research: Firstly, how did official German public mourning ceremonies 
define or categorize the war dead after 1945 and whom did these ceremonies instruct audiences 
to mourn and remember?  Secondly, to what degree did the categories of dead victims invoked at 
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official mourning ceremonies change over time and how?  Thirdly, why did official mourning 
ceremonies revise their understandings of these different groups of dead over time and to what 
degree did the reasons for such revisions change or remain the same?  Fourthly, what do these 
changes in official practices of memory and public mourning imply about German culture in the 
decades that followed the Second World War? 
 
Histories of Memory, Success, and Failure 
 The history of public mourning holidays in modern Germany has attracted scholars’ 
attention only infrequently and, until the recently, a major focus of research into the history 
behind Volkstrauertag and other similar holidays was the question of how such collective 
memory exercises factored into the rise of Nazism or served as remnants of its demise.  While 
not addressing the post-1945 period directly, Fritz Schellack’s study offered a wealth of 
information illuminating the difficulties German leaders encountered during the Kaiserreich as 
they attempted to create a single national day of remembrance for a regionally and culturally 
diverse society then only recently united into one.1  George Mosse’s influential work argued that 
during the Weimar Republic, Volkstrauertag was one of many instances where German society 
remembered the First World War positively and viewed its soldiers as heroes, helping prepare 
the way for the rise of the Nazis and thus setting into place a toxic precedent which critics after 
the war were loath to repeat.2  Thomas Petersen’s history presented the first comprehensive 
survey of Volkstrauertag from its earliest beginnings in the 1920s to the post-Reunification 
                                                 
1 Fritz Schellack, Nationalfeiertage in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1990). 
 
2 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World War (New York, 1990).  Alexandra Kaiser 
(discussed below) also points out the very concept of a nation-wide Volkstrauertag only came about because the 
Nazis took control of the holiday away from the VDK and transformed it into an element of nation-wide 
propaganda, allowing uniformity in message and style over all of Germany.  Alexandra Kaiser, Von Helden und 
Opfern. Eine Geschichte des Volkstrauertages (Frankfurt/New York, 2010), 406. 
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present, though his is chiefly a history of legal decisions and institutional changes, with glimpses 
of actual memories or reactions to history and its memory largely absent.3  While Petersen and 
Schellack are helpful in establishing the legal and administrative background to Volkstrauertag, 
each of these authors unfortunately largely ignores the public mourning and collective memory 
content that populated the official ceremonies from year to year after 1945.  This study aims to 
fill this gap by contributing a description and critical analysis of the messages broadcasted 
through these official moments of public mourning, as well as a consideration of how they may 
have changed over time. 
 More recently, other historians have turned their attention to Germans’ public mourning 
activity in the post-1945 era.  Axel Kapust examined the complicated and twisting relationship 
between the Protestant Church in Germany and the Volkstrauertag holiday from the Weimar 
Republic to the present.  While not denying that the institutional church had before 1939 
enthusiastically supported a memorial day to praise the dead, Kapust also argued that, by 
insisting after 1945 that Volkstrauertag no longer exclude civilian victims of war from national 
remembrance, the Protestant Church rebuilt its political credibility and answered cultural 
conservatives’ desires for political celebration of the dead with a more somber and severe 
pastoral comfort for the bereaved.4  Kapust’s study is therefore somewhat rare in arguing for 
successful changes in one element of West German society that prove a turn away from the 
militarist and fascist past, while simultaneously noting other evidence of the maintenance of 
older ideas.  Even less attention has been devoted to East German public mourning, whether 
official or not.  Peter Monteath offered a brief study of the Gedenktag für die Opfer des 
                                                 
3 Thomas Peter Petersen, Der Volkstrauertag: Seine Geschichte und Entwicklung (Bad Kleinen, 1998). 
 
4 Axel Kapust, Der Beitrag der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland zum Volkstrauertag (Frankfurt am Main, 
2004), 109-110, 143-144. 
5 
 
Faschismus in the German Democratic Republic, demonstrating that while this holiday began as 
an attempt to mourn those persecuted and killed by the Nazis, the East German Communist Party 
increasingly restricted the categories of victims to be so mourned and remembered.5  Gilad 
Margalit’s history of public mourning in Germany after 1945 also took up this question of 
Germans’ discussions of death and the dead, finding that official German mourning efforts in 
both East and West had directed categorically insufficient attention to explaining the 
uncomfortable history of the Nazi dictatorship.  For Margalit, “the issue of German guilt and 
responsibility” was crucial, leading him to criticize Germans for only minimally mourning the 
dead racial victims of the Third Reich and placing much more weight instead on Germans’ own 
dead.6  While he was correct in his characterization of German memory of the Nazi past as 
generally too uncritical and too selective, Margalit’s interests did not really include addressing 
how Germans’ remembered the events of the war, leaving open the question of how these 
German survivors regarded military combat (even if it became clear that they did not want to 
discuss the fascist dictatorship).  Indeed, the aspect of Germans discussing the role of the 
military in their society, while they remembered the military dead of the most recent war, is 
under examined in these works but ranks as a major interest of this dissertation. 
 Alexandra Kaiser most recently and perhaps most comprehensively took up the history of 
public mourning holidays in Germany and her dissertation treated Volkstrauertag from its 
Weimar-era beginnings to its continued place in re-Unified Germany.  Kaiser, like Kapust, 
identified the holiday as a site of conflict over the remembrance of the past and, like Margalit, 
                                                 
5 Peter Monteath, “A Day To Remember: East Germany’s Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Fascism,” 
German History 26, 2 (2008):195-218. 
 
6 Gilad Margalit.  Guilt, Suffering, and Memory.  Germany Remembers its Dead of World War II, Trans. Haim 
Watzman (Bloomington, 2010) 4-5, 292. 
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Kaiser came to a highly critical evaluation of these efforts to mourn over time.  She did find that 
the elite national organizers of the holiday gradually adjusted the verbal content of the official 
memorial ceremonies to reflect more critical attention towards the Nazi regime and not just the 
Germans’ own anguishing experience of the war.  Yet Kaiser also argued that the symbols and 
ritual aspects performed at the annual Bonn ceremony, and also often at local Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies, continued to impress upon audiences “older moral concepts, such as the bravery, 
honor and heroic acts of the soldier,” which clearly drove West Germans to continue to praise 
their military dead in a way that the civilian dead (least of all, the racial victims) could not be 
praised and celebrated.  Indeed, as much as West Germans added new classes of victims of the 
war or violence to their formulaic Totenehrung, this amounted to a “levelling off of the dead,” 
which served as “a strategy to allow the continued remembrance of the dead German soldiers.”7  
Ultimately, Kaiser interpreted the history of Volkstrauertag as a story of small changes but larger 
continuities in Germans’ actions remembering their dead soldiers, with ceremonies in the present 
still too closely resembling those from the problematic past. 
 Taken together Kaiser and Margalit present the most complete point of departure for this 
dissertation.  These two authors largely agree on a characterization of Volkstrauertag as a 
holiday that has seen some small successes in encouraging the remembrance of victims of 
German violence alongside Germany’s own victims of war.  Yet these limited successes here and 
there have been fleeting, in their opinions, and overshadowed by the larger failures of 
remembrance and mourning ceremonies organized on Volkstrauertag to force Germans to 
confront their misdeeds thoroughly enough.  While this dissertation will not completely refute 
                                                 
7 Alexandra Kaiser, Von Helden und Opfern. Eine Geschichte des Volkstrauertages (Frankfurt/New York, 2010), 
407-408. 
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these findings, Kaiser and Margalit’s conclusions differ from those of the present study because 
of the very questions that each one asks of the past.  Whereas Kaiser and Margalit ask, ‘why 
were not more civilian victims or racial victims of the regime not featured more prominently at 
Volkstrauertag,’ this dissertation begins by asking simply, ‘who was included and how and why 
did this change over time.’ Thus, this dissertation will work to complete the picture sketched out 
by Kaiser and Margalit, by prioritizing those topics that Germans actually discussed each year at 
official remembrance ceremonies on Volkstrauertag, rather than only looking for what was 
absent. 
 
 In addition to the historiography of German public mourning holidays, several other 
literatures help frame this dissertation and the questions it asks.  One is a body of research 
detailing transformation within West German culture and its relationship to military institutions.  
In particular, a number of historians have demonstrated post-1945 discontinuities with the past, 
whether in the diminished role of veterans in politics, an increased public skepticism towards 
war and military service, an increased willingness by civilians to criticize the military, or an 
increased willingness to understand male war veterans primarily as civilians (and not warriors).8  
These examples together represent a larger direction in the literature that posits a break in post-
1945 West Germany with the heretofore powerful and unrestrained political, social and cultural 
presence of the army.  West Germany’s army was instead under civilian control and West 
German society saw its men as civilians, not soldiers.  While this large of a cultural shift was 
                                                 
8 James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War (Chapel Hill, 1993); 
David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, 1996), 8-9; 
Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 (West Port, 
CT, 2003), 186-187, 189, 194-196, 281-282, 284); Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The search for a Usable Past in 
the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley, 2001), 89, 121; Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the 
Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton, 2006) 5-6. 
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likely the result of multiple factors operating at once, this change was taking place alongside, and 
perhaps in relationship with, some of the large changes characterizing public mourning for the 
wartime dead. 
 
 Equally important as this literature on Germans’ shifting attitude towards the military is 
the consensus that Germans developed a steady and multifaceted commitment to democracy, as a 
response to the experience with dictatorship.  Historians have found numerous lenses through 
which to view and describe this transformation, from an awakened sense of political engagement 
within elements of German society such as the Protestant Churches, which had long been 
characterized by their deference to the state.9  Other historians have pointed to increasing 
acceptance of ethnic minority and emigrant populations in West German society or to the 
commitment of intellectuals to support democracy in ways they had not done so before 1933.10  
Still others have argued that the phenomenon of the generational rebellion of the 1960s and the 
turn by young West Germans to a much more critical sensibility toward politics and a vigilant 
stance toward political involvement were measures aimed to ensure Germany would not repeat 
its fascist past.11  Particularly influential on this dissertation is the argument that this intersection 
of cultural change and political transformation crucially began under the tutelage of the Western 
Occupiers but then continued as West Germans (and later East Germans, too) on their own 
learned to move away from a militaristic, illiberal society into a freer, more open and democratic 
                                                 
9 Frederic Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany (Middletown, CT, 1973), 353; Benjamin Carl Pearson, 
“Faith and Democracy: Political Transformations at the German Protestant Kirchentag, 1949-1969.” PhD Diss. 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 2007, 12. 
 
10 Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (New York, 2007), 7-11; Dirk Moses, German 
Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (New York, 2007), 5-6. 
 
11 Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, eds. Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European 
Societies, 1960-1980 (New York, 2006). 
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society that placed high values on peace, democracy, human rights and free and peaceful 
association of its members.12   
 
 While the new-found changes or lingering continuities in German history since the Nazi 
regime have long occupied historians, the history of Germans’ own memories of the Nazi regime 
and Second World War have received sustained attention really only in the past decade or so.  
For most of these investigations, the central concern has been whether the German people 
discussed the Holocaust or not, and whether these indisputable victims of German aggression 
weighed on Germans’ consciousness.  This literature has fallen largely into two groups, one 
group that has presented memory broadly construed, as a force that consciously or unconsciously 
affected Germans’ daily lives and decisions about politics, medicine, art, gender roles, and even 
sexuality.13  A second group of research has followed memory more purposefully, studying 
Germans’ remembrance of the Nazi past as explicit and purposefully shaped narratives that were 
revised over time.  One of the most influential works in this field established the consensus 
interpretation that West Germans chose systematically to embrace their own wartime suffering at 
the expense of remembering the suffering of the victims of German violence, and that this 
tendency characterized West German collective memory of the war throughout the late 1940s 
                                                 
12 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (New York, 2006), 
269-274. 
 
13 Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration, Translated by Joel 
Golb (New York, 2002); Linda F. Hogle, Recovering the Nation’s Body: Cultural Memory, Medicine, and the 
Politics of Redemption (New Brunswick, 1999); James E. Young, “Against Redemption: The Arts of 
Countermemory in Germany Today” in Peter Homans, ed., Symbolic Loss: The Ambiguity of Mourning and Memory 
at Century’s End (Charlottesville, 2000); Elizabeth Heinemann, “Gender, Public Policy, and Memory: Writing 
Wives and War Widows in the Postwar Germanys” in Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., The Work of Memory: 
New Directions in the study of German Society and Culture (Urbana, 2002); Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: 
Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton, 2005). 
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and across the 1950s.14  Another highly-influential book explained that the absence of public 
memory of the Holocaust in the GDR and the only slow turn to publically remembering the 
Holocaust in the FRG was a result of the experiences under which those governing elites in East 
and West experienced the war themselves, as well as the political and international pressures of 
the post-War moment.15  Other more recent historians have focused on the fluidity and processes 
of change in what Germans at different times and places remembered about the Nazi past and 
why.16  Still other historians have taken a slightly different tack and explored the limitations and 
problems associated with Germans remembering the criminal actions of the Wehrmacht (instead 
of the criminal actions of the Nazi regime proper), attacking the “clean Wehrmacht myth” as just 
as great a failure of Germans memory as the slowness to discuss the Holocaust.17 
 
 Each of these bodies of literature described above serve as important frameworks for this 
dissertation.  This study will situate the histories of official remembrance ceremonies organized 
on Volkstrauertag in the West and the Gedenktag für die Opfer des Faschismus in the East 
within contexts of a society becoming more civilian and more democratic but one that is touched 
throughout by the stigma or shadow of the Nazi regime’s crimes.  By placing the focus on public 
mourning holidays and their organized ceremonies, this study aims not for a history of emotions 
                                                 
14 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley, 
2001) 2-3. 
 
15 Jeffery Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA, 1997) 1-2. 
 
16 Klaus Neumann, Shifting Memories: The Nazi Past in the New Germany (Ann Arbor, 2000) 2; Jeffrey K. Olick, In 
the House of the Hangman: The Agonies of German Defeat, 1943-1949 (Chicago, 2005) 3-4, 332. 
 
17 Michael Th. Greven and Oliver von Wrochem, eds. Der Krieg in der Nachkriegszeit: Der Zweite Weltkrieg im 
Politik und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik (Opladen, 2000); Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, 
Reality, Trans. By Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: 2006). 
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but rather hopes to find to what extent successes that are consistent with the efforts to reform 
German society might have been concealed by histories solely concerned with Germans’ limited 
remembrance of the Nazi past and its crimes.  In short, this dissertation seeks to reconcile the 
tension between Germans’ limited memories of the Nazi regime and the war and the far-reaching 
ways the memory of this past positively informed their post-war lives in the present. 
 
Construction and deconstruction of memory 
 Historians of memory agree broadly on the constructedness and fluidity of humans’ 
memories of history.  Particularly informative for this dissertation is Alon Confino’s definition of 
collective memory as a “symbolic representation of tradition and of the past embedded in the 
context of social action,” which results from “collective negotiation and exchange between the 
many memories that existed in the nation.”  Confino’s interest was in “how people construct[ed] 
a past in which they did not take part individually, but which they share[d] with other members 
of their group as a formative sense of cultural knowledge, tradition, and singularity” in a very 
specific historical context.  Important to Confino’s definition was not only “the representation of 
the past, but also its rejection and reception.”18  Confino’s conception offers a method for 
identifying the boundaries of acceptable remembrance versus taboo topics, suggesting what 
facets of the past were still too sensitive for wide public discussion at a given moment in time.  
At the same time, the presence of conflict over memory can also point to moments when 
                                                 
18 Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-
1918 (Chapel Hill, 1997), 11, 7, 8, 11. 
 
12 
 
Germans considered drastic revisions or reconsiderations of the past they had been taking for 
granted.19 
 In addition to the importance of conflict, manifestations of congruence or coexistence 
among different strands of memory is another revealing phenomenon in collective memory 
formation, one that is also important for this dissertation’s findings.  Konrad Jarausch described 
collective memory as a process of sharing and stylizing memories across three roughly distinct 
levels.  The first level is the village- or community level where neighbors would have told their 
stories to each other, forming a memory through this exchange that is distinct to that locality.  
The second level would witness these local memories exchanged regionally or more widely, 
where they would be stylized and altered to share tropes and common events with other local 
memories.  Finally, a third level – a national level – would emerge out of this continued 
exchange at higher and higher levels.20  Attention to change and similarities across these levels 
are instructive in thinking about the constant re-ification or revision to memory that Germans 
undertook at their annual memorial ceremonies.  At the same time, thinking about levels 
possessing only a degree of fluidity suggests as well the importance of noting the boundary 
between what elements of the remembered past (or the remembered dead) were thought 
generally applicable and what was too specific to be carried on to the next level.21   
                                                 
19 Confino is not the only historian to point to the importance of conflict and negotiation over collective memory.  
For two recent accounts of the French experience after the First and Second World Wars, see, respectively, Daniel J. 
Sherman, The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago, 1999), and Sarah Farmer, Martyred Village:  
Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane (Berkeley, 1999). 
 
20 Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Identities (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 317-341. 
 
21 Kaiser also discusses the phenomenon of collective memory operating at different “levels,” but she posits the 
greater potential for results that diverge, rather than converge, over time, meaning slow reform and revision of 
memory and mourning in a more inclusive or objective direction at the top me remain divorced from any such 
reform at the local level.  Kaiser, 407. 
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 Both of these above examples can be categorized as collective memory that is primarily 
communicative, based on ways of narrating the past.  Yet many scholars specializing in memory 
point also to the importance of cultural memory, or memory that is preserved through symbols, 
ritual practices, or even the lived environment of the people who are remembering.  While 
evidence of a memory that preserved and archived through fragments and artifacts that colors the 
present day is not promises fruitful revelations, this study restricts itself primarily, though not 
exclusively,  to the narrated past.22  Both methods for understanding memory formation and 
reception, cultural and communicative, can point historians to moments of conflict, where actors 
negotiate over how to properly remember the past and interpret its meaning.  It is these such 
moments of conflict, made inevitable by a memory that impels people to take “social action,” 
that can reveal changes or continuities over time in how Germans remembered their wartime 
dead. 
 Searching out conflicts over memory is one way to answer what is perhaps the most 
obvious criticism lodged against studies of collective memory – the  problem of how to derive 
explanatory power from these cultural phenomena that are almost always describable but not 
tangible phenomena.  Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche proposed a very powerful answer, 
suggesting historians of memory undertake interpretations that trace the real, demonstrable 
actions taken by individuals back to the memory which these actions invoke or articulate – the 
“social action” that results from collective memory.23  That is, the refashioning of narratives or 
                                                 
22 The best example of this sort of cultural memory is Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume: Formen und 
Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses, 3rd Ed. (Munich, 2006); Kaiser’s study of Volkstrauertag makes very 
insightful use of this methodology. 
 
23 Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., The Work of Memory: New Directions in the study of German Society and 
Culture (Urbana, 2002) 3-4. 
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reinterpretation of cultural traces need not necessarily happen in memoirs or private interviews, 
but can take the public form of “social action,” whether as protests, angry letters, or efforts to 
propose counter-narratives to ‘correct’ the memory under scrutiny.  This process of “social 
action” arising from remembrance can also be fruitfully extended to the phenomenon of 
individuals and groups publicly mourning their dead.24 
 Throughout this dissertation, I will make use of the term, “public mourning,” to describe 
official memorial ceremonies held on Volkstrauertag and the OdF memorial day, both in terms 
of the discussions planning and programming the ceremonies and the actual content and 
messages broadcast in them.  While this term is admittedly vague, it represents a fruitful 
synthesis of some of the more important methodological contributions outlined above.  On one 
hand, the term “public mourning” embraces the role of government or civil-society officials in 
sanctioning ceremonies to remember the past and the dead in a manner understood by their 
designers and their audiences to be representative of the national, state, or local population’s 
experience.  Alternatively, the term “public mourning” could be employed to categorize any 
mourning activity that is simply carried out in the public sphere, whether it is intended to meet 
with widespread affirmation or to provoke controversy.  I understand this term to describe 
activities creating communicative memory that combine the processes of the “three levels” and 
the “social action.”  That is, “public mourning” moves beyond memory formation, toward a 
point where people exchange their specific individual and group memories in public, using the 
                                                 
24 At the risk of overstating the obvious, “mourning” is not necessarily the same as “remembering.”  Liz Stanley 
defined “local mourning” as “the expression of grief about the deaths of people known, loved and remembered,” 
providing one definition to differentiate “mourning” the dead from remembering the history of why those dead died.  
See Liz Stanley, “A ‘secret history’ of local mourning: the South African War and state commemoration,” Society in 
Transition 33, 1 (2002):1-25, 2. 
Because of the intense emotions involved, I use the term “mourning” when describing conversations about 
the individual and collective dead victims of the war, while reserving the term “memory” to describe efforts to 
narrate the history of why they died.  
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resultant collective memories to both interpret the past but also understand the present and the 
future.   
 This dissertation will prioritize national remembrance ceremonies, and therefore national 
“public mourning” events.  Because the planning and execution of these memorial activities 
involve political leaders and civil society elites, political concerns abound.  This was the case not 
least because of the visible participation and sanction by the post-fascist governments in actions 
to remember and explain the events and outcome of that fascist past.  Given that a national model 
of remembrance ceremonies involves the deployment of a hegemonic narrative by the elite, the 
problem of whether this elite memory is representative of the population is unavoidable.  After 
all, the function of national remembrance ceremonies on public mourning holidays was largely a 
process of elites’ ideas about memory exercising direction on or shaping the audience’s notions 
of whom to mourn and how.  Yet because pronouncements about the dead soldiers, German 
civilian victims of the war, or racial victims of Nazi violence were all politically sensitive, it is 
possible to gain a sense of the extents and limits of what comprised acceptable discourse about 
remembrance of the past, based on the contours of when and why moments of conflict and 
revision arose.  While this description is apt for West Germany, in considering East Germany I 
use the term, “publicly-visible mourning,” to acknowledge the restricted possibilities available to 
collective and individual audiences living under a dictatorship, who faced their own version of 
remembering and explaining the past, present and future.  Yet as this dissertation will show, 
there were indeed moments when German audiences in West and in the East made clear their 
acceptance, rejection, or modified revision of the memory suggested by their leaders.   
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Sources of memory 
 The Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge (German War Graves Commission) 
created the Volkstrauertag holiday after the First World War and managed the planning and 
carrying-out of the holiday, including the national remembrance ceremony in Bonn, after 1945.  
Because the history of Volkstrauertag forms the backbone of this history of official public 
mourning practices in Germany, the archive of the Volksbund serves as the chief provider of 
primary sources.  From the Volksbund’s collections, this dissertation draws speeches delivered at 
the annual national commemorative ceremony, as well as descriptions of the participants and of 
the musical or dramatic elements of the ceremony each year.  The archive also preserves the 
actual texts of the dramatic readings and plays that the official ceremonies featured in certain 
years.  These records of are also augmented by an uneven range of press clippings that can 
occasionally hint at the popular reception of the national ceremony from year to year.  Thus the 
VDK archive is the first source throughout this dissertation, because the actual national 
ceremonies staged and memories discussed are most often available there. 
 Beyond the final product in each case, the archive holds extensive files documenting the 
behind-the-scenes side of these national Volkstrauertag ceremonies.  Memoranda and drafts from 
the planning stages, in some cases years in advance, of each annual Volkstrauertag memorial 
ceremony make it is possible to analyze and interpret both the messages conveyed in each year’s 
ceremony as well as the intentions of the Volksbund officials planning the event.  This added 
dimension of intent is even more revealing when the Volksbund officials themselves disagreed 
about whether their collective memory needed to be reformed or whether “social action” was 
necessary to reform the public’s memory.  Even more telling are the occasional instances when a 
particular speech, dramatic performance, musical debut, or other element of the national 
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ceremony proved so moving to individual audience members that they wrote to the Volksbund to 
register their approval (or in some cases, disapproval).  Although these are exceptional cases by 
nature, they do provide textured lens, however imperfect, through which to gauge public 
reception when they do occur.  In addition to the national ceremony, the Volksbund archive also 
preserves some uneven holdings of records (including planning documents and speeches) for 
Volkstrauertag programs carried out by state-level and local-level VDK chapters.  These in turn 
are augmented by a range of local press clippings that present coverage of state- and local-level 
Volkstrauertag ceremonies that sometimes departed quite dramatically from the national one.  
While a comprehensive view of Volkstrauertag from the national down to the local is not always 
possible from these records, a far-reaching picture of the national Volkstrauertag ceremony’s 
history from year to year, along with the ideas of those shaping it and their hopes for reception, 
provide the chief source base for this study. 
 The second major group of source materials for this dissertation comes from several 
archives of the Protestant Church in Germany.  The national and state-level leaders of the 
Protestant Church played a major role in the development of the Volkstrauertag holiday before 
the Second World War and confronted the question of how to resurrect it after the war as well.  
Letters from local pastors to their superiors attest to congregations’ earnest need to mourn in the 
wake of the war but also demonstrate the conflicted nature of the Church towards this tradition.  
On the one hand, the church had participated in what had become a very militant, nationalist 
exercise but now, undergoing its own anti-conservative reform, the church was hesitant to allow 
Volkstrauertag to resume without at least some measures to dampen the military-centric aspects.  
The resulting documentary record of memoranda, letters asking for guidance, in records of 
internal deliberations among senior church leaders illustrates the role these leaders sought to 
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influence the new Volkstrauertag and push it to become an institution that reflected the civilian 
war experience alongside the military one.   
 Besides communications within the Church, there exist also records of the Church’s 
dealings with the Volksbund and government officials, whereby the Church worked to use its 
presence in local communities, local cemeteries, and its role as a chief source for parishioners 
seeking comfort from bereavement all to reshape Volkstrauertag into new directions that were 
less politically suspect.  Thus, these records reveal much about how church leaders viewed the 
issue of mourning for the dead soldiers, versus mourning for the dead German civilian victims or 
dead racial victims of the regime, and what these leaders hoped their congregations would learn 
from a change in practice.  While these sources do tend toward national voices and fewer local 
voices from different contexts, it is possible to detect changing attitudes within different 
elements of the Church toward the issue of defining the victims mourned on Volkstrauertag.  In a 
surprising revelation, there is a small scattering of sources from the East German side of the 
Protestant Church that also reveal a very limited glimpse at national and local leaders there re-
thinking the question of victims to be mourned.  Of course, in East Germany there was both a 
different collective memory being preached by the government and a stricter context of 
censorship and political sensitivity towards naming the victims of the war. 
 Preserved within the archives of the Volksbund and the Protestant Church are documents 
depicting a continual dialog between each of these parties and the government of the Federal 
Republic.  Most often, these are memoranda or transcripts from conversations or formal 
meetings, nearly always reflecting the desire of federal ministers to exercise some influence or 
even take a direct role in re-shaping or re-directing West Germans’ impulses to mourn their dead 
and remember the war.  Especially in the early years following the war, this desire by the 
19 
 
government resulted from the dual sensitivity of even discussing the Nazi past in front of 
domestic audience versus being seen by international observers not to be discussing the Nazi past 
and thereby being thought suspect.  While the government’s degree of censorship, objection, or 
encouragement varied at different moments, these documents also reveal instances where the 
VDK pushed back against such censorship, which the VDK felt was at some times too 
progressive and at other times too conservative.  The push-and-pull between government censors 
or crafty politicians and Volkstrauertag ceremony planners was not a constant but these records 
do preserve a sense of the high political and emotional stakes that informed ceremony planning, 
at least in the first two decades or so following the war. 
 Of course, the role of the government and the Volksbund were completely different in 
East Germany.  For the GDR’s Opfer des Faschismus holiday, this study relies primarily on SED 
Politburo records and Neues Deutschland clippings to access the content of speeches and other 
party projects involving public mourning for the dead anti-fascist fighters.  Naturally, the 
censorship of the SED did not allow any third party uninhibited access to the public sphere and 
the Volksbund and Volkstrauertag were out of the question.  Still, records from both the German 
Federal Archives collections of East German political party files do reveal occasional 
confrontations between East German Protestant Church leaders and the SED over questions of 
military service or remembrance of the war dead.  More precisely, SED records detail intense 
efforts to exalt new East German soldiers after a decade or so of ignoring dead Wehrmacht 
soldiers from memorial ceremonies.  At the same time, church records indicate efforts at a local, 
even underground level, to circumvent official propaganda and organize publicly-visible 
mourning ceremonies for East German communities that embrace the memories of their dead 
soldiers and civilian victims of the Second World War. 
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 Thus while historians eternally face the question of how representative or exception a 
source may be compared to its context, the picture of East German public mourning on the OdF 
memorial day and outside of is are more opaque.  It is possible to detect the preferred collective 
memory that the SED hoped East Germans would adopt, which was informed by the choice of 
which victims could be publicly mourning on official holidays.  Yet the absence of large-scale 
public response in opposition to this narrative, coupled with the apparent popularity of OdF 
memorial day in Berlin cannot be understood as simple markers of East Germans’ approval.  On 
the subject of public mourning in the East, this dissertation will try to assemble a picture of the 
overall context of how the SED framed both the old Wehrmacht and its new East German army 
in the public sphere.  The regime’s limited support for Wehrmacht dead in favor of unremitting 
praise for both anti-fascist fighters and the new NVA provide a basis for comparison with the 
unorthodox memory of the Second World War seen in the fragmentary evidence we have of 
more independent, organic expressions of mourning and collective remembrance 
 
Organizing the answers 
 The chapter organization will attempt to both direct attention to a diachronic change-
over-time analysis but also give special attention to specific problems along the war.  The 
following central questions will guide the presentation: (1) How did Germans mourn their 
wartime dead before 1945?  (2) How did Germans decide how to mourn in the initial years after 
1945?  (3) How did Germans balance war, the dead victims, and the threat of renewed conflict?  
(4) To what extent did official East German memory become re-militarized across the 1950s and 
1960s, and what responses are discernable from the East German people towards this memory?  
(5) What effects did larger changes in the West German memory landscape (i.e. new attention to 
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the Holocaust and the Nazi regime) have on annual public mourning ceremonies in West 
Germany across the 1960s?  (6) How did West Germans arrive at a fixed but flexible memorial 
day that was ultimately acceptable to all parties, one that remains in place to the present day?  
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CHAPTER ONE: TRADITIONS OF WAR AND MEMORY 
  
 On Volkstrauertag [National Day of Mourning] 1931, a Berlin newspaper wrote that 
collectively mourning the fallen soldiers from the First World War should reinforce a “complete 
national Germanness [gesamtes deutsches Volkstum] for which the two million devoted their 
lives.”25  In other words, German civilians of all stripes ought to look to the heroic, masculine, 
soldierly ideal of their military as a guide for their recovery from war and economic hardship.  
This suggestion reflected a longer tradition in Germany according to which military service and 
the military dead were supposed to capture the public’s imagination.  Yet after 1945, the notion 
that all of civilian society should model itself on the military’s values had been discredited 
beyond repair.  Indeed, some Germans had already begun questioning the proper relationship of 
the military to the rest of society.    
 In order to fully understand how Germans’ public mourning of the wartime dead differed 
after 1945 from practices and assumptions of the Third Reich, the Weimar Republic and before, 
this chapter will examine the history of Germans’ attitudes towards their military and soldiers up 
to and including the Second World War.  Examining military-civilian relations and the normative 
assumptions about war and soldiers, this chapter will seek answers to the following questions:  
(1) How did Germans before 1914 imagine the place, role and status of the soldier?  What 
political, cultural and religious traditions informed this understanding?  (2) Departing from 
defeat in 1918, how did Germans discuss and remember the First World War and its dead during 
                                                 
25 D. Ludwig Kaas, „Den Toten des Krieges.“ Germania. March 1, 1931. 
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the Weimar Republic?  How were the subjects of mourning understood in light of the increased 
violence of this war over those of the nineteenth century?  (3) During the Third Reich and the 
Second World War, how did the experience of renewed, intensified and ultimately unsuccessful 
warfare shape Germans’ thinking about soldiers and death?  What traditions and assumptions 
from this era would be important references points for post-1945 Germans who desired to 
resume or reform public mourning practices? 
 
A civilian society with a military: 1806-1918 
 The much celebrated and revered German armies of the nineteenth- and twentieth 
centuries stem institutionally from the Prussian army of the eighteenth century, a respectable 
fighting force but one that enjoyed little popular esteem among civilians.26  However, Prussians 
did not imagine their army as a nationally representative institution, to which they all equally 
owed loyalty and support until they had first experienced a national crisis.  In 1806, French 
Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte defeated Prussia’s troops with a mass army of revolutionary 
conscripts.  In response, reformist army officers and civil servants set about to “arouse a moral, 
religious and patriotic spirit in the nation” by creating their own new revolutionary Prussian 
army, conscripted from the whole nation, even though widespread popular support of general 
conscription had no historical precedent in Prussia.27  Nonetheless, this army’s battlefield 
performance would quickly win the public’s confidence. 
                                                 
26
 Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk.  Das Problem des „Militarismus“ in Deutschland.  Erster 
Band: Die altpreußische Tradition (1740-1890), 3rd Edition (Munich, 1965), 28-30, Gordon A. Craig, The Politics 
of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London, 1964), 1-3, 12-13, Ute Frevert, A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, 
Military Conscription, and Civil Society, Trans. by Andrew Boreham with Daniel Brückenhaus (Oxford, 2004), 10-
22. 
 
27 Matthew Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848 
(Oxford, 2000), 1, 3, 6, 14, Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall, “Introduction” in Alan Forrest, Karen 
Hagemann and Jane Rendall, eds., Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the 
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 When they mourned their wartime dead, Prussians organized public memory and 
commemoration through the lens of German Protestant Christianity.  In 1816 the king ordered a 
general day of mourning to remember all who had died in the wars against Napoleon and many 
of the provincial Protestant churches outside of Prussia also adopted this new Totensonntag 
[Sunday of the Dead], too.28  This new Totensonntag enjoyed both temporal and spiritual 
support, each of which “gave official sanction to the linkage between the cult of the fallen and 
Christian piety.”29  Yet the traditional religious spirit of this holiday was stronger than the civic, 
with remembrance appearing as or being informed by religious practices, especially worship 
services and laying of memorial wreaths.30  The public memory of the war dead on Sundays also 
reflected a growing religious dimension to Prussian identity whereby Protestant German pastors 
believed in a “chosen-people model,” and drew from it “metaphors….that served to give 
meaning to individual suffering, sacrifice, and loss,”31 to “justify the Wars of Liberation,” and 
“to disguise the reality of war.”32  At the same time, the Prussian public gradually accepted 
                                                 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2009), 1-2, 3, Craig, 37-38, 
40, Freiherr vom Stein, quoted in Craig, 40, Frevert, 22-30, 32, 34-35, 39, Karin Baumgartner, “Valorous 
Masculinities and Patriotism in the Texts of Early Nineteenth-Century Germany Women Writers,” German Studies 
Review 31, 2 (May 2008), 325-327, Craig, 41-43, 44-45, 47, 48, Karen Hagemann, „Der ‚Bürger‘ als 
‚Nationalkrieger:‘ Entwürfe von Militär, Nation und Männlichkeit in der Zeit der Freiheitskriege“ in Karen 
Hagemann, Ralf Pröve, eds. Landesknechte, Soldatenfrauen und Nationalkrieger: Militär, Krieg und 
Geschlechterordnung im historischen Wandel (Frankfurt, 1998), 75. 
 
28
 Karl-Heinrich Bieritz, Das Kirchenjahr.  Feste, Gedenk- und Feiertage in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Berlin, 
1986), 159-160. 
29
 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York, 1990), 50. 
 
30
 Hans Hattenhauer, Deutsche Nationalsymbole: Zeichen und Bedeutung (Munich, 1984), 105. 
 
31 Hartmut Lehmann, “The Germans as a Chosen People: Old Testament Themes in German Nationalism,” German 
Studies Review, 14, 2 (May, 1991), 262-263. 
 
32 Mosse, 27-28, 34-36.  This change represents a larger transition in European memorial culture of the nineteenth 
century, whereby monuments made “inner-worldly claims” about the value of soldiers’ deaths in this world.  
Reinhart Koselleck, “War Memorials: Identity formations of the Survivors,” in Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of 
Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Pressner (Stanford, 2002), 291 
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conscription based on a discourse that framed military service positively, “not purely as a civic 
duty, but … a means of social integration and cultural socialization,” and as “an honor,” giving 
rise to the expectation that (male) citizens had a “moral duty” to serve the nation by fighting its 
enemies while “contribut[ing] to the furtherance of humanity.”33  Mourning the dead and 
remembering their actions, then, served both to express the public’s grief for the fallen and 
gratitude for their actions while simultaneously creating justification for future generations to do 
the same. 
 The 1848 Revolution further redefined the ways Prussians (and later Germans) thought 
about their military.  The very idea of an armed citizenry was central to the 1848 revolution and 
yet the concept of a “Bürgerwehr” [citizen’s militia] was gendered masculine and classed 
bourgeois.34  These militias both served as security details, protecting the property of the liberal 
middle class from agitated democratic revolutionaries and general looters, while simultaneously 
serving as “the armed wing of the [liberals’] Revolution” and as a check on the power of the 
king’s standing army.35  The defeat of the 1848-1849 Revolution, however, allowed the army to 
clamp down on any democratic challenge to a closed, professional military institution, thus by 
the middle of the nineteenth century, Prussians conceived of bearing arms as the task not of 
                                                 
33
 Frevert, 47, 50-51, 54-55, 59-60.  Frevert understands this process of delineating who could and could not serve 
in the army as actually defining who was and was not included in the nation. René Schilling, “Die soziale 
Konstruktion heroischer Männlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert: Das Beispiel Theodor Körner“ in Karen Hagemann, Ralf 
Pröve, eds. Landesknechte, Soldatenfrauen und Nationalkrieger: Militär, Krieg und Geschlechterordnung im 
historischen Wandel (Frankfurt, 1998),  122, 124. 
 
34 Ralf Pröve, „ ‚Der Mann des Mannes:‘ ‚Civile‘ Ordnungsformationen, Staatsbürgerschaft und Männlichkeit im 
Vormärz“ in Karen Hagemann, Ralf Pröve, eds. Landesknechte, Soldatenfrauen und Nationalkrieger: Militär, Krieg 
und Geschlechterordnung im historischen Wandel (Frankfurt, 1998), 104; Frevert, 113-118, 124-125, 127-128.  On 
the 1848-1849 Revolution in general, see Jonathan Sperber, Rhineland Radicals: The Democratic Movement and the 
Revolution of 1848-1849 (Princeton, 1991). 
 
35 Pröve, 104-105; Sperber, 170-171. 
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civilian patriots, but as the work solely of professional soldiers, the legitimate defenders of the 
nation.36    
 The army’s status and reputation in Prussian society was greatly enhanced by German 
Unification following the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871, which had allowed Prussian 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to force the political unification of the German lands under 
Prussian leadership in 1871.37  Through victory over Prussia’s archrival and the ensuing national 
unification, the army and soldiery enjoyed even greater public appreciation and esteem.38  These 
successes settled any question of army policy, conscription, and limitations on the military 
establishment once and for all, allowing the army to “now actively [seek] to use this influence 
and leave its mark on society.”39  The mechanism through which the politically conservative 
army could most easily shape individual Germans’ lives was the system of officer commissions 
for the army reserve.  These soldiers in middle-class clothes served as a constant crutch for the 
state and carried the mentalities, prejudices and politics in which they were socialized as young 
men back into their civilian lives.40  The hiring preference for civil service positions and the 
prestige of a closer relationship with the Emperor elevated the soldier above the civilian, which 
corresponded with the army’s expanded role as an instrument of social control and social order.41  
                                                 
36 Pröve, 116; Craig, 107, 127. 
 
37 Wehler, 28. 
 
38 Craig, 180-181, 193, Frevert, 156-157, Wehler, 28. 
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Beyond gendered and social expectations, Protestants’ faith continued to bolster the primacy of 
the warrior, as the Prussian-German victory was seen as nothing less than divine intervention.42  
Historians have unendingly debated the degree to which the German army influenced the state 
and society, or the other way around, yet the role of the institutional military and the place of the 
soldier within Imperial Germany were undeniably important. 
 To commemorate the victory at the Battle of Sedan on September 2, 1870, which led to 
the French surrender and German unification, national liberals created a new holiday, Sedantag 
[Sedan Day], that all Germans could celebrate and that would bolster those newly-incorporated 
non-Prussians into the Prussian-dominated German Empire.43  This holiday became an occasion 
for honoring the dead soldiers, too, but did not meet universal acceptance.44  These celebrations 
placed commemorating the new nation-state within longer German traditions of celebration 
using local monuments, statues, processions, speeches and (in Protestant regions) the Church, all 
putting national significance into the locality and which by 1874 were less of reminders of the 
battle itself and really pedagogic projects for educating children and youth about the greatness of 
German unification and German traditions.45  Dissent among Catholics and democrats meant that 
Sedantag became a political campaign extension for nationalist liberals, and thus meaningless to 
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other political- and social groups, since the celebration had no consensus of public support 
outside of Protestant Prussia.46  Still, the military was present in German culture in many ways at 
once, as the army enjoyed special constitutional privileges and the soldiers possessed a 
celebrated status in popular imagination.47  
 The First World War brought tremendous violence to the lives of soldiers and civilians in 
Germany.48  While the German government had anticipated a war (albeit short) and made plans 
for the deployment of its troops, planners had made few preparations for a sustained conflict that 
would require the long-term production of war materials.  Nor had they considered how to 
correct for shortages of raw materials, food, or manpower.49  This war demanded not only a 
mobilized, modernly-equipped and technologically proficient military but also a politically and 
industrially mobilized society, organized for rational production, and agreeable to overcome their 
internal social and political divisions through a temporary domestic truce [Burgfrieden].50  Over 
                                                 
46 Confino, 73, 79-81, 83, 87, 90-91.  This is, in fact, Confino’s major argument about Sedantag: that it did not 
convince non-Protestant Prussians to feel German.  Instead, building the identity of new Imperial Germans 
proceeded through an intense fascination with the Heimat. 
 The ensuing Kulturkampf [culture war] persecuted primarily Catholics and Socialists, both of whom were 
seen as “unpatriotic” because of their loyalties to international movements.  See Michael B. Gross, “Kulturkampf 
and Unification: German Liberalism and the War Against the Jesuits,” Central European History, 30, 4 (1997), and 
Frank J. Gordon, “Protestantism and Socialism in the Weimar Republic,” German Studies Review, 11, 3 (October 
1988). 
 
47 Eckart Kehr, “The German Fleet in the Eighteen Nineties and the Politico-Military Dualism in the Empire” in 
Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History, Edited and with an 
Introduction by Gordon A. Craig, Translated by Grete Heinz (Berkeley, 1977), 5, 12, 16-19, Hull, 105-106, Craig, 
218, 237, 252, Frevert, 212-218, 221-223. 
 
48
 Michael Geyer, “How the Germans Learned to Wage War: On the Question of Killing in the First and Second 
World Wars” in Alon Confino, Paul Betts, and Dirk Schumann, eds. Between Mass Death and Individual  Loss: 
The Place of the Dead in Twentieth Century Germany (New York, 2008), 25, See Ute Daniels, The War From 
Within: German Working Class Women in the First World War, trans. Margaret Ries, (New York: Berg, 1997), 
Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires Burning : Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (Chapel Hill, 
2000), Gerald Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1966). 
 
49 Wehler, 203-205; Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918, Second Edition 
(Cambridge, 2004), 30-31. 
 
50 Feldman, 3. 
 
29 
 
the course of the war, the military command took increasing control away from the parliament, 
despite the efforts of the civilian government to mediate between the demands of the army, the 
industrialists running the factories, and labor leaders directing workers to not strike but to 
supporting the war.51    
 Despite the initial appearance of popular support for the war, the German public grew 
increasingly splintered from 1914 to 1918.52  German Protestants had seen greeted the war 
“almost as a blessing,” and made “ringing calls to battle and impassioned identifications of the 
German cause with that of Christ.”53  Yet Protestant war enthusiasm was not universal and other 
groups, such as Catholics and Social Democrats, did not welcome the conflict.54  Ultimately, the 
stalemate of the military fronts, compounded by Germany’s dwindling economic, industrial and 
population resources forced an armistice in 1918.  This produced revolutions by civilians and 
mutinies by sailors and marines, who effectively surrendered any further bargaining position the 
military command might have held.  With the revolutions, the abdication of the Emperor and the 
proclamation of a republic, the defeated army quickly turned on its erstwhile partner throughout 
this mechanized, industrialized, total war: workers (male and female) who had produced the war 
materials with which the army had failed to win the decisive victory.  The legend of how 
Germany’s soldiers were “stabbed in the back” by workers and communists on the home front 
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who surrendered in the face of victory would sharply color the ways Germans after 1918 thought 
about their military and their military dead. 
 Before 1918, it was not self-evident that Germans would decide to embrace the institution 
of the army and celebrate it.  Rather, specific circumstances of Prussian history had led the 
population to embrace its army.  The events of 1813 and 1871 both provided strong precedents 
for a united German approach to remembering the military dead: praising the soldiers, praising 
the causes for which they died.  To be sure, this popular affection for soldiers was not universal, 
but the general tendency was for Germans to mourn and remember dead war victims through the 
prism of fighting and dying in the service of the state, leaving little room for the wider civilian 
population to publically remember their non-military experiences.   
 
Civilians with a militarized society: 1918-1932 
Searching for order 
 The end of the war was chaotic for most and terrifying for many Germans.  Under the 
impression that they were winning the war, the German people were shocked by the demand for 
an armistice, yet a peace movement enjoying large public support quickly gathered steam.55  The 
peace coincided with revolution in Germany, which was not a “centrally planned campaign of 
subversive actions by revolutionary elements, but a spontaneous outbreak by the war-weary 
peoples, who hoped in this way to force their rulers to make peace.”56  With the abdication of the 
emperor, German politicians now had their chance to experiment with democratic government.  
                                                 
55
 Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, trans. P.S. Falla (London, 2004), 5; Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: 
Promise and Tragedy (Princeton, 2007), 3, 9 ,11, 17-18. 
 
56
 Kolb, 7; Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, trans. Richard Deveson 
(New York, 1993),  29, 28, 28-33, 33-35. 
 
31 
 
Suddenly finding itself running the government, the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) 
had to navigate between right-wing parties who rejected the Weimar Republic or were at least 
hesitant to support the democratic system, as well as hard-left parties who wanted to continue the 
revolution and pursue a republic of workers’ councils, along the Bolshevik model.  Feeling more 
threatened by their more radical and progressive cousins, leading Social Democratic leaders to 
tried to “maintain order and solve day-to-day problems.”57  Yet the “Weimar Compromise” 
between the more moderate center-left, who had, after all, supported the war effort, and the 
center-right (and increasingly far-right) parties, did little to secure deep support for the German 
republic among all groups of society.58   
 In many ways, the war did not end in 1918.  Disillusionment over defeat in light of the 
trench experience myth, anger over the Stab-in-the-Back legend, and indignation resulting from 
the Versailles Treaty (specifically the “guilt clause” and the reparations demanded because of it) 
all contributed to conservatives’ a priori resentment toward the Weimar Republic.59  The initial 
chaos of 1918-1923 gave way to a relatively stable period of the middle 1920s, as Germany 
renegotiated reparations payments to a much more manageable level, convincing the French to 
withdraw from the Ruhr region in 1925.60  Yet this stability was fragile, since the political parties 
(besides the SPD) were constantly “in a state of tension” with each other, making for an unstable 
parliament.61  Despite domestic displeasure, internationally, Germany’s government reassured 
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the international community by signing treaties affirming its western borders and entering the 
League of Nations in 1925 and 1926.62  Following the death of German President Friederich 
Ebert (SPD) in 1925, the election of the former general and war hero (and “silent dictator”) Paul 
von Hindenburg as president began a process of political power shifting away from the 
parliament towards the executive.63   
  By the late 1920s, even the center-right political parties had begun shifting further to the 
right, making it progressively harder for the SPD to form governing coalitions.64  The indecisive 
elections in 1930 forced the creation of a grand coalition that itself produced little results and 
saw the SPD retreat from power, back into opposition, making it easier for other parties at the 
table who were more hostile to the Republic to engineer its failure.65  The political crisis 
intensified with the onset of the worldwide economic crisis of 1929, making economic policy 
negotiations more difficult and made the realization of broad-ranging welfare state provisions 
promised by the government impossible, contributing further to public disenchantment with the 
new Republic.66 
 
Organizing the mourning 
 The Weimar Republic faced a challenge in deciding which symbols and mnemonic 
traditions to jettison and which to keep.  In the matter of a new national day of remembrance to 
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mourn the dead, the older 1871 constitution had left commemorations in the regional Land 
governments’ hands, offering little precedent for a united, nationally orchestrated and uniformly 
observed holiday.  This precedent would prove perhaps the largest impediment to finding 
agreement on a new commemoration.  Despite Weimar Germany’s reputation for new forms of 
art and expression, as well as experiments with other forms of cultural production, Germans’ 
memories of the First World War did not break new aesthetic boundaries, but clung to older 
traditional (usually Christian) modes of mourning.67  The dividing line for Weimar Germans, 
instead, lay largely along the political divide of the left, who generally took a more pacifist 
stance towards explaining the war and shaping its remembrance in the public sphere, and the 
right, who praised the devotion and heroism of soldiers and validated their deaths through a 
largely positive presentation and memory of the war.68  Arguments over the proper observance of 
any holiday became the rule through the Weimar era.69 
 The Volksbund deutscher Kriegsgräberfürsorge (VDK) was created on December 16, 
1919 by eight charter members “as a private but state-supported war graves commission to take 
over the maintenance of the German war cemeteries.”70  One of the founding members, Dr. 
Siegfried Emmo Eulen had studied folklore and written a dissertation on ancient German folk 
songs at the University of Freiburg, where he had been a member of the Burschenschaft 
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Teutonia.71  Fighting as an infantryman in WWI, Eulen fell ill in 1915 but rejoined the Prussian 
War Ministry as a military cemetery organization officer, setting up cemeteries in Poland, 
Turkey, and in Odessa.  In founding the Volksbund, Eulen and the others sought to better 
organize the maintenance and recognition of military cemeteries in foreign lands, continuing the 
level of effort and degree of dedication from the wartime Prussian ministry into the (defeated) 
Weimar Republican atmosphere.  This “centre-right nationalist organization” was “primarily 
backed by war veterans, the military and conservatives who longed for a bygone era” but it still 
“held a wider appeal for the general public” and was instrumental in organizing Volkstrauertag 
nationally and locally, through member chapters, and believed a united, national effort to mourn 
and remember the dead soldiers was essential.72  Volkstrauertag offered a memory of the heroic 
sacrifices of Germany’s soldiers, a memory that held up these soldiers’ dedication and loyalty to 
the state in the face of certain death as a model of citizenship. 
 Early discussions within the national government over a day set aside for remembrance 
circled around using either May 1 or November 9.  The Social Democrats preferred May 1 
because it served as a common point of celebration for their political tradition and the German 
people could celebrate the dead and the workers’ struggle.  The political right was less 
enthusiastic about May 1, but November 9 was an unpalatable choice too because this would 
have placed Germans’ national celebration into association with 1918 Revolution and 
surrender.73  The VDK sought, beginning in 1919, to organize its own, apolitical memorial 
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celebration of the dead German soldiers.  Realizing Volkstrauertag as a national German event 
did not happen until 1925, but the VDK negotiated tirelessly with the federal and state 
governments to organize and carry out its holiday, with the disagreements over the date for the 
planned ceremonies a continual bone of contention.74  While the old Totensonntag holiday, 
arising out of the Wars of Liberation in the early nineteenth century, offered a precedent for 
mourning the battlefield dead, the Volksbund most often favored a Sunday in the springtime, 
usually before Easter.75   
 The process of Germans honoring their dead soldiers in 1918 engendered an acceptance 
and legitimating of violence, warranting another war to fight and die for the dead soldiers’ cause 
and transforming their sacrifice, not their service, into a paramount virtue.76  The experience of 
such large-scale death led WWI veterans to look for a “new meaning [Neudeutung] of death in 
war” as a way of separating themselves from civilians without the combat experience, giving rise 
to a hierarchy of the dead.  Veterans placed the deaths of those with front experience more highly 
than all others, and within this hierarchy, those who died fighting to protect other soldiers ranked 
highest.77  Toward the end of the 1920s, this cult of the dead developed “into a phenomenon of 
the whole society,” as nationalist political groups invoked the dead who had died “for Germany,” 
and used the dead’s symbolic weight to guide discussions of treaty revision and foreign policy.78  
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Yet this highly selective public mourning did not crystallize immediately and without opposition 
during the Weimar Republic. 
 
Commemorating different memories 
  Press accounts of public mourning during the Weimar Republic illustrate the dynamism 
of Germans remembering the dead, as well as the diversity of audiences and narrative tropes.  In 
November 1920, one Berlin newspaper published an article discussing a ceremony 
commissioning the first 5,000-man militia in Weimar-era Bavaria.  This article presented a 
palpable criticism of the political left while praising the militia as a “reminder of old Bavarian 
custom” and a representation of Bavarians’ “hardened resolve against popular unrest and 
disturbances of the peace.”79  The captain of this militia remarked that the reception his unit 
received assured him that Germany was “on the right path, “working our way up from this deep 
ignominy [of Versailles]” and that, “only the energetic coming together of the orderly elements 
of society can lead to recovery” for Germany.80  Disgust towards the Revolution of 1918 and the 
Versailles Treaty’s restrictions were evident in these Bavarians’ words, as well as call for 
national recovery in the wake of the defeat and the deaths of so many German soldiers.81 
 The same day another story reported that the Reich Economic Assistance Association for 
Active and Former Professional Soldiers had celebrated its two-year anniversary with an 
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extraordinarily well attended assembly.82  The assembled soldiers had listened to a speech 
arguing that “the individual soldier of the German Republic would never ever be allowed to 
perform a single subservient act for the sake of economic desires or out of spiritual 
backwardness.”  Several other speakers argued that, the “new” German soldier would be neither 
conservative nor liberal, but only committed to renewing Germany.83  Although in November 
1920, there was not yet an organized Volkstrauertag, gathered veterans and soldiers sometimes 
demonstrated that their interest in criticizing the left outweighed their concern for mourning the 
dead.    
 Another story appearing later that week continued casting political blame instead of 
honoring the dead.  Discussing the upcoming Parliamentary debates regarding the new 
Reichswehr’s84 formation and organization, this story bemoaned the “sorrowful fact that our 
army is opposed by the Social Democrats with such mistrust,” while the military reorganization 
required by the Versailles Treaty was “being implemented by a fundamentally Socialist 
Minister.”85  Reflecting on the Kapp Putsch in March of 1920, and addressing the long-standing 
opposition from the Left against the military, this article attacked the SPD as an “Agitation 
Party” who had set the stage for uncertainty on the military question now and possibly stronger 
opposition from the more radical left parties in the future, without addressing the dead soldiers 
who were supposedly stabbed in the back.86 
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 Criticizing the left was not the only concern aired by veterans and mourners in November 
1920.  An article published on Totensonntag, 1920, reported that the German ambassador to 
France had laid a wreath at a memorial in Paris for German soldiers buried there.87  In his 
speech, the ambassador asked both domestic German and the international French audience that 
“the memory of the fallen be celebrated honorably,” demonstrating a concern for the upkeep and 
proper care of German war graves, even when the graves were located abroad.  The geography of 
World War I meant that many German soldiers were buried outside of Germany, so marking and 
maintaining their battlefield graves were the only ways to make possible visits later by loved 
ones to mourn over the body’s resting place.88  After this ambassador’s wreath laying, his wife 
also laid a wreath, “[f]or the German mothers and wives,” as an act of remembrance for the 
emotional suffering and trauma of German families, particularly mothers and wives of soldiers 
killed in battle.89  This second wreath strikingly revealed that mourning the dead and 
remembering for First World War did not carry an exclusive emphasis on the soldiers’ 
experiences, at least in 1920.   A wider category of victims, combined with some German 
mourners’ concern for the conditions of the graves and interest in international cooperative 
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agreements to care for them, brings into question the notion that Volkstrauertag was ever only an 
occasion for conservative, nationalist rhetorical and political fuming. 
 Germans’ concern for proper care of war graves was prominently featured in an article 
extending gratitude to the Volksbund deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge and its founder, Dr. 
Siegfried Emmo Eulen for its Totensonntag90 memorial observance.  The article relayed that the 
VDK had been successfully organizing the care of cemeteries and securing agreements with 
foreign governments to carry out such work in former belligerent lands.  In particular, the VDK 
was at this moment arranging a special agreement with the French government, under which the 
French government would place evergreen wreaths on German graves on Totensonntag each 
year.91    
 VDK leader Eulen gave a speech at this remembrance ceremony, concluding that caring 
for the maintenance of German graves was “a particular duty of the German people” but also 
said of this duty, “hopefully this collective work of piously honoring the dead will develop into a 
closer relationship for us with the peoples of other lands and develop into a final peace.”92  In 
addition to the overriding concern for care of graves and growing support for international 
cooperation in mourning, Germans also continued their conversation about defining the category 
of “victim of war” into 1921.  That year, the German ambassador to France laid another wreath 
at a Parisian cemetery, on behalf of all German soldiers buried in France.  While “all of Germany 
remembers in deep mourning but also in unspeakable thankfulness and admiration” these fallen 
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soldiers, the Ambassador’s wife again laid a wreath dedicated to the German soldiers’ mothers 
and wives, too.93    
 Once more, concern for the conditions of graves and the hopefulness and faith in 
international cooperative agreements to secure it, even on the part of the VDK, presented an 
alternative form for the still-nascent military-centric Volkstrauertag.  The resort to celebrating 
the dead soldiers on a Sunday demanded that the Volksbund obtain at least tacit support of 
religious leaders for augmenting the spiritual concerns of the liturgical calendar with temporal 
matters and by 1922, the Catholics, Evangelicals, and Jewish religious leadership all supported 
the Volkstrauertag, even if the exact nature of this day of public mourning and remembrance was 
not yet agreed upon. 94   The willingness of these religious groups to take part and try to shape 
the public’s memory is testament to the as-yet-undefined nature of Volkstrauertag.  Protestants 
had supported German nationalism almost without exception since the mid-nineteenth century, 
while Catholics and Jews had been traditionally outsiders in German political and cultural life 
since unification.  Although there was a small splinter of liberal Protestants who supported the 
Weimar Republic, most politically conservative Protestants were reserved, if not hostile, to 
German democracy, and their political beliefs eventually became visible in their discourses of 
mourning.95  These remembrances were not canonized yet, and did not necessarily have to 
become episodes for nationalist, militarist ceremony.  Instead, a peaceful, cooperative memory 
that did not applaud war itself, only the fallen heroic warriors, could also exist. 
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More Mourners, Less Victims: Volkstrauertag 1925-1926 
 Volkstrauertag was still coalescing through the VDK and other institutions’ contributions 
in 1925.  Organizers had gradually turned to using a church celebration day onto which to graft a 
day of mourning so that Germans could attend ceremonies regardless of work schedules but 
finding one Sunday suitable to all the federal States proved most challenging in this process.  In 
November 1922, broad support for using Sontag Invokavit (the 7th Sunday before Easter) had 
crystallized among the state governments.  Since this day had no special importance politically 
or religiously and it did not interfere or compete with any pre-existing church mourning day, 
church services and bells could be instrumentalized for the observance, providing mourners 
comfort and space for meditation.96  Those who did participate in Volkstrauertag did so with 
prayer services and the ringing of bells.97  In 1925, the VDK set Volkstrauertag on Sonntag 
Invokavit but the Protestant Churches in the different federal states did not uniformly accept this 
decision, giving excuses to not participate and calling instead for a Volkstrauertag on 
Totensonntag.98   
 Germans supporting Volkstrauertag were acutely afraid that people in different parts of 
Germany would not celebrate the holiday the same way.  Any concerns over popular reluctance 
to remember the dead disappeared when the German President Friedrich Ebert (SPD) died on the 
eve of Volkstrauertag in 1925.  The next day, special articles ran in the press, praising Ebert for 
his commitment to orderliness and grounding of a new Germany on the rule of law, as well as for 
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being able to rise above politics and “at last initiate the way to [a national] resurgence.”99  
Because of the wave of emotion and mobilization of mourning and memorializing, Ebert’s 
passing created not only a turning point for the Weimar Republic, but also in the practice of 
remembering the World War I dead.100 
 The day after Ebert’s death, Volkstrauertag 1925, articles ran in the press referencing 
Germany’s fallen soldiers of World War I, “whose marked and unmarked graves are scattered 
over half of Europe and part of Asia [and] to whom this day [was] dedicated.”101  The same 
article called for national unity, complaining that “Germany, for whose future two million of its 
best sons fell, [had been] torn apart inside.”  This national division, said the author, was the 
result of a “hatred, which the dead … would not understand” because they “did not die for a 
party, but for Germany.”   Making a claim for remembering the dead “as Germans” first and not 
as members of this or that element of German society, this article advocated national unity, 
which could arise only from remembering the dead in a uniform manner everywhere at the same, 
while it  also contributed to the conversation about victims of war, expanding the category of 
“victims of the war,” from exclusively the “dead of the war” to include “the maimed, the widows 
and orphans,” even “in particular aspects, the entire nation [Volk].”  Returning to the theme of 
national unity and uniform memorial practice, this article challenged Germans to learn from all 
those dead to unite Germany into a truly unified people.102  
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 A second 1925 Volkstrauertag article continued calling for a nationally united day of 
remembrance, framing Volkstrauertag as “a Memorial Day for our fallen heroes” and “a day to 
honor all the victims of the war.”  This act of remembering should, according to this author, 
“erase” for one day “all political, confessional, and class differences.”  The soldiers “gave their 
lives in protection of their beloved Heimat” and so all Germans should be thankful.  “It was out 
of love [for the Heimat] that they went to their deaths and in the hopes that the Fatherland would 
prove itself to be one land in the face of the horrors of war” [emphasis added].  In the end, this 
article called on Germans to reach over their divisions and dedicate themselves to the same goal: 
“reestablishing Germany’s greatness in peaceful tenacious work.”103  For this author, achieving 
the long- awaited but ever-elusive nationally united day of remembering the “victims” of the war 
is a prerequisite for Germany’s rebuilding itself in the wake of defeat and only this unity of 
mourning could heal the political and social fractures that prevented Germany’s recovery. 
 The official celebration of Volkstrauertag for 1925 offered more definition to the 
question of victims, while also underscoring the continued desire of supporters and organizers to 
have the entire nation observe Volkstrauertag together.104  It was in 1925 that Volkstrauertag 
was first celebrated nationally, with at least nominal church and state support.105  Press coverage 
of the celebration reported that Germans were still mourning Reichspräsident Ebert but also 
pointed out the VDK had sought “already for several years” the opportunity “to honor 
Germany’s heroic sons” through a nationally organized Volkstrauertag, with the support of the 
state and the churches.  Underscoring the united mourning aspect of 1925’s Volkstrauertag, one 
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reporter wrote in passing that there were individual remembrance services “in all boroughs of 
greater Berlin.”  In the Reichstag itself, the national political leaders were present as well as 
Ordained Bishop Dr. Deitmer, representing the Catholics and Dr. Kappler representing the 
Protestants, with Rabbi Dr. Blumenthal present for the Jewish community, too.106    
 The inclusion of the Jewish community reveals that in 1925 the “victims of war” included 
Christian or Jewish soldiers,107 even if it did not include women on the home front.  These dead, 
together, were invoked to challenge the living to continue to serve and support their nation: “the 
memorial day should be a symbol for the spirit with which our fallen brothers were filled, for the 
spirit in which they died: that of a Great Germany.”   Tying the charge to be loyal and patriotic to 
a united day of remembering the dead, one article closed by saying that “similar ceremonies” 
were held too in the in other public venues across Berlin.108 
  Press coverage surrounding Volkstrauertag in 1926 continued to feature both discussions 
about the category of “victim” and calls for national unity.  An article published about a 
proposed tax hike did not deal directly with Volkstrauertag or the fallen, but made clear that the 
author believed that such a tax increase should not harm those disabled by the war.109  While 
expressing gratitude to the veterans who were injured for their wartime service, this article 
revealingly did not use the terms “heroes” or “victims” to refer to those badly injured or disabled 
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by the war.  Instead, an alternate category of “war-disabled” was applied to veterans in this 
category, even though remembrance ceremonies did not routinely use this term.110  Besides a 
further narrowing of the category of victims, reports on the 1926 official Volkstrauertag 
ceremony in Berlin offered proud commentary over Germans’ ability to overcome party 
differences and act united in their public lives and in remembrance of the dead.111 
 For 1926, Volkstrauertag was moved back one week, to Reminiscere, the fifth Sunday 
before Easter, although some Protestant Church officials were uncomfortable with the apparent 
overlap between the functions of Totensonntag and this new Volkstrauertag, while others 
opposed the inclusion of secular mourning for soldiers in the Passion season.112  In 1926, the 
church moved to actually expand Totensonntag to look more like Volkstrauertag and allow all 
Germans to feel a part of Totensonntag, remembering all the war’s dead and not just the 
veterans.113  At this point, there was still contestation and lack of a unified, long-standing 
position on when to celebrate Volkstrauertag and how exactly to do so.114  Even though the dates 
were changed and individual states did not always celebrate a unified holiday, the central 
location and prime celebration of Volkstrauertag from 1926 to 1932 was the assembly hall of the 
                                                 
110  On organizations for wounded veterans, see James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans 
after the Second World War (Chapel Hill, 1993). 
 
111 “Deutscher Volkstrauertag.” Germania. February 28, 1926, morning edition. 
 
112
 Kapust, 96, 99, 100. 
      Latin for „remember,“ „Reminiscere“ is the name of the second Sunday in Lent in the German Protestant 
Church’s calendar.  The name references Psalm 25:6, which urges remembrance of God’s love and mercy, but 
makes no reference to death.  Karl-Heinrich Bieritz, Das Kirchenjahr. Feste, Gedenke- und Feiertage in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart (Berlin: Union Verlag, 1986), 98-9; Ps 25:6. 
113 Kapust, 101. 
 
114 Ibid., 101-109. 
 
46 
 
Reichstag, where “high-ranking leaders of the Volksbund, leading politicians, and leading 
churchmen “directed the mourning.115 
 By 1925-1926, mourning Germans placed less priority on political criticisms one way or 
the other, instead calling for “unity” or non-political mourning to unite all Germans together in 
remembering their dead.  This still-pressing concern for a united remembrance did not include 
the concern for graves’ conditions or international cooperation, but was tied to a conversation 
about who the “victims” of war were.  In 1926, it was still not clear whether or not women were 
victims as much as men were, but if the category of victims was shrinking, then the category of 
mourners was expanding. 
 
Remembering collectively and religiously: Volkstrauertag 1929-1932 
 From 1926 to 1930, the discussions among the states, the Churches, the VDK and the 
national government made placing Volkstrauertag a yearly contest.  The states entered into 
renewed in discussions 1930 over Volkstrauertag, unhappy with the federally approved and 
organized arrangement, with some cancelling the holiday or moving it to a different religious 
observance day. While the memorial day was moved to March 16 in 1930, the national 
government was concerned because different political fractions were instrumentalizing 
Volkstrauertag for their own Party purposes.  The next year, 1931, the States again found no 
agreement on the date.  Prussia suggested moving Volkstrauertag to the fall where precedent 
existed to honor the war dead on Totensonntag.  A conference of representatives from the states 
met in January 1932 with the majority wanting to use Totensonntag, and hoping the churches 
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would go along.  Despite the near unanimity on Volkstrauertag, Prussia now stubbornly held 
remembrances on Reminiscere.116  While Volkstrauertag organizers believed a uniform 
observance was essential, orchestrating such agreement between the national government and its 
states was never an easy task. 
 From 1929 to 1932, Volkstrauertag commemorations and the press surrounding them still 
carried some concern for the condition of German graves abroad but without the patience for 
international governments whose care of those German graves was deemed poor.  Gone at this 
stage was any faith in international cooperation arising from nations mourning their dead and 
assisting their former enemies in the same.  Volkstrauertag at the end of the 1920s was also still 
an opportunity to critique the SPD and other leftist parties in Germany based on their perceived 
hostility towards the military and alleged guilt for surrendering in 1918.  The category of war 
victims became narrower during this time and the most prevalent themes surrounding 
Volkstrauertag commemorations from 1929-1932 were the continued desire for a nationally 
unified memorial observance and an increasing religious element.  Interestingly, however, was 
the persistence of at least a few critical voices raised against Volkstrauertag as the VDK 
interpreted it. 
 In February 1929, articles ran presenting concern for the graves of German soldiers in 
foreign lands and their upkeep, expressing worries about graveyards without the confidence in 
international cooperation that had been common years before.  Informing readers about 
battlefield cemeteries in Poland, Serbia and Rumania, the article expressed appreciation for the 
VDK’s work replacing “the old rotting wooden crosses” with “lovely grave stones.”  No matter 
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how well these Germans could care for graves, though, the “approximately 5,000 German 
heroes’ cemeteries” in Poland were in a “quite different” situation.  The author bemoaned the 
sluggishness with which the Polish government had attempted to fulfill the Versailles Treaty 
obligations to care for the (German) dead on its soil.117  By 1929, the patience with foreign 
governments to care for graves was gone, replaced with a fear for the German graves that 
criticized foreign nations’ poor care.  
 Just as the concern over graves and criticism against other nations’ poor care of them was 
more acute in 1929, so too was political criticism against the German left.  Another 
Volkstrauertag 1929 story recounted the German military’s retreat from the Black Sea at the end 
of World War I, describing the soldiers’ entrance to Berlin, two months after the November 1918 
revolution, where the they heard “Hail Liebknecht, down with the officers!” shouted in the 
streets and “reflect[ed] with particular bitterness on the revolution, which was the true reason for 
our fate and the collapse of our Fatherland.”118  For this author, remembering the end of the war 
and the soldiers who died meant also remembering the socialists who fomented a revolution that 
cost Germany the war. 
 One newspaper published details of the upcoming official 1929 Volkstrauertag ceremony 
in the Reichstag the day beforehand, noting that the speech to be delivered by the President of 
the VDK would be broadcast by radio and concluding that, “[i]t is earnestly hoped for, that on 
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Volkstrauertag as many buildings as possible would lower their flags to half-mast.”119  This 
desire for flag lowering represents another call for a nationally united remembrance of the fallen 
soldiers, this time in the visual form of half-mast flags across the country.  This desire for a 
nationally unified remembrance was also emphasized by Berlin pastor D. Richter.  Pastor Richter 
wrote that, “[j]ust as remembering the dead in the wake of the Wars of Liberation a hundred 
years ago, where the entire healthy people were united,” again the German people had united on 
this Sunday Reminiscere into a “community of memory.”120  He added, “[a] people who endure 
such hardship without breaking must be called to greatness by the Lord of history” and 
concluding that the true “sense of the Memorial day for the Fallen” called “all German Christians 
to come under the Cross,”121 revealing a new, growing religious dimension of Volkstrauertag.   
 The increasing religious dimension of Volkstrauertag in 1929 corresponded with the 
beginning of a turn to more nationalist, exclusionary celebration of the dead, as well as a swell in 
conservative political parties’ support.122  The intersection of increasing hostility towards the 
Republic and praise for the soldiers who had died for the Empire lay in nationalist German 
Protestants.  The relationship between  German Protestants and the then-governing Social 
Democratic Party was “characterized by continuing mutual hostility, with provocations coming 
at least as much from the socialist as from the Protestant camp,” primarily over the issue of 
religious instruction in German public school. 123  The SPD upon coming to power in 1918 had 
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been initially quite zealous in purging religion from public education, but had warmed somewhat 
in its ideological opposition to religion in public life in the mid-1920s, largely as a tactic of 
building coalitions with the Catholic Center Party.124  Socialists still believed that religious 
schooling was a roadblock to their goal “of emancipated human beings in a secularized society,” 
while Protestants and Catholics believed Christianity to be a fundamental part of Germanness, 
and that “Germany could remain a Christian country only if its children continued to receive the 
traditional religious instruction in school.”125  This increasing religious aspect was layered amid 
the hope for uniform remembrances and critiques against those who did not support 
Volkstrauertag for political reasons or those who did not show the proper respect and care for 
graves of the fallen. 
   Calls for a nationally united memorial observance were at center stage in the press 
commentary of Volkstrauertag 1929.  Describing how an “entire nation mourned” one moment 
and “an entire people were in mourning” in another, one article characterized Volkstrauertag as 
an already-united effort to remember the dead, with “numerous and huge … were the 
celebrations in Berlin.”   While tying “our [German] dead and their heroic suffering” to the 
painful past of a lost war and revolution at home, the article encouraged Germans to find their 
“hope for the future” from “the experience of these heroes,” asserting that out of such a properly 
united national remembrance could come a national renewal.126   
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 Another newspaper published a surprisingly different article covering Volkstrauertag 
1929, uniquely assuming that the World War One fallen soldiers may have died for a number of 
different reasons: some may have fought and died out of “religious motivation,” while others 
died amid fatalism and doubts about their survival, with a third portion meeting death “under a 
curse,” resigning themselves to believing that “if they die[d], it [was] ‘as the law had 
commanded.’”127  Separating these different possible motivations for the fallen, this author 
supposed that different memories of World War One were possible, ranging from “victorious,” 
to “profitable” or “comforting.”  Having questioned the grounds for using dead soldiers as a 
model of sacrifice and selfless loyalty to the nation, this dissenting author resolved that 
Christians should look toward a future without an obsession with war, but should carry inside 
them “a strong will to peace,” derived from and supported by their religious beliefs.128  In this 
instance, a new religious dynamic to Volkstrauertag did not uphold the war as an act of God’s 
Will, but instead questioned the complacency with war and death that Volkstrauertag often 
reflected.   
 A critical examination was also partly visible in commentary offered by a Bishop Dr. 
Paul Wilhelm von Keppler for Volkstrauertag 1929.  Keppler wrote about pain and suffering, 
characterizing war in a negative or perhaps more realistic manner and hinting that the 
Volkstrauertag memory holding soldiers and their deaths in central importance might be 
challenged.  However, Keppler employed this dim picture of war to suggest that everyone must 
participate and not shirk their duty to endure the sufferings of warfare and threatening times, 
repeating in slightly different form a more standard invocation of the dead soldiers as a model to 
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civilian survivors for their proper dedication to the national good.  Keppler did adopt another 
less-common argument, suggesting that, because suffering visits all during time of war, it 
“ma[de] everything and everyone equal” and the only “classes” that matter in a wartime society 
were “those who suffer correctly and those who suffer incorrectly,” going further to say that 
there were those who embraced these challenges, the “heroes of suffering” and those who 
shirked from it, the “cowards of suffering.”129  Challenging the German people to not be 
“cowards,” ultimately Keppler indicated that civilians were responsible for enduring suffering 
and hardship at home just as much as soldiers are expected to suffer in the field.  Such a 
conclusion appears to partly undermine the distinction between the front and the home front, 
though Keppler did not comment on how this arrangement might affect Volkstrauertag and 
remembering Victims of War. 
 Other reporting on the 1929 national remembrance ceremony in the Reichstag did not 
clarify this issue of suffering and victim status any further.130  The keynote speaker that year 
invoked the “spirit of Loyalty,” “spirit of devotion” and the “spirit of the Victims” side by side, 
returning to the use of the dead as a model to the living and alluding to a national renewal that 
could result from a united memory of the dead.  The article further encouraged Germans to think 
about mourning as one nation together, characterizing Germany as a “community of fate and 
emergency,” and calling upon their readers to be “strong in their unity and love.”  The author 
admonished the audience to “believe in the future of Germany,” and to “believe in [the German] 
people’s resurrection.”131  These much desired goals of resurrection and a bright future for 
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Germany recovering from defeat could each only come about if the German people overcome 
their political and social differences, which might be possible through a united structure through 
which to mourn the war dead on Volkstrauertag. 
 The next year, for Volkstrauertag 1930, another Berlin pastor published an article 
echoing the 1929 official ceremony’s concentration on national renewal through a united 
memory of the dead soldiers.  Speaking to the importance of presenting the German people with 
their history, which included German heroes and those heroes’ deaths, this author complained 
that the German population either did not fully appreciate “the memory of the heroic ones 
anymore,” or regretfully resisted this memory.  He directed harsh words to this latter group, from 
whom he frequently heard “the sound of disarmament” or speeches made without regard for “the 
deepness and seriousness of the heroic memory by which they got their rights [to make such 
speeches].”132  Calling for a better education on Germany’s historic heroes, while not the same as 
calling for a united national remembrance observance, was still consistent with this larger goal of 
Volkstrauertag supporters.  Also consistent with other Volkstrauertag remembrances was this 
author’s somewhat opaque political critique. 
 To his call for better education on Germany’s heroes, this pastor further complained that, 
while the Allied powers that had fought against Germany had their own heroes and celebrate 
them, Germany could not do so [i.e. Germany lost the war and its wartime government].  He 
betrayed deep frustration at the fact that “against the heroes by their actions and the heroes by 
their endurance [i.e. the German soldiers] stand the heroes by their gossiping [i.e. German 
women who worked and endured hardship while remaining on the home front during the 
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war].”133  Following his rationale that Germans needed a better education in their history and 
their heroes from that history, the pastor thus advocated a much-restricted category of “victims” 
of the war who should be mourned on Volkstrauertag: only the soldiers were the proper heroes 
whose past ought to be represented.     
 Beyond unfamiliarity with German history and confusion over the heroes who ought to 
be mourned, this Berlin pastor finally turned to the “the last reason” why Germans were “morally 
confused” about heroes.  Demonstrating an increasing religious dimension for Volkstrauertag, he 
wrote that the German people had lost their faith in and dependence on God.  Linking God’s 
Will, fate, and human history, the author concluded that celebrating the German history of fallen 
heroes on Volkstrauertag must be an occasion combining submission to God with submission to 
the nation.134  Taken together, this pastor’s extensive contribution to informing Berliners’ 
memories on Volkstrauertag exemplified both the increasingly narrow category of “victims” to 
be mourned and the increasing religious dynamic evident in the late Weimar years.  While 
evidencing little concern for a united national memorial observance, a revised history of German 
heroes and German history meant to correct contemporary Germans’ unfamiliarity with their 
national past would have been consistent with the VDK’s long-running preference for a truly 
nation-wide, uniform memorial day. 
 This overwhelming concern for a nationally united memorial observance was also 
strangely absent from a notice in 1930 amidst preparations for Volkstrauertag.  This article 
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actually mounted another challenge to Volkstrauertag, reporting that the national government 
was planning to hold a demonstration commemorating its defeat of Kapp Putsch on 16 March of 
1930, the same day when the VDK was also planning to hold Volkstrauertag.  This author 
believed that the “republican” demonstration (the defeat of the Kapp Putsch) would be more 
important, if only because the Volkstrauertag duplicated the mourning function of the Protestant 
Church’s Totensonntag and the Catholic Church’s Allerseelen, which were already sufficient to 
mourn the fallen soldiers.135  If this author’s complaint was rooted in a conviction that Germans 
had one too many memorial days, this article nonetheless criticized the Volkstrauertag holiday 
supported in Berlin by the Prussian State government that posed a challenge to the national 
government’s Kapp Putsch demonstration.136  This critic believed that the states should yield to 
the federal government in these matters.  However, in posing such a critique, this author actually 
agreed that Volkstrauertag should be nationally unified and organized memorial observance, 
orchestrated by the federal government.  This objection to Volkstrauertag appeared aimed at 
Prussia (and the VDK, implicitly) for attempting to hold regionally particular memorials that 
might conflict with the national government’s policies. 
 That lone critique of Volkstrauertag was short lived, with another brief story on the same 
day taking the form of a very simple sermon that remembered the dead soldiers who never 
returned home.137  To this memory of the dead soldiers the author added a religious element by 
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citing 1 John 2:17, “[o]nly those who perform the Will of God remain in eternity” and explaining 
that this Will of God included not only spreading the gospel of salvation through Christ’s death, 
but just as much “all a person does to glorify his [Christ’s] life in order to share in the Kingdom 
of God,” including the German soldiers waging war to defend their nation. Casting the fallen 
soldiers in a religious light enabled this article to lob a new criticism at the leftist parties in 
Germany: Germans should have observed threats to their devotion and carrying-out of God’s 
work in “the barbarians of Russia, who have abolished Sunday and the Christian festivals and 
made the Christian Churches into Communist clubhouses and persecuted the Christians as 
enemies of the Empire.”  Similarly, Germans ought to have shuddered at “those who amongst us 
subscribe to secularism, who secularize the schools and who want to socialize the economy;” in 
other words, the SPD.   
 That a religious element of Volkstrauertag was becoming more evident in 1930 was 
confirmed by a brief story announcing that, on Volkstrauertag this year, the Protestant churches 
would also participate with services remembering the fallen.  In particular, the Berlin churches’ 
worship services would pay attention to the “the particular character of this day” as the 
Consistory of the Old Prussian United Church had issued guidance for “the participation of 
pastors also in the non-churchly ceremonies such as the ringing of the church bells on Sunday at 
1:00pm.”  The High Church Council had “arranged for a general collection to be taken,” “whose 
return [would] be used for ‘the easement of personal emergencies’” arising from the experience 
of the war as well as “the care of the war graves.”138  In 1930 the Protestant church “attach[ed] 
itself” to the VDK in a desire for “vaterländischen” [patriotic] Volkstrauertag: the call for a “day 
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of Memory” instead of a “day of sadness.”139  By this move the Protestant churches abstained 
from observing the “moment of sadness” to unite the German people and instead set up the dead 
soldiery as political ideal, to unite people in their deference to the “authority” of the Fallen.140  
At this moment, never before had high church officials wanted to so cleanly differentiate 
Volkstrauertag from Totensonntag in form and content, and had the full backing of Provincial 
Protestant Churches to do so.141 
 Volkstrauertag in 1931 saw more attention focused on the goal of a nation-wide 
remembrance on the same day to underline the unity in Germany for which the dead soldiers 
were supposed to have died.  In one article, this concern appeared via the question of whether or 
not to lower flags to half-mast as the VDK had requested.  The half-mast question was to be “the 
subject of a discussion today at a meeting of the Reich Cabinet” and the paper reported that it 
was decided that they would continue the policy, which they had already been following up to 
this year, whereby the federal offices and the state offices together flew their flags half-mast.  
The author also reported that the Reichswehr would continue to lower its flags to half-mast as it 
had done in previous years and that the German President, “as commander in chief of the Armed 
Forces, [would] simultaneously set his personal flag to half-mast.”  To make these questions 
simpler in the future, the article concluded that the national government would in the future 
“bring about a legal ruling over this question of the arrangement and spirit of a Memorial Day 
for the Victims of the World War.” 142  This article illustrated the still-uncertain aspects of 
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Volkstrauertag, even in 1931: the absence of a complete set of regulations by the national 
government indicates lingering doubts about how the federal and individual state governments 
should cooperate in national ceremonies. At the same time, the VDK was advocating for 
practices it believed were in due order to promote a sense of national unity, while such policies 
had no legal basis.  
 Another story on the same day, very self-consciously discussed the lack of a German 
national holiday.  Addressing the importance of such a holiday, this author interpreted the 
Germans’ situation as a result of a “reaction against the excesses and formalities of the old 
regime” and “the pluralism of [Germany’s] historical development, in the disunity and division 
of the German people.”143  The author voiced desire for a nationally unified memory of the dead 
by calling for a “Volkstrauertag” that “should in this sense become a complete symbol for the 
renewed unity and national community [Volksgemeinschaft] arising out of the graves of out 
fallen.”  Coupled to this desire for a nationally united remembrance was also an invocation of the 
dead to call for Germans to rise above their political divisions.   These dead did “not fight for 
party ideas,” and they “did not die for party goals,” so Volkstrauertag should reinforce a 
“complete national Germanness [gesamtes deutsches Volkstum] for which the two million 
devoted their lives.”144 
 Reports of the official Reichstag celebration of Volkstrauertag in 1931 combined this 
desire for a nationally unified remembrance with invoking the dead as a model for loyally 
serving the state.  One article reported that the ceremony’s speaker argued that the German 
soldiers’ suffering should remind the audience of the devotion of “those who died so that 
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Germany lives.”  This speaker ended his speech with the reassurance that “[n]ever again will the 
Reich be destroyed, if all of you remain united and loyal!”145  The story concluded by also 
reporting that many other ceremonies were held throughout Berlin, giving the reader a sense that 
not only elites were remembering the dead soldiers, but that all Germans felt moved and paused 
to mourn the dead and remember their struggle. 
 Volkstrauertag in 1932 was still plagued by lingering discord over how best to organize 
the memorial day.  One report announced that the “long-unresolved question of the date 
arrangement of a Memorial Day for the Victims of the World War is to be henceforth 
definitively answered.  General understanding exists, that such a Memorial Day is a matter for 
the entire German people and, to that end, can only be arranged in a unified manner.”  The story 
reported that, although the federal government and the states were still deciding on which day to 
hold such a ceremony, the VDK had already made “extensive preparations for a Memorial 
ceremony for Sunday, February 21,” and that the federal government had ordered all flags at its 
office buildings to be flown at half-mast in Prussia and in the other states, and the Prussian State 
government has ordered its buildings to do likewise, assuming that the national government 
would issue a decision soon asking all of the states to do so, in order to create a unified holiday 
observance.  The article closed reassuring that “[f]or the avoidance of misunderstandings it 
[would] be noted that official guidelines for the limitations for public organized events on the 
day being decided upon [by the national government] [were] not being considered, that for this 
reason no legal guidelines exist[ed].  A corresponding general declaration [Runderlass] [would] 
be published soon.”146  From the bureaucratic confusion, it appeared that the Volksbund was able 
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to decide when to hold Volkstrauertag and then pressure the federal and state governments into 
allowing it. 
 In 1932, the conservative Berlin pastor of previous years continued to interpret 
Volkstrauertag within a broadened religious program, writing that God had assigned Germany its 
destiny, not to make it suffer, but because of his own purposes.  Echoing his Volkstrauertag 
articles in previous years, the pastor described serving the nation as a way of serving God, 
ameliorating the trauma of this memorial day and the painfulness of remembering the dead by 
recognizing that God’s higher purposes were served somehow through all of the graves and all of 
the dead.  This author saw Volkstrauertag 1932 as a chance to use the pain and “common fate of 
[the German] people,” as a vehicle for observing and comprehending that God was at work 
controlling the fate of Germany.147  Gone in 1932 were his remarks about who the victims were 
or what German history should teach future generations, leaving the religious dimension of 
Volkstrauertag to give mourners comfort while they pondered their losses. 
 Descriptions of the official 1932 Reichstag Volkstrauertag ceremony indicated that the 
staging and ceremony did, however, indicate reflect a further narrowing of the category of 
“victims” of the war who could be mourned.  Five crosses, “symbols for all Germans” 
represented a backdrop for the ceremony in 1932, rendering the victims worthy of discussion 
only those Christian soldiers who died, ignoring the deaths of Jewish soldiers from the First 
World War.  At the same time, this story identified mourning Germans “in all districts of the 
country and in German communities across the borders” extending the category of “Germans” 
who should mourn while simultaneously restricting who should be mourned.  The keynote 
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address in 1932 both emphasized the sacrificial deaths of the soldiers and characterized the First 
World War as a time when “truly German history experienced a moment in which the Germans 
without reservation were united.”  The article reassured that such a loss of life promised “a holy 
future,” “a holy renewal in the deeper German soul.”148  The 1932 remembrance both helped 
complete the definition of “victims” of the war and illustrated, through the extensive preparations 
and legal planning, the desire of many in the government and the VDK to unite all German-
speakers in remembering their dead soldiers at one time and in one organized memorial 
apparatus.  Parallel to these continued trends, the 1932 ceremony also saw the continued 
publishing of accounts surrounding Volkstrauertag with religious or pseudo-religious aspects. 
 Volkstrauertag observances from 1929-1932 shared an overarching concern for a 
nationally-unified memorial remembrance, which would see all Germans put aside their political, 
social or even religious differences and mourn together for the fallen soldiers.  Also prevalent 
was a growing religious dimension associated with the holiday, whether espoused by official 
church organs or indirectly by individual pastors and authors.  Some concerns for the graves 
abroad and lingering criticism for the left remained while the process of narrowing down the 
categories of victims of war continued further.  Despite the near agreement on the obligation to 
mourn and the mechanisms through which to do so, lingering doubts and dissent from over 
Volkstrauertag offered different visions of how the war and the dead might have been 
remembered. 
 Multiple memories of the First World War and the dead circulated in 1918 and none of 
them necessarily had to lead to a militant, nationalist set of practices aimed at making heroes out 
of the soldiers and making theirs the paramount wartime experience.  Memory of the First World 
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War in Weimar Germany is an important piece in explaining the rise of the Nazis and the Second 
World War, but by far not the only piece.  These ways of remembering and mourning the dead 
from World War I could indicate a readiness by some to welcome a new military rearmament 
and support a new war, but they do in fact reveal a willingness to weight soldiers’ deaths and 
military service more heavily than others’ wartime experiences that were just as dangerous, 
important, and deserving of recognition.   
 
A society of violence: 1933-1945 
The normalization of violence 
 Contextualized within the trajectory of the Weimar Republic, public mourning follows 
the path of reeling from defeat, to stability and level headedness, to economic stress and descent 
into class warfare, leaving room for a conservative nationalism and a radical conservatism to 
oust an equally fractured left.  The end of the Weimar Republic is best understood not as the 
“fall” of a government along the lines of 1918, but rather the “disintegration of the political 
system.”149  The SPD continually faced electoral pressure from the radical right and left while 
the moderate right was never strong enough or completely supportive enough of the Republic to 
govern it, all of which allowed the Nazis to garner votes from the right and middle, 
“undermin[ing] the pro-republican centre from within.”150  Thus, the rise of the Nazis was “by no 
means predestined,” but made possible only through the political assistance given by President 
Hindenburg, the army, right- and center bourgeoisie, industry and agriculture groups as well as 
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conservative intellectuals.151  The Nazis’ rise to power was not simple, and they incorporated a 
great deal of violence directed at political opponents to assure that the German public would 
accept and support the Nazi Party.152  Besides the political left and German Jewish population, 
some German Protestants withheld support for the Nazi Party, although most German Protestants 
embraced the regime, which seemed to offer a program for the revitalization, re-Christianization, 
and return to international prestige for the German people.153  Once in power, the Nazis 
undertook the forced “coordination” [Gleichschaltung] of all organized elements of civil society, 
to ensure the elimination of all areas of the public sphere critical of the Party and its programs.154  
This process included the Nazis’ appropriation of the VDK and its Volkstrauertag holiday. 
 
From soldiers to heroes 
 After the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933 gave Hitler the powers of the legislature to 
augment his powers as chancellor, the states lost their control over observances of 
Volkstrauertag.155  VDK founder Emmo Eulen became a member of the Nazi Party and eagerly 
tried to use Hitler’s interest in Volkstrauertag to secure the holiday’s solid legal footing on 
Reminiscere Sunday.156  Volkstrauertag soon became a day for the Nazis to publicize their 
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authority and dedication to the German people via their memorialization of the fallen soldiers, as 
they first flew the black-white-red imperial colors and swastika over government buildings, 
instead of the black-red-gold republican colors, on Volkstrauertag 1933.157  The following year, 
the Nazis changed the name of the holiday, from “Volkstrauertag” to “Heldengedenktag” 
[Heroes’ Memorial Day], as a reflection of how they conceptualized these dead soldiers and how 
the German public should remember them.158   
 The VDK did not want to hand over control of the holiday to the Nazis, but rather asked 
the Nazis to let the Volksbund participate in the planning and carrying-out of the holiday, too, 
preferring still a springtime date that would be free of pre-existing religious festivals of 
mourning in the fall, as well as the taint of the 1918 Revolution.159  On February 27, 1934, 
Heldengedenktag was received official designation as the 5th Sunday before Easter 
(Reminiscere).160  The Nazis tried to use the name “Volkstrauertag” for a new, second memorial 
day in November, centering on the “fallen” Nazi Party members but this suggestion encountered 
stiff resistance from the VDK.161  In 1939, Hitler changed the date of Heldengedenktag from 
Sonntag Reminiscere (which would change from year to year, depending upon when Easter fell) 
to a fixed holiday falling on March 16, further removing the holiday from the Volksbund’s 
control and intentions.162  Increasingly, the Nazis used Heldengedenktag as a platform for not 
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only demonstrating their dedication to mourning the soldiers’ deaths, but also as a blatant 
platform for political theater, announcing the resumption of universal military service in 1935, 
the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, the Anschluss with Austria in 1938, and the “Day of 
the freedom to self-defense” in 1939, all on Heldengedenktag.163  
 As it became more of a Nazi Party event, Heldengedenktag took on the additional 
purpose of celebrating the deaths of dead Nazi Storm Troopers [Sturmabteilung; SA] street 
fighters and the new Wehrmacht, in addition to the First World War dead.164  The Nazi and VDK 
planners mobilized the emotion of the German people through the heroificaion of their dead 
soldiers in order to build party support165 and worked to not just praise the “heroes’” virtues of 
selflessness and commitment to the greater good of their society, but too their deaths in 
furtherance of a cause.  This cause (Germany’s international defense and power) became the 
“sacramental” aspect of the front soldiers’ deaths and of the deaths of those heroes who fell 
victim to the “enemies” of the Party.166  In the Nazis’ eyes, the hero was ready to sacrifice his 
life for the good of Germany, thus if that good requires him to kill another, such action would 
have been clearly justified.167   
 In carrying out Heldengedenktag, the Nazis used the party, the state and many other Nazi 
Party-affiliated organizations, eventually giving control of local festivities and observances to 
military garrisons and Party leaders in localities, removing the Volksbund’s remaining control 
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over the interpretation of the holiday.168  As Heldengedenktag ceremonies were molded into 
military celebrations, they resembled less and less the model of mourning prayer services of 
remembrance that characterized the early Weimar Republican Volkstrauertag ceremonies.169  
The Nazis’ worldview saw emergency all about and permitted any action by party operatives that 
were consistent with party needs or desires.170  Thus, the lives and well-being of all individuals 
were subservient to the Party’s need to violently change society.171  Making virtues out of 
victory and pursuit of it, even to the point of death, the Nazis considered it virtuous to have 
bravely suffered for the movement and grieving family members ought (said the Nazis) to be 
proud.172  Because aggression and relentless, selfless pursuit of victory was so praised, 
Heldengedenktag left no room for sadness or sorrow.173    Instead, the bombastic, celebratory 
military character of Heldengedenktag meant that Germans were supposed to take pride in 
having someone to mourn.174 
 Aside from monopolizing and redefining the older Volkstrauertag into their own re-
imagined Heldengedenktag, the Nazis were divided over how best to commemorate their own 
dead Party members from the years of struggle before 1933.  In addition to invoking these dead 
SA fighters on Heldengedenktag, the Nazis also commemorated their deaths, apart from any 
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association with the First World War or the tradition of national military service, on November 
9, the anniversary of the March on the Feldherrnhalle in 1923, in Munich.175 This event and its 
failure to instigate a revolt in Munich had long been the “cornerstone of National Socialist 
martyrology,” as the Party venerated the sixteen “Immortal” heroes who died for a (supposedly) 
new Germany.176 Compared to the public spectacle, parades, and speeches on Heldengedenktag, 
the November 9 ceremony was less of a public festival and more of a mysterious, religious, rite 
to honor those “fallen” Nazi fighters and heroes, incorporating the motif of the crucifixion of 
Christ (represented as Germany in 1918), for a later resurrection to greatness.177 
 When the Nazi-controlled government fixed the date of Heldengedenktag on Reminiscere 
in 1934, the Protestant and Catholic churches were reduced to officially mourning primarily on 
their own Totensonntag and Allerseelen Sundays, respectively, with only minimal roles for the 
churches to play in the party-directed Heldengedenktag.178  The decision to permanently set 
Heldengedenktag on March 16 further restricted the churches’ participation, as the holiday now 
had no relationship to the liturgical calendar, although celebrations were still held on Sundays, 
but only because people were not at work.179  Yet this separation of party-directed mourning for 
soldiers and church-directed mourning for Christians more generally was consistent with the 
Protestant Churches’ wishes to keep Totensonntag a purely religious observance.180 
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 That otherwise patriotic and nationalist Protestants would willingly forego official 
participation in Heldengedenktag seems surprising, but from the earliest discussions of the idea 
for Volkstrauertag in 1921, the Protestant Church as a whole had been uninterested in creating 
another celebration or memory day for the dead.  They thought Totensonntag was enough, and 
were willing to extend its theological scope for all of Germany (not just the Protestant portion).  
National-level Protestant Church leaders had only been willing to accept the new Volkstrauertag 
of the 1920s if it encompassed all victims of the First World War (not just soldiers) or if it 
celebrated the memory of soldiers, rather than glorification of the deeds of soldiers.  Both 
requirements had been unacceptable to the VDK at the time, thus some Protestant Churches 
withdrew their support for Volkstrauertag, although they were not above directing attention to 
dead veterans on Totensonntag.181 
Each year since seizing power, the Nazi Party had made use of Volkstrauertag-cum-
Heldengedenktag for the purpose showcasing the regime’s commitment to reinvigorating 
Germany’s military traditions and great power status.  While military parades, nationalistic 
speeches, and silent wreath-layings promoted the Party’s profile as worthy caretakers of proud 
traditions, at the same time these spectacles maintained the adulation for military service and 
readiness for battle that earlier ceremonies in the Weimar Republic had also expressed.  Equally 
important to the events staged in Berlin was the recording and broadcasting of these activities 
across Germany, either via radio or, more powerfully, via newsreels shown in movie theaters in 
the weeks following Heldengedenktag.  The events in Berlin, taking place before a selected 
audience and heavily managed before the cameras, could still be moving experiences for a 
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national audience, vicariously attending them via the newsreel.182  With the arrival of the Second 
World War, however, a national ceremony for publicly mourning the dead became problematic 
for both the Party and the people. 
 After the impressive victories over Poland, Denmark, Norway and France in relatively 
quick succession, there remained nevertheless dead and wounded Wehrmacht soldiers, whom the 
springtime 1940 and 1941 Heldengedenktag ceremonies had to incorporate.  Not only did 
Hitler’s yearly meetings with disabled military veterans in conjunction with national mourning 
now include freshly deployed and wounded soldiers, Heldengedenktag now took on “a 
completely new meaning.”  At the same time Nazi Germany remembered and mourned its past 
military (and Nazi Party) dead, they “had to mobilize a preparedness for fighting and dying in 
the present-day war,” leaving speeches and propaganda to do more than just grieving for “lost 
comrades, but instead extracting [gewinnen] from their sacrificial death [Opfertod] the will and 
the power” to accept the same mission “in the struggle now forced upon us.”183  During the  
Second World War, with the return of massive levels of violence and the ultimately enhanced 
toll of death and destruction, found the Nazis encouraging Germans to see Heldengedenktag “not 
[as] an organized mourning event but instead a celebration of proud rising up” to meet Germans’ 
new challenge.184 
 Despite the Germans’ initial successes, as the overall tempo of the war slowed down by 
early 1941, with the Battle of Britain deterring any attempt to invade the U.K., the Nazi war 
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machine appeared to be settling on for a much longer war than it had hoped.  The effect on 
mourning ceremonies was not immediate but the once “the euphoria of the early successes wore 
off,” German soldiers and their families at home now “faced…the prospect of an endless 
struggle, [which] strip[ed] the war of its heroic appear.”185  This suspicion was borne out once 
Hitler ordered the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941 but also owing to the Japanese 
bringing the United States into the conflict that December.  With the case of the war against the 
Soviet Union, territory or weapons systems no longer drove the strategy (if they ever did), 
leaving the conduct of the war to revolve around ethnic cleansing and racist colonization of the 
East, and “blurring the any real distinction between combatants and civilians.”186  The winter of 
1942-1943 saw the German VI. Army surrounded and forced to surrender after vicious fighting 
at Stalingrad, more impatiently begging the question of whether these and other German 
soldiers’ deaths could be mourned in such a way that understood each life lost as a necessary – if 
painful – means to Germany’s inevitable victory.  After all, “Russian and German commanders 
fought more aggressively, often with wanton disregard for the human costs” than did American, 
British or French generals.  This characteristic inclination to absorb more casualties in pursuit of 
perhaps smaller victories was itself a manifestation of the nature of Stalin and Hitler’s regimes 
that “were willing and able to demand more from their citizens and soldiers than any civilian 
society,” and which increased the bloodletting as the war ground toward a turning point.187  
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As the prospects for an easy or even decisive German victory appeared to wane, so too 
did the efforts of the Nazi regime to continue publicly mourning its increasing numbers of 
soldiers killed in action.  In the decade following his assuming the post of Chancellor in 1933, 
Hitler had always been the featured memorial speaker at the national Volkstrauertag/ 
Heldengedenktag ceremony in Berlin.  Yet beginning in 1943, his role as the national face of 
mourning and gratitude for the sacrifices of the dead was much reduced.  Tellingly, instead of 
referring to the actual memorial wakes for dead soldiers as “Celebrations honoring Heroes” 
[Heldenehrungsfeier], the Nazis now changed the word to “Celebrations honoring the Fallen” 
[Gefallenenehrungsfeiern]” and between 1943 and 1944, officially-sanctioned memorial 
ceremonies nearly ceased altogether.188  When grieving Germans could not find solace in the 
Party, they returned to the church, where, by 1940, Protestants and Catholics were holding 
increasing numbers of memorial services and masses for dead soldiers, which were decidedly not 
in a spirit of thankfulness for those giving their lives.189  While those German families who 
mourned in churches particularly appreciated the spiritual and pastoral care at a personal level, 
Nazi celebrations continued to pursue different goals – not comfort and support but to rally the 
population’s willingness to keep up the war and the sacrifices.190   
   That year (1943) he did not speak at the ceremony and even the following year, before 
the Allied Landings at Normandy in June, the March 1944 Heldengedenktag ceremony was held 
“without the participation of the citizenry,” on Hitler’s order.  This was apparently a “reaction to 
the increasingly unbelievability of a ceremony honoring the heroes [Heldenverehrungsfeier] in 
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the symbols of the “Final Victory.”191  This retreat left those Germans still interested in publicly 
mourning their dead soldiers with the much-less-impressive chance to hear Grand Admiral Karl 
Dönitz, Commanding Officer of the German Navy, deliver a memorial speech “in the setting of a 
ceremonial hour via German Radio,” with Dönitz also laying the Führer’s wreath at the Neue 
Wache, too.192  Unsurprisingly, the following March of 1945, amid rapidly encircling of the 
German armies and their daily bombardment from the aid, Hitler also shunned the chance to 
stand before his people and declare the deaths of their sons, brothers and fathers as an honorable, 
worthy and laudable sacrifice.  Having ordered Göring to stand in his place, it is questionable 
whether the Führer’s absence from national public mourning inspired further lack of confidence 
in the war effort or further denied grieving families the comfort they sought.193 
 This is because the pattern of mourning dead soldiers amid an increasingly total war, one 
that witnessed violence and death being directed against military and civilian targets, made 
problematic the notion that the soldiers’ deaths were more valuable to Germany than the civilian 
ones.  Because the German Army had essentially been retreating since the fall of Stalingrad in 
the East and the invasion of Normandy in the West, it was difficult to make the argument that the 
deaths of soldiers killed in battle had still somehow delivered great benefits to Germany.  
Moreover, military deaths due to disease, exposure to harsh terrain and weather conditions, lack 
of access to medicines, or other causes in rear-echelon areas unrelated to combat also seemed to 
fall outside the heavily-propagandized notion of battlefield sacrifice fighting for Germany’s 
rebirth.  Instead, soldiers who died in less glamorous, but no less painful circumstances, still left 
                                                 
191 Kaiser, 192. 
 
192 Kaiser, 193. 
 
193 Kaiser 193. 
 
73 
 
behind “stunned survivors [who] attempted to imbue this senseless death with a higher purpose,” 
often with little option but to “resor[t] to tired clichés” of Christian faith, professional conduct, 
loyalty to comrades, or dedication to the national goal.194  Even in the case of traditional soldiers 
“falling” in combat, the final months of the war saw over 1 Million German battlefield deaths, 
which amounted to ‘almost  quarter of the total battlefield deaths.”195  Thus the longer the war 
went on, the less there was in the way of comfort or political meaning to be found in 
Heldengedenktag. 
 This problem existed doubly for the civilians who were killed due to aerial bombing or 
other manifestations of violence, because they were now at once both the audience for mourning 
ceremonies but also increasingly participating in the dying or witnessing death close by.  That is, 
if the “fallen” soldiers had not all “fallen” in battle, why did it make sense to separate their 
deaths from civilians who had also lost their lives but not been ostensibly engaged in the military 
mission?  Deaths not arising from combat operations on the front lines are just as permanent and 
just as painful as battlefield death, so it was undoubtedly difficult to sustain the illusion that “the 
fallen” were “sacrificing” for Germany’ gain.  Furthermore, if Weimar-era Volkstrauertag and 
Nazi-era Heldengedenktag were meant to foster public appreciation and support for war and 
willingness to suffer war deaths, these goals had become impossible in May of 1945 (if they had 
not lost meaning earlier), because the unconditional surrender, occupation, and demilitarization 
of German armed forces meant there were no more “soldiers,” only veterans, victims and other 
survivors of the war.  Furthermore, public mourning could now only comfort survivors and 
grieve for the dead, since in May 1945, it was impossible to seriously imagine the carrying-on of 
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German military traditions.  What appeared more necessary was a rethinking of these military-
centered mourning practices to somehow recognize that changed circumstances of the 
unsuccessful Second World War and the fallen Third Reich. 
 
Conclusion: a tradition broken beyond repair? 
 Despite the catastrophic violence of the Second World War that prompted Germans to 
begin questioning the value in soldiers’ deaths, in the time before 1945, specific historical 
circumstances had appeared to validate the military’s contributions to Germany’s growth from 
disunited confederation into a world power.  At the same time, this process was not one 
dimensional, nor were these cultural values felt universally across German society.  If we return 
to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter about German attitudes towards their 
military and their dead soldiers, a few conclusions seem apparent. 
 Firstly, in the period spanning from the early nineteenth century to 1914, Germans did 
have ample reason to evaluate their soldiers positively.  While “German” in 1806 meant many 
things, the German Army in 1914 traced its early history back the Prussian Army and it was this 
force that had demonstrated its loyalty and selfless service to the state in rescuing Prussia and the 
rest of the German lands from Napoleon.  Despite the army’s role in quashing the democratic 
revolutions in 1848, the military victories over external enemies that led up to Unification in 
1871 meant that soldiers had accomplished what politicians had not: the deliverance of a German 
nation-state, the arrival of which greatly enhanced the German public’s esteem for their soldiers.  
At the same time, in 1914 this modern, industrialized army had not suffered a major defeat in 
almost a century. 
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 Secondly, the defeat in 1918 shook the foundations of this monument that was the 
German soldier standing over his nation.  Even before the armistice, revolutions, and surrender, 
it had become clear to the German people that modern industrialized war was not solely the 
domain of the professional soldier (or even the civilianized reserve soldier).  The First World 
War had brought civilian casualties largely in the form of starvation due to the blockade, and 
even the many more who did not perish felt the effects of the war, either materially via the 
blockade or emotionally via their dead, wounded or missing soldiers.  Public mourning efforts to 
deal with the history and memory of the war did attempt to recognize this new type of war 
experience but could never really break away from practice of defining loss, suffering, and even 
the experience of the war in military terms and indeed used the military deaths to call for 
national unity in the wake of the defeat.  Yet at the same time, while mourning efforts placed a 
premium on the political, social or even cultural unity of the German people, seemingly ignoring 
fissures and cracks that were festering during the 1920s, the dead whose loss and remembrance 
demanded this very unity were increasingly defined as a smaller and smaller group. 
 Thirdly, the increased level of violence, coupled with the defeat and fall of the Nazi 
regime at the end of the Second World War, made even more meaningless the boisterous 
celebrating of the dead that had become characteristic of the late years of the Weimar Republic 
but even more so of the Third Reich.  Nearly twice the number of military casualties in 1945, 
coupled with correspondingly higher civilian casualties had made the human cost of war much 
more apparent while the gains derived from war, political or otherwise, shrank away into non-
existence.  For civilians, the Second World War had been an even longer and more harrowing 
experience, via the aerial bombing campaign that delivered a much more threatening daily 
encounter with the enemy than did the blockade in 1918.  The inescapability of death and 
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suffering for Germans – even aside from any consideration of Germans’ victims – made the 
regime’s promises of victory and greatness ridiculously over-promised, while the totality of the 
defeat meant it was more difficult to find any redeeming positive value in individuals’ deaths.  
Added to these challenges was the burden of shame and considerations of guilt that accompanied 
discovery of the Holocaust and war crimes in the East.  Thus in 1945, there was little-to-nothing 
that grieving Germans could say to frame their soldiers’ deaths as beneficial and deserving of 
special respect.  If anything, Germans were no longer required respect their old assumptions 
about dead soldiers but rather to suspect them. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
“The turning away from soldiers:” Rethinking public mourning in Germany, 1945-1952 
 
 On a cold Sunday morning in November 1945, Pastor Gerhard Gülzow took to the pulpit 
before his Lutheran congregation in the Baltic port of Lübeck.  It was the annual German 
Protestant Sunday in remembrance of the dead -- Totensonntag -- but, unlike the customary 
observance of this holiday reaching back over a century, 1945 was different.  This year, Pastor 
Gülzow insisted, had “a different appearance and weight” in Germans’ lives, because “death 
ha[d] become like a monstrous power” that had “indiscriminately taken away tens of thousands, 
hundreds of thousands, millions and millions.”  Today, this congregation in Lübeck, like the rest 
of their Protestant brethren all over occupied Germany, remembered both the “soldiers of our 
courageous Wehrmacht” who had “given their lives as sacrifices for us” as well as the “many 
innocent victims” who died as a result of “the madness of the Terror Bombing of our cities,” the 
many German civilians who fled from the East and those under Soviet occupation.196   
 Germans experienced the Second World War and the Nazi dictatorship in many and more 
complex ways than a simple soldier/civilian dichotomy can express.  Unlike 1918, survivors in 
1945 could not credibly deny or ignore the deaths of many categories of German- and non-
German civilians.  Supporters of the secular, state-sponsored Volkstrauertag during the Weimar 
Republic (and its twin, Heldengedenktag during the Third Reich) had perpetuated and 
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participated in the holiday out of the belief that the German public had an obligation to mourn its 
dead soldiers.  Beyond allowing surviving family members to publicly express grief and receive 
words of comfort, solace and reassurance, these holidays also served a public function in 
establishing for German society that these dead soldiers were examples of courage, loyalty, 
responsibility and selflessness whose deeds in death ought to be matched by subsequent 
generations.  Put another way, the dead soldiers’ military service to the Empire had been the 
reason for the public day of mourning. 
 After the Second World War, Germans did not immediately move to reinstate the public 
mourning tradition of Volkstrauertag, despite the manifold increase in casualties and exponential 
magnification of violence compared to earlier conflicts.  Rather, this time Germans struggled to 
answer the question of whether to mourn at all and, if so, whom to mourn and how to do it.  Just 
as Germans encountered a complex mix of facts, circumstances, emotion and denial when 
sorting through their own memories of the war, so too did they find the puzzle of public 
mourning a challenge that bore no answers.  In order to understand the solutions Germans found 
to this problem, we should begin by unpacking the same questions Germans faced in 1945: (1) 
How did German survivors conceptualize the war and their role(s) in it?  How did this memory 
inform their choices regarding mourning?  (2) How did Germans’ political leaders understand 
the history of the war and the “lessons” it implied for the next generation?  What limitations or 
possibilities did this create for state-led mourning efforts?  (3) What did Germans see as the point 
of public mourning in 1945?  How had this changed from 1918?  Did Germans resort to the same 
tradition of mourning soldiers as before? 
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Parallel memories 
 Germans remembered the Second World War through the lenses of their own 
experiences, whether as soldiers, families of soldiers, expellees, and so forth.  Aside from the 
uniqueness of each individual’s circumstances, enough similarities overlapped, as people shared 
and revised their stories over time, to create large groups who felt that certain stereotypical 
episodes were representative of “their” war.197  Besides coloring how they talked about the war, 
different parallel memories of the war also drove how Germans thought about mourning the war 
dead: namely, which dead, and what to say about them?  Two parties central to conversations 
about public memory, the Protestant Church in Germany and the Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge, had two different memories of the war that led them to different 
conclusions about public memory. 
 
An anxious church 
 German Protestant Church leaders were unsure of how to proceed with public mourning.  
They had witnessed (and in some measure supported) the Volkstrauertag holiday after 1918.  
More objectionable than Protestants’ participation in ceremonies to celebrate and heroify soldiers 
was their compliance with the Nazi regime after 1933, which had many implications far beyond 
public mourning.  Yet, the specter of repeating Heldengedenktag and the Nazis’ rampant 
propaganda (worshipping “fighters” and “heroes”) meant that churchmen were anxious about 
resurrecting any form of public holiday devoted to military dead. 
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Openness to change 
 Confronted with families whose connection to the war was primarily through a soldier 
son or father, local Protestant pastors and their superiors had difficulty refusing to recognize the 
Volkstrauertag tradition of mourning and honoring the military dead.  “In general,” wrote a 
deacon to his provincial church superiors, “if the Sunday Reminiscere was meant to be 
celebrated,” it should be done “not as Heldengedenktag, but instead as Volkstrauertag,” 
following the original model.198  This deacon acknowledged that some might prefer abolishing 
Volkstrauertag altogether but to his mind, the dead soldiers deserved their own specific public 
memorial day, apart from any other civic or religious celebration.  For this churchman and many 
others, the dead Wehrmacht soldiers were little different from their own fathers who had fought 
for the Kaiser.  For those Germans who observed and understood the Second World War as a 
conventional conflict, along the lines of any nineteenth-century altercation, dead soldiers 
represented a laudable devotion to duty and sacrifice to the nation whose deaths were to be 
honored. 
 Yet the openness to change apparent in this local church official’s appeal for guidance 
from above reflects a larger process at work within German Protestantism at this moment.  Like 
the rest of German society, the Protestant Church in Germany was in a period of transition and, 
unlike the rest of the fallen Third Reich, the Protestant Church largely evaded the scrutiny of 
Allies’ denazification efforts.  These churchmen did not sit idly, however.  Besides reconsidering 
their own embrace of Volkstrauertag and Heldengedenktag, which had whet the public’s appetite 
for war, the Protestant Church was in 1945 aware of its own role in supporting conservative 
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politics and assisting the Nazis, about which it felt some shame.  Protestant clergy had shared an 
“antidemocratic conservative German nationalist or völkisch inclination” without exception 
before the war.  Even though the Confessing Church had been a center of opposition to Hitler, it 
was not necessarily a democratic one but rather concerned with materialism and secularization, 
as well as older conservative-patriarchal class interests.199  For all of these reasons, the pre-1945 
old German Protestant Church “was clearly a grave embarrassment to Protestants and too tainted 
a foundation upon which to rebuild an ecclesiastical structure.”200   
 The Protestant Church of Germany was formally re-established as a new entity in July of 
1948 and even before settling upon the new institutional order, in October 1945 Church leaders 
issued the Stuttgart Confession of Guilt.  This public announcement that the Church and the 
German people were at fault for failing to oppose the Nazis met with hostile public reception.201   
Nevertheless, in 1945 the churches “fill[ed] the void left by the disappearance of German 
governmental authority” and were “de facto leadership of the nation,” since “most Germans 
would look to the churches rather than to the military government for guidance.”   This early 
confrontation between reform-minded Protestant clergy and the German people illustrates the 
churches’ desire in 1945 to “assum[e] responsibility for the broad social interests of the German 
people,” a testament to “the moral strength” that the Protestant churches now exerted.202 
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 The Protestant Church’s privileged moral position in Occupied Germany extended to 
directing the public’s efforts to mourn their dead.  The organization that created Volkstrauertag 
in the 1920s, the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, did not receive permission to 
resume its operations until 1946 and only in the American and British Zone at that.203  Thus, 
while the Volksbund was still trying to reorganize, the national Chancellery of the Protestant 
Church was consulting with its provincial member churches on the holiday question.  Just as 
prominent Protestant leaders were beginning to rethink the church’s relationship to secular 
society and to the state, churchmen concerned about public mourning reexamined the 
assumptions behind such holidays and the dead soldiers traditionally remembered. 
 
Questioning the assumptions 
 The new, more self-critical attitude that led Protestant leaders to consider questions of 
guilt and responsibility for the rise of the Nazi regime also stoked a new energy committed to the 
question of recourse to war and the position of the military in civilian society.  An influential 
position paper by Bishop Dr. Dr. Stählin, a member of the High Church Council 
[Oberkirchenrat] of the provincial Protestant Church of Oldenburg, quickly established a hard 
line against Volkstrauertag.  “[T[he border between the ‘fallen soldiers’ [Gefallenen] and the 
others who lost their lives has become fluid,” wrote Stählin.  Since there was little reason to 
single out soldiers, Stählin recommended establishing a new “Memorial Day for the Eternally 
Resting [ein Tag dem Gedächtnis der Entschlafenen],” which could encompass the First- and 
Second World War’s dead but which would deny any special attention to soldiers at the expense 
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of non-combatants who died, too.  In an effort to make this newly-proposed memorial day more 
representative of the national experience, Stählin further suggested not placing the new holiday 
at the end of the church year, where Totensonntag had always been scheduled, but instead 
observing the new holiday early in November, to coincide with the Catholic Church’s All Saints’ 
Day, making a new memorial event accessible to all Germans.204  Bishop Stählin’s proposal, to 
submerge the memory of the dead soldiers into the more generic and less-inspiring remembrance 
of all who died, reflects the ideas of those within the churches who adopted a more historically 
authentic understanding of the Second World War.  Much like the First World War, the more 
recent conflict had been a “total war,” involving not just armed soldiers but also unarmed 
civilians.  If the soldiers had no monopoly over the experience of violence, so this thinking went, 
then those soldiers could no longer claim a monopoly of public memorial attention.   
 This bishop’s critical attitude towards mourning the dead and minimizing the public 
attention devoted to soldiers, though, was not shared by all German Protestants.  While pastors in 
local churches may have been sympathetic to the (more politically liberal) view of Stählin and 
others who argued for the end of Volkstrauertag, such local pastors also had to face their own 
congregations each Sunday morning.  For the everyday Germans who survived the war but who 
mourned for their lost loved ones as soldiers, the local parish church was where they expected to 
find comfort and understanding from their pastors.  Thus, to these families accustomed to 
Volkstrauertag and Heldengedenktag of decades past, there seemed little reason to discontinue 
such ceremonies.205  These varying early responses to the problem of how to mourn illustrate the 
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lack of unanimous opinions within the Protestant Church on the question of how to remember 
their dead.  What followed was a protracted discussion of whom precisely to mourn and what 
sort of holiday to adopt. 
 
An uncomfortable middle ground 
 In the spring of 1946, leaders at all levels of the Protestant Churches were uneasy with 
the prospect of reinstituting Volkstrauertag or Heldengedenktag and, at the same time, 
uncomfortable denying this rite or tradition to their congregations who wanted to publicly 
commemorate their dead through the only customs they knew.  Faced with the choice between 
what the German people wanted and what (the Protestant leadership believed) they needed, 
churchmen erred on the side of caution.  In February 1946 the Hanoverian Provincial Church 
instructed its pastors to proceed with special memorial ceremonies to remember the “victims of 
the war,” however vague, and “specifically…the fallen” on Reminiscere Sunday.206  In an effort 
to prevent supporters of the traditional mourning holiday from getting the wrong impression, 
these leaders also declared that, in the coming years, this sort of remembrance of the fallen 
soldiers should be incorporated into the Totensonntag service at the end of the church year, 
instead of continuing on its own course.207 
 In this initial, hesitant, yes-and-no answer to the question of mourning, the Protestant 
Church demonstrated two assumptions that would remain nearly constant among church leaders 
over the long discussions over the holidays that would follow into the 1950s.  First, the Churches 
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more often than not insisted that the “fallen” be remembered along with other “war victims.”  
“Fallen” [Gefallenen] is a term that ostensibly refers to soldiers, or other military personnel, who 
“fell” while in the undertaking of their official duties (here, fighting).  While supporters of the 
Volkstrauertag holiday sometimes conflated “the fallen” military dead with the civilian victims 
of the war, use of “the fallen” freezes the audience’s understanding of the dead people in 
question in the moment of their death.  Thus, labeling the dead as “the fallen” allows mourners to 
express grief and remembrance about the dead without having to confront the reason for which 
they “fell,” namely, the Nazi regime.  Nonetheless, “fallen” almost always implied soldiers, and 
betrayed a determination to ignore or minimize civilian victims of the war. 
 At the same time, “victims” or more precisely “victims of the War” [Opfer des Krieges or 
Kriegsopfer] was the term used by both critics of Volkstrauertag and sometime by proponents of 
the ritual, too.  In her study of the Heldengedenktag and other Nazi Party rituals, Sabine 
Behrenbeck discusses the ambiguity of the German word, “Opfer.”208  That is, “Opfer” can mean 
both “victim” and “sacrifice,” thus one can “sacrifice” [sich opfern] one’s life for one’s country 
or one can be “victimized” [opfern worden] by a criminal.  The murkiness of this term makes it 
more difficult to tease out the meaning of those German family members whose deaths were 
being mourned.  Were German soldiers “victims” of the war, or the regime who sent them to 
their deaths?  Or did they willingly “sacrifice” their lives for their families and their nation?  In 
both cases, “Opfer” makes deaths appear to be blameless: either they were innocent victims of 
the dictatorship or they were merely defending their homeland.  Moreover, “Opfer” does not 
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convey the aggressive and racialized nature of the Second World War (much less acknowledge 
the Army’s participation in the Holocaust).209   
 Besides the difficulty of explaining “the fallen” and “the victims,” the second problem 
facing Protestants was also one that presented itself over and over again – the question of how to 
define civilian victims of the Second World War.  Civilians were usually implied in the very 
choice of phrase, “Opfer des Krieges” and rarely did Germans choose the formulation that would 
more closely approximate the English equivalent, “Zivilopfern.”  For discussing civilian victims, 
the controversy circled around which civilian victims were included in this label.  “Opfer des 
Krieges” became shorthand for German civilian victims of aerial bombing, of flight and 
expulsion, and of combat in their streets.  Yet victims of the Holocaust were often not included 
in the same category, at least in the early post-war years.  Thus, “Opfern des Krieges” suffers 
from a similar interpretive weakness as does “Gefallenen,” in that the why behind the deaths of 
these “victims” is not explained or brought into question.  Similarly, the possibility that these 
German “victims” had themselves contributed (or not) to the victimization of non-Germans was 
also often missing. 
 
One group among many 
 Notwithstanding the problematic terms of debate, Protestant Church leaders would 
eventually agree by early 1947 on their preference for publicly mourning all the war dead, in 
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their various named and unnamed categories, on Totensonntag at the end of the Church Year.210  
In advocating this move, though, Church leaders undercut the special place many in the public 
wanted to award to dead soldiers.  This is because, if all the war dead were mourned at the same 
time and place, then the soldiers would be just one group among many who either passively died 
a victim or who actively gave their life.  However tempting it was for Protestant leaders to 
dictate what the German people should or should not do, public sentiment in favor of the old 
form of Volkstrauertag was not something these churchmen could ignore.211  By early 1947, the 
weight of opinion within the ranks of the Protestant Church’s leadership was turning against 
Volkstrauertag in its traditional form.212  In the end, by deciding to push all public mourning 
onto Totensonntag, Protestant officials demonstrated their inability to simply ignore the dead 
soldiers while at the same time betraying their uncertainty over exactly how to go about 
mourning the soldiers with a November holiday. 
 The churches’ role in exerting moral leadership and also pastoral care put them into this 
position that demanded some compromise.  While pushing the German people to critically re-
examine their ideas about the war and about death, Protestant ministers also faced family 
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members who wanted to still grieve for soldiers whom they loved.  Many times, churches who 
wanted to end the tradition of mourning soldiers on Volkstrauertag were afraid of doing so, 
fearing that moving this tradition to Totensonntag where it would not receive as much exclusive 
attention, would deeply anger their congregations.213  In other instances, churches felt compelled 
to single out the soldiers by name, even if they were to be mourned in combination with civilian 
bombing victims.214  The opposite side of preserving room for families to unquestioningly grieve 
their dead soldiers alongside the dead civilians was a non-engagement with the question of war 
crimes, the Holocaust, and those beloved soldiers’ possible participation. Scarcely more than a 
year after the end of the war, Germans in east and in west were not of one mind about how to 
mourn their dead.  Questions such as which dead to mourn, when, and what precedent to follow 
all found only partial answers and at painstakingly slow pace.   
 
A confident VDK 
 While German Protestants slowly found consensus in mourning (nearly) all the victims of 
a “total war,” the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge emerged from the Second World 
War with few new ideas about mourning the dead.  Rather than soul-searching over its own 
political activity during the Weimar Republic and Third Reich, the Volksbund started in 1945 
from the same conviction it had held before the war: that Germans ought to mourn their dead 
soldiers without exception.  What was new after this war was the open question of whether to 
also urge German audiences on the traditional Volkstrauertag to mourn dead civilian victims, 
                                                 
213 Landeskirche Nassau-Hessen, Landeskirchenamt to the Kanzlei der Ev. Kirche in Deutschland, 6 January 1947, 
regarding Gefallenen-Gedenktage, letter, EZAB 2/650. 
 
214 Evang.-Luth. Landeskirchenrat [München] to the Kanzlei der Evang. Kirch in Deutschland, 30 January 1947, 
regarding Gefallenen-Gedenktag, letter, EZAB 2/650.     
89 
 
too.  Yet civilians remained, for the present moment, a secondary concern to the Volksbund, and 
only intermittently at that.  This early debate over redefining mourning within the VDK was 
inconsequential because the leadership continued to understand and remember the Second World 
War as a conventional war fought according to conventional rules, between two conventional 
armies.  Thus, it was the military dead alone who warranted the German public’s undivided 
attention.  The “thousands of battlefield graves [Feldgräber]” that “still needed to be transferred 
into cemeteries,” was symbolic of the “holy obligation of the German people” to preserve the 
memory of their fallen soldiers.215 
 
Soldiers beyond reproach 
 In the narrative propagated by the VDK, the soldiers who died had merely done their 
duty, fought honorably, and sacrificed for their nation.  The military experience of so many men 
was the unifying factor that explained the war for all German families and, therefore, the military 
dead were the most important dead to remember.  More than caring for graves and mourning 
these soldiers as a service to their families, the Volksbund understood its work to “serve…the 
preservation and safe-guarding of peace.”216  That is, focusing public attention on the tangible 
results of war (namely massive numbers of casualties) would minimize the German public’s 
appetite for another armed conflict.  Yet this simple calculation – reminding the public that war 
means lives lost – reveals much more about the Volksbund and its leaders.  At the same time, the 
rhetorical tactic of war-equals-dead-soldiers, while true to a large degree, grossly simplifies the 
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German experience of the Second World War, because it implies the argument that Germans 
went to war because they did not appreciate what the cost of doing so would be in German 
soldiers’ lives.  Thus, the Nazi dictatorship, the military’s eagerness to launch an aggressive war 
for territory and racial annihilation, as well as complicity in the Holocaust, all remain 
unexplained.  Rather, the VDK saw German soldiers as morally unimpeachable individuals who 
served their nation and sacrificed their lives. 
 The Volksbund acknowledged the Nazi era only indirectly.  Because of the Volksbund’s 
political history during the Weimar era, as well as its compromised past under the Nazi 
Gleichschaltung, the appearance of Nazi ties was always a nagging concern for VDK national 
leaders.217  Besides instructing local chapters to use the Kameradlied only in Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies in “small village communities” but not in “large cities” or even “smaller cities,” the 
VDK anticipated that critics would be skeptical.  Those who feared the return to Volkstrauertag 
would point to Heldengedenktag as a perfect example of what could go wrong with a public 
memorial day for soldiers, and the Volksbund acknowledged that “the German people have often 
incorrectly understood their dead.”  By confronting the problem head-on (as they saw it), VDK 
leaders acknowledged the Nazi legacy of German history to be a problem only insofar as it 
related to memorial ceremonies. 
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 By making the German peoples’ misunderstanding of dead military heroes (because of 
the Nazis’ propaganda) the central obstacle to renewing Volkstrauertag, this line of argument 
then pointed to a deceptively simple solution.  Granted that “the language of Romanticism is 
[among Germans] quite prevalent,” the Volksbund’s leaders argued that grieving families were 
wrong to speak of “heroism and heroes’ glory.”  Rather, grieving survivors needed to soberly 
realize that their soldiers had died so that their families could survive, while acknowledging that 
“the path to the life which led over the graves [of the soldiers] is far from hatred, the search for 
retaliation and rage.”  In order to truly and properly mourn the dead, these living survivors had to 
devote themselves to peace.218  Indeed, other membership materials warn Germans not to 
“incorrectly hear” the “voices of the dead,” betraying a fear on the part of the VDK that ordinary 
Germans would “hear” the dead soldiers as calling survivors to seek “vengeance” on their former 
enemies, perhaps as they had done after 1918.219  In this call to avoid vengeance, the Volksbund 
implies that the desire to retaliate on the part of an aggrieved innocent party might be a 
legitimate emotional response to the war, only not the best one for Germans to pursue at this 
moment.  Yet even to construe the Germans as an innocent, aggrieved party in 1939 would be to 
misunderstand the causes and course of the Nazi dictatorship and the war itself.220 
                                                 
218 So schmücken wir die Gräber. Vom Mahnen unserer Toten.  Attached to Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. Bundeszentrale to all Landes- und Bezirksverbände, 10 August 1947, Rundschreiben Nr. 
12/1947 regarding Werbematerial, letter, VDK A.10-9. 
 
219 So lasst uns denn stille werden.  Was unsere Gefallenen uns sagen. Attached to Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. Bundeszentrale to all Landes- und Bezirksverbände, 10 August 1947, Rundschreiben Nr. 
12/1947 regarding Werbematerial, letter, VDK A.10-9. 
 
220 On the day-to-day operations of the Nazi regime on the lives of average Germans, see Peukert, Inside Nazi 
Germany.   For an overview of the connections between the regime and the Holocaust, see Ian Kershaw, Hitler, The 
Germans, and the Final Solution, Fourth Edition, (New Haven, 2008).  On the regime and its decision for war see 
Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York, 2008). 
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 In overly simplifying how they remembered the history of the dictatorship and its war, 
the Volksbund rejected the possibility out of hand that there were war criminals or Holocaust 
perpetrators among the selfless soldiers.  Instead, they maintain, the soldiers “performed [their] 
duty, just as all of our heretofore opponents have done.”  Here the Volksbund relied on the “clean 
Wehrmacht” myth in its earliest form to deny any dishonorable behavior on the part of the 
soldiers.221  In doing so, the Volksbund was merely following the lead of the senior German 
generals, who maintained this myth publicly in their memoirs, as well as in later negotiations 
over rearming to join NATO.222  This myth corresponded with the interpretation of the dead 
soldiers that the Volksbund wanted to convey – that they were faultless and beyond reproach: 
“the death of our fallen [soldiers]…had nothing to do with guilt and sin.”223  In this instance, the 
Volksbund latched onto a powerful current in western German society, whereby the public was 
increasingly less and less likely to critically question the conduct of the war.224 
                                                 
221 For a general treatment of the army’s participation in war crimes see Wette, Wehrmacht: History, Myth and 
Reality.  For the propagation and eventual shattering of the “clean Wehrmacht” myth, see Oliver von Wrochem, 
“Keine Helden mehr.  Die Wehrmachtselite in der öffentlichen Auseinandersetzung“ and  Peter Reichel, “Helden 
und Opfer.  Zwischen Pietät und Politik: Die Toten der Krieg und der Gewaltherrschaft in Deutschland im 20. 
Jahrhundert“ in Michael Th. Greven and Oliver von Wrochem, eds. Der Krieg in der Nachkriegszeit: Der Zweite 
Weltkrieg im Politik und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik (Opladen, 2000), as well as James A Wood. “Captive 
Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945-1961” The Journal of Military 
History 69 (January 2005): 123-47.  For the best overview of Germans’ collective memories of the war in the 
immediate post-war decades, see Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, 
MA, 1997) and Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
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Powell (Chicago, 1958), Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon. (Washington, DC, 
1979), Albrecht Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, translated by William Kimber (Novato, CA, 
1989) and Karl Dönitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, trans. R.H. Stevens (Annapolis, MD, 1990). 
 
223 Aussprache für dörfliche Gemeinden. Attached to Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. 
Bundeszentrale to all Landes- und Bezirksverbände, 2 March 1948, Rundschreiben Nr. 6/48 regarding Material für 
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224 This is, in fact, Moeller’s central argument: that Germans in the immediate aftermath of the war opted to 
remember their own suffering and victimization while choosing not to remember the Holocaust and aggressive war 
of conquest.  Moeller, War Stories. 
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A “necessary remembrance” 
 The Volksbund’s understanding of German soldiers as models of selfless sacrifice, 
besides anchoring a denial of Nazi sympathies or crimes, also put the VDK into square 
opposition with Protestants who wanted to relocate Volkstrauertag from its traditional spring 
date to the fall, usually to correspond with Totensonntag.  Protestant Church leaders hesitant to 
agree to support a new Volkstrauertag suggested this move, putting the remembrance of the dead 
soldiers on par with the remembrance of all other victims of the war (indeed, all dead Germans).  
The Volksbund found this proposition unacceptable, because subsuming the soldiers into a 
general pool of dead members of society deserving attention would detract from the qualities that 
made these military dead special. 
 For the Volksbund, Totensonntag obscured the unifying experience of the families who 
suffered and survived the war while simultaneously ignoring the special sacrifice of the lives of 
fallen soldiers.  If the German people were to simply add these special categories of dead to the 
“ordinary” dead commemorated on Totensonntag, they ran the risk that “the necessary 
remembrance of the war dead would veer off into the general dead.”  Such a diluting of the 
attention devoted to the war dead would thereby obscure the special lessons that the German 
people must learn, such as “the duty of confessing to the fallen”, the German people had learned 
“the duty of loyalty, which is an integral part of the challenge of proving one’s own worth in this 
life.”225  These lofty words and soaring rhetoric, while directed at explaining why a separate 
memorial day for the dead soldiers and other war victims was necessary, reinforced the 
simplistic, one-dimensional image of soldiers and all other possible German war victims: that 
                                                 
225 Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. Bundeszentrale to alle Mitarbeiter in Stadt und Land, 26 
November 1947, Rundbrief Nr 2, letter, VDK A.10-9. 
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they had honorably and justly done their duties, or were innocent victims of violence which was 
not of their own doing.   
  
Two memories, two extremes 
 If the VDK was guilty of subscribing to a very one-dimensional memory of the war, so 
too were their Protestant critics.  The Volksbund believed that remembering the war meant 
remembering selfless soldiers who fought and died honorably for the nation and whom society 
ought to publicly mourn without reservation.  At the same time, those Protestant leaders most 
critical of Volkstrauertag furthered a memory of the war that heaped fault solely on patriotic 
veterans and those who would celebrate them.  Such alarmist fears were not universal within the 
church, as some more moderate voices would be satisfied with a softened Volkstrauertag, one 
that occurred in the fall and included civilian victims while still gesturing toward military dead.   
 Yet the extreme voices in the Church made exaggerations and generalization just as 
wanton as the most ardent supporters of the old Volkstrauertag.  Wrote the Oldenburg provincial 
church officials to their superiors in the national Protestant church: “we regard it as no longer 
sensible, after the events of recent years, to separate the memory of the ‘victims of the war’ from 
a general memory of those eternally resting.”226  Not only “has the border between fallen 
[soldiers] and other victims of war become fluid in a total war,” but “the danger is great that by 
such a Memorial Day for Fallen Soldiers [Gefallenen-Gedächtnistag] the clear separation from 
                                                 
226 Evang.-luth. Oberkirchenrat Oldenburg to the Kanzlei der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland, to the 
vorläufige Leitung der vereinigten Evang.-luth. Kirchen in Deutschlands,  to the Evang.-luth. Landeskirchenamt 
Hannover, to the Evng.-luth. Landeskirchenamt in Wolfenbüttel, 10 December 1948, regarding Wiedereinführung 
eines Gedenktages für die Opfer des Krieges, letter, EZAB 2/650.  
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unclear nationalistic thoughts will not be maintained.”227  If Volkstrauertag and soldier-worship 
had given rise to dictatorship and war once, wondered these concerned churchmen, how could 
the same outcome not transpire again?   
 
Two memories to inform mourning 
 Whether naïve, exaggerated, or seeking a realistic in-between view, German Protestant 
leaders, Volksbund officials, their congregations and member chapters did not all remember the 
same wartime experience.  Yet how these populations did remember the war and its causes and 
effects directly shaped whom these groups felt ought to be publicly mourned.  Volkstrauertag 
enacted along its old pattern was the answer to parties who understood the Second World War as 
a conventional 19th-century conflict.  Some sort of modified holiday was necessary to others who 
saw the war as having affected civilian populations in great numbers.  What both sides in this 
dispute ignored was the experience of victims of German-directed violence, in large part, which 
explains the absence in their arguments of the Holocaust and the War of Annihilation.  For both 
the VDK and the church, mourning was concerned with the victims each side saw when they 
imagined the war. 
 
Mourning as a relationship to the Nazi past 
 Above and beyond groups of Germans sorting through their individual memories and 
finding common ground, East- and West German political leaders made influential 
determinations over which dead victims each state would mourn and what memory of the Nazi 
                                                 
227 Der Landesbishof, Der vereinigten Evang. Protestant. Landeskirche Badens to the Rat der Evangelischen Kirche 
in Deutschlands z.H. der Kirchenkanzlei, 23 December 1948, regarding   Gedenktag für die Opfer des Krieges, 
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past this mourning would support.  These politicians’ choices over public mourning, in turn, 
framed the possibilities and limitations of ceremony, rhetoric, celebration and “lessons learned” 
for Germans on each side of the border.  Unsurprisingly, the choices for East Germans were 
fewer and the consequences for overstepping the boundaries greater.  Yet each Germany created 
a public mourning tradition that departed from pre-1945 precedent and which served to help 
define its state’s relationship to the Nazi past. 
 
Censored mourning in East Germany 
 While the Protestant Churches and the Volksbund wrestled over the question of how best 
to mourn the war’s dead, the political realities of the post-war present exercised increasing 
influence over these discussions about memory and ceremony.  Neither institution wanted to 
appear to harbor unreconstructed Nazi sympathies before the Occupation authorities.  While the 
churches enjoyed considerable independence amid denazification efforts, the Volksbund emerged 
again only in the western Zones, with the Soviet Occupation officials hesitant to see Volksbund 
continue its work.  Even though the Protestant administrators and these influential civil society 
leaders differed in degree, they did fundamentally see a need for Germans to publicly mourn 
their dead soldiers, along with other victims of the war.  Still in conflict over the exact 
formulations, calendar, and terms of the debate in the western zones, the VDK and the Protestant 
Church together sought a form of public mourning that would hold meaning for the majority of 
the German people in the eastern zone.228  While each case was different, nearly every family 
                                                 
228 Copy of Kirchenleitung der Kirchenprovinz Sachsen to the Kanzlei der Evangelischen Kirche in Schwäbisch 
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Evangelischen Oberkirchenrat Berlin-Charlottenburg, 8 March 1947, letter, EZAB 7/3090. 
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had been impacted by the war, and the commonly-invoked tropes of soldier, civilian bombing 
victim, expellee or refugee, all spoke to one (or more) of nearly every family’s war experience.  
For the Christians in question, setting aside a day within the space of the church to mourn the 
dead soldiers in the Soviet-Occupied Zone may have had different connotations than their 
brethren in the West.   
 In the Soviet Zone, and on a smaller scale in some of the western Zones, Communists and 
other political groups who had been targeted by the Nazis before and during the war began 
mobilizing to compel the German public to recognize their particular (and singular) form of war 
experience.229  The Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes [Association of Persecutees of 
the Nazi Regime – VVN] emerged out of a merging of Committees of “Victims of Fascism” 
which had formed in and around Berlin in 1945.230  Active mostly in the eastern Zone, the VVN 
organized its own memorial day, the Gedenktag für die Opfer des Faschismus [Memorial Day 
for the Victims of Fascism], which embraced and recognized as legitimate only the wartime 
suffering (and in many cases, deaths) of political opponents who mounted organized, armed 
resistance against the Nazi regime.231  In most cases, armed political opposition came from the 
German Communist Party (KPD), and the VVN was almost exclusively a Communist 
                                                 
229 For good overviews of the Soviet occupation and the subsequent GDR, respectively, see Norman M. Naimark, 
The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA, 1995) and 
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Remembrance for the Victims of Fascism,” German History 26, 2 (2008): 195-218 and Gilad Margalit.  Guilt, 
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remained in Germany, often in Concentration Camps.  In 1948, the SED, led by cadres of German Communists who 
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organization.  As the Soviet Zone authorities began putting their own trusted cadres of German 
Communist operatives in place to run the future GDR, the Opfer des Faschismus became the 
only recognized celebration and memorial for the war dead for East Germans, though the 
message proffered by the German Communists hardly conformed to most East Germans’ war 
experience.232  While it was true that only Social Democrats and Communists could claim to 
have worked to stop Hitler’s rise to power, and that Communists across Europe could claim to 
have fought against the rise of fascism, this form of self-righteous back-slapping and finger-
waving offered little in the way of comfort to families who would never be whole again. 
 
“Heroic resistance fighters” – an unrepresentative memory 
 At a very basic level, the VVN (and later the SED) used a discourse of death and 
remembrance that served similar ends to that employed by the Protestant Church and the 
Volksbund in West Germany.  Whereas the Volksbund wanted Germans to mourn the dead 
soldiers, admire their sacrifice, and dedicate the new Germany to peace and international 
reconciliation and the Protestant Church sought to remind Germans of all the various categories 
of equally tragic and equally dead family members, also to serve the end of peace, East German 
public mourning stressed the desirability of peace, too.  The SED’s official organ, Neues 
Deutschland, proclaimed that “all friends of peace remember on this day [the Memorial Day for 
the Victims of Fascism] particularly the heroic resistance fighters, who gave their lives in the 
struggle for peace and the freedom of Germany.”  Yet unlike the Volkstrauertag and 
Totensonntag traditions, the East German memorial day called attention to the suffering and 
                                                 
232 The SED dissolved the VVN permanently and assumed direct control over the “Memorial Day for the Victims of 
Fascism” in 1953.  Margalit, 127  
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selfless example of only a small section of the population, who were active Communist 
organizers and who took up arms against the Nazi regime.   
 The unrepresentativeness of the OdF narrative is made clear by the reliance on armed 
intervention from the Red Army.  As the official rhetoric explained it, these resistance fighters 
“from all strata of the German people, from all political camps” were in the end, “insufficient to 
destroy the enemy in its own country.”  Ultimately, the resistance fighters who were most worthy 
of praise and emulation were soldiers of the Red Army, who fought the “heroic struggle rich 
with sacrifices” to destroy Hitler’s Reich.233  The German people, for better or for worse, had not 
widely embraced the Communists before 1933 (and they could only exist underground 
thereafter) while the Red Army’s approach had terrified Germans, fearful of pillage and rape on 
unprecedented scale at war’s end.  Thus, the East German publicly directed mourning apparatus 
offered only unpalatable, insulting and meaningless vignettes and rhetoric to most of the East 
German population.  If the goal of spurring German survivors to value peace more highly than 
war overlapped with the West German traditions, the means for arguing this point were quite 
different. 
 Another difference between the East German and West German public memorial days 
was the politicization in which each side engaged.  Neither the Protestant Church, the Volksbund, 
the East German officials nor the eventual West German government was above political 
posturing on days of mourning.  Yet they most commonly engaged in Cold War rhetoric, such as 
the SED spooking their readers into fearing that “still is there no peace as peace does not fit well 
with the American armaments factories, with the kings of finance from Wall Street.”  The lesson 
                                                 
233 „Für das Leben unserer Kinder!  Aufruf des Parteivorstandes der SED.  Opfer sollen nicht umsonst gewesen 
sein.“  Neues Deutschland.  Zentralorgan der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands.  Volume 4, Number 212.  
Berlin, Saturday 10 September 1949.  Edition B. 
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to be learned from both the experience of the resistance fighters during the war and the present 
Cold War tensions surrounding them in 1949, was that peace could only come if they, East 
Germans, “in the hour of danger for the existence of our nation” come together “regardless from 
which political or philosophical camp” to support the National Front.234  Political engagement in 
support of the East German state (alone) was the way that “the legacy of our precious dead is 
fulfilled.”235   
 One aspect of the war experience that the GDR more happily discussed than the FRG was 
the Concentration Camps.  Yet even here, the mourning was directed at victims framed as 
“antifascist resistance fighters,” without acknowledgment of the other groups of German society 
targeted for persecution by the Nazi regime.  When survivors of the Ravensbrück Concentration 
Camp held a reunion in 1949, they appeared publicized as “each individual a fighter 
[Kämpferin], each a heroine who, despite unheard of terror never lost their belief in the victory of 
humanity.”236  The West Germans were slower to introduce Concentration Camps to the 
discourse of mourning but were nudged into doing so by critical West Germans who felt the 
necessity of confronting the Holocaust and the persecution of Jews in particular.   Yet there were 
“antifascist” agitators and organizations in West Germany, too, who wanted to uncover the 
complete truth of the “victims of the Nazi regime.”  A chapter of the VVN even organized its 
                                                 
234 The National Front was “an umbrella group of mass organizations and movements from all sectors of the public 
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own Memorial Day for the Victims of Fascism in Bremen.237  While such demonstrations drew 
the ire of conservative West German officials, the German public was overall more likely to 
empathize with the approximately four million dead soldiers or half million or so dead German 
civilian victims of the war than the “many thousands of Germans” who counted “among the 
victims of fascism.”238 
 
Remembrance as resistance? 
 For East Germans in the SBZ and later in the GDR, the choice in this matter was not 
between the OdF-memorial day or nothing.  Just as they would demonstrate in other moments 
across the history of divided Germany, East Germans so moved by their dedication to mourning 
their war dead or caring for the remains of others organized to carry out the types of activities 
underground that their fellows in the West could do openly.239  The Protestant leaders overseeing 
the increasingly isolated eastern Germany saw in the Volksbund less of a protégé than another 
organization being targeted by the Communist Party officials and who had a common interest in 
working to resist the new regime.  The Communist cadres returning from Moscow had little 
interest in reminding East Germans of the massive numbers of casualties their (German) soldiers 
had borne on the Eastern Front.240  As the same time, expellees’ and refugees’ harrowing tales of 
escape from the Red Army or new Communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East 
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Prussia (which had been excised and given to Poland) did not reinforce the popular legitimacy of 
the Socialist Unity Party and its claims to represent a vision of a new, democratic Germany. 
 In January 1949, Protestant officials in the Church Chancellery-East in (West-)Berlin 
began planning how to arrange a partnership with the Volksbund to care for war graves in the 
Eastern Zone.  Besides shutting out the VDK, Soviet Authorities had given permission to the 
church to undertake the work of caring for military graves, “under two prerequisites: (1) that the 
word war grave maintenance [be] minimized and instead grave maintenance [be] said, and (2) 
that every organizational form [be] minimized.”  Hesitant to suspend their operations but eager 
to see their projects carried out, the Volksbund officials agreed to confine their presence in 
eastern Germany to its West Berlin offices and would agree to finance the activities of a special 
Abteilung Gräberfürsorge within the East Berlin Church offices, with the understanding that, as 
soon as permissible, the VDK would re-enter the SBZ and personally resume its work.241 
 The risks inherent in the Church’s secret partnership to undertake war graves 
maintenance in the East were justified in the Church leaders’ minds, because of their conviction 
that they were performing both a service to their congregations and also an act of resistance 
against communism.  More dangerous, though, then being discovered in partnership with the 
Volksbund, whose politics and view on mourning were not identical to the church, was being 
discovered by East German officials.  One careless slip-up in the VDK’s communication with 
the Abteilung Gräberfürsorge “would be a red flag” to the Stasi.  War graves maintenance had to 
appear “a purely churchly affair” in order to be tolerated.  Yet these Protestants saw the danger 
as worth it, because, while “the struggle against the churches belongs to the program of the 
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Communists, care of graves stands out as the ominous calling,” as a “churchly and therefore 
patriotic and anti-communistic affair.”242  Thus, caring for war graves was another way 
disaffected or independent-minded (or secretly conservative and nationalist) East Germans could 
act against the wishes of the regime.   For the church, such attendance to graves, in order to allow 
a more complete mourning for the dead, was “also pastoral care for the German people.”243  The 
Churches in Berlin-Brandenburg also reached out to care for Jewish graves, a further protest 
against the exclusivity of OdF, while private East German citizens wrote letters to the VDK in 
West Germany, asking for photographs of their loved ones’ gravesites.244   
 Nonetheless, the Protestant Church’s decision to partner with the Volksbund in the east 
while obstructing it in the west makes sense only after consideration of the memory and public 
commemoration being offered by the Communists, which was enough to draw the ire of both.  
The official agreement between the VDK and the Church was made effective on July 1, 1949.245  
Now with a foot in each Germany, the problem of reproaching the German people for their 
nationalism-through-mourning of the past while leaving enough room to still comfort them for 
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their losses (and not risk alienating parishioners) became more complicated and more urgent, 
especially in the GDR. 
 
Mourning for all people? 
 Conscious of the GDR’s decision to officially commemorate only a small, 
unrepresentative sample of the war generation’s experience, West German government officials 
shied away from a similar option.  Instead, leaders within the Federal Republic concluded, the 
remembrance of the war implied by public mourning had to encompass more people.  Yet 
Volkstrauertag in West Germany was not a foregone conclusion.  Although the VDK had gotten 
Volkstrauertag off the ground, even while losing the official support of the Protestant Churches, 
the new West German government did not embrace the holiday at first.246  Volksbund leaders had 
much work to do in garnering full support across all of German society for its vision of public 
mourning, especially when they presented flowering praise of “the German soldier” who 
performed “his soldierly duty in good faith” while evading a serious discussion of the 
ramifications of German Army’s actions and those of the Nazi regime.   
 
Searching for unity amid division 
 One important step in securing wide popular support and participation in Volkstrauertag 
was ensuring Germans in different areas of the Federal Republic marked the holiday on the same 
day.  Such uniformity of both purpose and execution was highly prized and greatly sought after 
by VDK leaders in the post-war years.  Only after the new provincial and federal governments 
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were erected could the VDK approach legislators with requests for writing their holiday into law.  
Securing legal designations and protections would then minimize the distraction of the Protestant 
Churches, who at this point were still abstaining from the Volkstrauertag in favor of their own 
Totensonntag remembrances.  
 Yet these legal protections and codifications did not always result in clear explanations of 
what sort of memory the new states or the Volksbund wanted the public to keep in mind.  The 
Hessian legislature declared Reminiscere Sunday to be the day for remembrance of soldiers as 
well as those “who gave their lives for the greater good of humanity,” and “those who died 
simply fulfilling their everyday duties.”247  It seems clear enough that Hessians were to mourn 
their soldiers but perhaps anti-fascists resistors and the Confessing Church, too, along with 
anyone else unlucky enough to have been killed during the war.  Still murky, though, is whether 
or not “fulfilling their everyday duties” included Concentration Camp inmates, war crimes 
victims, or other groups persecuted by the regime during the war.  Though politicians in many of 
the states may have felt sympathetic to the impulses behind Volkstrauertag, as the Hessian 
Minister of the Interior explained, the collected interior ministers of all the West German states 
were being asked to coordinate legislation in each state on the “Memorial Day for the Dead of 
the War” (perhaps Volkstrauertag but this is unclear), as well as the “Memorial Day for the 
Victims of Fascism” and a “National Memorial Day” all at the same time.248  At this moment, 
                                                 
247 Dekanat des Kirchenkeises Kirchhain to the Landeskirchenamt in Kassel durch die Hd. des Herrn Propstes in 
Marburg, 20 January1951, regarding Sunday Reminiscere, letter, EKKW C/1038.  
 
248 Dr. Adolf Flecken, Innenminister [Nordrhein Westfalen] to the Volksbund Deutsche Krietgsgräberfürsorge e.V., 
z.Hd. d. Herrn Präsidenten Landeshauptmann i.R. Dr. h.c. Hagemann, 21 January 1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, 
letter forwarded via Volksbund Deutsche Krietgsgräberfürsorge, e.V. to the Volksbund Deutsche 
Krietgsgräberfürsorge Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen, 26 January 1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, letter, VDK 
A.100-137, Staatsministerium [Württemberg-Baden]  to the Herrn Präsidenten des Volksbundes Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V., 29 January 1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, letter, VDK A.100-137, Der Hessische 
Minister des Innern to the Herrn Präsidenten des Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V., 31 January 
1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, letter, VDK A.100-137.  
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when the still-new state- and federal governments were constructing their ministries and crafting 
their laws, the possibility of uneven memorial ceremonies and ill-defined public memory was but 
one issue of many demanding their attention.    
 Amazingly, despite the legal, administrative and political roadblocks for creating a 
uniform set of Volkstrauertag practices that would guide celebrations in all West German states, 
the Volksbund persuaded the President of the West German Parliament, Hermann Ehlers, to 
deliver the keynote address at the 1951 national Volkstrauertag ceremony in Bonn.  Sensitive to 
the spotlight and lingering international attention on the new Federal Republic, Ehlers minced 
few words, criticizing the “devilish game” that past generations had played at Heldengedenktag, 
“which in no small part served to prepare the way for the next time [Germans] took up arms.“  
Yet at the same time, Ehlers insisted that opting not to mourn the dead would be as big a 
mistake, insisting that Germans were not “prepared to allow remembering the dead to be denied 
to us through political actions.”  From Ehlers’ words arise the basic problem for public leaders of 
all stripes in West Germany: allowing West Germans to mourn their dead was critical but it was 
a process that required close management and oversight.249  Therefore, it is unsurprising that, 
scarcely a month after Ehlers’ address, the Federal Minister of the Interior Dr. Lehr intervened in 
the Volksbund’s efforts to secure legal sanction in each individual state on its own, declaring 
that, “the question of resolving the regulations for Volkstrauertag” was “basically a Federal 
issue.”250  
                                                 
249 Hermann Ehlers, Ansprache des Präsidenten des Deutschen Bundestages Dr. Hermann Ehlers am 18. Februar 
1951 in der Gedenkstundes des Volkbundes Deutsche Kreigsgräberfürsorge im Bundeshaus zu Bonn, speech, VDK 
A.100-15.  
 
250 Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. Bezirksverband Wüttemberg-Hohenzollern to the Volksbund 
Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V., 15 February1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, letter forwarded via Volksbund 
Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. to the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. Landesverband 
Oberrhein, 15 March 1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, letter, VDK A.100-137.   
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Mourning out of “political considerations” 
 Once Volkstrauertag became “a federal issue,” events quickly slipped out of the 
Volksbund’s control.  At stake was not merely choice of date and time or even key words used to 
encode the ceremony’s content.  Instead, the entire collective memory that West Germans would 
have told to them, year after year, hung in the balance and determined the details of victims, 
coded words, tropes and implicit assumptions that became part of the broadcast and reception of 
Volkstrauertag.  Federal Interior Minister Lehr himself already believed that Totensonntag 
would be a more suitable date for the holiday (which would break with the Heldengedenktag 
association) but put the question to the conference of Interior Ministries of the collected states on 
April 4, 1951.251  No final decision would come from this conference and another meeting would 
be scheduled for April 30, to which the VDK, the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church, and 
Organization of Persecuted Social Democrats as well as Federal and State ministers, would be 
invited.252  The most notable results of this preliminary discussion on April 4 was the agreement 
among state-level Interior Ministers that “a united memorial day for the war victims would be 
absolutely necessary” and that such a memorial day “should also extend to the victims of the 
Nazi regime.”   
                                                 
251 Ibid, OKR Ranke toHerrn Oberkirchenrat von Hartling, 30 March 1951, regarding Feiertagsrecht, letter, EZAB 
2/4416. Copy of Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfursorge e.V. to the Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen Herrn Dr. Adolf Flecken, 30 March 1951, letter, VDK A.100-137.  
 
252 Copy of Der Bundesminister des Innern, Niederschrift uber die Besprechung am 30.4.1951 im 
Regierungspräsidium Koblenz wegen der Bestimmung eines Gedenktages für die Opfer des Kriegs, 10 May 1951, 
transcript forwarded via Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland to the Leitungen der deutschen evangelischen 
Landeskirchen in Westdeutschland, 6 February 1952, regarding Volkstrauertag: Sonntag Reminiscere, letter, EKKW 
C/1038. 
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 In this resolution, these West German politicians backed away from both perpetuating a 
memory that embraced solely soldiers as well as the Communist version that held up only 
antifascist fighters.  Blending all component memories together would result in none of the 
extreme variations achieving prominence.  This determination affected equally the choice of 
dates as it did the victimology.  These ministers agreed that their proposed memorial day “when 
possible fall in the ‘peaceful time’ of the year, that is, in the fall,” rather than either the 
springtime (which was too closely associated with the Nazi rituals) or the beginning of 
September (alternately too close to the VVN-sponsored holiday in East Germany).  Ultimately, 
these provincial ministers resolved to summon the VDK, the VVN and the churches, as well as 
inviting the Federal Minister of the Interior to collaborate on a final decision.253 
 These cautious (or politically savvy) ministers were not alone in their appreciation for the 
subtle and powerful messaging conveyed in public memorial days.  At the next conference, held 
on April 30, 1951, the Volksbund found itself isolated, with no support from either state 
governments, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, or the organization of persecuted 
Social Democrats, (the VVN did not send a representative).  Among those present, only the 
Volksbund still supported using Reminiscere for a nation-wide memorial day for the war dead, 
thus freezing public memory into a soldier/civilian dichotomy and plainly rewarding soldiers’ 
deaths more highly.  The Protestant Church’s staunch declaration that it would boycott any 
Reminiscere-holiday (while the Catholic Church was simultaneously uninterested in debating 
“worldly affairs”), struck the Federal Interior Minister as considerable roadblock.  Aside from 
                                                 
253 Von Lutzen, Verhandlungen über die behördliche Festsetzung eines für das gesamte Bundesgebiet einheitlichen 
Gedenktages für die Toten des Krieges, 15 May 1951, transcript forwarded via  Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräbewrfürsorge e.V. Bundesgeschäftsstelle to the Herren Vorsitzenden der Landesverbände des Volksbundes 
Deutsche Kriegsgr:aberfürsorge, 15 May 1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, letter, VDK A.100-141.   
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objections to the continued use of the spring holiday grounded in liturgical arguments, the 
Federal Interior Minister also believed that “doubtless in wide-ranging counties” there was 
“opposition to the Sunday Reminiscere out of political considerations,” given that the 
Volksbund’s proposal was “burdened after the Falsification of Heldengedenktag.”  Whatever 
their determination to hold onto this spring holiday, the Volksbund agreed with the other parties 
to move Volkstrauertag to the fall but not to grafting it onto any other Sunday already recognized 
as a holiday.254  With final details left undecided, it was at least clear at this point that West 
Germans’ public mourning and the collective memory if would carry would expand beyond the 
pre-1945 confines of a military holiday.    
 
Remembrance through political muscle 
 In winnowing down the final details of the reformed Volkstrauertag, the Protestant 
Church used its influence and personal connections to both the Volksbund and the political class 
to exert decisive influence in resolving the Volkstrauertag question in its favor.  While the 
Catholic Church agreed that moving Volkstrauertag to November was a good idea, the chief 
Catholic Archbishop in West Germany, Cardinal Frings, believed that any Sunday in November, 
whether they conflicted with Allerseelen, Totensonntag, or neither, would be acceptable.255  The 
Protestant Church’s West German leadership, however, was not content to take such a “hands 
                                                 
254 Ibid, Präsident, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. to the Bundesministerium des Innern, 24 May 
1951, letter, VDK A.100-141. According to other records, the BVN was involved in these discussions in West 
Germany (and also were in agreement with the Protestant Church, the persecuted Social Democrats, and the 
government ministers in rejecting Reminiscere).  Referat III [Osterloh] to Herrn Präsident D. Brünotte, 22 May 
1951, regarding Ratssitzung – Volkstrauertag, letter, EZAB 2/4416.  The Bund Verfolgten des Naziregimes (BVN) 
was the West German, non-Communist and thus non-SED-aligned organization of leftists persecuted by the Nazis 
who split with the VVN in 1948.  For the BVN-VVN split, see Margalit, 128-129. 
   
255 Copy of Der Erzbischof von Köln to the Bundesminister des Innern, Herrn Minister Dr. Lehr, 11 July 1951, 
regarding Ihr Schreiben vom 14. Juni 1951, letter, EZAB 2/4416. 
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off” stance.  The national Protestant Church’s government liaison officer in Bonn, 
Oberkirchenrat Ranke, repeatedly urged federal officials to summon VDK President Hagemann 
(who was also a senior official in the provincial Protestant Church of Lower Saxony), to a 
personal meeting so that the government could “read him the riot act [ihm den Marsch zu 
blasen].”  Ranke also urged Edo Osterloh, the national Protestant Church’s Special 
Representative for Volkstrauertag [Sachbearbeiter für Volkstrauertag] to get in touch with 
Hermann Ehlers, President of the West German Parliament, who had recently delivered the 
Volkstrauertag address in February 1951, and “whom at this time is in good standing with the 
Volksbund,” to make sure that Ehlers “does not step out of line again in the coming year [aus der 
Reihe tanzt].”256  These strong-arm tactics by the Protestant leadership on the question of public 
mourning reveal both the commitment of a new generation of churchmen to assert their influence 
in important matters of state and the public’s interest (as they saw it).  These bold suggestions 
that the government bully a private civic group into acquiescence might have felt eerily familiar 
except that, in this case, Protestant and center-right political leaders felt a common fear over 
allowing the older style of martial public mourning for soldiers to return.  If the Nazis had used 
fundamentally similar tactics, though admittedly much more brutally and directed at a much 
more sinister goal, this irony was lost on all parties. 
 The Protestant Church’s aggressive tactics did not end here.  Scarcely a month after 
Ranke laid out his plan of action for muscling the Volksbund into submission, he met with VDK 
President Hagemann in person, arguing that “in his capacity as a former member of the 
[provincial church of Lower Saxony’s] council,” Hagemann should, according to Ranke, 
“personally engage himself so that the conflict between the Protestant Church and the Volksbund 
                                                 
256 OKR Ranke to Herrn Oberkirchenrat Edo Osterloh, 4 August 1951, regarding Volkstrauertag, letter, EZAB 
2/4416. 
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on account of the Sunday Reminiscere would be ended.”  Ranke made clear that this was a fight 
about more than a calendar date, reaching to the fundamental assumptions behind 
Volkstrauertag.  The Church felt obligated to ensure “that beside the war dead, the dead in the 
home front and in the Concentration Camps also would be remembered.”  This suggestion of a 
wider palette of victims than simply dead soldiers “was strikingly [erschütterndeweise] new to 
Dr. Hagemann.”  In a final thrust to convince Hagemann, and the entire Volksbund by extension, 
to relent, Ranke threatened that “the Volksbund may not, from a financial standpoint, possess the 
room to maneuver for a showdown with the Protestant Church.”257  The Church’s rough tactics 
did not go unnoticed, as the Hermann Ehlers, President of the West German Parliament, wrote to 
Protestant Church Councilor Osterloh out of concern that the outward appearance of the Church 
seeking “to torpedo the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge” could diminish the 
justification of Church’s argument for wanting a new date for the holiday.258 
 
Turning away from tradition? 
 With the Volksbund isolated but obstinately holding out to at least keep Volkstrauertag as 
a special Sunday apart from other religious holidays, the debate slowed into stagnation.259  
Desperate for political support to bolster its position, the VDK wrote again to the Federal 
Minister of the Interior but to both the Federal Chancellor and the Federal President this time 
also, arguing the lamentable situation of Germans in different places holding memorial 
                                                 
257 OKR Ranke to Herrn Oberkichenrat Edo Osterloh, 13 September 1951,  letter, EZAB 2/4416. 
 
258 Dr. H. Ehlers, Präsident des Deutschen Bundestages to Herrn Oberkirchenrat Osterloh, 18 October 1951, letter, 
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ceremonies for their dead at different times and in different manners.260  To these pleas for 
consideration, both President Heuss and Chancellor Adenauer replied that memorial days were a 
matter for the Interior Minister alone to decide.261  The Federal Interior Minister stood in 
agreement with his earlier conviction that using Reminiscere was a mistake, because “it will 
conclude in itself the exact same dangers as we already have had.”262  On January 30, 1952, the 
Minister wrote a letter to the Volksbund outlining his decision.  Noting the near-universal support 
for moving Volkstrauertag to November, he reproached the VDK, saying that the re-initiation of 
the Reminiscere observances were also precluded by other “weighty political considerations” and 
that the VDK were aware of these reservations.  Rejecting any reason or support from historical 
examples to support the March holiday and noting that elections scheduled on that particular 
Sunday in Württemberg and Baden could not be moved earlier or later, Minister Lehr concluded 
that the remembrance observance must be held in November.263 
                                                 
260 Geschäftsführender Präsident to Herrn Bundesinnenminister Dr. Lehr, 20 November 1951, letter forwarded via 
Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. Generalsekretär to Herrn Konstantin von Beguelin, 22 November 
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Sonntag Reminiscere, letter, EZAB 7/3090. 
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 While Lehr left the door open for the Volksbund to suggest when in November they 
would like to schedule Volkstrauertag, the Volksbund leaders realized that they were not likely to 
win their campaign to preserve the Reminiscere Sunday date.  In one last surge of protest, the 
Volksbund sought to muster politically supportive organizations of German war victims to levy 
pressure on parliamentary representatives and government ministers to save Reminiscere as 
Volkstrauertag’s date.264  Oblivious to the worst fears of their critics (that a springtime 
Reminiscere would give the impression that the Federal Republic was a continuation of the 
previous regime in terms of where public sympathies and memory were directed), the Volksbund 
made the strategic mistake of making public appeals to support the old-style Volkstrauertag from 
civil society organizations who tended to lean right politically.  Those included organized groups 
of veterans, wounded veterans, survivors of wounded- or killed veterans, veteran paratroopers, as 
well as civilian refugees from the German lands lost to Poland or Czechoslovakia as a result of 
the war (Landsmannschaften).265  These organizations did not have enough sway in political life 
to change the tides of public mourning. 
 The Volksbund was correct in perceiving that there was a political element to this debate 
over public mourning but they misunderstood it.  Whether Germans dedicated their attention to 
mourning on Reminiscere or some Sunday in November was not a fight over whether they voted 
CDU and SPD.  Rather, the politics here was in relationship to the Nazi past, a fight over 
nearness to versus distance from all things associated with the Third Reich.  Organizations who 
represented veterans, dead soldiers’ families, wounded soldiers’ families and people made 
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landless by shifting positions of the armies all established a means of remembering the Second 
World War that centered on the front lines, the army’s experience, and the bodies that were 
shipped home in coffins.  What these would-be visual reminders of the need to mourn on 
Reminiscere were missing was a tangible recognition that the war did not stop at the front but 
continued into cities and small towns, both inside and outside of the German borders.  The old 
Volkstrauertag could not represent the reality of the Second World War that the critical 
Protestant Church and cautious conservative government knew was true.266    
 On February 20, 1952, Oberkirchenrat Osterloh received a series of telephone calls from 
the Federal Minister of the Interior’s office, informing him that the VDK and the Minister had 
abruptly agreed on the suitability of the second-to-last Sunday of the church year for 
Volkstrauertag 1952.  While this was not quite the result the Protestant leadership was hoping 
for, they were willing to accept the decision as better than the continued use of Reminiscere.267  
Now it seemed that the West German state would decisively turn away from the old martial 
traditions of its past, though not quite in the same fashion as its East German sibling. 
 
One past, two memories 
 Besides Germans individually, or in civil society, political leaders’ understandings of the 
war enabled or limited choices for public mourning.  While the SED limited it to only “victims 
of fascism,” the Federal Republic allowed Volkstrauertag but forced it to assume a shape quite 
                                                 
266 Even within the VDK, consensus over Reminiscere was eroding, with the provincial chapters in Bavaria and 
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different from Nazi practices, as well as content much broader.  In the process of setting the 
boundaries, East- and West German political leaders framed their states’ relationship to the 
(common) Nazi past.  At the same time, public memory ritual acted as “teachable moments,” 
where leaders acted to show the public what needed to be “learned” from the dead.  In this less 
formal but still important pedagogical function, East German- and West German public 
mourning helped define the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany, 
respectively, as two “imagined communities” of common purpose – avoiding a return to 
Nazism.268 
 
Evolving conceptions of mourning 
 In 1918 and continuing throughout the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, officially-
sanctioned German public mourning served to direct attention only to German soldiers and later 
to Nazi paramilitary “fighters.”  However, in 1945 the subject of officially sanctioned mourning 
was not as simple.  Competing versions of remembered history, as well as contemporary political 
concerns within each of the dueling Nazi successor states, pushed public memory in many new 
directions at the same time. 
 
Soldiers as a “completely different type” of dead 
 The bitter emotions and restless energies poured into this controversy over mourning 
points to the importance of mourning the right people, to support the correct memory of the past, 
in the eyes of the belligerents.  That the different parties represented different understandings of 
                                                 
268 This concept comes, of course, from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, Revised edition (London, 2006). 
  
116 
 
the same history is evident from responses to the settlement, too.  Wrote one former Marine 
chaplain from Cuxhaven, “I am quite concerned” at the news of the changed holiday.269  Such 
rearranging and reimagining of an old, military-centric tradition would, he feared, would “knock 
everything over and cause confusion.”270  Another supporter of the old Reminiscere holiday from 
Braunschweig wrote that moving Volkstrauertag to November, “the time of darkness, of dying-
off of all earthly things [Absterbens alles Vergänglichen],” was a clear mistake.  Better to keep 
public mourning firmly in “the time of nature’s re-awakening, of spring,” thought this critic.271  
“Dissatisfaction reigns,” wrote an individual from Bogholxhausen, because families could no 
longer mourn for their dead sons and husbands as they used to.  Nonetheless, “in a few 
localities,” small groups of faithful will observe their own Volkstrauertag on Reminiscere.272   
 Not only were supporters of the old holiday disappointed at losing their tradition, they 
resented being told that their memory of the war was wrong.  If Volkstrauertag could no longer 
serve as a day only for soldiers, it meant that these dead might not receive the attention their 
families felt they deserved.  One woman who lost her father, brother, father-in-law and brother-
in-law in the First World War and who then lost her husband in the Second World War summed 
up the view of these supporters of the traditional springtime Volkstrauertag well: “[t]hrough this 
that the church would so engage itself for a repositioning of Volkstrauertag,” the Protestant 
                                                 
269 On German military chaplains’ contribution to the Nazi war effort, see Doris L. Bergen, “German Military 
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Church, which had for so long pushed for Reminiscere’s elimination as a memorial day, was 
party to a “turning away from soldiers [der Abkehr vom Soldaten].”273  Concerned about the 
long-term prospects for public participation in Volkstrauertag, the General-Secretary of the 
VDK, Otto Margraf, wrote that Volkstrauertag must one day return to a spring-time date, 
because “the memory of the dead of the war” is “a completely different type from that of any 
other dead, who  in the normal course of life go on to eternity.”274  For the VDK and its 
sympathizers, the military dead were truly the point of memory and of mourning. 
 
War as “unbounded suffering” 
 For those who carried a memory of the war that recognized more than simply the affairs 
of soldiers, their memories of the war consequently varied considerably.  The East German state, 
for one, privileged German communists’ unique experience of the war as armed resistors fighting 
against the Nazis.  The communist memory, thus, supported a vision of the past where only anti-
fascist fighters stood for what was right and whose deaths alone deserved memorial attention and 
honor, as an example for future generations.  Though diametrically opposed, politically speaking, 
to the old German nationalism that characterized the old Volkstrauertag, the “Memorial Day for 
the Victims of Fascism” was nearly as selective and exclusive. 
 There were also critical responses to the old Volkstrauertag from some Protestant leaders 
who felt that allowing a special day to mourn the war dead at all was a mistake.  For these 
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churchmen, all the dead were equal before God, thus none required special attention.  After all, 
the war had killed soldiers and civilians alike, all of whom were equally dead, without any 
expectation of distinction in the afterlife (as Christians understood it).  If all were equally sinners 
in the eyes of God, a holiday like Volkstrauertag seemed to suggest that soldiers were more 
worthy or more deserving, which threatened the Church’s doctrinal message for Totensonntag.275  
If the point of mourning was to realize the equal imperfection of all sinners before God (or at 
least, the non-distinction between soldiers and sinners), this then required grieving for simply all 
the dead, implying the need to merge Volkstrauertag with Totensonntag once and for all.276   
 The West German government, along with more moderate Protestant leaders, embraced a 
middle ground between the unpalatable trifecta of embracing soldiers exclusively, rejecting any 
distinction among the dead at all, and embracing the communist resistors as being worthy 
opposites of soldiers.  In his keynote address at the 1952 November Volkstrauertag, President 
Heuss navigated a fine line between acknowledging all the victims and still distancing himself 
from the fallen Nazi regime.  Heuss insisted that “the time is past for heroification; here is simply 
unbounded suffering” [da ist es vorbei mit dem Heroisieren; da ist einfach grenzenloses Leid].”  
Germans could truthfully no longer view their dead soldiers on a pedestal and ignore the other 
peoples who died, since “the victims are a thousand more,” extending from bombing victims, to 
                                                 
275 Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland, Das Landeskirchenamt to the An die Kirchenkanzleii der Evangelischen 
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A.100-140. 
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Concentration Camps, “and to the Jewish cemeteries.”  They were all killed because of a 
criminal regime whose nature must be acknowledged by Germans trying to rebuild their lives.  
Heuss spoke directly to the soldiers, imploring them to take a more self-critical view of their own 
experience while at the same time congratulating them for having done their duty: “He, the 
soldier, carried the most difficult burden, that he not only had to protect the German homeland – 
which he did happily” but that he was doing so at a time when that homeland saw “the driving 
out of honesty and law through cynicism and crude violence,” which in turn “eroded the inner 
sense of a “just war,” which seeks only to protect humanity.” 277  Heuss demonstrates the precise 
nature of Volkstrauertag in the post-1945 context: a compromise between completely ignoring 
the singular experience of German soldiers and lauding those soldiers’ determination and deaths 
to the exclusion of all other experiences of the war.     
 
A tradition now open to change? 
 While each of these critical reactions to Volkstrauertag were slightly different, they 
demonstrate together the resonance of alternative traditions of public mourning that moved 
beyond a sample fascination with soldiers.  Though the Communist narrative bore little 
resemblance to the eventual newly reformed Volkstrauertag for West Germany, they prove that 
Germans had several viable and resonant models for public mourning in this new context.  More 
importantly, these alternatives demonstrate that the conversation over public mourning was one 
evolving and open to change. 
 
                                                 
277 Deutscher Volkstrauertag. Ansprache des Herrn Bundespräsidenten Professor Dr. Theodor Heuss gehalten in 
einer Feierstunde aus Anlass den Volkstrauertages am 16. November 1952 im Plenarsaal des Bundeshauses in Bonn, 
booklet, VDK A.100-16. 
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Conclusion: The end of a tradition? 
 May 8, 1945 was a decisive moment in German history, marked by contradictions of 
radical changes but also a degree of continuity, all in the same event.  Despite the division of the 
fallen Third Reich, Germans all showed the common challenge of mourning for lost loved ones 
amid uncertain present circumstances.  Collectively, Germans’ reactions to grieve for the dead 
while simultaneously struggling to explain why those dead had lost their lives added up to a 
decisive departure from the public memory tradition of 1918. 
 Firstly, Germans did not all remember the same war.  Those who understood the war as a 
traditional conflict in the pattern of 19th century Great Power struggles structured their memories 
accordingly – seeing an event that only involved soldiers.  If only soldiers had been involved, so 
this thinking ran, then only soldiers were the subject of public mourning.  Yet other survivors of 
the war saw the deaths of antifascist fighters, of civilian aerial bombing victims, of expellees and 
even (in a very few cases) Jews.  These critics of the old Volkstrauertag envisioned a different 
class of victims as the subject of mourning, based on their different memory of the war itself.  
The common element across the disagreements on victims and mourning was that all agreed to 
the deaths of millions.  Beyond the loss felt by all, the details had to be negotiated. 
 Secondly, Germans’ political leaders similarly made choices about publicly remembering 
the war and mourning the dead according to how these leaders understood the victims.  Yet these 
leaders at the same time saw a role for public mourning and public memory recitation in defining 
how the East- and West German states defined their relationship to the Nazi period.  Thus, it was 
crucial to these leaders to set the boundaries of acceptable discourse in such a way as to prevent 
any appearance of Nazi sympathy.  These boundaries then framed the possibilities for individuals 
to publicly mourn their own dead and the dead of their nation. 
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 Thirdly, the object of public mourning in 1945 was far more open to question then it had 
been in 1918.  Given the difference in popular perceptions of the war, along with politicians’ 
goals in defining mourning practices, this is perhaps unsurprising.  Yet this meant that 1945 
marked a moment when Germans were pushed by their own memories or by their leaders into 
lowering the social prestige and exclusivity of the soldier back to an even level with the rest of 
German society.  To be sure, public discourse was not inflexible and individuals were still free to 
make up their own minds on the matter.  However, in the public sphere, at least, “the time for 
heroization” of soldiers had ended. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
“Prioritizing the human and personal aspects:”  
Rethinking war and death in Germany, 1952-1961 
 
 Ten years after American artillery had encamped there to repel the Wehrmacht’s 
Ardennes Offensive, Luxembourgers had ample reason to gaze wearily across the Mosel River.  
Twice in the previous generation, German troops had brought destruction and now the Federal 
Republic of Germany was creating a new military force.  In February 1955, leaders of the 
Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge happily concluded that, “the political atmosphere … 
has largely relaxed,” to the point where they could build a Germany military cemetery near 
Luxembourg City.  Keen to manage their public image, these leaders explained that “[i]f 
possible, we would like to prevent a storm of German spectators” from flooding across the 
border to visit, which might have alarmed or at least offended the locals.278  Even though West 
Germans had by 1952 agreed that older mourning traditions would not be statically preserved 
into the future, any public mourning event still trod a fine line between acceptance and scandal, a 
tension summed up in the planning for the Luxembourg cemetery.   
 Public mourning for the war dead in each Germany was made more challenging by the 
contemporary post-1945 context.  By the mid-1950s, each Germany was building its own new 
military and moving to ally that new military with NATO in the west and the Warsaw Pact in the 
East.  Besides the call to take up arms only a decade after the German army’s defeat, the new 
context of the Cold War giving rise to actual violence (as in Korea in 1950) made the prospect of 
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rearmamnent more troubling.  Furthermore, the possession and readiness to deploy nuclear 
weapons on both the part of the US and the USSR gave Germans fear that the next war would 
leave only a charred stretch of land between the superpowers.   
 These concerns over the nearness of the next war and the greatly increased death toll that 
would likely follow it corresponded with Germans’ efforts to re-think the ways they had 
understood and remembered the human costs of war.  The Second World War, like the First, had 
been a total war, delivering violence already against civilian populations beyond the front lines.  
The fact that the Second World War, with the key role played there by aerial bombing, had been 
far deadlier for civilian populations was all the more reason to fear a dynamic toward ever more 
casualties from war and decreasing prospects that foreign policy objectives could be settled 
cleanly via military violence.  That is, both East and West Germans began to realize that, 
wherever the next conflict might take place, the war would inevitably reach back home and its 
effects would be inescapable. 
 In order to more completely characterize the nature and content of Germans’ collective 
memory of the Second World War, this chapter will examine the content of public mourning in 
each Germany but also place these events into their 1950s and early 1960s political, military and 
cultural contexts.  Four questions will guide this chapter: Firstly, how did West Germans divide 
their attention between collectively remembering the experience of war on one hand and the 
history of the Nazi dictatorship on the other?  Secondly, how did Volkstrauertag designers 
present the Second World War emotionally or aesthetically?  Thirdly, to what extent did East 
Germans, at a state-level and below at a more local level, imagine and re-imagine the Second 
World War and its “lessons” for future generations?  Fourthly, to what extent were public 
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mourning ceremonies in West Germany products of political concerns relating to the present 
democratic moment, rather than simply reactions to the discredited fascist past? 
 
Contemplating war in the Federal Republic, 1952-1956 
 In order to publicly mourn the war dead, West Germans had to collectively remember the 
war, which meant somehow also publicly discussing the Nazi dictatorship.  Unsurprisingly, it 
was easier for West German civil society- and political leaders to speak with authority about the 
hardship of war than to credibly claim to have worked to stop the Nazis.  While the mid- and late 
1950s did not see a protracted and self-critical engagement with Germans’ support for (or at 
least, passive compliance with) the racist and aggressive policies of the Nazis, 279 this period did 
see a conscious effort to re-imagine “war” and the value German society had ascribed to wars 
and warriors over the past century-and-a-half.  The monumental celebration of conflicts across 
the nineteenth-century and through the First World War had largely emphasized “the dead” as 
“fallen soldiers,” who were understood as the primary (if not sole) element of the population 
harmed by war.280  Yet in what was one of many “learning processes”281 enforced upon and then 
encouraged among West Germans at this time, Volkstrauertag ceremonies increasingly took 
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measures to include a wider set of non-combatant deaths, as well as non-German deaths, which 
could no longer be excluded from a meaningful and serious effort to understand and explain war. 
 
Civilians and non-civilians 
 The West German parliament took a large step in this process of re-conceptualizing war 
when they enacted the “Law for the Maintenance of War Graves (War Graves Law)” in the 
spring of 1952.  This War Graves Law provided federal funding for the construction of 
cemeteries for “the war dead” who were buried inside of (West) German territory, plus the costs 
of the actual burials, as well as a lump sum for upkeep and maintenance of these graves, with the 
VDK being assigned as the sole contractor for carrying out these designs.282  This 1952 law 
expanded upon a similar 1922 measure but, beyond members of regular the armed forces, the 
1952 law defined “war graves” as also extending to individuals who died performing 
“paramilitary services.”283  Whether “paramilitary” was meant to include Wehrmacht 
Auxiliaries, German Red Cross, or even SS members, is not clear.284  Nonetheless, the 
designation of “war dead,” and thus how the West German public ought to understand the effects 
of war on their population, now included the battlefield dead, those who died as a result of 
injuries received in the course of their duties beyond the battlefield, those who died in POW 
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camps, on the return journey home from POW camps, or shortly after their arrival in West 
Germany after their release form POW camps.285  Thus, West Germans’ legal understanding of 
the phrase, “war dead,” had by 1952 grown to encompass the larger variety of military- or 
military-related experiences of war, keeping the military aspect of remembering the Second 
World War foremost in the public’s mind but simultaneously minimizing the attention given 
understanding the rise of the Third Reich who launched the war.   
 The Nazi regime was not entirely absent from the War Graves Law but, when it did 
appear, it was as an external force that simply enacted suffering on its victims.  That is, most 
legislators (and their constituents) preferred to keep discussion of the Nazi era at arms’ length, 
with as little critical inquiry or interrogation as possible.  This is evident in Section 6 of the law, 
where the Federal Republic explained its obligation to finance the care of graves of “victims of 
National Socialism, who on the basis of political, racial, or religious reasons were brought into 
medical- or detention centers” and subsequently died.286  While a fairly clear reference to Nazi 
racial, political, and other ideological persecution, this extension of Federal recognition may 
have been more symbolic that anything, since at least as many major concentration camps were 
located outside of the 1949 borders of the Federal Republic as those located within, meaning 
those remains beyond the Oder-Neisse Line or even the Elbe River would have been ineligible 
for West German recognition and benefits.287  Indeed, the Law went on to enumerate other 
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victims of the war also due “war grave” status, who were more likely to be inside of the Federal 
Republic: “German- and ethnic German resettlers and expellees,” “civilian internnees,” 
“transported Germans,” “foreign workers…conscripted into then-current borders of the Reich to 
work,” and “foreigners cared for by internationally recognized refugee organizations who died in 
collection camps.”288  So while the West Germans did not completely ignore the Nazi past when 
it came to public mourning and collective memory, Nazi crimes and violence were largely 
emphasized only so far as they related to a conceptualization of war as an event encompassing 
many victims beyond the battlefield. 
 Whatever the blind sports and silences present in West German collective memory and 
public mourning, the documentary record does prove that West German leaders were beginning 
to recognize that, “as opposed to the understanding of the concept of war graves up to now, 
stemming from the First World War,” the reality of the Second World War, especially the 
increased scope and intensity of the violence from 1939-1945, meant that the understanding of 
“war” and its victims must likewise be widened.  “War graves are,” in light of these 
considerations, “in the future also [to be considered] the graves of civilian victims of the aerial 
bombing campaign,” too.289  More than that, “the graves of war participants of foreign nations 
who died as POWs or fell in the Second World War,” as well as “the graves of Germans and 
foreign civilian persons, who lost their lives through direct consequences of the Second World 
War” were now designated as “war graves” and considered worthy of state-led public 
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mourning.290  The sum of the regulations contained in this law, then, meant that the primary lens 
through which “war” was presented to the public via gravesites was no longer solely a military or 
combat-related role.  Instead, West Germans were told, at least on the basis of gravesites, that 
war affected civilians and non-civilians alike.  
 
Tragedy beyond control 
 The national Volkstrauertag programs in Bonn shared these conclusions about how to 
understand war’s impact on society.  The 1953 national public mourning ceremony featured 
classical music interspersed with numerous text readings, nearly all of which presented the story 
of the Second World War through the eyes of survivors grieving for their dead loved ones, rather 
than by uncritically presenting these combat deaths as evidence of soldiers’ patriotic service and 
sacrifice.  Titles such as, “To the Fallen Soldier,” “Over a Death Notice,” “Dresden 1945,” 
“Farewell in a POW Camp,” and “Letter of the Greek Bishop Nikolai of Ochrida to a Mother 
Who Could Not Finder Her Son’s Grave” all suggested that the West German audience was 
meant to understand war as a sorrowful tragedy, rather than a praiseworthy and enviable 
experience,291 and that this audience was encouraged to consider the war’s effects on the home 
front to be just as real and important as the battle front.292     
 The new emphasis on warfare as a negative experience, as well as the centrality of 
civilians’ suffering alongside military deaths, was noted by many members of the audience in 
1953.  “The effect,” wrote one civil servant, “at finding a new approach [Stil]” for organized 
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ceremonies like Volkstrauertag “is thoroughly to be welcomed.”293  Not everyone appreciated 
the diminished role of the soldiers, however, with some critics complaining about a program that 
“had morphed into a pure civilian – artificial – spirit.”294  Still others believed that the everyman 
aspect of having no single, prominent political speech made the 1953 Volkstrauertag message 
more relatable to average listeners, who could reach out and grasp the words from Dresden, from 
the Hospital Ship on the Baltic, and the long-awaited return from POW camps.295  This turn 
away from mourning only soldiers, as a way of demonstrating Germans’ priorities when 
considering war, toward a more pluralistic understanding of death and victims, made 
Volkstrauertag in 1953 something different, a chance to “buil[d] a bridge between painful 
remembrance and warning admonition to the present-day.”296  Quite far removed from the 
Weimar- and Third Reich-era official mourning holidays, 1953’s Volkstrauertag presented death 
as undesirable, unglorious, and hopefully something that future generations would not be forced 
to suffer for pursuit of national interests. 
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 The leitmotif of war as a terrible, bloody, and ultimately undesirable event also informed 
the 1954 Volkstrauertag ceremony.  That year, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
argued that the casualties of the Second World War, military and civilian, were actually 
incentives for West Germans to do all they could to avoid another war, declaring that “[w]e see 
the burning cities and villages but we hear deep within us the warning cry [mahnende Stimme] of 
the dead.”297  While his desire for peace was likely sincere, Adenauer’s message seems to rest on 
the assumption that, if only the Nazis and the military leaders had not tried to settle their political 
goals with war, then the catastrophic deaths of millions would have been avoided.  That is, in his 
remarks, Adenauer ignored the racial and aggressive character of the Nazi dictatorship, equating 
Hitler’s agenda to the wars of Kaiser Wilhelm II or even the Iron Chancellor Bismarck, only 
longer and deadlier in scale.   
 The discussion of war and its horror did not entirely evade mention of the Nazis’ crimes, 
however.  Gustave Ahlhorn, President of the VDK in 1954, pointed out the Second World War’s 
unique differences from recent German military history up to 1939, explaining that, not only had 
more soldiers died by 1945 than in 1918, “also innumerable women, old men and children in 
small towns” had perished “in the firestorms of the aerial bombing campaign,” or as the 
unnamed casualties from “the ice storms of the treck” westward, before the approaching Red 
Army, not to mention those who were killed “in prisons, camps and piled up in Gas ovens.”298  
Here Ahlhorn moved beyond indicting “war” as a problem and engaged with the problem of 
explaining the Third Reich, albeit somewhat indirectly.  Nonetheless, mentioning the Nazis in 
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passing at least encouraged the West German audience to fill in the missing details themselves 
while helping reinforce the interpretive point that “war” was explicitly considered a bad thing. 
 That Ahlhorn at least entertained the notion that more than “peace” was necessary to 
avoid another fascist dictatorship and return to bloodshed was a departure from the rest of the 
Volkstrauertag program in 1954, which featured the premier of a newly written symphony by 
Rudolph von Oertzen, titled Hiob [Job].  Hiob set to music the anguish and chaos that had been a 
common experience for many, if not most, German families during the waning years of the war.  
Though the composer’s exact intent is not clear from these records, the Biblical story of Job, if 
applied to the German experience of the Second World War, would leave soldiers and their 
families with little need to critically probe their own histories.  According to the Old Testament 
story, Job was a righteous and faithful man who suffered one catastrophe after another, not 
knowing that he was a pawn in a dispute between God and the Devil.  If West Germans were 
meant to imagine themselves as Job, then it was not possible for families to discover historical 
(or even moral) reasons why they experienced such losses and grief during the war, because the 
point of the story was the righteous man’s struggle with “the bitter question of ‘Why?’”299  
Imagining Germans-as-Job thus problematically made all Germans into bystanders or co-victims, 
while still keeping to the overall pattern of representing warfare negatively, as a catastrophe that 
reasonable people only dreaded. 
 
Fear of the future 
 By 1954, West Germans seem to have agreed that they wanted no further wars in their 
lifetime, yet the reason or justification for this conviction (as presented in the national 
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Volkstrauertag ceremony) varied from one moment to another.  As these records indicate, it was 
not unusual for the interpretive pendulum to swing from understanding soldiers as the primary 
victims of the war one year to the next year seeing civilians as the most important element of 
remembering the war, or from understanding the Nazis as the enemy in one moment to seeing 
authoritarianism in general as the problem at the next.  This plurality and fluidity of 
interpretations is especially evident in the 1955 and 1956 national Volkstrauertag ceremonies.   
 In 1955, senior representatives from West Germany’s two largest Christian confessions, 
Roman Catholicism and Lutheran- and Reformed Protestantism, gave guidance to those in grief 
and explanation to those wrestling with how to understand Germany’s recent history.  Cardinal 
Joseph Frings restricted his comments mostly to articles of Christian faith, reassuring his 
audience that, although they “mourned for the dead,” Germans ought “not to mourn as those who 
have no hope but rather as Christians who believe in their salvation through Christ.”300  Similarly 
to what listeners would hear at a funeral service, Frings denied any room for calling for 
vengeance but rather told Christians to hope for a better future in heaven, because the dead were 
good people (not perpetrators or war criminals), who would there be reunited with their 
families.301  For Cardinal Frings, there were nothing but positive consequences to follow the 
deaths of so many and no possibility that certain guilty parties may in fact have deserved some 
form of punishment.   
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 Frings’ Protestant colleague, Bishop Otto Dibelius, offered only a slightly more complex 
message in 1955, talking much more concretely about the pain of surviving family members 
grieving for dead soldiers.  Simultaneously, Dibelius argued for a special respect for soldiers 
who fought for their fatherland, declaring, “[e]ven the smallest nation has respect for those who 
wear the soldier’s uniform.”302  Dibelius’ words carried the message that Germans ought to learn 
from Second World War: wars kill enormous amounts of people and therefore future conflict 
must be avoided, because “a war in the era of atomic weapons [can] only be greeted with 
horror.”303  Thus, from both religious leaders in 1955, West Germans heard the remembered 
history of a war without the Holocaust and without war crimes but nonetheless a war not to be 
repeated. 
 In the following year, West Germans heard a sharply opposite message at Volkstrauertag.  
Writer Manfred Hausmann delivered the keynote speech, incorporating a stinging indictment of 
the Nazis and German ‘fellow travelers.’  Audiences in 1956 were told that they must remember 
the complete details and history surrounding these casualties of the Second World War, because 
the dead “have the right to the complete truth of their deaths” and the events leading to them.304  
That Hausmann called for a more complete and honest accounting for West Germans’ actions 
and choices during the Third Reich is somewhat ironic, since Hausmann himself was not an 
outright opponent of the regime, even though he did not embrace the Nazi Party and its ideas 
explicitly.305  Despite his own opaque history during the Nazi years, nevertheless Hausmann was 
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by far more explicit in naming victims of German aggression alongside German civilian victims 
of violence, pointing to “the innumerable on both sides who died woefully in camps or on the 
journey to them,” “the women and children, the old men and little babies [who died] in the 
firestorms of the bombarded cities,” and those „who because of their conviction, of their pure, 
upstanding, noble conviction, of their faith, of their deep-seated [durchgeisteten] humanity, of 
their compassion, of their political beliefs, of their birth, were deliberately pursued, beaten, shot, 
decapitated, hanged, stuck into Gas chambers, who glowed in rows of ovens.”306  Hausmann 
demanded West Germans acknowledge the dual nature of the Second World War and the 
German soldiers who participated in it, declaring that “[t]his is the face of war, which on one 
side sees deeds of such greatness and severity can be done” but which “on the other side 
[features] a bestiality without equal.”307  The point here seemed to be that individual Germans 
made choices that led to suffering of others while navigating life under a dictatorship.  Thus, the 
war-dead, soldiers and civilians alike, became an anti-hero, models of imperfection and 
humanity that signaled the potential for good and for bad.  “The Dead warn us of our own 
failings…between greatness and abominableness, not only in war but also in peace.”308 If the 
post-war West Germans were just as imperfect as their war-dead, the lesson of these deaths was, 
according to Hausmann, that war (and maybe even a fascist dictatorship) could return. 
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Hoping for no more to bury 
 The fear expressed at the end of Hausmann’s 1956 Volkstrauertag speech reveals a larger 
characteristic of West German public mourning during the middle 1950s.  When remembering 
the Second World War and grieving the dead, national Volkstrauertag ceremonies at this time 
directed more emphasis onto the wider categories of casualties inherent in 20th century warfare, 
with the fear of a new, nuclear-armed war always present.  Because the Cold War had already 
sparked a US-USSR face-off in East Asia, West Germans mourned their dead while hoping for 
no more to bury.  This intense focus on war via understanding the wide range of casualties 
corresponded with an intermittent engagement with the Nazi past, as certain words of critical 
interrogation towards Nazi supporters or even passively complicit citizens of the Third Reich did 
occasionally surface but were far less frequent than general admonition to avoid any new 
military conflict. 
 
Reframing war in the West, 1955-1959 
 Centering public mourning on the casualties of war was an aspect of Volkstrauertag in 
the 1950s that only partially differed from the Weimar-era precedents (see Chapter One).  Unlike 
the original holiday, which had adopted a largely affirmational and celebratory tone by the early 
1930s, the post-1945 version maintained a more skeptical, if not critical, outlook on warfare.  If 
Germans had somehow softened their memory of war and death in the decade-and-a-half 
following 1918, West Germans did not make the same revisions to public mourning ceremonies 
after 1945.  Rather, Volkstrauertag had by 1959 reframed the history of war in a way that that 
seemingly rejected future military conflict entirely.  Such a radical change in attitudes was 
neither universal in reach nor quick in taking effect.   
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Finding a new aesthetic 
 Volksbund leaders were attuned to the West German public’s fears of a new war and 
considered this when programming Volkstrauertag ceremonies across the 1950s.  Perhaps more 
pressing to the VDK, however, was the problem of keeping national audiences interested in 
Volkstrauertag at all.  A growing generation gap, they feared, meant that the youth of the 1950s 
had not encountered war closely enough to understand its danger, which in turn threatened to 
undermine West German society’s respect for its dead.  Above all, the Volksbund wanted to 
retain interpretive control over public mourning for the war dead.  In order to do so, they had to 
remain relevant in the public’s eye, which meant finding ways to reform and update 
Volkstrauertag. 
 In October 1955, senior representatives of the VDK met with leaders from both churches 
and from the Federal Interior Ministry, as, well as a group of publishers in the Hessian city of 
Arnoldshain to discuss a new initiative for organizing the national Volkstrauertag ceremonies 
differently.  The goal of this conference was the incorporation of different forms of memorial 
activity (e.g. art, music, drama) into the national ceremony in Bonn, imparting new life or 
relevance into the old-worn formula of keynote speeches interspersed with classical music.  The 
representatives from outside the VDK persuaded the VDK to hold an open competition to search 
for these new artistic and cultural works, with the VDK still keeping editorial veto and thus 
interpretive control.309  Not much came of these early efforts but a series of subsequent meeting 
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in December 1956 and April 1957 extended invitations to musicians and writers, soliciting their 
ideas, as well as clarifying the methods for submitting and vetting proposed works.310  Having 
agreed on the mechanics, the Volkstrauertag committee now needed to divide on what type of 
outcome they wanted.   
 In early April 1957, this special committee met in Stromberg (also in southern Hesse), to 
tackle the specifics of how to present a collective memory to the public and persuade that public 
audience of this memory’s validity, representativeness, and suitability as a guide for future 
decision-making.311  Moving from a consideration of “death” in a general sense, toward a 
discussion of the meaning of “death in wartime,” in particular, these men concluded that, when 
remembering those killed during the war, “the soldier’s death should stand in the foreground.”312  
While the committee spent little time parsing the “special German” problem of soldiers’ deaths 
in favor of offering “comfort for the surviving families,” this passing mention of the difficulty of 
placing soldiers into a post-fascist memorial tradition reveals some degree of consciousness of 
the problematic circumstances of these military deaths – unprovoked war, in the service of a 
racist dictatorship.  Nonetheless, these representatives from the VDK, the Interior Ministry and 
the West German artistic and literary elites who were planning the new Volkstrauertag evidently 
tabled further soul-searching at Stromberg, concluding instead to focus on providing „comfort,” 
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framed by a “Christian, or at least religious” interpretative framework, to the bereaved 
families.313  Even if this “comfort” for the bereaved came at the expense of confrontation over 
the Nazi past, such a compromise still left room for a critical discussion of warfare and death. 
 The committee meeting in Stromberg seems to have been keenly aware of the difficulty 
of their position.  On the one hand, Volkstrauertag was obliged to offer support to families who 
were mourning their dead soldier but on the other, political difficulties would surely follow any 
efforts to praise dead soldiers who had served the Nazi regime.  What made public mourning 
more difficult for West Germans to navigate was that, despite the emotional needs for closure 
and comfort from millions of grieving mothers, fathers, spouses and children,314 classic notions 
of soldiers’ patriotic death for the greater good or for the national interests were explanations not 
available to Germans now.315  Declared Klaus von Lutzau, the Assistant Chief of the VDK’s 
national offices in Kassel, “in response to the question of the meaning [of death],” Germans had 
“initially no clear answer to give”316 but instead were forced to „transform“ this „self-apparent 
‚Glory to the Fallen‘“ into „a peaceful, reverent bow before the war dead.“317  Whether or not 
this “reverent bow” entailed a purposeful forgetting of the military’s participation in war crimes 
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and the Holocaust,318 as well as German society’s own “moral indifference,” was left unspoken.  
What this Stromberg committee seemed to have accepted was that public mourning ceremonies 
were inherently prone to controversy.  This was because Volkstrauertag moved beyond 
mourning the act of German soldiers (and civilians) dying, to also suggest how families and 
friends ought to interpret and remember the events surrounding and leading up to these deaths.  
More than that, Volkstrauertag offered a vessel for one generation of immediate survivors and 
family members to codify and re-present this remembered past to future generations, years or 
even decades later.   
 The question at hand in 1957, then, was how to comfort families for the deaths of their 
soldiers while doing so in a way that did not invoke the ghost of German militarism.  If the VDK 
and their supporters erred on the side of offering too much praise or expressing too much love 
for the dead soldiers, they would surely please the grieving survivors but offend those in the 
wider public opposed to rearmament and who, perhaps, advocated of more self-critical collective 
memory of the Second World War.  On the other hand, if the committee was too parsimonious in 
its comfort to families, perhaps denying that their soldiers had somehow displayed virtuous 
characteristics in serving a cause greater than themselves, the effect might be scandalous in the 
eyes West German political leaders then working to integrate the new Bundeswehr into the 
NATO alliance.319  While the ultimate solution did not please all audiences, it is notable that the 
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VDK representatives and their partners in this project did not seem eager to airbrush all of the 
wrinkles out of Germans’ collective memories of the war.   
 What seems to have happened instead was to retreat and present war and death in all their 
horror and tragedy but within the framework of a “traditional” 19th century war between two 
states acting in their own legal self-interests.320  A memo to VDK members, explaining the 
“new” Volkstrauertag in advance of its debut, argued that the older tradition of romanticizing 
war and dead soldiers was no longer suitable to the post-1945 world, because a rose-tinted notion 
of soldiers sacrificing for the national good corresponded “…no more to the experiences of the 
individual, but also not to the real event.”321  Yet this newly re-designed Volkstrauertag would 
still be sensitive to the traditional understanding of a soldier’s death that many in the audience 
likely would harbor, acknowledging that “death” as experienced in civilian life “differentiates 
itself, however, completely fundamentally from the obligation to die in war.”322  This was 
because “the ‘civilian’s death’ out of reasons of age, of sickness, accident” or other normal 
aspect of civilian life was “still [a] ‘natural’ event.”  On the other hand, death in wartime seemed 
to the VDK leaders to be associated with certain higher virtues, such as “a citizen’s duty to their 
state, the duty to defend others, readiness for military deployment and for sacrifice.”323  For all 
their efforts to minimize links with a patriotic, uncritical, nationalist tradition of regarding 
                                                 
320 That is, VDK leaders seem to have ignored the racialized goals in Germany’s war seeking territorial gain for the 
purpose of gaining Lebensraum.  Instead, Volkstrauertag planners acted as if Germany’s war goals in 1939 were no 
different or no more problematic than its goals in 1918, or any other nation’s war aims in 1918 (or even across the 
nineteenth century).  On the centrality of “race and space” in the Second World War, see Doris L. Bergen, War and 
Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust, 2nd edition (2009).  
 
321 Informationsbrief Nr.5 vom 5. Oktober 1959, memorandum outlining the history of the project to develop new 
content for Volktrauertat which had culminated in the play, Der Andere, no author, 5 October 1959, VDK A.10-69.  
 
322 Ibid. 
 
323 Ibid. 
 
141 
 
soldiers as heroes, Volkstrauertag designers still prompted audiences to express sympathy for the 
warrior at the expense of the civilian, even as this newly-reformed public mourning apparatus 
ignored the dictatorship and its crimes that had made the Second World War different from those 
conflicts before it.  If West Germans were ever to let go of their affection for soldiers, it would 
only be the result of a shocking realization that a rejection of war and death required a similar 
rejection of soldiers’ exalted value. 
 
A price too high? 
 Even if the Volksbund and its partners dared not offend military veterans’ families or 
opponents of West German rearmament, the initial ‘new’ Volkstrauertag that resulted from this 
long set of deliberations featured a play that presented a sharply darker view of war.  The radio 
drama Der Andere, with text by Otto Heinrich Kühner and music by Rudolf von Oertzen 
(composer of Hiob), still centered memory and mourning on the war in a “traditional” sense (that 
is, combatant deaths and formal battle lines) but did so at the expense of remembering the Third 
Reich and its crimes, attributing the outbreak of simply to the people on one side of a river 
growing envious of neighbors on the other side.324  In this mythical world, soldiers appeared not 
as professional warriors but as transplanted civilians and the characters “Der Eine” and “Der 
Andere” (The One [Soldier]  and The Other [Soldier]), soldiers on campaign, bemoaned the pity 
that humans could make warfare while also praying, singing, and exploring the heavens and 
nature.325  While on campaign, both soldiers fell in love with a girl from the enemy land and 
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eventually quarreled over which man would eventually marry her.326  The character ”Death” 
interrupted their argument only to warn that, in the next day’s battle, one of the two soldiers 
would die, leaving the other one to marry the girl.  This disavowal by “Death” for any 
responsibility relating to the millions of soldiers’ deaths in the Second World War is where the 
play was meant to strike home with viewers, as “Death” explained that humans were the ones 
with free will from God but who still decided to wreck all of their peaceful accomplishments 
with fruitless war.327  Der Andere and Volkstrauertag 1959 made clear that remembering the 
war, not the dictatorship, was the intended framework of West German collective mourning. 
 In this respect, the 1959 ceremony echoed the 1954 Hiob Symphony, equating war with 
random and meaningless death.  However accurate this conclusion may have been, it omitted any 
explanation of the army’s complicity and eagerness to launch the Second World War, its 
officers’ own aggressive anti-Slavic sentiment on the Eastern Front, and their tacit (at least) 
cooperation in  Hitler’s racial policies in the conquered areas.  ”Death” offered the soldiers a 
deal: one soldier of the two must die, “One of you must be The Other One,” but to serve no 
greater purpose or end.328  As the two soldiers cast lots over the girl, they came to a draw and 
realized how much pain and heartache war brought to all participants.329  The effect of Der 
Andere, then, was to give war a human face, showing life opportunities that were wrecked by 
war and warriors who appeared as humans with no a priori desire to fight and kill. 
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 Der Andere and the 1959 Volkstrauertag that presented it not only aspired to shape West 
Germans’ collective memory and public mourning practices in respect to the Second World War 
but also aimed to influence their future behavior, too.  In this play, humans also learned to pursue 
peace, with the mortally wounded “Other One” exhorting “The One” to “Forget us not!  And let 
us not have fallen in vain!  Give our death meaning: peace!”330  When “Death”  approached “The 
One” to ask if he was satisfied that he got to live, “The One” replied no, because “[h]e died in 
my place” and was “no guiltier than I.”331  “Death” was disappointed that humans had by then 
learned to avoid future wars and never again “allow him his dead.”332  The moral of this story 
could not have been clearer to West Germans in 1959: war is no longer winnable, is too costly 
and promises nothing to be gained except more death.  In the words of ”The One,” “[e]ach 
additional Dead One proves that war always kills more.  Now the price is too high for us.”333  
Instead, Germans had now learned, to “have no more hope in victory”334 but rather only distrust 
the prospect of war.  After all, realized the mother of the dead soldier in the play, “everywhere 
there are the same tears and the same life and the same death.”335  Thus, the lesson of public 
mourning, here fixed upon the war (but not the dictatorship), was learning that wars ought to be 
avoided, however appealing a solution they might appear. 
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 As groundbreaking a departure from custom as Volkstrauertag 1959 was, public reaction 
seems to have been split, with many of those present in person for the Bonn ceremony 
responding positively but many of those listening to the broadcast via television or radio voicing 
less approval.  Wrote one senior civil servant, Der Andere presented, “for the first time, the 
tragedy of the meaninglessness of this unnatural and more or less coincidental death, in its 
complete depth.”336  Moreover, this play provided a “warning” to stave off “a repeat of this 
senselessness,” which would surely come to pass in another war, if contemporary Germans (and 
Europeans) did not heed the truth that death in war was something tragic.  It was clear in 1959 
that the “cloud” of the “’dulce est pro patria mori’” sentiment of the First World War 
generation had now been completely removed.337  Instead, Der Andere left the audience to 
ponder solely the personal painfulness of war and death, “prioritizing…the human and personal 
aspects of death in war,” and the “intransitoriness of this suffering,” as ends far removed “from 
all things ‘völkisch’ and interpretations of the soldier’s death relating to the state.”338  While a 
majority of responses from the broadcast audience, as well as the individual VDK state-level 
chapters, were negative, this criticism was directed in part to the quality to the transmission and 
partly at the exclusion of a more complete discussion of the Nazi dictatorship.339  Thus, the 
interpretation of war as “bad” scarcely met with protest. 
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Learning the right lessons 
 On the whole, the sentiments characterizing Volkstrauertag across the 1950s 
corresponded with the West German public’s reservations about rearmament, attesting to a 
collective skepticism of renewed military obligations for West German men and fear of their 
deaths in a new, deadlier war.   By and large, the threat of war or recourse to war (in a nuclear 
age) seemed more likely to West Germans than a return to Nazism, in no small part due to the 
fact that nuclear weapons and Cold War brinksmanship in Washington and Moscow lay largely 
beyond Bonn’s ability to control.  Moreover, West Germans were convinced that they could 
never again succumb to Nazism and thus they did not need to worry about encountering a new 
fascist dictatorship.  Having gone through denazification by the Allies and then reversing what 
they (West Germans) considered to have been the excesses of denazification, West Germans 
were confident that they could trust themselves to embrace democracy (even if a conservative 
type) and steer a clear of fascist and socialist strongmen.340   
 This near-consensus that future wars proved a more pressing threat than future 
dictatorships is a key insight into understanding the much-documented “silence” about the Nazi 
years in 1950s West Germany.  If West Germans had believed future dictatorships were a threat, 
this would mean that ordinary West Germans could become Nazis again and furthermore might 
bear some guilt for having accepted the Nazi dictatorship the first time around.  Whereas, if these 
survivors were in fact also victims of a police state, who had never voted for or sympathized with 
the NSDAP, and who had learned never again to countenance a dictatorship, they could safely 
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ignore the problem of remembering the rise of National Socialism and its crimes, even if doing 
so would only have warned future generations.341   
 Overall, then, this project to re-imagine Volkstrauertag as a “lesson” about the experience 
of war undeniably presented “war” as a negative, pointless affair.  The tragic death of so many 
warriors was not really celebrated but instead Germans created room to commemorate the 
abstract casualty lists as human faces and shattered lives.  Because the point here was to avoid a 
return to warfare in the future, Volkstrauertag made very clear to the audience that they should 
not consider the Second World War (and maybe even the First World War) as conflicts limited in 
their reach to battlefields and generals’ map tables.  Rather, Germans’ experience taught that 
nearly every aspect of military and civilian life was impacted by war.  Furthermore, all Germans 
ought to be very careful in imagining any future military conflict, with a view to avoiding the 
massive loss of life that would surely follow.  
  
Mourning in East Germany: Remembrance and Resistance, 1953-1960 
 East German leaders also encouraged their citizenry to reconsider long-held assumptions 
about war, albeit differently from the process at hand in the Federal Republic.  While 
remembering past wars and cautioning against a threatened new war posed challenges to East 
Berlin, the East German Communist Party did not believe that some sort of romantic 19th century 
notion of combat might allow any reckless diplomat or statement to escalate disagreements into 
wars.  Similarly, the SED did not believe that an appreciation of war’s grotesque effects upon 
society beyond the trenches would help avert popular lust for battle.  Rather, the SED continued 
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to see war as a threat specific to fascism, something that could only be prevented by proactive 
propaganda campaigns to denounce lingering “fascism” in West Germany and its patron, the 
United States.342  Thus, public mourning in the GDR during the 1950s also assumed the form of 
a “lessons to be learned” warning, similarly to the Federal Republic.  The key difference here 
was that the East presented itself as having already “learned” these “lessons” and thus better 
positioned avoid future calamity.  
 
Anti-fascist lessons 
 The annual OdF Memorial Day in East Germany continued to serve as an occasion for 
the SED to remind its citizens and the world that they (the GDR) understood the causes and costs 
of war.  During the early 1950s, these public mourning occasions highlighted the East German 
state’s status as being “on guard,” watching for the rise of a new fascist threat and ready to 
counter it.  GDR leaders called on East Germans to direct their continued struggle toward the 
realization and preservation of peace (meaning a united Germany under SED leadership), which 
would evidence all Germans’ faithful memory of these antifascist dead.  Neues Deutschland 
reported that the 1953 OdF day was “the day, on which the peace-loving people of the entire 
world honor[ed] the heroic fighters against fascism and remember[ed] the victims of the fascistic 
terror.”343  The memory of antifascist resistance in 1953 did not celebrate exclusively German 
resistance fighters, but included the “millions of antifascists who led the peoples under the yoke 
of Hitlerfascism [Hitlerfaschismus] in a loyally allied struggle with the glorious Soviet army 
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against the Nazi beasts [Nazibestien].”344  Unlike the Federal Republic, who had to learn how to 
de-emphasize soldiers in its memorial traditions, the GDR, at least officially, already ranked 
civilian political resistance fighters above regular military contingents in relating the experience 
of the Second World War.   
 To be sure, the GDR’s leaders reckoned only those civilians who did take up arms in 
order to wage war upon the Nazis as worthy of top-tier recognition.  Beyond that, the only 
soldiers whom the SED likely had in mind to celebrate were Red Army troops, making public 
mourning more of an international affair in the German Democratic Republic.  The international 
aspect of this collective memory nevertheless reinforced the message that “out of the struggle of 
the antifascist resistance fighters, the German people [had to] pull the deciding lessons,” 
articulated by GDR leaders as resisting the “plans of the imperialistic reaction” and 
“mobiliz[ing] all power for the struggle over the national reunification of Germany and the 
conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.”345  These lessons about war, according to the 
Communist Party, meant that the GDR had to stand ready to repel the next assault, which would 
surely come from West Germany.  Yet “war” was still something considered “bad,” an event to 
be feared, which made the GDR’s public mourning in some ways consistent with Volkstrauertag 
in the Federal Republic. 
 
                                                 
344 Ibid.  This rhetoric centering attention on the Soviet army is more notable as it follows the June 17, 1953 East 
German uprising, which was put down via intervention of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany.   
 
345 Ibid.  Throughout the Cold War both East and West Germany housed Soviet and NATO troops, respectively.  
The possibility of German unity in exchange for peaceful German neutrality that did not threaten the USSR was the 
subject of at least limited diplomatic discussion between the 1952 and 1953.  The formal, legal end of hostilities 
between West Germany and the Soviet Union did not come until the Moscow Treaty of 1970 and the following 
treaties with other East European neighbors, which recognized the 1945 borders (the Oder-Niess line) and 
renounced any future West German quests to regain former German lands lost in the war.  Timothy Garton Ash, In 
Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York, 1994), 48-49, 70-74. 
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Contested mourning 
 Yet this state-led effort did not meet with the East German public’s universal approval.  
This was due in no small part to the nature of the “second dictatorship” and the GDR leaders’ 
penchant for invoking the history of the Third Reich in order to justify demanding East 
Germans’ ideological obedience and compliance.  At a time when the regime was most 
threatened following the June 17, 1953 uprising, the antifascist memory of the Second World 
War provided examples of selfless and unending dedication to the ideals of the East German 
state.346  To the average East German listener, however, these examples could hardly have been 
representative, because the experience of the KPD, the SPD, and the Red Army did not reflect 
the wartime experiences of the majority of the German population in the Third Reich.  Thus, it is 
unsurprising that there exists evidence of East Germans organizing into civil society 
underground, to mourn a wider set of victims of the Second World War.   
 East Germans responded to the official collective memory in several ways, offering 
another example of Eigensinn.  While the attentiveness and interest of the national audience in 
either Germany cannot be assumed (much less proved easily), there are several examples of 
individuals or groups responding to official commemoration via their own “social action” in 
support of or in contest with the elites.  In East Germany, this “social action,” motivated by 
alternate collective memories, took the form of religiously framed mourning for those German 
victims of the Second World War whom the SED chose to ignore.  To be sure, East Germans do 
not appear to have concentrated heavily on mourning the victims of Nazi racial persecution.  Yet 
the existence of organized, sustained efforts at some level below the notice of censors to identify, 
                                                 
346 „Internationaler Gederktag für die Opfer des faschistischen Terrors. Für den Sieg der Sache unserer toten 
Helden/Von Hermann Matern.“ Neues Deutschland.  Zentralorgan der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands.  
13 September, 1953.  Ausgabe A. 
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mourn and foster remembrance of some other dead victims of the Second World War besides 
antifascist fighters and Red Army troops reveals that public mourning was in fact a contested 
event in East Germany, too. 
 Invoking as “victims of war” those soldiers who had served the fascist Third Reich was 
politically dangerous.  This was because those East Germans who participated in alternate forms 
of public mourning, in opposition to the official anti-fascist memory, did so by reconceptualizing 
“war,” moving beyond or even rejecting the Marxist understanding of the SED elites.  East 
German Protestant Churches were understandably nervous, then, when their brethren 
congregations in the West held public “Prayer Weeks” for the release of POWs still in Soviet 
captivity in 1954.347  Similarly, the secret Abteilung Gräberfürsorge, working under the cloak of 
the Protestant Church to carry out the VDK’s gravesite registration and care in the GDR, could 
only accomplish this mission by asking local churches to compile lists of all known war graves 
in their parishes or bishoprics, then secretly forward the muster rolls to East Berlin for the 
creation of a central registry.348  At a more personal level, individual East Germans sought such 
information from the VDK in the West regarding loved ones buried there, with the VDK taking 
care not to use their return address (in Kassel), which might tip off the Stasi.349  Some East 
                                                 
347 Das Landeskirchenamt, Ev. Luth. Landeskirche Hannovers to the Herren Ephoren, circular memorandum K 
50/54, 7 December, 1954, EKKW C/1057.  Bericht des Landesbischofs D. Noth auf der Tagung der Landessynode 
am 4. Dezember 1957, report forwarded as attachment to the circular memorandum KB I 2390/57  from the 
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Kirchenkanzlei Berliner Stelle to the Kirchenleitungen der Gliedkirchen der 
Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland and to the Herren Mitglieder des Rates der Evangelischen Kirche in 
Deutschland, 6 December 1957, EKKW C/1041.  
    The churches in East and West were institutionally united until 1969, when the East German churches split off to 
form their own union.  See Benjamin Carl Pearson, “Faith and Democracy: Political Transformations at the German 
Protestant Kirchentag, 1949-1969.” PhD Diss. University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 2007. 
 
348 Copy of Kirchenkanzlei-Berliner Stelle, Abteilung Gräberfürsorge, letter regarding Gräberfürsorge, 4 August 
1949, EZAB 2/2559. 
 
349 Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge to alle Landesverbände, circular memorandum 15/58, 26 August 
1958,  VDK A. 10-54. 
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Germans even tried to arrange to travel to the West (before the Wall was complete in 1963), with 
the help of the VDK, to view their own family members’ gravesites in person.350  The fact that 
some East Germans took advantage of these avenues to articulate a different collective memory 
of the war, though dangerous or perhaps illegal “social action,” testifies to a subset of the 
population’s non-acceptance of the antifascist memory of the war, in favor of a more inclusive 
interpretation. 
 What these alternate memories contained, as far as narratives or interpretive emphases, is 
difficult to know.  A few sources indicate concern for “not just soldiers,” but “all victims” of the 
war,351 while others mention caring for Jewish cemeteries, too,352 but these are exceptional.  
Motivations to preserve an alternative to the socialist-inspired OdF collective memory could 
have ranged from Nazi apologists, to older conservative nationalists, to even politically active 
moderates from the center-right, the center left and the non-communist left.  Other reasons might 
conceivably have included Jewish survivors of the Holocaust.  At the very least, resistance to or 
non-compliance with the SED’s propaganda was a result of some degree of anti-communist 
sentiment, itself a product both of Germans’ different experiences with the war and their choices 
about which of those experiences to preserve for future generations to remember. 
 
                                                 
350 Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, to alle Landesverbände (Verteiler I), circular memorandum Nr. 7, 21 
June 1957. Rundschreiben Nr. 7, VDK A.10-53.  Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, circular memorandum 
Nr. 10/53, 12 March 1953,  VDK A.10-49.  Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge to alle Landesverbände, 
circular memorandum Nr. 26/54, 23 August 1954, VDK A.10-50. 
  
351 Untitled draft regarding Kriegsopfergräberfürosrge 1951, dated 7 July, 1950, forwarded as attachment to the 
letter from the Kirchenkanzlei, Berliner Stelle, Abteilung Gräberfürsorge to the Kirchenkanzlei, Hannover, letter,  7 
July 1950, EZAB 2/2559. 
 
352  Evangelische Kirchenleitung Berlin-Brandenburg to the Herren Vorsitzenden der Gemeindekirchenräte von 
Berlin und Brandenburg, memorandum, 21 June 1950, EZAB 2/2559. 
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Affirming war and death 
 Besides consciousness of a wider set of victims and a more complex history of the 
Second World War than the Communist leadership acknowledged, East Germans had ample 
other reasons to dissent from the language of “victims of fascism.”  By the mid-1950s, East 
Germany was rearming, in response to what the SED viewed as West Germany’s provocative 
creation of the Bundeswehr, and, unlike the FRG, GDR citizens did not have the right to 
conscientiously object to military conscription.353  Indeed, the new military obligation to prepare 
to fight West Germany’s “fascist” resurgence was coupled with a more emphatic discourse of 
national service surrounding the May 8 holiday in East Germany.  Here, the SED echoed much 
of the rhetoric of the OdF memorial day, proclaiming May 8, 1954 as the celebration of 
“liberation” from the Nazis, thanks to the Red Army.354  Going so far as to offer medals to 
leading citizens for “patriotic service,”355 the call to national service in the present and 
(expected) future fight against fascism meant that public mourning and collective memory of the 
war and the dead in the GDR echoed elites’ larger concerns about the the possibility of war and 
the need to prepare for war. 
 This fear of war implicit in the GDR’s official May 8 and OdF memorial celebrations 
was multidimensional, reflecting the Communist Party elites’ need to harness a useable past to 
                                                 
353 Antrag auf Zulassung des Bundes der Kriegsdienstverweigerer in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, item 
6 from proceedings of the Politbüro meeting, Protokoll Nr. 13/55 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 
8. März 1955, no author, BA-DDR DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 412.   
The new East German National People’s Army was in fact recruited from those members of the East 
German People’s Police who were considered more loyal and trustworthy.  That is, before the army’s existence, East 
Germans had already been living under the guard of a paramilitary police force.  Konrad Jarasuch, After Hilter, 40. 
 
354 Staatliche Verwaltung, Berlin, submission to the Politbüro for consideration regarding the May 8 „Day of 
Liberation“ celebration, dated 24 April 1954, Protokoll Nr. 2/54 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 
27. April 1954, BA-DDR DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 346.     
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enhance their position in the present.  The 1955 OdF memorial day argued that Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima together symbolized the “two dangers which threaten[ed] the world,” but which now 
arose from “the resurrection of German militarism and the NATO-preparations for an atomic 
war,”356 a direct reference to West German rearmament and the efforts to ally with NATO.  The 
response of invoking the “German problem” as part of the Cold War meant that public mourning 
ceremonies in the GDR gave the USSR and its military dead an enhanced role.  According to the 
SED’s preparation for the 1955 May 8 celebration, “[a]fter the liberation of Germany by the 
Soviet Army, the historic challenge stood before the German people, to eradicate the basic 
condition of fascism and militarism” and to “hinder that our people ever again be led into a war 
of aggression.”357  Moving closer to the USSR over the issue of rearmament naturally meant 
moving the East German people closer to the USSR and further away from the US and West 
Germany.358   That is, the official collective memory of the Second World War for East 
Germans, which promised in 1955 to have “wreath-layings and celebratory programs honoring 
the fighters of the Soviet Army,”359 held little that could have felt representative to most families 
who lost loved ones during the war.  For regular East Germans who had seen the war through 
Wehrmacht retreats and Allied aerial bombing, the experience of having served the Nazi regime, 
                                                 
356 „Auschwitz mahnt!  Zum Internationalen Befreiungstag/ Von Edward Kowalski, Warschau, Mitglied des 
Internationalen Verbindungskomitees der Widertandsbewegung.“  Neues Deutschland.  Zentralorgan der 
Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 11 September, 1955.  Ausgabe A.   
 
357 Vorbereitung und Durchführung des 10. Jahresages der Befreiung des deutschen Volkes von Hitlerfaschismus 
durch die ruhmreiche Sowjetarmee am 8. Mai 1955, submission to the Politbüro for consideration as part of item 9 
on the meeting agenda for 29 March, 1955, Protokoll Nr. 16/55 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 
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however problematic, and suffering because of it, were not reflected in the triumphant OdF or 
May 8 celebrations. 
 The anti-fascist tradition seems to have become a celebration in affirmation of war on the 
part of the GDR elites, positioning itself as an almost equal opposite to Volkstrauertag in West 
Germany.  Yet, for both holidays, the war was the point of public mourning, not the Nazi 
dictatorship’s crimes (at least not completely).  Because the SED privileged the suffering and 
victimization of political opponents to the Nazis, the larger program of racial persecution against 
Jews in Germany (and, it seems, against ethnic Slavs, Roma and Sinti in Germany in in Eastern 
Europe) was not a part of publicly remembering the Second World War.  In the framework of 
Marxian analysis, fascism was dangerous because it inevitably led to wars over resources, 
following from the conviction fascism was the most highly developed form of monopoly 
capitalism.  What is interesting is that, far from denouncing all war as bad, the SED denounced 
only fascist-instigated wars as bad, leaving wars fought by anti-fascist forces in resistance to be 
highly praised.   
 This selective enthusiasm towards war and encouragement to fight (albeit only to fight 
against fascism) at public mourning events in the GDR corresponded with a larger set of 
developments establishing a Socialist military institution with some sort of historic link to a 
decidedly non-Socialist German past.  In September 1956, shortly after that year’s OdF 
memorial celebration, the Politbüro of the SED met to consider, among other business, the 
creation of a “National People’s Army Day.”360  The NVA, the East German military, was 
actually a successor and augmentation of the state’s paramilitary police force, the Kasernierte 
                                                 
360 Untitled submission to the Politbüro regarding the National Volksarmee Day for consideration as part of item 18 
on the meeting agenda for 25 September 1956, Protokoll Nr. 46/56 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees 
am 25. September 1956, BA-DDR DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 520. 
 
155 
 
Volkspolizei, and was meant as an answer to the Federal Republic’s new Bundeswehr, labeled by 
East Berlin as the latest in a long line of fascist, authoritarian, anti-democratic abuses of power in 
German history.361  Thus in 1955-1956, at the moment when the Spätheimkehrer returned from 
prolonged captivity at the hand of the “heroic” Red Army, East Germans were encouraged to 
both herald these sacrifices by resistance fighters, the heroic Red Army and even the “excellent 
role of the National Committee for a Free Germany in the struggle against the Nazi regime and 
for the conclusion of the criminal Hitlerwar”362 as lessons to be learned to guard against a return 
of fascism.  Simultaneously, these East Germans were told to understand the creation of a new 
military apparatus, in which their sons had no choice but to participate, as the application of 
these lessons that the antifascist memory of the Second World War prescribed. 
 However much SED leaders had to stretch history and the public’s memory to secure 
legitimacy and acceptance of this new military concentration, these documents do not indicate 
the public’s response.  It is striking, however, that GDR leaders not only tried to legitimate the 
NVA via antifascist resistance and allegiances with the USSR, but also by selectively embracing 
the Wehrmacht veterans themselves.  In 1957, the Politbüro discussed the creation of a 
                                                 
361 Strangely enough, the Politbüro in 1956 was having trouble choosing the date for this new day of celebration for 
their socialist, anti-fascist armed forces.  One idea was to use January 18, “because on January 18 in the 
Volkskammer the Law over the creation of the National People’s Army and the formation of the Ministry for 
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Politbüro discussion, was the fact that January 18 was the date of Frederick William I’s coronation as King of 
Prussia, while early March was the beginning of the Lenten season in the Christian churches, which it will be 
recalled is when Volkstrauertag had long been celebrated in the 1930s, eventually being fixed as Heldengedenktag 
on March 15 by the Nazis.  Untitled submission to the Politbüro regarding the National Volksarmee Day for 
consideration as part of item 18 on the meeting agenda for 25 September 1956, Protokoll Nr. 46/56 der Sitzung des 
Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 25. September 1956, BA-DDR DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 520. 
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“Working Group of Former Officers of the Second World War,” a veterans’ organization for 
Wehrmacht officers, whose purpose would be the “[s]ystematic ideological influencing of former 
officers and soldiers in West Germany, as well as the officers and soldiers of the Bundeswehr” 
through professional contacts, political publications and even historical work to undermine West 
German support for the Bundeswehr and the “clean Wehrmacht myth.”363  What is striking is the 
SED’s decision to depend on officers, long considered by the German political left to be the most 
reactionary and anti-democratic elements in the history of the German army, who repeatedly had 
resisted political democratization or even liberalization in preference for loyalty and obedience to 
the status quo and the monarch.  This came at the time when many of the leading generals of the 
Wehrmacht were busy writing and publishing their memoirs, hoping to preserve the image of an 
“honorable” and unblemished record of service for the army from the taint of Nazi criminality.  
This argument, of “guilty senior Nazis” versus “innocent bystanders” in the military was exactly 
the argument that the SED had worked to disprove, via the logic of the OdF and Antifascist 
fighters!  Only now, when it appeared to serve policy needs of the present, did they allow 
slightly more nuance in the official collective memory of the war.   
 The shared history between the GDR and the FRG and the shared challenge of 
remembering that history without repeating it becomes more visible via public mourning 
ceremonies and other tangible manifestations of collective memory.  That is not to suggest that 
either state got their version unimpeachably correct, or much less that censorship and 
surveillance in the GDR was somehow justified in the pursuit of a more correct body of 
                                                 
363 Untitled submission to the Politbüro regarding an Organization for Former Officers, for consideration as part of 
item 10 on the Politbüto’s meeting agenda for 30 July 1957, BA-DDR DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 576.  Supporting 
documents titled Richtlinien über die Ziele und Aufgaben der ‚Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere des 2. 
Weltkrieges, for consideration as part of item 10 on the Politbüto’s meeting agenda for 30 July 1957, BA-DDR DY 
30/ J IV 2/2A/ 576.   
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knowledge.  Yet both Germanys sought to reach back into time, latching their post-fascist 
militaries to the Prussian Reformers of the early 19th century and later, with East Berlin 
resurrecting the statues of von Blücher, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Yorck, only “altering [the] 
inscription,” so that “the Prussian eagle [would] be removed.”364  Similarly, the GDR began to 
use the Neue Wache memorial in East Berlin as a war monument once more, this time 
commemorating both victims of war and also the (antifascist) victims of dictatorship,365which 
mirrored the slow process of Volkstrauertag urging West Germans to think of more than simply 
soldiers when they thought about the “war dead.”   
 Probably the most striking evidence of the dual states’ competition to “master their past” 
in a way that served their then-present needs is the “Totenehrung” read at the 1959 OdF 
memorial service.  Here, the SED recited its catechism of antifascist belief, organizing “the 
dead” under the categories of first “the many millions of humans out of almost all European 
nations, who became victims of the Hitler-fascism and the criminal war it unleashed.”  Secondly, 
the SED called attention to the “eleven million men, women, and children” who suffered “on 
account of their world view, on account of their country of origin, on account of their beliefs, on 
account of their ethnicity.”  Next came the “comrades and fellow fighters…who…fought against 
fascism and militarism,” and “sacrific[ed] their lives” in the process.366  In short, the more 
selective, less historically-grounded East German memorial tradition organized the hierarchy of 
                                                 
364 Vertrauliche Verschlusssache from Beschlüsse. Tgb.-Nr. 56/69, Politbüro resolution  regarding the re-erecting of 
statues of generals from the Anti-napoleonic Wars, dated 15 December 1959, Protokoll Nr. 56/59. Sitzung am 15. 
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victims from international, to civilian Germans, to combatants and those who took up armed 
resistance, whereas the West German Volkstrauertag did the opposite: listing German soldiers 
first, then civilian Germans, then non-Germans last.  In both cases, however, the shared 
conclusion was that another war would break out and that it would be a tragedy.  What set 
official mourning in the GDR apart was the solution to have enough East Germans in uniform to 
anticipate the threat and thus be victorious, whereas the West German solution seems to have 
been to avoid war via appeals for peace. 
 
Resistance or Remembrance: publicly mourning “as often as possible” 
 Even if all East Germans agreed with the SED that another war would only bring more 
casualties and suffering, those individuals who were working underground in the Abteilung 
Gräberfürsorge appear to have increased the publicly-visible profile of their work promoting an 
alternative collective memory of the Second World War.  Whereas the SED’s official acts of 
memory and other changes to policy and ceremonies tended to heighten the emphasis on the 
military, with the goal of bolstering contemporary opinion in support of it, the Abteilung’s 
cemetery restoration practices and community-level remembrance ceremonies appear to have 
underlined the conclusion that war is not glorious and necessary, only deadly.  To be sure, public 
opinion among a citizenry living under censorship is difficult to gauge at best.  While there is 
proof of a discussion inside the EKD of holding Volkstrauertag in East Germany, the impulse 
seems to have originated in the West.  Indeed, senior EKD officials in West Germany reasoned 
that “it could surely not prove politically provocative” to mark Volkstrauertag in the GDR “if the 
memory of the dead” were invoked “in prayer during a worship service.”367  This impulse to 
                                                 
367 Der Bevollmächtigte des Rates der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland am Sitz der Bundesrepeublik 
Deutschland, Prälat D. Kunst to Herrn Bischof D. Dr. Dibelius, letter, 30 April 1955, EZAB 2/4417. 
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counteract the state-led mourning that dominated the wider public sphere with an alternative 
memory and set of rituals at the local and more intimate level of the individual congregation is a 
remarkable example of memory as “social action.”368   
 These memorial activities reveal much about how 1950s East Germans perceived the 
extents and limits of the police state.  Although Volkstrauertag does not appear to have been 
openly observed in the GDR, the Abteilung instead actively organized “prayer services 
[Andachten]” on the “great soldiers’ cemetery in Halbe” where “20,000 fallen soldiers” were 
buried.369  Pastor Ernst Teichmann, the head of this underground organization, wrote in 1957 
that, since “Church President of Hesse [in West Germany], Dr. Martin Niemöller, first held 
Prayer Services at this cemetery during his lecture tour through the GDR,” the Halbe 
congregation “now [had] also the possibility” of holding more such services, “with permission 
from the authorities.”370  Eager to exploit this opening, Teichmann added, “now we would also 
like very much to make use of that [permission] as often as possible,” demonstrating that 
apparently this privilege was still available.371  Here, these East Germans had a small chance to 
organize collective memory and public mourning on their own terms, and did so eagerly. 
 What is unclear from these records is the degree to which Halbe’s experience was 
exceptional or not.  It is conceivable that local government officials made allowances such as this 
to help keep the public compliant in other matters.  It is also possible that such renegade public 
ceremonies were open secrets, unacknowledged but unchallenged by local political leaders who 
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were sympathetic or powerless to change their peers’ opinions.  Teichmann mentions many 
ceremonies as a way, “with God’s help,” to meet their Christian “obligation to those in 
sorrow.”372  He also described very public demonstrations of the Abteilung’s politically 
unorthodox activity, as his church had erected two plaques in its Halbe cemetery.  The first 
plaque presented traditional Christian mourning language, that “Jesus Christ has taken power 
away from death” and believers should therefore “[n]ot be sorrowful” but rather trust that “he 
will also heal us.”373  The second plaque transformed these abstract rejoinders to faith and hope 
into concrete terms, declaring that the community remembered “[o]ur fallen soldiers,” “the men, 
women, and children of our nation [unseres Volkes], who in the year 1945 at the end of the 
calamitous war… had to sacrifice their lives.”374   This is another example of East Germans 
imagining their own alternatives to the Party ideology, but one that is difficult to parse for its 
underlying political or social motivations.  At the very least, this was an alternative to the 
Communist formula that was displayed in public, through the competition over public mourning.    
 Pastor Teichmann and his Abteilung Gräberfürsorge appear to have enlisted the support 
of a number of communities across the GDR in preserving collective memories of the war and 
public mourning for the dead as alternatives to Communist Orthodoxy.  This was indeed 
deliberate, sustained, “social action” by these East Germans to provide their families and future 
generations a more representative way to remember the Second World War.  In 1957, Teichmann 
described “reburials [of dead bodies] out of the Feldmark” and from “other cemeteries” into that 
in Halbe, as well as efforts to secure “wrought iron hurricane lamps to be burned on Days of the 
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Dead at the cemetery."375  Further ceremonies were held with different guest speakers on Good 
Friday and Totensonntag, with visitors coming to Halbe at other times of the year.376  In 1959 he 
wrote of other cemeteries at Bansin, “the crosses and headstones [were] finally erected,” and at 
Neu-Petershain, “a wonderful celebration on Totensonntag” had been reported.377  He had “been 
invited to the dedication of memorial stones” at Rüdensdorf bei Berlin, but could not attend.378  
Everything did not always go smoothly for Teichmann’s organization, as he noted “long-lasting 
difficulties” with the cemetery groundskeeper at Treuenbrietzen, making the completion of that 
project quite delayed, “despite all efforts of the pastor” there.379  Similarly, the Beelitzer 
cemetery was also behind schedule, with difficulties ordering the cross for the monument, which 
“must now be allocated from a Volkseigene Betrieb,” resulting, he feared, in a much more 
expensive monument.380  The ups and downs of this secretive, or at least unorthodox, publicly-
visible mourning work Teichmann summarized in 1960, writing that “[t]he status of care of war 
victims’ graves is very uneven, depending strongly on the initiative of the cemetery 
organization.”381  That is, organizing alternate collective memory displays and “social action” 
through public mourning practices was not something that all communities did as a matter of 
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course.  Rather, only those East Germans so motivated by their own experiences, their concern 
for the past and the future, or with sufficient fearlessness of the consequences undertook these 
projects. 
 There were other East Germans, probably far fewer than any congregation of Protestants 
or Catholics hoping to cling to older Christian mourning rituals, who enacted another separate 
publicly-visible mourning rituals to augment the official antifascist orthodoxy.  In September 
1957, the “Jewish Community of Greater Berlin” organized its own “religious ceremony… at the 
memorial at the Güterbahnhof in Grunewald,” to coincide with the official anti-fascist 
celebrations that year.382  Additionally, September 8 of that year, “just like every other year,” the 
Jewish community would also hold a “memorial service at the memorial at the Jewish cemetery 
in Berlin-Weissensee,” which would include a wreath-laying to remember these dead victims of 
Nazi racial violence, apart from the (fewer but more politically empowered) victims of political 
violence.383  In the case of the remaining Jews living in East Germany, their status as victims of 
the Holocaust and their claims to recognition did not conflict necessarily with the SED’s 
“victims of fascism” discourse.  After all, part of the point of OdF and May 8 celebrations was to 
remind the world of the crimes committed by Hitler and the dangers posed by the threat of 
resurgent fascism.  Yet, the extension of this warning into an aggressive military posturing, 
calling upon East Germans to ready themselves to fight the new “fascists” in West Germany and 
Western Europe, seems to have given little place in public mourning for Jews murdered in 
concentration camps.  In this way, East German Jews apparently had the opportunity to mourn 
their dead, killed because of racial and religious reasons, under guise of anti-fascist ideological 
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public ceremony, enacting some level of non-compliance or even resistance against the 
dictatorship while outwardly taking part in the regime’s own organized commemorations. 
 In a larger sense, the question remains of whether or not these alternative forms of public 
mourning and non-compliant collective memory were known to the East German regime or not.  
At least in the case of the Abteilung, their attention to the bodies of dead German soldiers was at 
least compatible with the new emphasis on the military traditions and NVA on the part of the 
regime.  How threatening or how dangerous these alternative “social actions” appeared to the 
regime on a day-to-day basis is not clear from these records.  This uncertainty is partly a product 
of the incompleteness of these documents, which do not tell much of the actual contents of these 
graveyard prayer services.  While the Abteilung believed themselves to be in some danger if they 
were to be caught, hence the secrecy, the Jewish community apparently did not share this 
concern.  Yet given Jews’ experience during the Third Reich, it is highly unlikely that fascist or 
German nationalist sentiments would be aired in their memorial services, whereas East German 
Protestants could easily have harbored ideological sympathies that made the SED uncomfortable.  
At the very least, East Germans on a very local level did engage in activity related to collective 
memory and public mourning that can safely be called non-communist, though any conclusions 
more precise must await further research. 
  
An uneven revision of tradition 
 Public mourning practices in the GDR looked at times similar and also different from 
those in the Federal Republic.  While the Communist Party framed official mourning in terms of 
antifascist resistance, past and future, underground- or alternative collective memories used 
different lenses, either religious or ethnic, to emphasize other, larger, groups by dead victims 
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than those that state wanted to celebrate.  While it is unclear exactly how seditious such practices 
were in the eyes of the Stasi, it is reasonable to conclude that both the East German government 
and some highly engaged, yet non-communist, groups of East German society re-imagined “war” 
over the decade of the 1950s, moving further away from pre-1945 traditions.  While the OdF 
ceremonies substituted for the heretofore tradition of commemorating heroic soldiers, it kept the 
uncritical praise of the dead, only now directing such applause at anti-fascist fighters.  The GDR 
added soldiers back into the mix only selectively, when it became important to then-pressing 
national security considerations amid the Cold War and the confrontation with West Germany.  
Yet this dynamic did build toward a plurality of victims for public mourning rituals to consider 
(though this plurality still did not encompass all victims with historically grounded claims to 
having suffered during the war).  At the same time, underground mourning activities changed the 
canon of official praise for “victims of fascism” to those dead soldiers who had died and their 
families who had survived them.  While publicly-visible mourning at this local level still left 
open room for uncritical nationalist sentiments, this had to be kept to a minimum because of the 
surveillance of the state.  Still, mourning in East Germany offered avenues of resistance, or at 
least non-compliance.  In a larger sense, East Germans, at a national- and local level, took 
measures to alter the pre-1945 tradition of reverence for soldiers and the military, though they 
did so unevenly and largely incompletely, compared to public mourning practices in West 
Germany. 
 
Re-militarizing West German public mourning, 1960-1961 
 While East German elites were enhancing the role of their military in the public 
mourning rituals related to the Second World War, conservative West German politicians sought 
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to make similar changes to Volkstrauertag in the early 1960s.  These leaders in Bonn seem to 
have been responding both to the highly critical Der Andere in 1959 but also to the dynamics of 
louder and more boisterous military celebrations in the GDR.  While some members of the 
Volksbund may have been sympathetic to this goal, the government’s campaign to direct more 
control over Volkstrauertag revealed sharp divides in West Germany over how to interpret the 
Second World War, its dead and the lessons they implied for the future.   
 
Re-affirming military death 
 The most recent national Volkstrauertag ceremony, 1959’s debut of Der Andere, had 
offered West German audiences a decidedly negative interpretation of all wars, past and future.  
Although this had been an “absolutely worthy and impressive” program, wrote one observer, 
there were “once more many young Germans” who were donning “the honorable cloak of the 
German soldier” and, therefore, Volkstrauertag had to be careful in presenting anti-war 
messages, lest this public mourning and collective memory prevent these young men from 
fulfilling “the duty of defending the home and hearth.”384  As it turned out, individual members 
of the general public were not the only ones with this reaction.   
 The following September (of 1960), when VDK leaders met to begin planning the 1960 
national ceremony, one of the first considerations raised was that “the last program of the 
Volksbund” was seen as “disfavorable and burdensome” by “different heads of the cabinet.”  In 
fact, Chancellor Adenauer and Minister for Defense Franz-Josef Strauß this time wanted more 
input in planning Volkstrauertag, with the goal of preparing Germans to be ready for another war 
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if necessary.385  Harkening back to an affirmative history of military death, Adenauer wanted to 
place “a strengthened national emphasis” on the ceremony, “in consideration of the thought of 
sacrifice from the past, and in a possible future.”386  Thus, for all their disagreement over 
interpreting the Third Reich and how to continue the existence of a German state in the aftermath 
of war and genocide, both the SED and Adenauer’s CDU government took for granted the 
necessity to prepare to fight a new hot war and both further agreed that convincing the public of 
this goal would require the mobilization of a different kind of collective memory of war. 
 Unlike the GDR’s reliance on the Red Army and resistance fighters to legitimate a post-
fascist military as a response to and defense against the tradition of German militarism, the 
Federal Republic’s Minister of Defense, Franz-Josef Strauß, wanted to embrace old traditions 
from the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht, allowing the Bundeswehr to play the role of only the 
latest incarnation of a military tradition apparently needing no reforms.  Strauß had suggested “a 
larger representative participation by the Bundeswehr” in Volkstrauertag 1960, to include “the 
music corps of the Guards Regiment” in the ceremony” as well as “inspection of the ranks of the 
honor guard by the President, the Chancellor and the Defense Minister.”387  Lastly, he thought 
that “drum roll and Deutschlandlied” would be best suited for the “Totenehrung” portion of the 
program.388  The conservative politicians’ suggestions met with mixed responses by ceremony 
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planners at the Volksbund.  Although some ideas, they thought, would “connect meaningfully to 
the tradition of ceremonies between the Opera House and the Neue Wache in Berlin” (a reference 
to pre-1945 practice), other Volksbund representatives made clear that the “Totenehrung” part of 
the ceremony should not be allowed to resume the form of a Nazi (or old nationalist) spectacle, 
going so far as to forbid the use of torchlight processions.389   In a remarkable reversal from 
1952, it appears that, in 1960, the West German government pushed to preserve Nazi-era 
practices while the Volksbund advocated a clear separation of the post-fascist present from the 
past. 
 It is worth pointing out the dilemma both the VDK and CDU leaders faced in making 
Volkstrauertag a popular, representative, but politically safe public mourning event.  No one 
seems to have seriously believed that resuming Nazi-era practices would be a good idea for the 
sake of maintaining a connection to the Third Reich.  Yet those years would have been most 
familiar to families of the dead or wounded soldiers (not to mention civilian casualties, too).  It 
was this public, rather than the political establishment in Bonn, whom Interior Minister Schröder 
had in mind when he suggested making Volkstrauertag a more popular event, one that “surviving 
families” would appreciate, instead of designing it as only an “affair for the suits 
[Bratenröcke].”390  Clearly, these politicians saw the potential for public mourning of the past to 
impact political discussions about the present and appreciated the need to carefully consider that 
present-day audience’s expectation.     
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 Yet this very outcome, the dissolution of collective memory and public mourning for the 
dead into electioneering and angling for votes, was precisely the situation that the Volksbund 
feared.  One senior VDK official wrote that straying from comforting families into advocating 
policy would be a “dangerous” move,391 yet the organization felt it was in a difficult position, 
relying on federal funding and bound to work closely with the federal- and state level officials in 
carrying out its cemetery projects.392  However, these elites were aware that cemeteries were not 
at the center of Adenauer’s attention – it was the national Volkstrauertag ceremony that was a 
highly visible, powerfully symbolic chance to make grandiose statements about the German past 
and its present efforts to deal with the past.  This was the reason why “since 1954,” “a member 
of the Federal government [had] carried out the Totenehrung at the lead ceremony in Bonn – and 
scarcely out of explicit request from the Volksbund.”393  Rather, this intense interest in mourning 
by the CDU politicians made sense only “in view of the at-the-time wide-ranging abusive 
disparagement (Verfehmung) of the soldier and the soldier’s death.”394  Given the public 
ambivalence or even hostility towards rearmament and the creation of a new military to follow 
on the heels of the tarnished Wehrmacht, the conservative political leaders seem to have 
understood the need for some sort of re-shaping to polish West Germans’ memory of war and 
their warriors. 
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 The public esteem and high acclaim given to German soldiers in 1813, 1871, 1914 (and 
maybe even in 1941) seems to have been the Adenauer government’s goal in Volkstrauertag 
1960.  The public’s skepticism about a new war, coupled with the growing opinion that a serious 
understanding of the Second World War could not be separated from an explanation of the Nazi 
dictatorship, were countered by the Federal government’s efforts at “Participation and 
Collaboration,” to “identify itself” with the Volkstrauertag ceremony and give the private 
organization’s program an even greater imprimatur of officialdom.395  While the Volksbund had 
encountered opposition and skepticism from the government a few years earlier in the 
Termindebatte of 1951-1952, “through the build-up of the Bundeswehr and its integration into 
NATO” there came “a very strong interest in topics related to defense politics.”396  Present-day 
politics of 1960 related to the Cold War in general (and to the German question in particular) 
made “[w]hat had been a hot potato [heißes Eisen]” in 1945, that is, “the memory of the war 
dead and in particular the honoring of the fallen soldier,” into a “more and more state-political” 
matter.397  Thus the Federal government was interested in inserting itself into public mourning 
for a number of reasons, including positive public relations derived from the nation-wide 
broadcasts, the normal involvement of politicians in memorial ceremonies, and especially the 
once-taboo topic of memorializing dead soldiers, in a time when these same politicians were 
trying to shepherd into place the Bundeswehr, get into NATO, get Western acceptance and full 
sovereignty back, and rebuild the image of the German soldier in the process.   
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 This plethora of political calculations behind Adenauer’s efforts to shape Volkstrauertag 
made the Volksbund’s leaders increasingly nervous.  Because this military-political significance 
makes the holiday so important, the Adenauer government had been, in the VDK’s eyes, 
exercising a form of “preliminary censorship” over the content of the ceremony in recent 
years.398  Despite the VDK’s closeness to veterans’ issues and its sympathy for the military dead 
before civilians, the Volksbund’s leadership viewed the instrumentalizing of Volkstrauertag for 
the purposes of gaining support for West German Rearmament as a “moment of danger.”399  This 
was because it created the problem of how to make the ceremony representative of “the entire 
people,” when “the entire people” were not of one mind about the Nazi past.  Instead, when it 
came to “examining our own history and past, there is in our people no single basis of 
opinion.”400  In order to program a Volkstrauertag ceremony that spoke to Germans’ diverse and 
competing memories of the war in an even-handed manner, the VDK tried to exercise no (or at 
least, minimal) editorial control over the artists and speakers from year to year, “never having 
exercised a preliminary censorship”  such as that which the government now sought.  The result 
had been messages that varied from year to year but which avoided any attempt to create one 
central “truth” which is applicable to all people.401   
 Aware of the political divisions and consequent divided reception to Volkstrauertag 
during the 1920s and 1930s, the VDK saw the problem arising when the government moved to 
shape the message, making the act of remembering the dead into a politically-directed “social 
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action,” which would alienate the segment of the population who did not support the party in 
power.  “So arises the danger, that out of the Volkstrauertag would emerge a Holiday celebrating 
the State [Staatsfeiertag],” one whose meaning could change radically as soon as a new party 
came to power.  That is, the VDK feared that no common set of values would be brought to bear 
to direct public mourning each year but rather a set of rules that could change with each new 
government, meaning that “the answer to the question of the meaning of Volkstrauertag given 
from us would only reach a portion of the population.”402  It should be pointed out that the VDK 
does not seem to have minded the ceremony changing some from year to year, as long as such 
pendulum swings from conservative to more progressive and back were organic, the results of 
the artists, speakers, and musicians’ own choices and decisions that would (hopefully) resonate 
with the German people.  The reality of a holiday that resonated with only part of the population 
but not others was a situation already at play in the GDR, with the VDK suffering exclusion 
because of it.  A divided collective memory was the outcome no one in Kassel wanted. 
 
Naming the dead (and the killers?) 
 Taking a step back from the debate over the place of the military in West German public 
mourning, it is apparent that the topic of war and German society’s historical and future 
relationship to warfare and its soldiers were the chief animus behind discussions over 
Volkstrauertag in 1960-1961.  Although the government and the VDK agreed to bring the 
Bundeswehr into the wreath-layings and other events surrounding Volkstrauertag, the new 
soldiers were not made part of the formal remembrance ceremony broadcast nationwide and 
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attended by foreign dignitaries.403  At the same time, the representatives from the VDK and from 
the Federal Minister of the Interior’s office began creating a more formal Totenehrung to read 
out at each year’s national ceremony.  This register of the dead victims who were officially 
mourned had, then, to navigate the question of how much emphasis to put on the war itself 
versus the dictatorship behind it.  That is, the VDK realized that mourning the dead was only part 
of what they were doing on Volkstrauertag. 
 At the same time they named the dead, the Volksbund were also proposing to West 
Germans (and the world) how to remember the Nazi regime, its crimes committed before and 
during the war, and how this part of German history, beyond the Second World War, should be 
explained to future generations.  This question was perhaps most challenging for the generation 
who had grown up and been socialized in the Third Reich, since it involved confronting the 
absence of widespread opposition to the regime and even “passive complicity (or at least, “moral 
indifference”) to the plight of German Jews and other minorities who were targets of Nazi racist 
policies even before 1939.  In the end, the Totenehrung hammered out in 1961 never really did 
explain these thorny questions, only making passing mention of the Concentration Camp dead, 
preferring to emphasize the nature of modern warfare and its deadly consequences beyond the 
formal battlefield.   
 Yet this move to clarify the exact memory and scope of Volkstrauertag was not a 
response only to the pressure from the government.  Instead, the Volksbund was responding to 
pressure from the conservative end of their audience (those elderly Germans who thought that 
the holiday always was, and always should be, dedicated to the battlefield dead) on one hand and 
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the more critical progressive end of their audience (those who demanded an outright publicity 
campaign dedicated to honoring and memorializing murdered Jews) on the other.404  In 
formulating their response, Volksbund officials declared that Volkstrauertag was meant, in the 
first instance, “like for instance Memorial Day among the Americans,” that is, “a day of 
mourning for the losses of the German people.”405  Yet, perhaps unlike Memorial Day in the 
U.S., by 1960 the West German Volkstrauertag had moved beyond German soldiers and 
emphasized the “sacrifice” of the “fallen soldiers of other nations” (emphasis added), “which 
belonged to many different population groups.”406  Nonetheless, the Volksbund continued to cite 
Volkstrauertag’s purpose in inspiring “reconciliation” among former belligerents,407 which 
suggests that remembering the war (but not the dictatorship) and warning that war (but not 
dictatorship) must be avoided in the future were the VDK’s primary goal in public mourning.  
That is, explaining how, why and by whom the Second World War began were less important 
elements of programming Volkstrauertag. 
 Beyond the military experience, the Volksbund leadership was certainly conscious of the 
multi-sided civilian experience of the Second World War and understood that an honest, 
meaningful public mourning ceremony for the German people had to incorporate civilian 
victims, too.  After all, the category of “Fallen” victims underwent “a considerable expansion in 
the Second World War,” to explode the older, simpler boundaries around fallen soldiers.408  
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Instead, now “women in Wehrmacht rear areas, Auxiliary Service Personnel in the Work Service 
and OT,409 Police, German Red Cross Sisters, civilian aerial bombing victims and refugees, who 
met their death due to enemy actions or hunger and cold” all undeniably died because of the 
Second World War.410  What is revealing about the VDK’s near-perpetual focus on “war” but not 
the “dictatorship” is their reliance on the military designation “Fallen [Gefallenen],” and their 
efforts here to fit civilian victims into this category, even though “fallen” ordinarily implies a 
battlefield presence that is “standing” and combatting the enemy.  This perhaps helps explain the 
VDK’s only lukewarm interest, initially, in mentioning victims of Nazi crimes in Volkstrauertag 
at all.  Apparently Nazi crimes were outside the war experience, according to the Volksbund’s 
logic. 
 The initial moves to include Nazism’s victims in Volkstrauertag had been part of the 
conversation in 1951-1952, when the Volksbund had been on the defensive and was forced to 
reform its pre-1945 practices.  According to the VDK, it was the Federal Government who, in 
1953, had made the suggestion of including “also those” who were murdered out “of racial 
reasons and because of their political and religious convictions,” whereupon the Volksbund “did 
not oppose…this idea.”411  The VDK’s less-than-enthusiastic response to bringing in victims of 
Nazi dictatorship at that time had stemmed from a distinction they were contemplating, between 
“victims of immediate [unmittelbar] enemy actions,” and victims “of mediated [mittelbar] 
circumstances of war.”412  The first group included, according to the VDK, soldiers “in the first 
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place” but also aerial bombing victims, refugees and expellees, whereas the second category 
included victims who died of hunger, exposure, or who were driven to suicide.413  Thus 
Concentration Camp victims seem to fit beneath the radar, as it were, with the VDK leaving open 
the possibility of expanding the categories for public mourning if more victims were suggested 
whose experience was in line with these categories.  Yet they seemed much more concerned 
about how to reckon with those killed because of war than those murdered by the Nazi regime.   
       This very point, whether to understand and interpret the years 1939-1945 as part of the 
larger Third Reich or not, whether to understand “war dead” as only combat deaths or not, or 
how far to compromise on each of these questions, was not a problem which the Volksbund felt 
they could easily answer.  In part, they felt the difficulty lay in generational differences by which 
1960 West Germans understood the concept of war and war dead.  Given that “those on one hand 
wanted only the soldiers” to be the center of Volkstrauertag, whereas “those on the other and 
[wanted to include] also those dead who died in flight,” and “those in the third instance also the 
KZ-dead, etc.,”414 VDK leaders concluded that they needed to work to change the West German 
public’s attitudes, to reflect a consciousness of the Second World War’s complex, multi-faceted 
and difficult-to-explain history, by which many different groups suffered some harm.415  What 
was clear to VDK leaders was that the older, pre-1945 understanding of war dead, “those who in 
the war fell as victims, [was] no longer tenable.”416  Instead, however the exact discursive 
boundaries for Volkstrauertag were to be drawn, “[i]t must be made clear to the older members, 
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with all due respect,” that the civilian and military dead “can no longer be separated from one 
another” in any meaningful remembrance of the Second World War.417   As great a change as 
they proposed to force on their members and supporters, the VDK felt that they should attempt 
these cultural changes via Volkstrauertag themselves, instead of leaving the job to politicians 
who might embrace some victims and not others, due to political whims.418  Regardless, what 
had happened by 1960 was that the Volksbund leaders had concluded that remembrance and 
mourning for the war dead were not self-apparent or incontestable ideas.  Rather, if mourning 
was a culturally-constructed process, depending on historical circumstances and individual 
choices, this practice was due for a change among West Germans.  1960 was a moment to 
reconsider how their society thought about and reacted to warfare and warriors.  
 The result of this long process of re-imaging what “war” and “death in war” really meant 
was the codification of the Totenehrung in March 1961.  Actually, this statement came about 
both from the VDK’s own internal discussions but also some external pressure from 
“considerations…on the side of the Federal Government” too.419  The precise formula they 
arrived at was as follows: 
 We remember 
 The soldiers of both World Wars who fell, who succumbed to their wounds [ihren 
 Verwundungen erlegen] and who died in POW camps, 
 The men and women who were killed [getöteten] or died [verstorbenen] in the wake of 
 the military at that time [im Gefolge der damaligen Wehrmacht], 
 The men, women and children who perished [umgekommenen] due to combat operations 
 [durch Waffeneinwirkung] on the home front [Heimat] or during flight. 
 
 On our Nation’s Day of Mourning for the Dead of every calamitous [notvollen] year of 
 the ordeal [Prüfung], we remember but also all of those, who were victims [Opfer] of 
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 their political or religious conviction, or from whom life was taken [das Leben genommen 
 wurde] on account of  their racial group [wegen ihrer rassischen Zugehörigkeit]. 
 
 The German people’s Volkstrauertag is the time, carried by the pressing hope [heißen 
 Hoffnung] for reconciliation in our midst and in the entire world, finally our 
 remembrance [Gedenken] to the war dead of all of the nations who took part in these 
 wars.420 
 
Critics might have pointed out that, by extending recognition to nearly everyone who had any 
connection to the war, Volkstrauertag gave special recognition to no one in particular (least of all 
those who were persecuted or victimized at German hands).421  Yet the evidence does show that, 
however uncomfortable West Germans remained in critically discussing the Nazi regime in 
1961, they had begun moving towards a reconsideration of war and the desirability of future 
wars and further military and civilian dead. 
 It should not be inferred that all of West Germany accepted this compromise and 
collective memory without question.  However much these VDK elites in Kassel knew to tread 
carefully, they faced criticism from both sides – those in the public who felt Volkstrauertag did 
not go far enough in recognizing victims of historic, racial or other forms of discrimination and 
persecution on one hand, such as complaints lodged with the Defense Ministry over the need to 
reinstate the names of Jewish veterans from the First World War onto war monuments (the 
names had been removed by the Nazis).422  On the other hand, traditionalists believed any moves 
to broaden Volkstrauertag and the official collective memory of the war betrayed the status and 
special honor historically reserved for soldiers, such as the controversy in a small town 
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surrounding a “young Catholic vicar” who “vented…over the dead of the war, as if the death of 
soldiers were a meaningless sacrifice for the strive for power of National Socialism” and was 
promptly chased from the stage by an older VDK member.423  Clearly, it would take time and 
much convincing to get older, more traditional Germans in agreement with the new 
Volkstrauertag but, at the same time, moving too fast or too far, in order to satisfy the critics 
looking for more acknowledgements of the dictatorship and its crimes, would only make those 
older traditionalists angrier. 
 The 1961 Volkstrauertag ceremony’s keynote speech reveals this tension between 
recognizing wartime German suffering in hopes of a future where Europeans will have learned 
the costliness and undesirability of war, while at the same time somehow acknowledging crimes 
committed by Germans that added to the brutality about which Germans wanted to warn the 
world. In 1961, VDK President Walter Trepte, speaking at the national Volkstrauertag 
ceremony, tried to walk a very fine line insisting that, “No, we are today on Volkstrauertag 
neither ennobling war nor the soldier’s death.  But we seek the truth and find it in this gripping 
voice of humanity, which I read out as well: Immutable holding fast with comrades, deep 
longing for peace, but a self-evident readiness for the final deployment.”424  After outlining the 
military experience, Trepte proceeded to talk about the German civilian experience, calling 
attention to the “defenseless women, children and old men on the home front  [who] died,” as 
well as those who perished “amid showers of bombs or in flight [from] unmerciful persecutors.”  
In third place (after soldiers and German women) came the Holocaust victims, “the terrible death 
                                                 
423 Bezirksvorsitzende Hennig, untitled Aktennotiz from Herne, 18 November 1960, VDK A.100-24. 
 
424 Walter Trepte. Gräber mahnen: Wandelt euren Sinn!  Gedenkrede des Präsidenten des Volkbundes Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge bei der Feierstunde zum Volkstrauertag 1961 im Plenarsaal des Bundeshauses in Bonn, 
speech, VDK A.100-25. 
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upon the execution site and in the Concentration Camps, in the torture- and gas chambers,” 
indeed “[t]he darkest page of German history,” which was just as much a part of the Second 
World War as German soldiers’ deaths.  Anticipating that at least part of the audience would 
react negatively to this indictment, Trepte cautioned that Germans were obliged “to hear the 
truth” in this “solemn hour,” and that “guilt must be called guilt, crimes must be called crimes, 
even when they relate to the German name.”425  While many in the audience could have 
overlooked the issue of guilt, “which allow[ed] the mourning to be more burdensome and more 
crippling,”426 there was a general agreement that the experience of total war could not be 
repeated a third time.  On Volkstrauertag, mourning Germans heard calls “to give the hand of 
cooperation, of Reconciliation, and of peace to the other.”427  This peace could not be simply 
understood as an absence of war, but was really “a constant building of a new order of 
coexistence among people.”428  A newfound German devotion to peace appears to have been the 
only way to reconcile this tension between recognizing and expressing admiration for soldiers’ 
resoluteness on the one hand while also recognizing and attesting to the brutality and horror of 
war for soldiers and civilians alike on the other. 
   
A tradition of mourning, rearmed? 
 Set against the context of the Cold War and West Germany’s efforts to integrate 
politically and militarily into Western Europe, it becomes clear that rearmament and military 
considerations informed decisions about public mourning, too.  The annual Volkstrauertag 
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ceremony in Bonn offered an opportunity to remind audiences about the past and explain to 
newer generations that past’s lessons for the present and for the future.  For this very reason, the 
conservative West German government reversed its earlier stance in favor of a less-militarized 
Volkstrauertag from early 1950s, towards a greater emphasis on veterans and the military in 
German society by the early 1960s.  The focus of public mourning in West Germany was thus 
still the Second World War and the impact of warfare (and not the place of the Nazi dictatorship) 
on German history but, just as the conservative government tried to steer this critical interpretive 
emphasis on war away from pacifist sentiments, enough of a mass of critical opinion had 
bubbled up among Volkstrauertag critics to begin demanding more acknowledgement of the 
fascist roots of the Second World War and the crimes and excesses that accompanied it.  For 
both supporters of a more traditional, militarized, Volkstrauertag and those who demanded a 
larger understanding of war and its consequences, fear about West Germany’s future were 
among the chief considerations. 
 
Conclusion: Remembrance of the past as reaction to the present 
 From this survey of Volkstrauertag’s content across the 1950s, as well as the decisions 
involved in programming that content, it becomes clear that West German public mourning was 
focused on explaining Second World War and remembering the dead resulting from it, while 
minimizing whatever similar explanations of the Nazi regime and its victims that might be 
needed fill in the blanks.   As a consequence of the the decision to devote attention to the war, 
with an eye to convincing future generations that war must be strenuously avoided, 
Volkstrauertag’s planners began a project in the mid-1950s to re-design the ceremony and frame 
war as an explicitly negative, sorrowful, dreadful affair, minimizing whatever discursive space 
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might have remained for uncritically praising soldiers’ deaths as heroic and selfless acts for the 
greater good (which had been the older, pre-1945 custom).  Thus Volkstrauertag operated to not 
only keep alive memories of the dead soldiers (and some German civilian victims) of the Second 
World War but was also directed at influencing then-present-day minds about warfare. 
 The picture that emerges from East German public mourning is more complex.  At the 
level of state-sanctioned-public mourning, the OdF and May 8 celebrations similarly treated war 
as a negative experience but slowly across the 1950s moved away from this interpretation.  
Instead of a manifestation of fascism that was uniformly undesirable, war and soldiers became 
seen as positive elements, reinforcing an antifascist defense policy stance that thought the best 
defense was to be aggressively poised and ready for a war with the West.  Thus remembering 
war changed over time, from singling out the experience of resistance fighters and political 
prisoners, to also praising those uniformed soldiers who fought against the Nazis, too.  At the 
same time, however, the Abteilung Gräberfürsorge reacted against the state’s focus on antifascist 
fighters and eventually military service, moving to center mourning on the sadness of death.  
While the Abteilung’s explanation for the Second World War and the Third Reich likely differed 
from that offered by the official SED-led public mourning events, the exact contours of this 
counternarrative for East Germans is not clear.  In each case, the SED-led official mourning and 
the unofficial alternative seem less drastic departures from older rituals mourning military dead, 
yet were heavily informed and motivated by Cold War concerns of the present. 
 These fears of a new World War also animated West German leaders’ attempts to revise 
Volkstrauertag toward a holiday embracing  the military and priming the population to produce a 
new generation of combat-scarred veterans. Yet these conservative leaders and the (somewhat 
more moderate) Volksbund officials agreed on the primacy of the war, and not the dictatorship, 
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in German public mourning.  That is, West Germany’s efforts to distance itself from any attempt 
to explain National Socialism and instead explain only the war as a terrible ordeal not to be 
repeated reveals one assured conclusion: that West Germans believed that no one who had lived 
through the Third Reich would ever let it be repeated, because they had seen how bad fascism 
was.  That is, If West Germans had felt the slightest potential of sliding back into fascism (like 
they did for sliding back into war), this would have required mobilizing public mourning and 
collective memory to call for avoidance of future fascism (along the lines of avoiding future 
war).  It precisely this confidence in West Germany’s imperviousness to fascism that began to 
erode at the beginning of the 1960s, which has been voluminously documented by historians of 
the New Left and the West German student movement.  Thus the turn towards a more serious 
and self-critical interrogation of the Nazi past had its roots in an earlier, less controversial, 
process of reconceptualizing warfare and death. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: “Quite far removed from worshipping heroes?” Public Mourning in 
East Germany, 1959-1972 
 
 On September 1, 1959, a Protestant congregation in the small East German community of 
Groß Gievitz erected a monument to “all of the Fallen and Missing of the Last War 1939-45 
from this community.”429  East Germans publicly commemorating casualties of the Second 
World War on the twentieth anniversary of its outbreak may be unsurprising but what is perhaps 
more striking about this episode is the inclusion of the names of the dead soldiers and the 
missing, all underneath a quotation of 1 John 5:4, “[o]ur faith is the victory which has overcome 
the world.”430  Concepts of “victory” and “overcoming” adversity are not uncommon in Christian 
teaching, especially in connection with mourning the dead.  Yet at the same time, these phrases 
could reasonably be construed as code for rejecting the prevailing values that the SED 
dictatorship had tried to instill in matters or remembrance and mourning.  Thus it is clear that, 
while the officially atheist regime preferred to center collective memory of the war on the 
Communist victims of Nazis political persecution, certain segments of the (largely still 
Protestant) East German population had other ideas about mourning and memory.431 
                                                 
429 Pastor Werner Bollmann to the Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR, Abteilung Gräberfürsorge, June 14, 
1972, EZAB 101/226. 
 
430 Ibid.  This is my translation from German of the biblical text as quoted by the pastor. 
 
431 Mary Fulbrook estimates that at least 90% of East Germans in 1945 were registered as Christians, with the 
majority being Protestant.  Mary Fulbrook, The Peope’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New 
Haven, 2005), 264.  Like Fulbrook, I prefer to use the English adjective “Protestant” instead of “Evangelical” to 
refer to the same “Evangelisch” confession, because “evangelical” has assumed a fundamentalist meaning in the 
United States not shared by the German equivalent.  
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 This example of East Germans maintaining older (here Christian) cultural practices under 
a Communist dictatorship that promised to reform the historic problems with German society 
may be only somewhat surprising.  After all, East Germans would eventually re-invigorate their 
public sphere and sap the regime’s last pretenses of legitimacy on their own, largely using 
networks outside of the regime’s direct concern, or at least its ability to directly control.  
Mourning the war dead in the 1960s and early 1970s was a far cry from demanding democratic 
reform in 1989, yet the problems of public mourning do form one part of the gap between the 
SED’s rhetoric and its actual practices.  In this case, East Germans had been largely told to 
mourn and remember the sacrifices of Communist fighters, Red Army soldiers, but not allowed 
to express grief or acclaim for the deaths of the Wehrmacht soldiers who came from nearly every 
family and who died serving the Nazi regime.  That is, the Communist government was 
enforcing censorship over peoples’ individual emotions and ideas, making it understandable that 
certain members of the public refused accept the party’s instruction. 
 At the same time that East Germans were being taught to not value the military service of 
their dead fathers, brothers and sons before 1945, the SED was also trying to convince these 
same families that military service in the new National People’s Army was a laudable and 
beneficial thing for society.  Thus while the regime seemed to be rejecting any suggestion that 
old dead soldiers’ contributed honorable or positive benefits to their society, the regime also 
indicated the new Socialist soldiers did fulfill the nation’s needs.  Furthermore, the imperative to 
prepare for the war that the SED suggested was being planned by the West Germans made it 
more important for the SED to encourage more young men to enlist.  All the while, this 
encouragement carried the implicit argument that war (or at least war in defense of Socialism) 
was a worthwhile and desirable endeavor.  Yet this suggestion likely flew in the face of many if 
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not most East Germans’ personal encounter with the Second World War, in final stages of which 
brought the Red Army to their doorsteps. 
 Public mourning for the war dead was therefore a complicated issue, for Germans in both 
West and East.  While West Germans were famously slow to direct their attention to Nazi crimes 
and aggression, provoking criticism from progressive and anti-authoritarian audiences in the 
1960s, East German leaders showed a similar hesitance to acknowledge the entire history of the 
war, also leaving their audiences not completely satisfied.  This chapter will examine both 
changes in the official state-led public mourning apparatus across the 1960s and sources 
documenting manifestations of “alternative” collective memories of the Second World War 
among private East Germans.  Four questions will guide this inquiry: Firstly, what were the 
central concerns of official public mourning in the GDR across the 1960s?  Secondly, in what 
ways did official public mourning reflect the wider political, military and cultural contexts of the 
German Democratic Republic?  Thirdly, what possibilities for publicly-visible mourning still 
existed in the 1960s for East Germans outside of the Communist-led tradition?   Fourthly, in 
what ways could East Germans who were unsatisfied with official public mourning use their 
alternative (non-Communist) traditions to challenge the regime?    
 
A past to explain the present: official public mourning in the GDR 
 The steadfast commitment to antifascist resistance that had been largely missing among 
Germans before 1945 remained the centerpiece of the Gedenktag für die Opfer des Faschismus 
across the 1960s.  As if to convince East Germans that their political leaders were guiding them 
towards their destiny, the East German press declared that the 1961 OdF ceremony was “an 
impressive confession of the legacy of the anti-fascist resistance fighters, who gave their lives for 
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the stamping out of fascism and militarism in all of Germany.”432  Indeed, the deaths of 
Communists in resistance against the Nazis was part of the GDR’s founding myth, its source of 
political legitimacy, as the SED declared that “we [East Germans] have fulfilled the legacy of the 
antifascist resistance fighters” in persevering to create a Socialist Germany.433  The issue of grief 
that East German families might have over their own dead Wehrmacht soldiers and dead civilian 
bombing victims, who by an large had not died to achieve this goal, was largely ignored (to say 
nothing of families grieving victims of Nazi racial persecution).   
 
“True patriots” and “glorious deeds” 
 Indeed, the “legacy” of a Socialist Germany for which the resistance fighters had died 
was still, in 1961, only incompletely realized, reaching only half of Germany.  Moreover, the 
benefits and promise of this new, purportedly more enlightened, more peaceful and more free 
Germany coexisted uneasily alongside the anguish of families and friends who had suddenly 
been walled apart from all contact with the West in exchange for these benefits.  September 1961 
was a scarcely one month after the Berlin Wall had been erected, finalizing the division of the 
two Germanys that had begun in 1945 and, while the GDR officially called for “peaceful re-
unification” of West and East, it was understood in East Berlin that Bonn would have to lay 
down its arms and embrace “Real Existing Socialism” in order to heal the wounds.  Considered 
                                                 
432  „150 000 Berliner im Gedenken an die opfer des Faschismus: Nieder mit dem Militarismus/ Her mit dem 
Friedensvertrag!  Grosskundgebung mit Hermann Matern auf dem August-Bebel-Platz/Mächtige Demonstration der 
internationalen Kampfgemeinschaft zur Sicherung des Friedens in Europa.“ Neues Deutschland. Organ des 
Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschland. Berlin, September 11, 1961. 
 
433 „Mit Hingabe und Leidenschaft. Aus der Rede von Hermann Matern.“ Neues Deutschland. Organ des 
Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschland. Berlin, September 11, 1961.   
The SED insisted that that East Germany represented the antifascist “better” Germany who had ceaselessly 
resisted the Nazis and now worked to overcome lingering fascism in West Germany.  See Herf, Divided Memory, 
Chapter 2.  Gilad Margalit makes a similar argument in Guilt, Suffering and Remembrance, 87-89.   
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from the standpoint of public mourning, East Germans who had lost relatives in the service of 
the Wehrmacht might counter (not entirely incorrectly) that, for all its faults, at least the 
Wehrmacht had ostensibly fought to preserve a whole Germany (which of course was also to be 
territorially enlarged and racially “purified”).  Even if one grants that the division of Germany 
did not rank among the antifascist fighters’ goals, Stalin and his Red Army had, at least in part, 
ensured that no unification would take place with the Western Zones (or Western Berlin).  Thus, 
for East Germans on the street, mourning dead Communist fighters and resistance leaders in 
1961 implicitly involved praising or at least approving the post-war division of Germany. 
 As if to address lingering unreformed German nationalist sentiments among Wehrmacht 
families, in 1967 the SED-controlled press printed a number of heroic biographies of “true 
patriots and sons of their nation” in connection with the OdF celebrations.  The message here 
was clear: the “glorious deeds” of these German antifascists, as well as those of “the great world-
changing power,” the Soviet Union, had roundly defeated the Nazis in 1945.434  In winning their 
great battle against fascism, these heroic resistance fighters had worked to undo the longer 
tradition of unquestioned loyalty to the king and the military in German history.  German 
communists who had “participated in the 1917 Sailors’ Uprising” or “fought in the 1929 Red 
Army of the Ruhr against Kapp and Lüttwitz,” were in turn “forced to don the hated Wehrmacht 
uniform” and serve on the Eastern Front but had been undeterred in selflessly working to 
undermine the German war effort, passing information to the Soviets or organizing underground 
resistance.435  Such actions to rescue Germany undertaken by both soldiers and civilians 
                                                 
434 „Sie gaben das Leben für ihre Freunde.  Toten deutscher antifaschistischer Kämpfer im zweiten Weltkrieg als 
treue Verbündete der Sowjetunion.“ Neues Deutschland. Organ des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen 
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sympathetic to the Socialist cause had cost them their lives in Buchenwald, Flossenburg, 
Sachsenhausen, or even summary executions at the front, all fates which were presented here by 
the official propaganda as acts of sacrifice and patriotism, far beyond any claims available to 
Wehrmacht survivors whose presence on the battlefield had only prolonged the dictatorship.     
 This attention to the deaths of German Communists and to the fact that they (the 
Communists) had undertaken actions in opposition to the goals of the German Wehrmacht was 
no accident.  While West Germans publicly and privately sought acceptable ways to mourn and 
remember their Wehrmacht dead positively, the East German regime used the issue of mourning 
to remind East German citizens that anyone who did not resist the Nazis was in fact a failure.  
Even without considering the problem of passive complicity versus indifference on the part of 
Third Reich Germans, this official collective memory sponsored by the SED in the 1960s was 
likely not a story that reassured or comforted most East Germans, whose fathers and brothers had 
largely fought for the Nazis. 
 
Memory as moral authority 
 Beyond concentrating on the largely unrepresentative experience of past anti-fascist 
heroes, the OdF memorial ceremonies across the 1960s increasingly responded to contemporary 
German tensions of the Cold War.  Reporting on the 1965 OdF memorial ceremonies, East 
German press described mass crowds meeting in East Berlin, determined “to do all they could to 
preserve peace” but apparently not ready to consider armed conflict as a means of doing so.436  
Besides the East German leadership, representatives from communist-, antifascist-, and other 
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Berlin, September 13, 1965.  
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leftist organizations in France, the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union were present in 1965, 
too, giving the memorial day event an air of international unity around the cause of preventing 
the return of fascism and war in Europe.  What was not said but can be easily implied from the 
press reportage, was the apparent failure of the Western Allies to ‘learn’ the right ‘lessons’ from 
the victory they had shared with the USSR in 1945.  Rather than pursuing peace and building a 
Socialist future without war, France, Great Britain, and the United States had all by 1965 been 
involved in one war or another to maintain European control over colonies (or former colonies) 
in the developing world.  Thus remembering war, violence and death from the past was in many 
ways inseparable from the concerns of the 1960s present.   
 In many ways, the morally advantaged truth of ending fascism within an international 
collaborative effort was a valuable platform for the post-war GDR to claim authority and from 
which to deny Western countries the same.  In the wake of wars in the Middle East, North Africa 
and Southeast Asia, East Germans could speak “honoring words in remembrance of the dead 
heroes of the anti-fascist resistance.”   This praise even extended to “those soldiers and officers 
of the Allied Powers of the Anti-Hitler Coalition who fell in the struggle for the liberation of 
Germany from fascism”437 but did not, in this case, give way to the belligerent rhetoric of OdF 
speeches in past years, even if the ceremony criticized West Germany’s open pursuit of nuclear 
weapons and the US’s rapidly escalating war in Vietnam.438  Instead, East German public 
mourning seemed to make a distinction between demanding peace and remembrance of the dead 
on one hand and promoting a new war in furtherance of the dead’s mission on the other.439  Thus 
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439 Other press reports in connection with the OdF memorial day in 1965 are consistent with the preference for peace 
but not necessarily the promotion of war.  See for example, “Warum ich hier lebe.  Ein Schriftsteller auf  der 
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criticism of German militarism of the past and outrage at nuclear proliferation in the present did 
not necessarily lead to a call to arms or hint of readiness to aggressively defend against the FRG 
and their nuclear-armed allies (though this link had been made often in 1950s).  In fact, it was 
this sort of deliberative, nuanced and careful attitude toward initiating war that the East German 
regime presented to the world that the same regime claimed was missing from the West. 
 This is not to say that belligerent posturing and saber-rattling were absent from the East 
German official public mourning tradition.  Rather, SED leaders demonstrated a flexibility in 
centering attention on their own narrative of communist suffering during the Third Reich while 
simultaneously restricting attention to the numerically larger groups of racial and ethnic victims 
of Nazi violence but also expanding the circle of Communist victims to include Red Army 
soldiers who fought fascism, too.  In conjunction with the 1967 OdF memorial day, press reports 
announced that a delegation of “Soviet friends” were touring the GDR and were learning that 
“Lenin’s legacy” was “in good hands” there.440  Here the message clearly indicated that a proper 
remembrance and understanding of the Nazi years must necessarily lead to support of the USSR 
in its confrontation with the West.  No mention was made, however, of the brutality that had 
characterized the fighting between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht only two decades earlier, 
leaving open the question of whether Wehrmacht families felt uncomfortable with the suggestion 
they forgive and forget the reasons and circumstances under which their missing loved ones died.   
                                                 
Deutschland. Berlin, September 13, 1965; and „Dresdner Gedenkstätte eingeweiht.“ Neues Deutschland. Organ des 
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440 „Meeting an Iskra-Gedenkstätte. Sowjetische Helden vor 900 Jugendlichen in Leipzig.“ Neues Deutschland. 
Organ des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschland. Berlin, September 10, 1967.   
On the brutality of the Eastern Front, see Omer Bartov, “Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich,” The 
Journal of Modern History, 63, 1 (March 1991):44-61; and Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, 
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 On the whole, the conclusion being conveyed in these official acts of collective memory 
and public mourning across the middle 1960s was that only a select few Germans’ deaths had 
ushered fascism’s fall and were thus deserving of the public’s attention.  Outside the circle of 
antifascist resistance (which included the Red Army), the remaining German war dead were not 
worth commemorating in the eyes of the regime because of their failure to take part in the 
resistance.  Considered from the theoretical framework of memory-as-“social action,” these 
ceremonies were not simple exercises in rehearsed rhetoric and performance but rather had very 
real implications for how the regime hoped its citizens reacted to the Cold War tensions around 
them.  The distinction between whose deaths should be and should not be publicly mourned in 
remembrance of the Second World War informed citizens’ support or disdain for the regime. 
 
Remembering violence past and present 
 What the SED ideology animating official public mourning could not hide, and what 
attentive East Germans could easily notice despite the official OdF rhetoric of peace, was the 
continued threat or actual employment of violent measures by East European post-fascist 
authorities in order to solidify their Socialist regimes.  What was effectively a continuation of 
war and unrest in the supposedly peacefully Socialist world stood at the top of official public 
mourning in the GDR into the late 1960s, with the 1968 OdF memorial ceremony featuring 
“leading personalities from our Republic as well as other tried-and-true Anti-fascists from 
twenty-six European nations,” devoted to the “all-around strengthening” of East Germany.441  In 
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this case, “strengthening” probably meant increasing production and standards of living while 
also ensuring proper devotion and dedication to the memory and continuation of the “victims of 
fascism’s” work.  Yet, this “strengthening” was usually accomplished with the help of the USSR, 
who had “strengthened” Socialism in East Berlin in 1953 and in Budapest in 1956.  The Soviet 
Union’s influence in defeating the Nazis in 1945 and its continued control over the Eastern Bloc 
in 1969 was impossible to ignore.  Said one speaker at the ceremony, “our success is based on 
the creative application of the lessons of Marxism-Leninism and the experiences of the Soviet 
Union.”442  If it was the clear-headedness of German Communists and their Soviet partners who 
defeated fascism the first time, the much-feared third world war in Europe would require GDR 
leaders and citizens to continue following the example of the OdF (and of the USSR) in order to 
survive. 
 That the “path of socialism, of democracy and of peace” led from the Anti-fascist 
sacrifices of the Second World War through the GDR’s continuation of their ideals in the present 
was certainly nothing new in 1968’s remembrance ceremony.443  Nor was it new that the 
invocation of the Communists’ experiences in other East European nations downplayed the 
memory of Wehrmacht dead and German civilian dead with which many more East German 
families were likely coping.  Yet the message in September of 1968 could not have been seen by 
East Germans except through the lens of the then-recently put down Prague Spring.  The 
Brezhnev Doctrine and Eastern European satellite regimes’ intolerance for democratic reform 
only reinforced the notion – bound up in the Opfer des Faschismus tradition – that it was only 
the successful antifascist fighters who were qualified to lead post-war regimes in pursuit of their 
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fallen comrades’ dreams.  What 1969 made clear, from the standpoint of public mourning, was 
that mourning and remembering the proper victims was not merely a personal reflection but a 
decision with political, social and military repercussions for East Germans. 
 One year later, the image of an occupied and oppressed people fighting for their freedom 
again animated the OdF ceremony in East Berlin.  The promise that “the progressive peoples will 
never forget the heroes who gave their lives in the struggle against the Hitlerregime,” might 
easily have reminded East German listeners that even after 1945, members of their communities 
had met their deaths while continuing to fight for their people but in 1953, 1956 and 1968, such 
resistance fighters’ deaths were not acknowledged and mourned by the state.  This irony may 
have seemed starker given that the 1969 official Opfer des Faschismus ceremony also reached 
out to remember “all of those people who fell in Vietnam in defense of their homeland against an 
treacherous and gruesome enemy.”444  Clearly, the SED meant this line as a jab at the United 
States but the nearness of war and violence to the 1969 East German people had been made 
clear, either through contemporary political events before their eyes or via public remembrance 
ceremonies such as this one reinforcing the East-West standoff.    
 
Compelling a new military enthusiasm 
 The connection between violence in the 1960s present on one hand and war and 
bloodshed in East Germans’ recent past on the other was apparent far beyond the annual Opfer 
des Faschismus mourning ceremonies.  Across the decade, political-, cultural- and military 
events combined to create an environment in the East German public sphere where the 
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possibility of war and the necessity of military values to answer such threats seemed very close 
at hand.  If East Germans were reminded once a year that they should look to the dead victims of 
fascism as role models and examples of public service, these same audiences witnessed the 
growth of a new set of expectations and rewards, designed to persuade people to serve the GDR, 
with a sense of duty and respect.  To be sure, the machinery of the regime did not stop only at 
persuasion and indeed could deploy deadly force to achieve its goals.  Nonetheless, the 
compelling public memory or cultural affinity for military duty and readiness to die for the 
German Democratic Republic were ends perhaps out of even this regime’s reach.  Instead of 
forcing East Germans to take part in and believe the discourse of the Opfer des Faschismus, the 
East German regime left these goals to be accomplished by propaganda and other suggestive 
policy measures.  By crafting a set of structures to enhance and reward military service that 
continued a supposedly long-standing Socialist military tradition, the SED and its servants hoped 
to augment the messaging and lesson-learning implied by the OdF holiday, subtly fashioning a 
new East German military enthusiasm to replace the one that Germans had lost in 1945. 
 
Indicting one past while rehabilitating another 
 Despite the slight changes in official OdF rhetoric across the 1960s, the closeness of war 
to present-day East Germans had been a fixture since 1962, when the German Democratic 
Republic’s legislature began discussing a law enacting universal male conscription.  The GDR 
had begun the armament process much earlier, first creating the Kasernierte Volkspolizei, an 
armed paramilitary police force in 1952, out of which eventually grew the National Volksarmee 
(NVA) in 1956 as a (initially) volunteer force.445  It is of course difficult to gauge public opinion 
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on the issue of military service given the political and social constraints on free expression of 
ideas within the GDR.  Nonetheless, in their efforts to promote acceptance and enthusiasm for 
the new universal obligation on young men to serve in the armed forces like their fathers and 
grandfathers had done before, SED appears to have leaned heavily on Wehrmacht veterans and 
the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDPD), which had been established in 1948 as 
a successor to the various conservative middle class parties of the past and therefore was aimed 
at building support among those members of the East German citizenry thought least likely to 
accept the regime.446  Thus the East German regime, after distancing itself from older German 
public mourning practices (such as Volkstrauertag) that had praised or at least endorsed patriotic 
military service to the nation, now turned to those elements of German society within their 
borders whom the regime believed would have been most amenable to these older traditions, 
were they still in place. 
 In January 1962, NDPD leaders were already planning a series of articles to be published 
in the party newspaper, Der nationale Demokrat, to persuade East German men that renewed 
military service was a good idea.447  At the same time, another report circulated within the 
NDPD leadership concluding that, based on surveys of local party chapters, the proposed law 
creating universal male military service was supported almost universally by the GDR 
population.  The opaque authors of this report gave numerous quotations from interviews to 
                                                 
soldiers who fought the Soviet Union, those POWs taken captive and held by the Soviet Union were sought out by 
the regime as prime candidates to serve loyally in the East German military.  It is also important to note that 
Bundeswehr exists after 1955 but the West German men have the right of conscientious objection to military service 
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testify that East Germans were not opposed to the draft in principle and that some were even 
enthusiastic about it.448  Although the genuineness and reliability of this document and other 
similar materials is open to question, the Nationaldemokratische Partei at least believed that a 
new nationally-representative East German army was worth pursuing and furthermore believed 
that their own party membership would join eagerly.  Whether any East Germans had 
reservations about a new conscript army manned by their sons, the existence of a force on such a 
scale only meant that the chances of another war were now de facto increased.  That is, the SED 
regime was preparing to force the East German people to put the Opfer des Faschismus memory 
into “social action,” whether they wanted to or not. 
 The very idea of the SED fostering a new emphasis and warmth for military tradition and 
institutions may appear surprising, given the German Left’s historic disdain for officer corps, the 
General Staff, and the military in general.  Yet both in the early 19th century and during the Third 
Reich, communists could point to an alternative tradition of violence used to advance politically 
progressive goals.449  It was this alternative, more fitting for the East German present in the 
1960s that the political leaders sought to resurrect.  While the Bundeswehr in West Germany had  
made the mistake of “again resurrecting” the tradition of “German Imperialism” and 
“militarism,” “from the Kaiserreich, then the Hitlerreich” and “now in the Kanzlerdemokratie,” 
their mistake lay in latching onto the 20th of July conspiracy as  a founding myth for its military 
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institutions.450  By ignoring “the true resistance fighters against the Hitler-Regime” – the 
communists – the West Germans blindly ignored the truth that “Goerdeler, Beck and 
Schacht…in no way stood in opposition to Nazism.”451  Rather, the 20th of July heroes of the 
West had really acted to try to “rescue German Imperialism and militarism” by removing Hitler 
so they could win the war against the USSR.452  Instead of these flawed and misguided heroes, 
the East German political leadership suggested Germans look to a leftist military tradition as a 
more credible source for leadership in the Cold War present. 
 This credibility granted to a tradition of fighting for Socialist or Communist goals, past 
and present, was not shared by all of East German society.  In particular, two senior leaders of 
the Protestant Church in East Germany wrote to the SED in 1962 to voice their objections.  In 
assembling its response to these Protestant Bishops’ objections to universal military service in 
the GDR, the Politburo members relied on their own specific understandings of German 
political, religious, and military history, evidencing another form of “social action” in outlining 
how East German Protestant Christians should understand the NVA and its mission, which 
themselves built upon the accomplishments of the Opfer des Faschismus who were already 
models for GDR citizens.   
 To begin with, the SED ministers criticized the German Protestant Church in West 
Germany as “completely integrated into the accomplishment of the military and political 
objectives of the Bundeswehr,” a result of German Protestants’ historic and uncritical loyalty to 
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the German state and its army.453  It was no accident that these Communist leaders painted the 
West German Protestant Church as the continuation of illiberal and reactionary trends in German 
history – this is also how the SED regularly described the Federal Republic in general.  The 
alleged close identification of the West German Protestant Church leadership with the West 
German political leadership was simply the result of “the old chauvinistic ideology of ‘God, he 
who gave us iron’ [‘Gott, der Eisen wachsen ließ’]” now being “dangerously resurrected once 
more” with “the help of the West German Church leaders” who themselves formed a “military 
church [Militärkirche].”454  Perhaps reluctant in 1962 to denounce religious faith as the root of 
the problem, these party leaders instead framed the issue as religious institutions’ improper 
influence on soldiers’ civilian Germans’ everyday lives.    
 This incomplete rejection of religion did not prevent the SED from pointing fingers at 
German Protestant leaders for their historic alliance with the German political right.  In fact, they 
insisted their new Socialist military would avoid employing any religious elements in the loyalty 
oath sworn by recruits, setting it far apart from “the fascist army” and the ways in which 
“military chaplains and NS leadership” had countenanced the commission of “gruesome crimes” 
by soldiers whose oaths had made it a pseudo-religious obligation to follow orders.455  Thus, the 
NVA and its new universal male military tradition would present a clear departure from the 
“tributary obedience” of German soldiers in centuries past.  It was this long history of Germans 
accustomed to unquestioning obedience that was exploited by German Protestant leaders’ long 
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promotion of a „Christian-patriotic duty of the soldier,” which in turn had convinced German 
men for generations to fight “unconditionally” in the service of the Emperor and “in the fascist 
Army of Hitler.”456  Beyond indicting the history of German Protestantism, this SED position 
paper reveals basic assumptions about the nature of war and the new types of conscription armies 
and wars that this new post-fascist East Germany would model.  The crucial connection to 
mourning lay in how the SED framed military service as an ideological action: East Germans 
could not mourn the dead Wehrmacht soldiers because their deaths had helped prolong the 
fascist state, whereas East Germanys’ sons who went to war and died would certainly be 
mourned and respected for their sacrifices in the service of “real existing Socialism.” 
 
A new Germany, a new army 
 Beginning with the supposition that the German Democratic Republic was no different 
than any other sovereign state in history, SED leaders calmly pointed out to their Protestant 
critics that states have always compelled their citizens to perform military service in times of 
need.  In addition to denying any reason why the East German Protestant Church might have 
historically-grounded objections to military service by its parishioners, the Politbüro attempted 
to re-frame the question as one of equality among all citizens, asserting that “[a]ll citizens, 
regardless of religion, social class, and world view” possess “the right and the duty to protect 
their Socialist home front, life and the existence of all its citizens.”457  Thus, because all East 
Germans were created equal and were equally indebted to their government, all East German 
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men must therefore protect Socialism, without exception.  As if to assuage fears of Christians 
facing a crisis of their faith, these partly leaders insist that there are “no regulations” in the 
conscription law as written, “that would make it impossible for Christian citizens” to perform 
military service.  Having denied any room for conscientious objection on political and religious 
grounds, SED ministers continued, insisting that East German Christian men also had political- 
and religious reasons for embracing that military service. 
 These arguments for accepting military service reveal more than the SED’s assumption 
that military service in the GDR was unproblematic, even after considering recent German 
history.  Rather, universal male military service marked yet another measure of how much more 
just and enlightened the GDR was, compared to the Third Reich.  In this case, the equality of 
opportunity and obligation undergirding military service “correspond[ed] in full measure to the 
interests of Christian citizens and their equal rights” in the GDR.458  Going further, these leaders 
make the point that the Church should not find this equality objectionable, since “exceptions to 
the rule” could only result from the existence of “privileges or discrimination” which 
“contradicts” the GDR Constitution “as much as the will and the beliefs of Christian citizens of 
the GDR” who “want neither privilege… nor [to be] ‘second-class citizens.’”459  Whether or not 
these counterarguments addressed the exact concerns raised by Protestant leaders is not clear 
from these documents.  Church leaders’ objections to military service may have stemmed from 
their own remembrance of the Third Reich as a site of glorification of military heroes (see 
Chapter II) or from the Church’s (more traditional) anti-Communism.  In either case, it seems 
clear that both church leaders and SED ministers had different memories of German military 
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history and each believed East Germans ought to take correspondingly different “social actions” 
in the post-war present.       
 In particular, the Politbüro took great pains in drafting its response to the Church to 
elaborate the many ways in which the Nationale Volksarmee existed as a new kind of military 
institution, one incapable of repeating the misdeeds of earlier generations.  Unlike centuries of 
German history, the NVA existed “not for imperialistic revanchist plans” but instead acted to 
preserve “peace, international friendship and prosperity for humankind.”460  As problematic as 
this statement may be, given the NVA’s key role as a first line of defense for the Warsaw Pact, 
this conceptualization of East German Soldiers as somehow serving a novel cause represents 
another instance of Germans (here, SED leaders) re-thinking the German people’s relationship to 
the military and to their own military history.  That is, East German political leaders were here 
responding to the same history that had motivated West German political leaders to create the 
doctrine of “innere Führung” for the Bundeswehr.461   
 To be sure, the SED had nothing but criticism for the Bundeswehr, denouncing it as 
having simply re-incarnated the mistaken assumptions of past German militarism.  Yet this 
instinctive invective against the Bundeswehr was more than a well-rehearsed philippic.  Instead, 
the East German leaders needed West Germans’ own hesitance toward military service for the 
Bundeswehr in order to explain to East Germans why military service east of the Elbe was so 
crucial. That is, the SED explained that the question of conscientious objection to military 
service must be re-framed to consider the nature of the state and military involved.  In the case of 
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West Germans, their “pacifist traditions and beliefs” present “the point of departure for their 
struggle against militarism and nuclear armament.”  That is, West Germans who objected to 
military service must have done so because they understood the unresolved ‘fascist’ tendencies 
of the Federal Republic.  Whereas for East Germans, service in the NVA was the most moral 
choice available, as the presence of a strong East German Army would deter the ‘fascist’ West 
from launching another war.  Given these reforms of military-religious relationships, the SED 
decried any GDR Christians who still conscientiously objected to military service as insincere, 
concluding that such a stance could not be motivated “pacifism but instead [by] 
Anticommunism.”462 
 
Rediscovering a shared tradition 
 If this optimistic defense of a Socialist alternative to traditional military concerns carried 
weight with East German audiences, one might expect sons of Wehrmacht veterans to have 
joined up without needing to be drafted, notwithstanding Christian leaders’ hesitance.  While it is 
nearly impossible to discern exactly how many young men and their families saw military 
service for the GDR as the proper “social action” to take based on remembrance of the Second 
World War, we do know that there were also voices from within the NDPD asking “why is there 
no possibility for conscientious objection to military service for us [in the GDR]?”463  Perhaps in 
the age of atomic weapons and the wake of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis, any 
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aspirations for continuing military traditions of the past or improving for the future seemed 
futile.  One way that the East German allayed such concerns was by reaching back to triumphant 
moments of German military history, in an attempt to frame the present-day standoff with the 
West as the latest chapter in this celebrated history of Germans resisting unjust authority.  Thus 
the young men of the 1960s had a historic task before them: not only to follow in the footsteps of 
the Opfer des Faschismus but also to prove equal to generations of earlier German men who had 
also fought to defend their communities.  
 The history of the early nineteenth century Wars of Liberation and Revolution provided 
SED leaders a way to justify re-creating a tradition of military service while instructing East 
Germans to mourn those recent dead who had performed non-military service under fascism.  In 
July of 1963, preparations began to mark the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, one of 
the turning points in Napoleon’s (first) defeat and banishment from the European continent.464  
While the history of Germans taking up arms to protect their king and deny the imposition of 
French Revolutionary ideals might seem problematic to the Communist Party (who saw their 
role as fulfilling the promise of the French Revolution), the SED solved this incompatibility by 
turning to the history of German-Russian relations.  Pointing to the ancient regime’s failures to 
resist Napoleon’s imperial designs, it was “a few enlightened nobles and bourgeois intellectuals” 
who had prepared the way for Germans to win their freedom from foreign oppression.465  Despite 
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the importance of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst,466 East Germans would be told in 1963, it was 
actually the Russians who provided the key to German independence: “Decisive for the 
beginning and result of the Wars of Liberation was the shared struggle and brotherhood-in-arms 
of the German and Russian peoples.”467  Because the Russians had fought “shoulder to shoulder” 
with the Germans in 1813 (and, at least in the case of the anti-fascist resistance fighters, in 1945), 
the SED asserted that it was more historically accurate for East Germans to see historic ties to 
Moscow and not to Paris and Washington, which had each “clearly ‘forgotten,’” as it were, this 
important history.468   
 In addition to publicly celebrating armed service in defense of the socialist cause, the 
SED had also recently begun to draw upon pre-1945 German history to find examples of a 
tradition of violence employed in the furtherance of socialism (or, at least, anti-fascism).  In 
1963, the Politbüro had discussed preparations for the twenty-year anniversary of the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising of 1943.469  In reaching back to the Warsaw Ghetto, which had seen Jews 
unsuccessfully but heroically fighting back against their SS jailers without the leadership of anti-
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fascist or Communist brigades, the SED made a point of noting that, by inviting international 
visitors to East Berlin in1963, the world could see evidence of “the eradication of anti-Semitism 
and revanchism in the GDR,” simply by observing the state of the education system, school 
textbooks, and literature in general.470  Thus even if the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was itself a 
stretch to link to the new NVA, demonstrating the GDR’s non-antisemitism was yet more proof 
of how the OdF tradition had led East Germans away from its fascist predecessor.  Furthermore, 
the example of the “Victims of Fascism,” whether German Communists or Russian Red Army 
soldiers, provided the key for framing a new tradition of universal male military service for East 
Germans, the “social action” implied by remembrance and mourning in the OdF tradition.  The 
key distinction was that the East German armed forces would fight for ideologically just reason, 
disregarding the traditions that the Nazis and the Wehrmacht had gotten wrong.   
  
Incentivizing the present 
 In addition to taking steps preparing for a possible new war, despite what claims to 
peacefulness they made at the annual Opfer des Faschismus memorial ceremony, the East 
German government by the mid-1960s had also begun taking concrete actions to materially 
reward past armed service to the Anti-fascist cause.  Beyond words applauding and affirming the 
deaths of Anti-fascist fighters in resistance against the Nazi regime, the SED approved the 
“granting of an honorary pension [Ehrenpension] to the Fighters against Fascism and the 
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Persecutees of the Nazi Regime as well as their Survivors.”471  Although the category of 
“Persecutees of the Nazi Regime” [Verfolgten des Naziregimes] could appear open to Jews and 
other racial minorities who had survived the Holocaust, it seems more probable that this category 
was understood by the SED to include victims of political persecution, which would be 
consistent with the annual OdF memorial day ceremonies’ focus on communists, to the exclusion 
of Jews and other racial and ethnic minorities.  Moreover, the point of this pension was to give 
concrete reward to the actions which the OdF memory was supposed to inspire in the East 
German population.   
 At the same time that it rewarded the actions warranting remembrance in the GDR, the 
SED’s actions here denied discursive but also physical public space to Wehrmacht veterans and 
their survivors, to whom memories of their veterans’ military service could have implied other 
forms of action in the 1960s that might have given name and recognition to other memories of 
the Second World War.  Instead, East German society “respect[ed] and honor[ed] the men and 
women” who had taken part in “the struggle against fascism and militarism” and who had 
“helped prepare way” for the flourishing of socialism in the GDR.472  While other realpolitik 
concerns on the part of the regime are not clear, it is apparent that, in granting monetary pensions 
of model citizens, two decades after their efforts had paid off, the regime made a point of 
framing such rewards as its “political-moral obligation” to those who had served the socialist 
cause loyally.473  Limiting the discussion and physical space of permissible public memory, these 
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communist fighters were allowed to demand and receive public acclaim and material reward, 
whereas decorations won by Wehrmacht soldiers could win their bearers equal status only in 
West Germany.474  Put into the context of remembering war and military service in the GDR, the 
granting of pensions would seem to underline the expectation that East German citizens answer 
the call of duty to their Socialist state and furthermore that they could expect material reward for 
doing so. 
 Granting material rewards of the OdF fighters and survivors from the past was a small 
example of the kind of universal commitment envisioned by the regime for its citizens to fulfill.  
Alarmed in 1965, in the wake of West German elections and the surging political power of 
conservatives there, East German political leaders in the NDPD spoke of “the dangerousness of 
the effects of anti-Communism, revanchism, and nationalism” on their border.475  These leaders 
hoped to convince their own membership that the future of the GDR depended on “a national 
consciousness developed on all sides,” which would inspire all East Germans to persevere and 
resist “wavering,” the “insinuations of enemies,” and “pacifism in our ranks.”476  Moreover, 
these leaders made clear that they spoke not in metaphors for discipline and ideological purity 
but of concrete actions: “The October Storm [Military] Maneuvers were socialist 
internationalism in action.”477  Consistent with the long-preached message of the OdF memorial 
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day, these politicians had concluded in 1965 that Germans’ “preparedness for defense of our 
German Democratic Republic” resulted from citizens properly understanding their role and 
obligations to the state.478   
 The nearness of war to the present, the long history of war fought for anti-Fascist causes 
(and in league with, not against, the Russians), and the promotion of a new East German military 
tradition all reached a high point in the re-dedication of the Neue Wache Monument in East 
Berlin in January 1969.   The Neue Wache Monument, in the “new” guard house near the Berlin 
Palace, had been the sight of Heldengedenktag ceremonies during the Third Reich.479  The 
decision by the SED to re-instate some form of commemoration for military dead there, 
tempered by including also anti-Fascists, makes sense then only in the context of the larger 
project to create an East German tradition of national military service, grounded in a particular 
reading of German history and augmenting a tradition of remembering and celebrating armed 
Anti-Fascist resistance against the Nazis.  In January 1969 the Politbüro considered the proposal, 
ultimately approved, to inter the remains of “an unknown Victim of the antifascist resistance 
fight and an unknown soldier as victim of militarism.”  These symbolic dead would be interred 
“with military ceremony” in the Neue Wache monument, along with samples of earth taken from 
the battlefields in Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Normandy, Monte Cassino, Narvik, Warsaw, 
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and Prague, and from the concentration camps at Auschwitz, Mauthausen, Natzweiler, 
Theresienstadt, Dachau, Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, and Dora-Mittelbau.480   
 While the decision to blur the lines between dead victims of Nazi violence and dead 
perpetrators (or at least enablers) of Nazi violence has been seen by Gilad Margalit as an effort to 
“symbolically mix” different experiences of the war into one memory supportive of the regime, 
it is also worth noting that this “mixing” simultaneously created room to equate future military 
service to the East German state with the morally-advantageous resistance against the Nazis, 
instead of the morally-tainted enabling and participation in Nazi crimes.  To be sure, these 
sources do not make clear how many East Germans took such rhetoric and implied obligations 
seriously or without question.  Subject to legal obligation under a dictatorship, many men may 
simply have not contested their conscription for reasons of practicality.  Yet it is safe to conclude 
that any large-scale effort to contradict efforts to build national ‘consciousness’ or support for 
military service, or even the memory of the OdF dead upon which it was based, could have 
posed great challenges to the regime.  Whatever the message individual East German spectators 
took away, the nearness of war and the expectation of military service by all young men in 
defense of the German Democratic Republic could not have been seen as remote, given the 
rhetoric and actions of the East German regime on the questions of the military and the dead. 
 
Dissent, non-compliance, or resistance?  Alternative public mourning 
Locating dissent under a dictatorship 
 
 Given that questions of properly mourning the war dead in East Germany were closely 
connected to the maintenance or creation of a new tradition of military service in the NVA, it is 
                                                 
480 Endgültige Gestaltung des Ehrenmals Unter den Linden, supporting documents submitted in support of Point 8 
on the Politbüro agenda for January 14, 1969.  Protokoll Nr. 2/69. BA-DDR DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1350.  Gilad Margalit 
also describes this change in Guilt, Suffering and Memory, 91-93. 
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unsurprising that skepticism in one case might correspond with reluctance in another.  The 
Protestant Church in Germany had voiced its opposition to East German conscription while it 
simultaneously gave people there space within its walls to question the assumptions bound up in 
the rules for officially mourning the war dead.   If the state did not allow conscientious objection 
to military service, what about objection to official mourning rituals?  Can non-participation in 
such officially-sanctioned events be read as politically significant statements?  Do the existence 
of alternative traditions outside of the SED-controlled channels equal sites of resistance or 
simply non-compliance?  Did the regime allow a certain level of “venting” by disaffected 
citizens, even at the risk of undermining its own anti-Fascist ideology, as a means of keeping the 
disgruntlement from boiling over?481  In the case of public mourning in East Germany, the 
sources presently available do not answer all of these questions but they do suggest continual 
manifestations of non-Communist (but not necessarily anti-Communist) civil society traditions 
of public mourning.    
 The Protestant Church in Germany was the vehicle for an alternative sphere of public 
mourning and collective memory activities in East Germany.  In the case of resistance to 
universal military service, it seems that Church leaders’ attitudes were shaped in fact by 
differences in how they remembered the Nazi past and what response this history required of 
them in the post-war present.  Two influential Provincial Church leaders, Bishops Mitzenheim 
and Krummacher, wrote to the SED to object to this policy, only to be called out by the regime 
for the church’s historic support of the Nazis and military institutions in the past.482  According 
                                                 
481 Mary Fulbrook describes “a degree of controlled debate” in the GDR that “was in part actively fostered, in part 
tolerated” but still subject to censorship, in The People’s State, 256. 
 
482 8. Argumentation zu Fragen über allgemeine Wehrpflicht, die von Bischöfen der evangelischen Kirche gestellt 
werden, supplemental materials regarding objection to conscription for consideration as agenda item 8 for Politbüro 
meeting on Febrary 20, 1962, Protokoll Nr. 7/62.  BA-DDR DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 877. 
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to SED Party documents, the exact nature of these churchmen’s objections seems to have been 
related to the requirement of swearing an oath on the regimental colors by new NVA recruits.483  
While the SED refused to see why Christians would have any problem completing this task in 
service of such an unobjectionable goal as forestalling war (see above), putting this complaint 
into broader context is revealing.484   
 What is most striking about these Protestant Church leaders’ objections is the appearance 
within their actions of a re-thinking of the church’s long history of unconditional praise for the 
military and deference to state authorities.  Indeed, SED officials raised this criticism against the 
church’s historic pattern of behavior, too.  That these Christian leaders resorted to open 
resistance in the name of their faith does not necessarily amount to them feeling penitent about 
their actions during the Third Reich.  This is all the less likely since the German Protestant 
Church had long harbored anti-communist and anti-socialist sentiments, even before 1933.  
Resistance against a politically leftist regime might be, therefore, more natural to these mature 
church leaders than efforts to critically distance themselves from a rightist tradition.  However, 
this newfound readiness and willingness to dismiss, or at least question, old traditional support 
for military service and the state in the East is consistent with what the Church in the West was 
saying and doing on the question of Volkstrauertag.  Even though the Churches split in 1969, 
with the East German churches forming their own federation, the Protestant Church had long 
                                                 
483 Politbüro of the ZK to die 1. Sekretäre der Bezirks- und Kreisleitungen der SED, Betr.: Argumentation zu Fragen 
über die allgemeine Wehrpflicht, die von Bischöfe und anderen kirchlichen Amtsträgern der evagelischen Kirche 
gestellt werden, letter submitted as supporting document and introducing problem of church objections to 
conscription for agenda item 8 of Politbüro meeting on February 20, 1962, Protokoll Nr. 7/62. BA-DDR DY 30/ J 
IV 2/2A/ 878. 
 
484 8. Argumentation zu Fragen über allgemeine Wehrpflicht, die von Bischöfen der evangelischen Kirche gestellt 
werden, supplemental materials regarding objection to conscription for consideration as agenda item 8 for Politbüro 
meeting on Febrary 20, 1962, Protokoll Nr. 7/62.  BA-DDR DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/ 877. 
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offered East Germans space for dissent, non-compliance, and resistance to the demands of the 
regime.485  Thus, already operating on the margins of officially-approved East German public 
life, the Protestant Church’s activism in publicly mourning the war dead while also raising doubt 
about the new East German military tradition may have been another step along the way to its 
well-known role in the 1989-90 peaceful revolution. 
 
Publicly visible sites of mourning 
 Besides questioning the present regime’s military policies and reconsidering its attitudes 
towards earlier governments’ military policies, underground activists operating within the 
Protestant Church in Germany had worked for decades to complicate official East German 
mourning for the Second World War dead.  This “social action” in the form of grave 
maintenance, information gathering and recovery and reburial of bodies, does not appear to have 
taken place everywhere with enthusiastic support.  However, those individuals and groups who 
did work to recover the bodies, preserve the memories, and offer comfort to grieving families of 
these war dead were de facto rejecting the notion that the antifascist resistance and Red Army 
sufficiently represented the entirety of Germans’ wartime experiences. 
 Besides the care for graves and the sharing of information about the remains of the dead, 
East German Protestants were also concerned about the preservation of those very gravesites, the 
destruction of which would severely impede on future generations’ abilities to mourn their own 
dead.  In January 1965, local churchmen wrote to their superiors in East Berlin, “alarmed” at 
having heard rumors “that not just community offices” had to limit military graves to the 
                                                 
485 Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany, 18; Fulbrook, The People’s State, 264-265 
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customary twenty-year Liegefrist (“resting period”)486 but that, apparently, such graves in church 
cemeteries were also subject to disinterment after twenty years in order to make room for the 
remains of the more-recently-deceased.  Realizing that they were, in 1965, at the end of this 
Liegefrist for any war-related dead killed before 1945, these churchmen begged for clarification 
and instructions.487  A High Church Council member in East Berlin replied to explain that church 
cemeteries were exempt from what were apparently guidelines for municipal cemeteries.  Yet, 
not content with simply preserving this space for the cultivation of alternative public mourning 
and collective memory traditions, this councilman also suggested that local pastors try to erect 
memorials on these graveyards that “keep alive the memory of the Fallen” but at the same time 
“call out for peace.”488  Thus this exchange proves that at least some Protestant pastors realized 
that the state’s hostility to any war-related dead outside of the anti-fascist collective memory 
meant that geographic space and physical remnants documenting those other dead would soon be 
lost and therefore must be somehow protected.  Interestingly, these churchmen appear to have 
been borrowing or repeating language about remembering the dead in order to preserve peace 
that was featured in similar debates about a decade or so earlier in West Germany.489  
                                                 
486 These individuals seem to distinguish the idea of a limited period of time during which the deceased are allowed 
to remain buried before disinterment (Liegefrist) from the concept of the permanent right of certain categories of 
dead to remain buried indefinitely (temed Ruherecht, “right to be left in peace”).  West German churches also 
debated this issue with their repective government officials at about this time.  Examples abound in EZAB 2/2560.  
In general, the problem of limited space for the burial of the dead in a community that has existed for several 
centuries is not altogether surprising. 
 
487 Nora Noth to Oberkirchenrat Behm, January 12, 1965, EZAB 104/1221. 
 
488 Author unknown to the leitenden Verwaltungsbehörden der Gliedkirchen in der DDR, January 22, 1965, EZAB 
104/1221. These instructions do not make clear whether such monuments were meant to be erected only in church 
cemeteries or also in municipal ones. 
 
489 The best example is the play, Der Andere, featured at the 1959 Volkstrauertag ceremony in Bonn.  Rudolf von 
Oertzen and Otto Heinrich Kühner, Der Andere.  Eine Ballade vom Tod im Kriege.  Für Sprecher Chor und 
Orchester, no date, printed and bound script, VDK A.100-23. 
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 As striking as this “public action” on the part of East German Protestant leaders may 
sound, it should not be assumed that all pastors or all congregations were of the same mind on 
these questions.  Tied up with the question of keeping or disinterring graves was the issue of 
defining a “war grave” in the first place and whether certain civilians might qualify or not for 
this designation.  One local Protestant leader in Borna wrote to his superiors that, because the 
1922 law defining and governing war graves and their care did not include civilians killed in the 
First World War (only civilians who died as internees during the war), the East German churches 
should similarly deny German civilian victims of aerial bombing or combat operations the status 
of “war graves.”490  Consequently, such civilians’ remains would be subject to disinterment after 
their 20-year Liegefrist was expired.  Interestingly, the Saxon Church official who answered this 
letter responded that all East German Protestant Churches should indeed include civilians killed 
by the aerial bombing or as a result of combat operations as “war victims” with “war graves,” 
thus extending to them the permanent “Ruherecht” (the right not to be disinterred) if they were 
buried on church grounds.491   
 Such differences of opinion should not necessarily be read only as evidence of sympathy 
or hostility toward the regime on the part of these local and state-level church leaders.  Rather, it 
is also fruitful to understand them as reflections of East German Protestants grappling with 
questions of how to understand war, the meaning or death in wartime, and the question of 
whether soldiers ought to continue to enjoy the enhanced social prestige in life and in death that 
they had known in the German lands since the early nineteenth century. 
                                                 
490 Evangelisch-Lutherisches Landeskirchenamt Sachsens to the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, 
Kirchenkanzlei für die Gliedkirchen in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, May 6, 1965, EZAB 104/1221. 
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215 
 
 
Questioning the past 
 The issue of soldiers’ proper place in East German society came up again when Pastor 
Günter Pilz from Mittelherwigsdorf wrote to Dresden church officials to register his vehement 
objection to the entire concept of “war graves.”  The recent rules calling for the gravesites of 
dead war victims (but not other dead congregation members) to be maintained “with particular 
care and love,” seemed wrong-headed.492  This pastor instead believed that East German 
Christians should not protect “war graves” (he seems to have meant “soldiers’ graves”) in any 
way that set them apart from the rest of the “regular” dead, since “in death all people are 
equal.”493  Besides, “many years ago” Germans had already “done away” with organizing the 
dead into “different classes upon burial.”494  With his comment about “different classes” having 
long been evened out, it is not clear whether this pastor meant to refer to the egalitarian nature of 
the GDR or the new critical attitude toward mourning the dead adopted by leading Protestant 
Churchmen (in the West) a decade or earlier.  In either case, this pastor clearly harbored a 
memory of the Second World War and its dead casualties that implored him to abstain from 
showing uncritical honor or reverence for them. 
 Continuing to repeat arguments similar to those leveled by the Protestant Church in the 
1952 West German debate over Volkstrauertag (see Chapter II), this pastor wrote that soldiers’ 
graves should receive no special treatment.  “Do we have today a particular reason” asked the 
pastor, for which the war graves needed to be “exposed?”495  “Do we have a moral obligation 
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toward these dead,” which requires Germans to devote particular care to their graves?496  
Conscious of the Weimar- and Third Reich era practices of Volkstrauertag and 
Heldengedenktag, whereby the dead soldiers and SA fighters were made into rhetorical role 
models for an uncritical German public, in turn helping promote the public’s support for a new 
war, this pastor insisted that “[w]e are all really quite far removed from worshipping heroes.”497  
Yet at the same time and like other pastors in the GDR, this church leader couched his critical 
discussion of mourning practices and collective memory in the framework of pastoral care, 
adding that Christians should obey Jesus’s words to “let the dead bury their dead.”498 
 This is an argument that one might expect from liberals within the Protestant Church in 
West Germany or one that might resonate with progressive student groups and others critical of 
the West German “silence” on the Nazi past at this moment in history.  Yet, the pastor did not 
want to entirely brush off his congregations’ needs for comfort and closure.  Relating that his 
church recently discussed erecting a monument for the war dead, he explains that “the 
congregation wanted a monument to honor the dead [Ehrenmal]” but that he, the pastor, wanted 
instead to build “a monument to remind us of the dead [Mahnmal],” which was apparently 
consistent with the building permit the church had secured.499  Ultimately neither suggestion 
                                                 
 
496 Ibid.  
 
497 Ibid.  
 
498 Ibid.  Here the pastor is quoting Matthew 8:22, Jesus’s instructions to potential disciples to concentrate on the 
future and not let burdens of the past distract them, which is the complete opposite of what public mourning 
practices in each Germany were trying to accomplish. 
 
499 Evangelisch-Lutherisches Landeskirchenamt Sachsens to the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, 
Kirchenkanzlei für die Gliedkirchen in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, May 6, 1965, EZAB 104/1221. 
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came to fruition, but the pastor’s resistance to celebrating the “heroes” marked his ideas about 
mourning the dead and remembering the past as being similar to his colleagues in the west. 
 At the same time, in the context of the GDR, these ideas could be read as politically 
consistent with the SED’s official memory since they evince a discomfort with the historical 
propensity to elevate the military above all else in German society.  It will be recalled that the 
SED was making arguments to persuade Protestant leaders of this very point, at about the same 
time, to secure support for the new NVA and universal male conscription in the GDR.  
Furthermore, this pastor seems quite clear on culpability for the Third Reich, writing that “the 
war dead are victims of our collective guilt” and that war grave care alone would not atone for 
“our sins.”500  However, for this pastor, the “social action” implied by the proper remembrance 
the war and the dictatorship was not the lesson of following the OdF’s example and resisting 
fascism via fighting for socialism.  Instead, making amends for Germans’ past sins were best 
accomplished through “a public word of solidarity with the conscientious objectors.”501    
 
Publicly-visible mourning as pastoral care 
 When they were preserving space for alternative collective memory and publicly-visible 
mourning practices within the church or the church’s cemeteries, Protestant officials did so while 
re-framing publicly-visible mourning as part of the pastoral care they were obliged to provide for 
their congregations’ spiritual needs.  In this way, Protestants could use religion to provide 
political cover for activities that might otherwise be seen as suspicious by the regime, especially 
given that the SED was already skeptical of organized religion and had taken steps to minimize 
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the churches’ threat by socially isolating them.502  A lengthy set of instructions to pastors 
regarding “the Erecting of Monuments [Gedenkmalen] for the Dead of the last World War” 
explained that “the message of the Gospels” was the answer for congregations and individual 
believers coping with “the horribly deadly events of the last war.”  In this vein, congregations 
erecting monuments were to take care to ensure these memorials were suitably “churchly 
monuments” that “allude[d] to God’s Word, to the seriousness of his holy presence [seiner 
Heimsuchung] and to the unfathomable deepness of his mercy.”503  While the ostensible goal of 
these monuments was framed as fulfilling the pastoral care mission of the churches, inspiring 
their grieving parishioners with words of comfort and hope in God’s grace, the implicit reason 
for the monuments themselves was that these congregation members felt a deep sense of loss and 
a need to make sense of their loved ones’ deaths, concerns that were not addressed via the 
GDR’s official antifascist public mourning tradition.      
 This move to erect monuments and inscribe the names of the dead, visibly attesting to 
their absence from the community of the living, was by its nature a very public form of “social 
action” motivated by concerns of collective memory.  To address the non-finality of grief and 
mourning facing communities who still did not know the fate of all their dead, these church 
leaders suggested also placing a “Memorial Book for the Fallen,” where the names of the dead, 
as well as the date they died, could be listed with room for adding more names in the future, once 
their fate became known.504  The chief goal of these monuments, memorial books, and such 
                                                 
502 Fulbrook, The People’s State, 35-36. 
  
503 Author unknown, date unknown, Copy of Über die Errichtung von Gedenkmalen für die Toten des letzten 
Weltkrieges/ Auszug aus einem Entwurf des Evangelischen Kirchbautages, forwarded with memo KD 107/66 I 
dated January 13, 1966, EZAB 104/1221.  
 
504 Ibid.  The Soviet Union repatriated most of its captured German POWs by May of 1950, announcing then that 
there were no more POWs to be released.  The West German public and as well as government leaders protested 
loudly while the East German government simply adopted this position and discouraged and denied that there were 
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attention to cemeteries in general was to foster a space that would “promote, in particular, the 
quiet prayers of the congregation and the next-of-kin.”  At the same time, however, these church 
leaders made clear that the militaristic excesses of the past public mourning traditions were to be 
avoided, writing that “the conversation” must “no longer be about ‘Heroes’ Memorial Sites,’ but 
rather only about ‘Monuments to Memory [Gedächtnismalen]’ or ‘Monuments to Remembrance 
[Gedenkmalen].’”  Furthermore, such physical reminders of history should include “not only 
soldiers…but also include all those who lost their lives as a result of the war.”505  Through these 
explicit instructions to avoid uncritically borrowing from Weimar- or Nazi-era traditions, East 
German Protestant leaders reveal a sensitivity not just to remembering the history of the war 
beyond the Communist experience but also a commitment to re-thinking (East-) Germans’ 
historical relationship to warfare and the military.    
 These monument instructions continue, reflecting perhaps some level of contriteness over 
German Protestants’ history of offering the state and its policies their uncritical support.  
According to these guidelines, any such local monument to the war dead must not be allowed to 
take the form of a shrine or site of prayer for soldiers’ fortunes at war that might suggest the 
Church’s endorsement of war and soldiers’ deaths.  “Only in exceptional cases should the 
sanctuary serve” as a location for the monument, and in “no cases may the Monuments to 
Remembrance [Gedenkmal] stand in the Alter room, in the vicinity of the pulpit or in line of 
sight of the worshipping congregation.”506  As if to directly refute the role of German Protestants 
                                                 
any more POWs left.  However there were two final waves in 1953 to 1954 and 1955 to 1956.  Biess, Homecomings, 
45, 179-180. 
 
505 Author unknown, date unknown, Copy of Über die Errichtung von Gedenkmalen für die Toten des letzten 
Weltkrieges/ Auszug aus einem Entwurf des Evangelischen Kirchbautages, forwarded with memo KD 107/66 I 
dated January 13, 1966, EZAB 104/1221. 
 
506 Ibid. 
  
220 
 
in supporting the First World War, the rise of the Nazis and the launch of the Second World War, 
these church leaders drew very clear lines around what their brethren could and could not do in 
the name of God, even when taking action to oppose Communism.  Despite this rather self-
critical reading of German Protestants’ history, it seems that East German Protestants had a 
range of responses to official public mourning and collective memory in the GDR, ranging from 
sympathy with the military dead, concern for civilian dead also, as well as disdain for the dead 
soldiers or even contempt for the very idea of differentiating the dead for any purpose 
whatsoever. 
 
Publicly-visible challenges to the regime? 
 The picture that emerges from these Church sources is one of wide variations in the 
possibilities for alternative public mourning but a scenario nonetheless where possibilities for 
dissent and some expression of conflicting ideas were possible.  By the early 1970s, East 
Germans still turned to their church officials for word of their missing military dead in such 
numbers that East German Protestant Church officials certified to their superiors in East Berlin 
that “the work of the Abteilung Gräberfürsorge is still meaningful.”507  This does not suggest 
that publicly-visible mourning for the wider circle of war dead was easy or always successful for 
East Germans.  One pastor wrote of his congregation’s successes in installing monuments in 
their own cemetery and in the cemetery of another nearby parish, only to report that “a third 
attempt,” this time to install a “memorial plaque in stone in a neighboring community” was 
                                                 
507 Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik to the leitenden 
Verwaltungsbehörden der Gliedkirchen, June 8, 1971, EZAB 101/226.  
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“shattered” by the objection of local government officials.508  Moreover, generational changes 
within East German Protestant congregations meant that efforts by East German pastors to 
devote space and efforts at preserving alternative collective memories of the war and of the war 
dead were increasingly less important to younger generations of East Germans into the 1970s.  
One parishioner lamented that, for “the younger generation… the service in the Gräberfürsorge 
appears as not so crucial.”509  Thus Protestants in East Germany looking to mourn a wider, more 
representative (as they saw it) set of war dead did not encounter obstruction solely from the SED 
regime.   
 These setbacks must not have been universal or universally frustrating for all East 
German Protestants.  In 1972, parishioners were still consulting with the Abteilung 
Gräberfürsorge, through their local Protestant pastors, for information on their loved one’s grace 
or resting place.510  At the same time, others worked secretly with the VDK to gain money and 
documents to travel across the inner-German border to the West, in order to view their family 
members’ gravesites.511  These documents do not tell how many people attempted with any 
success to work around the official limitations on publicly-visible mourning in the GDR.  Still, 
the efforts of certain circles of Protestants must have enjoyed a degree of support from one 
                                                 
508 Werner Bollmann to the Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen i. DDR, Abt. Gräberfürsorge, June 14, 1972, EZAB 
101/226. 
 
509 Evangelisches Konsistorium Görlitz to the Sekretariat des Bundes der Ev. Kirchen in der DDR, July 7, 1976, 
EZAB 101/226.  
 
510 Author unknown to die Gräberfürsorge der Ev. Kirche, September 7, 1972, letter forwarding materials from a 
pastor on behalf of a parishioner looking for information about her husband, EZAB 101/226. 
 
511 VDK to alle Landes-, Bezirks- und Kreisverbände, Rundschreiben Nr. C 1/73, March 28, 1973, memorandum 
foarwarding information about East Germans aksing for help in visiting their families‘ graves from across the Inner-
German Border, VDK A.10-114. 
222 
 
generation to the next, at least on a very small level, in order to account for the chronological 
span of documentation. 
 Yet at the same time, there were moments when the issue of mourning the dead moved 
East Germans to the point of openly expressing outrage and criticism against their regime.  
Wrote one angry individual to the High Church Council in East Berlin, while the “other nations’ 
skeletons of war, even those of the Russians, were immaculately cared for,” dead German 
soldiers’ remains “must always atone” for their history.  It is unclear whether this individual East 
German author was upset at the state of care for war graves or the official taboo of discussing 
dead Wehrmacht soldiers but they turned their complaint about remembering the past into one 
touching on the present: “People talk about an Army [the NVA] pulled from Prussian tradition, 
people give the soldiers even certain ideals to take with them, but [people] don’t really talk at all 
about Soldiers’ Deaths!”512  Although the author of this particular letter gives few clues to their 
personal background, the concern over mourning practices and soldiers’ graves should be most 
closely associated with the generations who were either already adults in 1933 or at least who 
grew up into young adulthood before 1945.  That is, those East Germans who much later 
resurrected public civil society in the 1980s were by and large younger people, born in the 
decades after the war’s end and with less knowledge of, less personal experience with, and less 
expectation of traditional patterns for mourning dead German soldiers.  Thus, while discontent 
over collective memory and public mourning practices in the 1960 and 1970s were phenomena 
largely unconnected with the peaceful revolutions of 1989, one wonders if these discursive and 
physical spaces for alternative collective memory and publicly-visible mourning might present 
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historians with important precedents to consider in understanding the ultimate triumph of East 
German civil society in 1989.   
 
Conclusion: Between Submission and Subversion 
 Despite the inconclusiveness of the evidence all around, if we return to the questions 
posed at the beginning, we can nonetheless draw some general conclusions about the changes 
that emerged in East German public mourning for the war dead over the 1960s and early 1970s, 
as well as arrive at a clearer appreciation for the political and cultural context that gave form and 
relief to these practices, both official and unofficial.  Firstly, the SED’s official memory of the 
war dead continued to focus on a collective memory of antifascist resistance, both by German 
Communists and the Red Army, neither of which realistically represented the majority of 
German families’ wartime experiences.  If anything, the attention to the Red Army over 
everyday German families’ losses would have promoted increased tension over time, given the 
then-contemporary collisions between reform-minded elements within the Eastern Bloc and 
Moscow’s inflexibility, which was enforced by the same Red Army whom East Germans were 
supposed to thank.   
Secondly, official public mourning echoed and underscored the then-contemporary 
political and military concerns of the regime – namely, preparing the public for the possibility of 
war as well as the need for East German men to serve in any such fight, in fulfillment of the OdF 
example.  Below the political- and military concerns of the regime, and their likely limited 
resonance with the East German public, alternative publicly-visible mourning suggests some 
degree of reluctance among the population to entertain the likelihood of fighting in a third world 
war.  Even some of the pronouncements by the party and other elites regarding their new 
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conception of military service and of warfare, coupled with the lengths they took to (forcibly) 
persuade people to embrace it, indicate that these elites were at some level aware that their 
citizens had reservations about fighting another war.  Whether or not East German leaders felt 
they were dealing with true pacifism, unrepentant Nazism, older German conservatism, or 
simply anti-communism, is not altogether clear.   
 Thirdly, this reluctance on the part of the East German public towards military service 
seems consistent with efforts to move outside of strict Communist canons of memory and think 
about the death and suffering of more non-Communist victims and soldiers, whose families were 
also impacted and mourned personal losses more immediate than a small minority of political 
elites.  Thus it was not surprising to find the Protestant Church at the front and center of this 
underground debate, given the degree to which the Church had debated these issues in West 
Germany during the 1950s, as the still-connectedness of the Church in East and West at this 
time.   
Fourthly, any of these avenues of alternative public mourning could have provided 
grounds for challenging the regime but there seems never to have been overwhelming support of 
these non-Communist traditions among East German Protestants to build a solid and continuous 
opposition to the regime.  Instead, the present evidence suggests clear moments of dissent in 
some sectors but enough non-dissent to keep the regime from feeling threatened or at least from 
taking action to quell these alternative practices and bring them around to the OdF line. 
 In the end, it is hard to know how many people, on an individual level, sympathized with 
the Communist collective memory of the war, the alternative presented by elements of the 
Protestant Church, or neither.  Yet we do have a more complex picture of public mourning and 
publicly-visible mourning, where it seems East Germans had small areas where they could 
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choose to think and act differently.  Furthermore, we can also see that conversations about 
memory and mourning inside the GDR were not restricted to proxy fights in support or 
opposition to the regime but also demonstrate moments where East Germans began re-thinking 
their society’s relationship to soldiers and to war.  Whether individual mourners found 
themselves submitting or subverting the Communist Party’s orthodoxy, East Germans were, by 
1972,  quite far removed from worshipping heroes of their past. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: “No longer finding agreement everywhere?”  
Public Mourning in West Germany, 1961-1969 
 
 One Sunday morning in late November 1968, the congregation of the Protestant 
Hauptkirche St. Marien in Wolfenbüttel was shocked to find their house of worship vandalized.  
A twenty-five year-old theology student, Dietrich Düllmann, had hidden himself within the 
recesses of the church, waiting until the dark of night to remove four large wooden plaques from 
the wall, each bearing the names of soldiers from the community who had died in the First World 
War, paint red “SS” symbols on them, then chop them to pieces with an axe.  Before being 
caught, the student also defaced two other plaques as well as the walls themselves, painting “‘Do 
not glorify criminality as the death of heroes’ and ‘My house is meant to be a house of prayer for 
all people but you have made it into a hall of honor for your crimes against all peoples.’”513  
Upon Düllmann’s arrest, the police shook their heads at the young man’s self-professed divine 
inspiration.  Yet this episode, widely reported in the press, neatly encapsulated many of the 
dynamics bound up in public mourning and collective memory of the Second World War dead 
across 1960s West Germany. 
 Beyond the element of youthful exuberance and impassioned protest offending the 
sensibilities of middle-aged and elderly generations of West Germans, the Wolfenbüttel scandal 
illustrates well the layering of tensions and concerns over how to talk about the war dead that 
                                                 
513 „Wolfenbütteler Kirche geschändet.  Theologiestudent zerstrümmerte Gedenktafeln aus Protest gegen 
Gefallenenehrung,“ Hildesheimer Allgemeine Zeitung, November 25, 1968, VDK A.100-89. This last slogan of 
course paraphrases the biblical story of Jesus clearing the temple of merchants and money-changers, whose trade as 
“robbers” preyed upon and corrupted the otherwise innocent and obedient act of worship by 1st century Jews.  Mt 
21:12-13 (ESV). 
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had been accumulating in West Germany since 1945.  The well-known rebelliousness of the 
“68ers” against what they saw as unreformed fascism or authoritarianism in the Federal Republic 
clearly played a part in motivating this young theology student to vandalize physical markers of 
the memory of 1918 (apparently by mistake).  The notion that West German survivors of the 
Third Reich might once more exhibit Nazi-like tendencies if allowed to carry on with Nazi-era 
practices was not new but instead had characterized Volkstrauertag planning in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s (see above).  Similarly reminiscent of earlier chapters in this history was the fear 
that maintaining any public dedication to remembering past wars or dead warriors, however 
abstract, would somehow equate to giving renewed cultural sanction to warfare and death that 
could ultimately lead West Germany back to the battlefield.  In each case, identifying and 
removing the perceived flaws in German culture from post-1945 commemorative practices had 
worked to allow West Germans space to mourn the dead, bemoan Germany’s structural failings, 
and neglect thorough-going discussions of their actions during the Third Reich.  It was this 
unexplored aspect, how survivors of the war had served the Nazi regime without consequential 
resistance, that 1960s West Germans critical of Volkstrauertag worked to reform and which the 
student in Wolfenbüttel had attempted to confront. 
 Despite the layering of continuity, there were also important changes in public mourning 
that began taking place across the 1960s, making Volkstrauertag in 1969 much different than it 
had been in 1961.  The VDK had regarded itself as the sole interpreter of German memory and 
mourning practices from the earliest moments after the war and had established a formula for 
public mourning designed to teach the public to value peace.  Yet these understandings of the 
past had, by the 1960s, begun to ring hollow for an increasingly vocal minority of West German 
society.  This chapter will trace the opening up of control over official collective memory and 
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public mourning in West Germany, tracing the re-negotiations over the boundaries of inclusion 
and interpretations of history from 1961 until 1969.  The following four questions will guide this 
inquiry: Firstly, what obstacles shaped revisions to collective memory and public mourning 
following the inauguration of the “new” Volkstrauertag in the late 1950s?  Secondly, when 
competing parties attempted to reconsider the Volksbund’s holiday, what alternative vision(s) did 
these dissenting voices offer for collective memory and public mourning?  Thirdly, in what ways 
did both the traditional and revised understandings of the Nazi past each shape the messages of 
the official national Volkstrauertag ceremonies?  Fourthly, to what degree did Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies below the national level correspond to the Bonn program from year to year?  What 
does the relationship of local to national, as well as the dynamics of change in memory over 
time, suggest about the history of West German public mourning? 
 
Governing collective memory 
 The inauguration of the new Totenehrung portion of the 1961 Volkstrauertag ceremony 
in Bonn could be understood as the moment when West Germany collectively turned toward a 
more open or inclusive memory of the Second World War, yet such a conclusion would be 
premature.  While the consensus discourse of mourning was moving away from a preoccupation 
with military dead, laws governing the care of war graves (which naturally also informed public 
mourning) still clung to the traditional distinction between battle front and home front that had 
been enshrined into law in the 1950s.  For all of the Volksbund’s introspective efforts to 
reexamine cultural assumptions about death, military service, and the burden of mourning in the 
wake of fascism, it proved ultimately more difficult to alter or augment the legal codes governing 
gravesites of war victims and thereby informing the collective memory of these dead.   
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Social “inaction” 
 To be sure, the act of planning, preparing, and carrying out the national Volkstrauertag 
ceremony in Bonn certainly constituted “social action” on the part of the Volksbund’s leadership.  
Physical gravesites, too, would certainly count as manifestations of “social action” inspired by 
memory and are undeniably related to the acts of mourning and remembering.  Yet the War 
Graves Law of 1952 institutionalized the care and maintenance of certain graves, defined as 
“war graves,” while leaving other categories undefined by the law and, by extension, not 
remembered and not mourned for as a matter of public policy.  That is, if one can read “memory 
as social action” in legal codes regulating state-endorsed acts or memory and mourning, then the 
non-adaptation or non-revision of such memory and mourning practices can itself constitute 
“inaction” based on an absence of memory.    
 It will be recalled from Chapter III that the War Graves Law of 1952 had marked a 
turning point in Germans‘ legal understanding of war victims and, hence, warfare itself, by 
reaching beyond the battlefield to also designate civilian victims of aerial bombing as well as the 
victims of Nazi racial violence, as equally valid “war victims.“  Marking these “war victims’” 
gravesites as “war graves” made their final resting places into permanent, lasting physical sites 
of remembrance and preserved history, ensuring that, decades later, future generations would at 
least be confronted with the existence of so many millions of dead remains, whether or not those 
future Germans tried to explain these deaths and remember that history.  Yet by 1960, after 
nearly a decade in place, close observers noticed at least one gap in the law’s efforts to preserve 
the physical remnants with which to call forth remembrance of the past. 
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 More specifically, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the oversights in the War Graves Law of 
1952 did not affect German military dead or German civilian dead who were killed by aerial 
bombing or some other manifestation of violence directed at Germans by their enemies.  Instead, 
the oversight was found to be an under-comprehension and incomplete explanation of the Nazi 
regime and its victims.  Buried in Section 6 of the law were a number of specific definitions of 
victims of Nazi racial violence who would be recognized as “war victims” and whose remains 
would thus be designated “war graves.”  Ordinarily, graves of these victims would be recognized 
and awarded “dauerndes Ruherecht” status, enjoying federally-financed maintenance and care at 
the hands of the VDK.  Yet, due to a technicality in the wording, it was possible for an unknown 
number of graves of Nazi victims to be allotted only the shorter “Ruhefrist,” leaving them open 
to the threat of being disinterred after fifteen years.  While the exact numbers of such affected 
graves are not readily available from these records, the scenario wherein certain graves lost their 
enhanced protected status, and thus their histories were forgotten, seemed a real enough threat to 
garner sustained public attention.   
 To be sure, the West German government did not callously set about to remove or neglect 
gravesites of Nazi victims.  Nonetheless, the chaotic conditions following the collapse of the 
Nazi government, during which family members sought out their missing relatives and recovered 
remains of the dead, left some proportion of graves for which no surviving family members 
existed, within German territory or otherwise.  In such cases, when no family members could be 
found to claim and identify individual gravesites, which could in turn not be definitely 
categorized as “war victims” (as defined under the 1952 law) or not, and when no other 
community came forward to care for them, such graves would be eligible for only limited 
maintenance and care under the aegis of the war graves law.  Yet these graves that were on the 
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edge of falling through the cracks, as it were, were only eligible for the shorter “Ruhefrist” 
protection instead of the longer lasting “dauerndes Ruherecht.”514  Complex as the details were, 
it was apparent to the governments’ critics that some undeterminable number of the Nazis’ 
victims, whose identities and lives had already been forgotten by post-war German society, were 
in danger of losing their permanent place in German history and collective memory.  Because the 
weathering of time and the elements would surely erode these gravesites if they were not in fact 
disinterred after the Frist had expired, it appeared that these graves would be eliminated from 
German memory a second time. 
While such a bureaucratic conundrum as this might seem remote from the memorial 
concern of most German families, the VDK, whose chief task aside from Volkstrauertag was the 
care of these very graves, noted the problem already in 1960.  Quite apart from the odd set of 
unidentifiable remains whose next-of-kin could never be successfully tracked down, “to this 
group also belongs those graves listed in § 6e),” the “graves of foreign laborers who were 
forcibly employed by the German Labor Mobilization Office during the Second World War 
inside the then-German borders (so-called Foreign Workers).“515  Thus, by allowing this group 
of neglected graves to lose their protected status, the Federal Republic was not merely risking 
offending the sensibilities of families from whom they would likely never hear complaints but 
                                                 
514 Dr. König, Aktenvermerk Betr: Gräber verschleppter Personen und nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge, uncirculated 
memorandum, August 12, 1960. VDK A.10-100. 
 
515 Ibid.  These foreign laborers were a combination of POWs, civilians conscripted from German-occupied 
territories and in some cases details of Concentration Camp prisoners sent to factories.  While the Third Reich did 
employ a few hundred thousand foreign laborers in 1939, the numbers of these foreign laborers increased 
dramatically after the invasion of the Soviet Union.  By late 1944, there were nearly 7.9 million foreign workers 
forcibly deployed within the German borders, making decisive contributions to German war production due to the 
drain of manpower to the fronts (and to casualties) as well as the limitations on deployment of German women in 
the labor force.  Figures from Doris Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust, Second 
Edition (Lanham, MD, 2009), 217 and Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the 
Nazi Economy (New York, 2006), 517.  These sources do not make clear how many of these foreign workers were 
killed over the course of the war, leaving unanswered how many graves fell into the gap in legal protections 
described above. 
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instead symbolically showing the world that these victims were easily forgotten and their 
remains allowed to rot in disrepair. The prospect, however unintended, of the conservative 
government of the Nazis’ successor state willfully erasing any of the Third Reich’s victims from 
the rows of physical reminders of that history, and therefore making it harder to account for these 
victims in collective memory, was a political problem but one that denied easy solution.  
  
An “unobjectionable” memory? 
 As a domestic political issue, the controversy over the expiration of certain graves’ 
Ruhefrist and the withholding of Ruherecht from these graves quickly became a conversation 
about how much West Germany did or did not resemble the Nazi regime.  While this conclusion 
may seem obvious, the comparisons between the Adenauer government and Hitler’s dictatorship 
were continuously implied by critics on the far left but otherwise rarely articulated openly.  In 
this case, an internal memo from the Volksbund made clear that the care of war graves was “a 
true obligation of international law, which the Federal Republic took on in the treaty with the 
former occupation powers governing the return of remains of soldiers.”  The subtext here was of 
course that the National Socialist government had broken the various treaties negotiated after the 
end of the First World War, as Hitler prepared his way for war.  Therefore, the lingering 
skepticism towards Germans and any German state meant that West German politicians and 
social leaders had their own special obligation to meet the letter and spirit of the agreements 
negotiated in 1945, in order to demonstrate their trustworthiness and dedication to the rule of 
law.   
This in turn meant that, whatever the oversights in the 1952 War Graves Law, the graves 
of non-German victims of the Nazi regime (in this case, the “Fremdarbeiter”) were “until their 
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giving up [into the care of families or other parties besides the Federal Republic] to be cared for 
in accordance with all rules and kept in good condition.”516  That is, when those graves that were 
scheduled to lose their protective Ruhefrist were in the final days of this period of guardianship, 
state and local authorities were still required to maintain all care and protections granted to war 
graves as long as statutorily required.  At the same time, Volksbund leaders seemed to indicate 
hope for a political solution to this sensitive problem but noted with regret that such political will 
appeared to have been lacking late in 1960.  As the most visible face of the Federal Republic 
when it came to war graves and public mourning, the VDK were in some respects hamstrung in 
only being able to carry out the work that the state paid for, despite the VDK’s insight into how 
such shortcomings would appear to the wider German and non-German public.  
 If political will to demonstrate consciousness and remorse for the crimes of the Nazi 
regime, by preserving the graves of the Nazis’ victims, was lacking in the conservative 
government, such sentiments were clearly present in the opposition Social Democratic Party 
(SPD).  Aside from the pedestrian political maneuvering and seizing of any opportunity to 
criticize their chief electoral opponents, the SPD had in the years since 1949 often and loudly 
invoked its relatively unstained credentials, as having been the only party in the Reichstag to 
vote against the Enabling Act in 1933.  By the early 1960s, after over a decade in opposition, the 
SPD was still stubbornly determined to remind the conservatives of their (the German center 
right’s) failings in not strenuously enough resisting the Nazis’ rise to power.  In April 1962, amid 
the controversy over the gaps in the War Graves Law, the SPD protested, calling for such 
undesignated graves to be granted “war grave” status by an expansion of the War Graves Law.   
                                                 
516 Dr. König, Aktenvermerk Betr: Gräber verschleppter Personen und nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge, uncirculated 
memorandum, August 12, 1960. VDK A.10-100. 
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More specifically, the SPD asked that the government amend the Law, so that “the graves of 
victims of National Socialism that do not fall under the Agreement with the French Republic of 
23 October 1954 receive the same legal status, including permanent Ruherecht, as the graves of 
fallen soldiers.”517   
This was probably easier said than done, and the opposition party in the Federal 
Parliament did not themselves bear responsibility for writing legislation and initiating the 
approval and appropriations process.  Thus it is unsurprising that the CDU Federal Interior 
Minister, Hermann Höcherl, responded that he thought such legal changes would be too difficult, 
perhaps even unconstitutional.  Still, he did allow that steps could be taken on a case-by-case 
basis to expand the provisions for long-term protection of gravesites whose preservation was 
threatened.518  Thus beyond what was in some measure political wrangling for public opinion, 
both the mainstream right and left in West Germany seemed to have understood the need to 
evince compassion for the graves of any and all Nazi victims, lest these parties appear to be 
revising collective memory and public mourning practices to underemphasize any aspect of the 
former regime’s crimes. 
 In some respects, this controversy over “war grave” designation in 1962 replayed a 
number of the characteristics of the 1952 Termindebatte over Volkstrauertag (see Chapter II).  In 
                                                 
517 Ollenhauer und  Fraktion, Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion SPD, April 4, 1962, formal petition from SPD to CDU 
government to pass a law expanding the types of graves covered under the War Graves Law, EZAB 2/2560. The 
petition is referred to elsewhere as Drucksache IV/333. 
 
518 Bundesminister des Innern Höcherl to the Herrn Präsidenten des Deutschen Bundestages, April 17, 1962, formal 
response to the SPD’s petition cited in Note 7 above.  EZAB 2/2560. 
 Höcherl was born in 1912 and thus was already a young man when the Nazis took power in 1933.  He 
fought and served time as a POW during the Second World War, joining the CSU in 1949 and serving in a number 
of local and regional offices before rising to the Federal Cabinet in 1961.  Perhaps old enough by 1918 to have 
understood the hardship of the home front during war time, Höcherl’s combat experience appears to have exercised 
a heavier influence on his understanding of war and the experiences of war for both soldiers and non-combatants.  
Hartmut Weber, et al.,  Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung Band 14. 1961. (München, 2004), accessed on 
30 April 2013 via http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1961k/kap1_3/kap2_1/para3_1.html 
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that event, the necessity of avoiding any substantial resemblance to Nazi-era practices of public 
mourning motived the federal government as well as the Protestant Church in Germany to 
pressure the Volksbund into reforming its resurrected mourning holiday.  That is, critics in the 
early 1950s wanted to remove any traces of the National Socialist past from the post-fascist 
public so as to appear to have marked a “clean break” with that discredited history.  In 1962, 
critics of the War Graves Law and the larger phenomenon of restrictions on the designation of 
“war grave” wanted to expand this recognition to more victims’ remains, so as to keep these 
gravesites present in the new democratic West Germany.  If the graves in question were allowed 
to be disinterred, some aspect of the Nazis’ crimes, however small or limited, would be 
figuratively stricken from collective memory as it was erased from the physical landscape.  
Writing to the SPD to express its support, the Protestant Church once more swung into action in 
order to ensure the post-1945 Germany did not repeat the mistakes of the 1930s.519  Again 
similarly to 1952, the Conference of Interior Ministers of the States would eventually come to 
agreement on the need to change the War Graves Law, this time pressuring the Federal Interior 
Minister to enact reforms (instead of a recalcitrant Volksbund).520   
 The impasse over how to reform the War Graves Law, and by extension, clarify this 
constituent part of West German public mourning for the war dead, is all the more surprising 
given that both the Federal and State governments had, in 1958, already agreed that the 
appearance of West Germans’ cold-hearted retreat from preserving and maintaining the graves of 
the Nazis’ victims should be avoided at all costs.  “There exists also from the standpoint of 
                                                 
519 EKD to the Herrn Innenminister des Landes Niedersachsen in Hannover, July 6, 1962, letter conveying 
disappointment that the government has not altered the war graves law. EZAB 2/2560. 
 
520 Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte bei der Evang. Gesellschaft to the Kanzlei der Evang. Kirche, OKR von Harling, 
August 6, 1964, letter including clipping of the article,„Namenlose ohne Gesetz,“ Stuttgarter Zeitung, July 21, 1964, 
EZAB 2/2560. 
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international relations a considerable interest,” explained a memo circulated by the Volksbund, to 
demonstrate “in every case an unobjectionable care and keeping-in-order” of the graves for the 
entire period under which they were in the state’s care.521  Here the concerns for how the rest of 
the world viewed West Germany’s actions in the matter of graves care was more than symbolic, 
as the VDK expressed its fear that allowing unprotected graves to eventually be disinterred 
would make it more difficult for West Germany to negotiate the right of the VDK to access and 
care for sites of German war dead in other countries.522  Such concerns about international law 
were not merely abstract conventions that West Germans needed to observe, in order to save face 
before its neighbors and allies.  Rather, other documents from the Volksbund make clear the very 
real demands and importance of proper grave maintenance and care for victims of the war and 
the dictatorship, such as graves of Russian citizens who died on German soil.  In June 1963, the 
Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in West Germany visited a number of VDK offices and 
cemeteries, apparently to determine the state of care of the graves.523  
The degree to which political hurdles such as those described above impeded the 
reforming of West German law governing the definition and care of graves for war victims 
plainly demonstrates the lack of consensus on the question of how to mourn the dead, which 
dead to mourn, and the level of political, financial, or even simply symbolic effort and support 
deserved by the several categories of dead victims of the Second World War.  For all the effort 
that the VDK expended from 1960 to 1961 to create the new, standardized Totenehrung portion 
of Bonn Volkstrauertag ceremony, their efforts to push the West German public towards a more 
                                                 
521   Dr. König, Aktenvermerk Betr: Gräber verschleppter Personen und nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge, uncirculated 
memorandum, August 12, 1960. VDK A.10-100. 
 
522 Ibid. 
 
523 VDK to alle Landesverbände, June 18, 1963, Rundschreiben Nr. 28/63, memorandum, VDK A.10-103.   
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comprehensive and more completely informed collective memory of the Nazi past was not 
supported by the legal codes governing the physical remnants of that past.  At the same time as 
consensus lacked between the parties attempting to create cultural norms and the structures 
enforcing such beliefs, other documents indicate that more voices were joining the debate 
between the Volksbund, West German leaders, and the public at large. 
 
A “completely different” memory 
 Political hurdles were not the only hindrance to the crystallization and popular acceptance 
of a singular collective memory of the war and the dead.  While the Volksbund had encountered 
critics in one form or another continually throughout the post-war era once Volkstrauertag was 
resurrected, by the mid-1960s a clearly defined alternative voice with an opposing memory of 
the past had emerged.  The Evangelische Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte did not harbor the same 
memory of the Second World War as did the Volksbund, the conservative West German 
government, and the War Graves Law from 1952.524   
 
Documenting a larger history 
Quite oppositely from demarcating the dead who had died due to “immediate effects of 
the war” from all the other casualties, the Hilfsstelle explicitly linked the war and its effects to 
                                                 
524 This organization is somewhat mysterious.  Evidently founded by or at least under the leadership of Pastor Fritz 
Majer-Leonhard from 1945 until 1964, this organization appears to have been a leading, if lonely and tireless, voice 
calling the EKD to pressure the VDK to expand Volkstrauertag and its war graves projects to include more 
recognition racial victims of the Nazi regime. Majer-Leonhard himself was a Protestant pastor whose family was of 
Jewish ancestry. Unable to serve in a clerical post during the Third Reich, Majer-Leonhard ended up in the 
Wolfenbüttel Concentration Camp in 1944.  Majer-Leonhard and his colleagues appear to have comprised a decisive 
minority, vying for influence over the minds of the church leaders and the clergy (attention that they did not enjoy, 
since they aggressively sought it out).  Gerhard Gronauer, Der Staat Israel im westdeutschen Protestantismus. 
Wahrnehmungen in Kirche und Publizistik vom 1948 bis 1972 (Göttingen, 2013),  502. 
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the Nazi regime who had launched it, in the process illustrating the qualitative disparity in 
mourning military dead versus civilian dead, despite the relative quantitative parity in numbers 
of victims.  In reimagining what West German public mourning should look like, whether in the 
form of the legal provisions for care of war graves or through Volkstrauertag itself, these critical 
voices from within a lay office of the institutional Protestant Church in Stuttgart drew out what 
had long been missing from the annual memorial ceremonies: attention to those aspects of the 
Second World War that made it different from the First World War and earlier conflicts in 
German history.   
 Just as the Volksbund was motivated to preserve and promote a memory of the two World 
Wars out of the fear for another conflict, the lay Protestant activists working to subvert or at least 
modify Volkstrauertag were also motivated by a fear that the older, more nationalistic and brash 
practices of Heldengedenktag would re-emerge from parts of West German society where it had 
not been entirely discredited.  For this reason, even though the Volksbund elites had taken steps 
to modify the annual national ceremony in Bonn with a wider palate of victims who deserved to 
be mourned, and therefore a more complicated and potentially self-critical memory of the 
Second World War, critics in the Hilfsstelle and also within the institutional Protestant Church in 
Germany seemed to have remained suspicious of Nazi practices hiding behind the curtain, ready 
to spring forth at any moment.   
Though it is unclear the degree to which these fears were justified, what is most notable 
is the appearance of another, separate center of interpretive thought on the complex question of 
mourning the war dead and explaining the history of the war.  Though the Protestant Church and 
the various government representatives had before voiced opposition to Volkstrauertag, they had 
always ultimately come to an agreement with the VDK and supported, however grudgingly, the 
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holiday.  While the lay Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte also confronted West German society with 
a very different and difficult-to-digest image of the war and the dead, their campaign to revise 
Volkstrauertag and collective memory came from outside the heretofore traditional bounds of 
public mourning practice. 
 
Equally representative dead? 
 The 1962 campaign to force a revision of public mourning and collective memory began 
from an assumption of equality between all deaths, no matter the circumstance of the victims’ 
dying or the ends which their suffering may have served.  In a pamphlet published to criticize 
Volkstrauertag for preserving a limited understanding of victims of the war, the Hilfsstelle 
explained that,  “[i]n the First World War, some 10 Million soldiers“ were estimated to have 
died, whereas „during the Second World War, between 50 and 55 Million people died 
[umkamen], of which every other one was a civilian.”525  The authors of the pamphlet continued 
by breaking down Second World War casualty figures for France, the USSR, Poland, 
Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, and Germany, in order to implicitly argue that, in 
nearly all cases, civilian deaths because of the war were equal to or even exceeded military 
deaths related to the war.526  Of course, the whole point of the 1961 Totenehrung portion of 
                                                 
525 Hilfsstelle für Rassenverfolgte bei der Evangelischen Gesellschaft in Stuttgart, „Zahlen, die zu denken geben,“ 
March 1962, pamphlet, VDK C.1-5. 
 These numbers from 1962 appear more or less correct, at least when compared to more recent estimates.  
While calculating exact numbers of dead is extremely difficult, a total estimate of 55 Million deaths due to the 
Second World War is given in a popular American newsmagazine.  While this magazine’s sources are not made 
clear, and while these authors refer to worldwide numbers of dead (and not just European dead), the authors here 
write that 45.5% of worldwide casualties were military and 54.5% civilian, which suggest that the Protestant critics 
in Stuttgart in 1962 were justified in arguing for more recognition of civilian deaths, considering their near-parity 
with military deaths.  See „The Costs of World War II,” American History, Aug2005, Vol. 40 Issue 3, p24-25 
 
526 Hilfsstelle für Rassenverfolgte bei der Evangelischen Gesellschaft in Stuttgart, „Zahlen, die zu denken geben,“ 
March 1962, pamphlet, VDK C.1-5. 
 The Hilfsstelle offers the following tabulations, making clear that “included in these numbers are the losses 
of the European Jewry, against whom the Second World War was also directed.” 
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Volkstrauertag (referenced above) was to codify a formula by which military and civilian dead, 
including racial victims of the Nazis, would be remembered.  Yet these categories were then 
presented abstractly and ranked (with the military at the top) as if they were otherwise equally 
historically representative.  That is, if the war dead were mostly equally distributed into these 
three general groupings of victims, then prioritizing the combat dead would make sense only if 
combat death carried a heavier value politically, culturally, religiously, or otherwise.  Yet by 
starting with the proposition that civilian deaths were just as important to recognize as military 
deaths, the Hilfsstelle’s argument begged the question of why civilian graves and deaths did not 
receive as complete a protection and recognition as soldiers’ graves and deaths, considering their 
near-numerical parity. 
 Beyond simply comparing aggregate military and civilian death tolls, the Hilfsstelle went 
further, identifying one of the most important historical differences between the First and Second 
World Wars.  The brochure explained that “[c]ontained in these numbers [were] the losses of 
European Jewry, against whom the Second World War was also directed.”527  This important 
distinction had been conspicuously missing in nearly all national Volkstrauertag ceremonies up 
to this time.  Instead, the war was always presented as a negative experience, an inexplicable 
tragedy, a tragedy of circumstance, or an event caused by German failures but one that affected 
all of its victims the same way.  That is, very little mention was made of the special violence and 
                                                 
France:  192,600 dead soldiers; 331,000 dead civilians; 
Russia:  13,600,000 dead soldiers; between 7,000,000 and 30,000,000 dead civilians; 
Poland:   100,000 dead soldiers; 4,200,000 dead civilians; 
Yugoslavia: 300,000 dead soldiers; 1,400,000 dead civilians; 
Netherlands: 10,000 dead soldiers; 200,000 dead civilians; 
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persecution meted out to Jewish communities or other minority groups.528  Even the new 
Totenehrung in 1961 placed victims of Nazi aggression after German soldiers and German 
civilians, and envisioned dead soldiers of both world wars as having shared the same experiences 
and suffering in pursuit of the same ends (See Chapter III). 
 The final page of this critical pamphlet from the Hilfsstelle clearly made the argument 
that West Germans were singularly misinformed or under-informed about the scale of death 
resulting from the Second World War.  Criticizing school textbooks, films, and military history 
statistical records for categorically underplaying the numbers of civilian dead, the Hilfsstelle also 
referred to such sentiments at the 1962 Volkstrauertag ceremony, calling on West Germans to 
recognize non-soldiers as equal victims of the war and therefore deserving of public memorial 
attention: “As far as we know, all victims of the war are considered as war graves in all the 
countries of Western Europe” and only in West Germany “do people hold on to the so-called 
‘traditional war-grave concept.’” 529 Furthermore, the Hilfsstelle considered it shameful and 
disingenuous that “a minister could in the year 1962 declare before the Bundestag that the 
Millions of dead civilians (Concentration Camp victims, foreign workers, deportees, euthanasia-
victims, victims of starvation, etc…) were not victims of immediate circumstances of the 
war.“530  Interestingly, the Hilfsstelle apparently left out German victims of aerial bombing or 
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Holocaust research.  Quote from Donald L. Niewyk, The Holocaust: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 
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combat operations on the ground from this designation of “civilian” victims, perhaps because 
they considered all “fellow-travelers” to be co-perpetrators. Yet clearly the Hilfsstelle considered 
all the casualties of the Nazi regime to be necessarily and simultaneously casualties of the war, 
since they (the Hilfsstelle) saw no dividing line between the regime and the war it began.   
 The Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte continued its criticism in a barrage of literature directed 
against the Volksbund and the West German Ministry of the Interior for adopting a “traditional” 
view of war graves.  Indeed, the very basis for comparing civilian to military deaths was 
subjected to relentless interrogation, with the hope of denying any logical basis for observing or 
demarcating one group of dead (namely, the military dead) as being different from any other 
group of dead (like civilians).  In another pamphlet, apparently drafted as a response to the 
SPD’s enquiry into the War Graves Law debate (see above), the Hilfsstelle remarked that, it 
“was doubtful, whether one may simply adapt a law created in 1922 amid circumstances 
completely different from the Second World War.”531  Lest supporters of the “traditional” 
distinction between military and civilian victims attempt to deflect criticism based on 
technological changes in warfare or even sheer numbers of people involved, the Hilfsstelle made 
its reasoning crystal clear: “[b]esides the purely military goals of the Second World War, the 
wider goals (Decimation of the peoples of the Eastern regions, Murder of the Jews and Enemies 
of the State, and ‘Annihilation of Lives not worth being lived’) may not be overlooked.”532  
These non-battlefield dead were not collateral damage but “victims” of the “measures taken by 
the German War Leadership” and therefore “were war victims, their graves therefore war-
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graves” and thus deserving of the War Graves Law’s enhanced protections.533  Having identified 
the heart of the problem with interpreting and celebrating dead soldiers on Volkstrauertag after 
1945, the Hilfsstelle concluded here that “[w]hoever makes the ‘traditionally developed war-
grave concept’ the basis of their considerations” on questions of memory and mourning, 
necessarily “trivialized the monstrosities of the Second World War.”534 
 
A history “not easy to hear” 
 The larger phenomenon of West German youth confronting their parents’ generation 
(who had lived through and taken part in the war) in the 1960s for not resisting Hitler has been 
well-documented.  Yet the place of public mourning in this moment of “cultural revolution” has 
surprisingly not yet been acknowledged, despite the Hilfsstelle making this challenge central to 
their campaign to revise public mourning and collective memory in the early 1960s.  Another 
pamphlet published as part of the campaign to revise the War Graves Law found the Hilfsstelle 
much clearer about also criticizing Volkstrauertag, loudly pointing out the contradiction or 
double-standard in treating “war graves” differently from regular graves of people who died 
during the war.  “The coming generation should know what happened and should, through a 
completely personal and visible sign, be made familiar with the actions of the recent past.”535  
Such an honest and bare representation of the war and the dictatorship who launched it would 
necessarily have to demonstrate “that the Second World War was not conducted in the traditional 
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form of earlier wars”536 but rather saw a more complete dissolution of the line between 
combatant and non-combatant, whereby “POWs were brought into concentration camps (and 
there killed), mentally disabled civilians were designated as ‘useless mouths to feed’ through a 
decree from 1 September 1939 (the Outbreak of the War) and Millions of Jews were in the 
number of war dead included, as the Third Reich declared war on ‘world-Jewry.’”537  Perhaps 
anticipating (or more likely, enacting the early stages of) the well-known confrontation between 
‘68ers and their elders later in the decade, the Hilfsstelle acknowledged that the truth was 
“doubtlessly…not easy to hear”538 but insisted on a truer understanding of the past and a more 
honest way for Germans to talk about it.  
 This more honest and historically accurate appreciation of the past was echoed in a letter 
sent from the Evangelische Hilfsstelle to the Chancellery of the Protestant Church in Germany in 
August of 1964, expressing dismay that the state-sponsored mourning ceremonies for 
Volkstrauertag did not acknowledge the more complicated and damning history of Germans’ 
actions during the war.  In its letter, the Hilfsstelle invoked the 25th anniversary of the beginning 
of the Second World War but then immediately conjured up the image of the Einsatzkommandos 
murdering the Jews of Poland in 1941, instead of the Wehrmacht first rolling across Poland in 
1939, much less launching “Operation Barbarossa” in 1941.  Of course, the anniversary of the 
war was an important factor in re-igniting the debate over graves and therefore victims.  Yet this 
time, unlike the early 1950s, the judicial proceedings in West Germany and in Israel against 
Holocaust perpetrators had begun, allowing the Hilfsstelle to point out that “the gruesome 
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Annihilation measures taken by the ‘Einsatzkommandos’ [had] by now become generally 
known.“539  This increasingly public knowledge, though not entirely unknown earlier, made the 
gap between caring for, preserving, and commemorating the graves of “purely military” actors 
but not non-military actors harder and harder to defend.  In light of this ugly reality, that the 
“pure military” side of the war was intimately connected to the criminal acts of German men-at-
arms, the Hilfsstelle declared that they “could not regard it as just, that the grave sites of the 
‘militarily-deployed SS-Men’ must be permanently preserved while the graves of the 
concentration camp dead do not receive this protection.“540  The image of SS remains being 
cared for and treated as an object of reverence, while the victims of SS brutality were trampled 
and left to rot, was a potent argument indeed. 
 Such convincing arguments did not fall on deaf ears.  A story run in the Stuttgarter 
Zeitung in July 1964 explained that the Interior Ministers of the different West German states 
had all agreed on the need to revise the existing War Graves Law but that the Federal Interior 
Minister Höcherl favored instead an entirely new law.  While not wholly clear on the details of 
the negotiations, this article reported that the Federal Minister had proposed the Federal 
government pay for care of soldiers’ graves from the Second World War while the states pay for 
the care of both soldiers’ graves from the First World War plus Concentration Camp victims.  
Apparently willing to shoulder the burden of soldiers from the Second World War (and, 
presumably if financial means were unlimited, those of the First World War, too), the Federal 
Minister was quoted as being hesitant to take on the care of concentration camp victims due to a 
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particularly constructionist reading of the West German Basic Law, whereby “[t]he Federal 
Interior Minister believed himself thereby compelled…only to overtake expenditures for 
domestic and foreign costs associated with the war.“541  While a number of state-level officials 
agreed on the linkage between war and regime as the most proper understanding of history and 
the dead, this federal official still believed that the victims of the Nazi regime were not part of 
“the war” and therefore, not technically his concern.   
The irony of a conservative West German government’s punctilious dedication to 
upholding the letter of the law as a way of separating itself from the shadow of the Nazi regime, 
and in the process ignoring the victims and history of that regime, barely requires explanation.   
The Hilfsstelle immediately criticized this non-common sense approach to war graves and 
commemoration (as they saw it) and praised the states‘ willingness to realize the equality of 
military and civilian graves, declaring that “[h]appily, the Landesinnenminister demonstrate[d] 
more instinct and refused this bill from the federal government,” because they “recognize[d] that 
one should not carry on the discussion of military victims and political victims on into the topic 
of graves on account of a couple million Marks.”542  The Hilfsstelle instead encouraged the states 
to take this initiative to the Bundesrat and there initiate the amendment process for the War 
Graves Law, since the Bundestag had by now (in July 1964) failed to act and, in September of 
that year, the graves in question would lose their protected status.543  In this case, the Hilfsstelle 
had the VDK seemingly on its side, as they pointed to the 1961 Volkstrauertag speech by VDK 
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President Trepte, in which he explicitly equated victims of the Nazi regime as worthy of just as 
much attention as military victims of the (German) regime’s war policy, using VDK’s own 
words and logic against those conservative elements in the government or elsewhere who would 
prefer to continue minimizing Germans’ problematic tradition of mourning the dead warriors, 
not those whom their warriors had killed.544   
 
Framing a more critical memory 
Appealing to the pulpits 
 Besides loudly critiquing “traditional conceptions” of war and war victims as they related 
to graves and preservation of graves, the Hilfsstelle simultaneously connected this discussion 
about the physical remains of the dead to the annual Volkstrauertag ceremonies meant to guide 
all Germans in their mourning of the dead and remembrance of the war.  As a practical matter, 
the Hilfsstelle did not rest its hopes on circulating brochures and issuing statements blindly but 
rather worked by lobbying the German Protestant Church directly, providing reading materials 
and talking points to pastors for use in preparing their annual sermons for Volkstrauertag 
Sunday.  A memo from the Provincial Church of Electoral Hesse and Waldeck, in northern 
Hesse, to its regional and local clergy, took the opportunity “to advise” its local leaders “on the 
meaning of Volkstrauertag” since, “in line with our experience,” the holiday usually “only 
remembered the war victims.”545  Yet this Protestant leadership objected only to practices that 
preserved Volkstrauertag as a military memorial festival, insisting that “the victims of the 
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National Socialist Terror [should] also be remembered.”546  To give pastors in the VDK’s 
backyard materials for use in preparing their sermons accordingly, this Provincial Church Office 
provided a brochure from the Hilfsstelle, which at this time was also worried about stubbornly 
antiquated interpretations and commemorative practices that “make a memorial day for the 
German soldier out of Volkstrauertag,” with the result that “the remembrance of the other dead 
of the Second World War” might “slowly be pushed out of the German consciousness.”547  To be 
clear, the Hilfsstelle never made clear in these documents who “they” (the party working to 
corrupt Volkstrauertag back into its former Heldengedenktag self) were but, nevertheless, these 
activists in Stuttgart remained convinced that, if left alone, West Germans would not force 
themselves to confront and re-learn this dark history of their lives under the Nazi dictatorship. 
 A few months later, the Hilfsstelle wrote again to the Provincial Church of Electoral 
Hesse and Waldeck’s office in Kassel, expressing continued “worry over the attempt to create a 
new Heldengedenktag” in some circles of culturally- or politically conservative (or otherwise 
unreconstructed) West Germans.548  Thanking the Kassel church office “for all of its efforts” to 
ensure “the correct celebration of Volks-Trauertag [sic],” the Hilfsstelle explained that the VDK 
and the Interior Ministers of the Federal States were all in agreement about including all victims 
of the war equally in official public mourning and collective memory activities, as evidenced by 
the state governments’ near-consensus on the “preservation of the Concentration Camp 
graves.”549  In the face of this near-unanimity, the Federal Minister for the Interior was the 
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holdout, preferring to maintain the older distinction between battle-field and home-front (see 
above).550   
The ultimate reasons for the federal government’s intransigence and preference for 
thinking (and remembering) “the war” was something separate from “the regime” (and its 
crimes) are not clear from these records.  Still, for senior civil servants in the 1960s, the war 
would have been a formative experience for them as (mostly) young men, generationally 
speaking.  Thus it is not hard to imagine bureaucrats and political leaders wishing to maintain 
any grounds, however small, for separating their Wehrmacht service away from association with 
the SS and other committed Nazi groups.  Unfortunately for the war generation, episodes such as 
this one, when political obstacles and bureaucratic delays prevented a more complete and 
perhaps critical discussion about the Nazi years from taking place, seemed to confirm the 68ers’ 
suspicions that “fascism” and “authoritarianism” lurked still in the West German corridors of 
power.  After all, rules that make reform and especially critical thinking and truth-seeking so 
difficult would not enjoy such respect unless the German people were still a nation of individuals 
who followed rules and deferred to state authorities. 
 The Hilfsstelle’s fear of a return to Heldengedenktag and the uncritical glorification of 
Germany’s military dead, whatever the probability of coming into fruition, resonated loudly with 
like-minded circles within the West German Protestant Church.  When the Protestant High 
Church Council wrote to the Chancellery of the Protestant Church in Germany to explain that the 
Hilfsstelle had gone so far as to suggest a “specially-designated memorial day for the Victims of 
the Third Reich,” the High Church Council admitted that the new settlement from 1952, whereby 
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“Volkstrauertag [was] dedicated to the memory of the Fallen of the two World Wars and also the 
Victims of the Nazi Regime,” could by 1961 “no longer find agreement everywhere.”551  It 
seems highly likely that the common picture scholars paint of Cultural Revolution, youth up in 
arms, and families in strife because of conflict between older and younger generations of West 
Germans over the history of the Nazi past, all had some roots in a larger building of discomfort 
with public memory and collective mourning practices.  
 
An ambiguous heterodoxy? 
In their relationship to the Volkstrauertag holiday, the Protestant Church in Germany, as 
an institution, seemed to be going in circles, with some critics unhappy about the 1952 settlement 
(which left Volkstrauertag extant, albeit in a moderated form), while other pro-Volkstrauertag 
groups were unhappy about the compromise and unwilling to accept any additional changes to 
the holiday at any future date.  At the suggestion of creating yet another holiday somehow 
dedicated to publicly mourning, even one especially dedicated to the “Victims of the Third 
Reich” which might counterbalance the apparent failings of Volkstrauertag, the Church’s senior 
leadership had to conclude that “the great majority of the Provincial Churches [were] not 
prepared to celebrate a new special memorial day with the vestments of religion.”552  Still, there 
stood the “many local clergy” for whom delivering their Sunday morning sermons on 
Volkstrauertag was quite difficult due to their congregations’ “misunderstandings of 
Volkstrauertag into the shape of the earlier Heldengedenktag but also due to the close following 
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of Volkstrauertag, Buß- und Bettag and Ewigskeitssonntag”553 in the church year.  Given that the 
1952 ruling to move Volkstrauertag from the Lenten season to the end of the church year, and 
thus depart with Nazi-era practices, “did not find applause in all the Provincial Churches”554 
(perhaps here meaning their provincial leaderships) but had found some resonance within the 
pastorate, the Protestant Church was not in as nimble a position to unilaterally demand changes 
or reforms to collective memory and public mourning in the 1960s as was the Hilfsstelle.   
 Thus, while the Protestant Church was more or less forced to adopt an institutional 
posture of some ambivalence toward the historically-troubled public mourning holiday, these 
documents also indicate that the national church leadership were themselves indeed more 
sympathetic to the Stuttgart activists than perhaps the middling- and lower-level church 
bureaucracy.  In some ways, this dichotomy of progressive/conservative approaches to mourning 
and remembrance may have been a product of age, as the men who had by the 1960s risen to 
senior leadership in the regional and state-level church bureaucracies were most likely old 
enough to have also served in the Second World War and also have been socialized during at 
least the Third Reich, if not the Weimar Republic.  Whereas those junior men still serving in 
local pastoral offices in the 1960s may have been, on the average, too young to have known 
these older mourning practices, and the war that made them seem urgent, firsthand.  If the state-
level Provincial Church leaderships and even local congregations were largely  only grudgingly 
accepting of the newer, less militarized Volkstrauertag into the 1960s, the deal from 1952 that 
guaranteed this new holiday had also failed to please the critical voices in the church for whom 
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the 1952 agreement did not do enough to constrain mourning for the military dead.  These 
progressives’ disappointment put bluntly, “[o]ur hope that its removal out of the Lenten Season 
to the end of the Church Year would lead, over the passage of time, toward a melting together 
with Totensonntag, has not been fulfilled,” wrote one pastor to his colleague, a Professor in 
Berlin in 1962.555   
The problem of collectively remembering the dead on successive Sundays, alluded to by 
this pastor above, was also a problem for pastors who did not necessarily want to see 
Volkstrauertag disappear.  One clergyman from Wiesbaden wrote to his superiors to express this 
frustration, that if Volkstrauertag was to be kept separately for “war dead,” this would mean only 
discussing non-war dead on Totensonntag and consequently leaving meditations on personal 
guilt and repentance for sins to Buss- und Bettag, a setting not directly related to the war and the 
issue of German crimes and culpability.  The indirect result of restricting discussion of moral 
concerns to days other than Volkstrauertag would be to leave nothing but war dead to talk about 
on the memorial Sunday, and usually soldiers at that, which could allow it to resume the form of 
“Heldengedenktag.”556  In this case, this pastor was asking for further and more detailed 
guidance in the form of a special pericope from which to prepare sermons and ensure theological 
consistency among all Protestant congregations and their pastors on these days of mourning.557  
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This problem of having to define separate liturgical messages for the separate Sundays of 
mourning, while insisting that these different classes of dead were in fact all equal, seems to have 
evaded the calculations of the church leaders who worked to move Volkstrauertag in order to 
dilute its significance.  After all, the Church’s position as far back as 1950 was that “the memory 
of the victims of the war should be bound up with the generalized memory of those who have 
passed away [die Entschlafenen],”558 since the “boundaries between the ordinary death and the 
death through events of war” had “become fluid” due to the “catastrophe of total war.”559  Thus 
for all of the national Protestant Church leadership’s enthusiasm for the campaign launched by 
the Stuttgart activists, Volkstrauertag and its associated mourning and memory challenges were 
problematic for churches in a number of ways, and Protestant enthusiasm for ending 
Volkstrauertag cannot simply be equated with a reformist or progressive stance on memory and 
history. 
 Instead, the Protestant Church’s leadership in Hannover seems to have feared, in the 
event Volkstrauertag should be allowed to continue unchanged, a different outcome than did the 
Hilfsstelle in Stuttgart.  The “social action” to reform the holiday taken by the Protestant Church 
in 1952, and again in support of the lay activists in the mid-1960s, sought to prevent the 
resurrection of a tradition for glorifying soldiers.  That is, a memory of the Second World War 
that taught that all victims, military and civilian, were equally part of the war experience, and 
therefore soldiers should receive no special treatment, demanded the “social action” of denying 
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such special treatment to those soldiers.  This was, of course, the position of the Protestant 
leadership across the post-war decades.  Contrarily, the Hilfsstelle in Stuttgart feared that the 
non-recognition of Nazi victims’ graves would lead to the public conceptualizing the Second 
World War without also attaching the Nazi regime and their own (the public’s) role in that 
regime.  Only when “social action” to ensure that “all graves of the victims of the war and of the 
persecution” were protected, were marked “with clear inscriptions” to explain their deaths, and 
“that on Volkstrauertag also these dead are remembered,” would Germans possess a clear and 
complete memory of the past.560  Such a radically different vision and articulation of mourning 
and memory as here makes clear that, by the 1960s, the VDK no longer held a monopoly on 
collectively remembering and interpreting the past. 
   
Divergent memories, shared goal 
 One ostensible reason why the Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte objected to the 
Volkstrauertag practices in the early 1960s was the tendency for the national ceremony in Bonn 
to anchor its highly visible, officially symbolic program to a memory of the Second World War 
that gave primacy to the soldiers’ experience.  To be sure, even the highly praised reforms to the 
national ceremonies through the late 1950s had also used the military experience as a jumping-
off point for discussion of the wider effects of war on the civilian population.  The point of these 
reforms, after all, was to press for the necessity of peace for the future in the age of atomic 
weapons.  The concentration on peace by VDK planners maintained during Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies into the 1960s, but the military experience became increasingly prominent as the 
basis of the programs.  At the same time, amid the debate on revising (and widening) the 
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regulations on “war graves,” this tendency of Volkstrauertag to prioritize military graves and 
largely ignore non-military graves appeared more and more of an anachronism to the VDK’s 
critics.  For the Hilfsstelle and the Protestant Church, the Volksbund’s concentration on war 
graves for inspiration to learning and “social action” seemed to largely miss the contemporary 
concerns relating to the continuation of war and violence in the 1960s present. 
 
Celebrating post-war successes? 
“Youth among the War Graves” 
 One year after unveiling the new, formulaic, Totenehrung as a fixed element of the 
Volkstrauertag national ceremony ensuring that all groups of dead victims were remembered 
from year to year, the 1962 Volkstrauertag program did not mirror the previous year’s attention 
to dead victims of German-directed violence.  In 1962, the centerpiece of the Bonn ceremony 
was the reading of the dramatic text, “Youth among War Graves. From Letters and Reports of 
Young People,” a feature designed to direct West Germans’ attention to the “nearly 30,000 
young people” who “during the past ten years” had “put their time and energy into the service of 
the war graves of the fallen from the two world wars.”561  Although it is not unreasonable to 
interpret this program as encompassing earnest, emotional, and authentic reactions of young 
West Germans who had volunteered to build and restore gravesites of both combat and non-
combat dead, the audience’s attention in 1962 was most likely directed at German military 
graves in France, with perhaps also secondary attention to those in German territory.562  Of their 
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experiences, said “Speaker 1,” “we saw the multiplied pain, of course not the immediate but that 
which over long years alleviated pain” of next-of-kin and survivors who came decades later to 
visit the remains of loved ones and comrades.563  Bearing witness to the emotional pain of 
families coping with the death of their loved ones during war, the speakers also made a point of 
refining the imagery of the war graves projects held so important by the VDK and its 
Volkstrauertag ceremony, to include not only “German cemeteries” but also “Czech [cemeteries] 
in France,” Slovakian and Hungarian cemeteries in Italy, or even “at the redesign of two Russian 
cemeteries… in the Luneburg Heath.”564  To be sure, the ceremony did mention that “it made no 
difference” which cemetery these German youths worked, their dedication to remembering the 
history of war and providing a service to the next-of-kin in the present, all in the hope of 
maintaining peace in the future, was the same in all cases.565   
 Even though the program noted that some war dead remains did not fall into the 
traditional categories of combat dead or even civilians caught up in combat operations, noting 
that “a few kilometers” from the Russian cemetery mentioned above “lay the Concentration 
Camp Bergen-Belsen,” the 1962 ceremony emphasized much more the duty to keep peace in the 
wake of the war, more than any duty of future generations to avoid political chaos and descent 
into a dictatorship.  “What would be said and done in the evenings, around the campfires, was 
nothing in particular, neither from the side of the Germans or from the others” but, “on all sides, 
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the will grew toward mutual understanding, to comprehension, and to respect for one another.”566  
Given that these youth cemetery projects featured partnerships between German youths and their 
peers from France, Italy, and other former belligerents, but not from the Eastern European Slavic 
peoples impacted by the war, much less the persecuted communities of European Jews, as well 
as German Sinti and Roma, Communists, disabled and “a-socials,” it is hard to read such 
outpouring of emotion and action as resulting from anything less than a memory of the Second 
World War that minimized the political and racial goals of the Nazi Party while portraying the 
1939 war as little different from its 1914 predecessor.  Perhaps more to the point, the centerpiece 
image of Volkstrauertag in 1962 was still combat deaths as deserving (and receiving) special 
memorial attention and preservation efforts beyond that which non-combatants received. 
 
“Fallen Without a Grave” 
 The use of German military graves as inspiration to remembering the war years and the 
war dead was also the centerpiece of the 1965 Bonn ceremony.  This time, the primacy of 
military dead in this memory was more pronounced simply from the title of the drama, 
“Gefallene Ohne Grab,” featured at the 1965 ceremony.  The point of this play was to articulate 
the importance of giving war graves “dauerndes Ruherecht,” especially considering the fate of 
many victims of the war whose remains were not properly buried or even identified in the 
aftermath of the war.  Certainly, the necessity of mourning and the desirability of mourning at 
the graveside was not something restricted to families of military dead and, for surviving family 
members, the gravesite itself was considered a crucial component of mourning, as a site where 
the headstones provided the survivors a tangible remnant “in which we set our hope, the hope 
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that what [remains of the dead that] were not earthly” would still one day “be called to life.”567   
It was at the gravesite where the spiritual remnant of the deceased could be properly imagined 
(and perhaps communicated with), because the grave held “the dead, really and symbolically.”568   
However, as this play makes clear, the weaponry and conduct of the Second World War 
meant that, in many cases, the dead could not be properly identified and their remains not 
individually preserved and marked.  It was these “people who died [gefallen sind] and who 
possessed no known resting place, much less a grave,” who were simply “missing and 
forgotten.”569  These victims of the war, depicted in this play as German civilian victims of aerial 
bombing, German soldiers who died in ground combat, missing German POWs and civilians 
expellees and refugees, had no known gravesite and thus those survivors mourning them had no 
specific place to focus their grief.  These victims of the war were “doubly killed and erased, gone 
without a trace,” or at the very least, burned and dismembered beyond recognition,570 therefore 
leaving their survivors with “nothing left that was human” to mourn.571  
It is worth noting that there is a degree of ambiguity hidden in the terms and images of 
this play.  Firstly, the VDK planners and the artists whom they recruited to prepare the programs 
continued to use the term, “fallen [gefallen]” to describe the war dead in general, whether 
military or civilian.  Similarly, “Concentration Camp” is used to refer both to Volksdeutschen 
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incarcerated by Eastern European authorities after the Wehrmacht’s retreat,572 as well as Jews 
and other targets of Nazi violence,“573 without much explanation of how these two groups of 
victims differed from one another.  While it was possible to interpret “Gefallene ohne Grab” as a 
call for respectful preservation of all war graves, regardless of circumstances, it is equally likely 
that critical voices, such as the Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte and the Protestant Church, would 
see in this example insufficient efforts to positively include and explain how West Germans 
should evaluate the responsibility and circumstances of these different deaths. 
 
Confronting past failures 
“Suffering of all people” 
 Much more explicitly than the 1965 “Gefallene ohne Grab,” the Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies in 1964 and 1967 featured speeches making clear calls for just the sort of honest 
accountability to history that “Gefallene ohne Grab” and the 1962 ceremony avoided.  In 1964, 
the pendulum of Volkstrauertag saw a return to the older keynote speech and classical music 
program, in this instance featuring the VDK’s then-president, Walter Trepte, once again at the 
podium.  Trepte’s speech invoked not only the dead soldiers from the Second World War but 
also went out of his way to link a series of anniversaries together that year: the fifty-year 
anniversary of the First World War’s outbreak, the twenty-five year anniversary of the beginning 
of the Second World War, the twenty-year anniversary of the 20th of  July Conspiracy, the 
twentieth anniversary of the D-Day landings in Normandy, as well as the twentieth anniversary 
                                                 
572  For example,“...Out of the German population remaining behind in the German Eastern Territories,  over 
900,000 men and women were brought into Concentration Camps during the year 1945.” Ibid. 
 
573 For example: “...The dead of the Concentration Camps, mostly former Jewish prisoners, were buried 
immediately.” Ibid. 
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of the Warsaw Uprising and brief mention that the Auschwitz Trials had only just begun in 
1964.574  In linking both the Polish experience of the war in 1939 and in 1944, as well as the 
Western Allies’ experiences of defeating Germany, to Germans’ own memories of the war, 
Trepte framed the task of mourning incontestably as a confrontation with Germans’ failures.  It 
was this larger history of death and dying beyond Germans’ own suffering, which West Germans 
in 1964 were to have realized.  “They outline a total event which has given rise to a 
Volkstrauertag” and which amounts to “a community of emergency and of suffering of all 
peoples who were touched by the war and its effects.”575 In other words, Volkstrauertag was an 
occasion to move beyond Germans’ immediate encounter with war and reflect on the several 
overlapping, competing and interconnected ways in which different people were negatively 
impacted by the Second World War. 
 In his speech, Trepte seemed to be less interested in haranguing Germans for their own 
contributions to the Nazis’ ability to do so much damage but more concerned with erasing any 
lingering distinction between “front” and “home front” or between the “war” and the “regime.” 
Declaring that “in the course of a generation, twice” had the “greatest and strongest so-called 
Cultural Nations of the world” sought “with all their available means” to kill “not only men of 
military age but also women, children and old men.”576 Trepte left no room to define civilian 
deaths and suffering as anything unrelated to the war.  Going further, he added that, “when we 
are talking about death in war,” Germans “may not omit anything from the size of this sacrifice 
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of human life.”577  Echoing sentiments expressed by the Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte in 
Stuttgart, this VDK leader was envisioning a past wherefrom few, if any, positive examples 
could be drawn. 
The 1964 Volkstrauertag speech made clear that the Nazi regime was the link between 
deaths of German civilians caught up in the war and the deaths of Germany’s victims who were 
the targets of the war in the first place.  “Next to those whose deaths were immediate outcomes 
of the war,” and who had been long recognized as legitimate victims of the war and part of the 
collective memory of the war, “are there not still many thousands who died by terrible methods 
during the last war on execution sites or in Concentration Camps?” asked Trepte.578  Here Trepte 
left no room for equivocation on the issue of the Jews, declaring it was impossible to “blur” the 
“innumerable hundreds of thousands of Jews” who “were forced to suffer in torture- and gas 
chambers” on account of Germans’ own failings.579  Because these deaths fit within the events of 
the regime and the war, it was undeniable that “they belong also in the circle of those to whom 
our remembrance on Volkstrauertag applies.”580  In so elaborately linking the Nazis’ victims’ 
deaths to the larger war, Trepte not only adapted the Hilfsstelle’s position but implied that peace-
learned-from-former-wars was not the only lesson Germans ought learn from  remembering 
history but rather they also needed to learn how to prevent violence and inhumanity from ruining 
Germans’ lives, too. 
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“Between memory and sensitivity” 
 The confrontation with Germans’ failures and responsibilities relating to the Nazi 
dictatorship also surfaced at the 1967 Volkstrauertag ceremony, where Trepte again spoke.  
While the degree of emphasis or the balance of editorial content clearly varied considerably from 
one year to the next, the common touchstone for ceremonies over time always remained the 
necessity of peace and increasingly also the presence of physical remains of the dead, as 
inspiration to mourn and remember.  In 1967’s Bonn ceremony, Trepte began his keynote speech 
with a frank acknowledgement that Germans’ collective memory necessarily had to incorporate 
“not only …the German losses” but also could not “spare” the chance “to be reminded of all, 
who for any reason had to bring the sacrifice of their lives in these wars.”581  However, Trepte 
did not pretend that doing so was easy, conceding that “[w]e find ourselves in a conflict between 
memory and sensitivity,”582 making the point that VTT forced Germans to split their energies 
between wanting to remember favorably the dead soldiers and even civilian victims they had 
known while also necessarily expressing grief and remorse for the harm inflicted by some of 
these dead onto innocents.  This was not the first time such a message was featured at the 
national mourning ceremony nor is it the most revealing element of the 1967 speech. 
 What is perhaps more notable about this year’s ceremony is the attention given to the 
youth generation (who had not experienced the war first-hand) and their attitude toward publicly 
mourning the war dead.  The preservation of gravesites of the “war dead” was still thought 
critically important by the VDK, since these sites were seen as key to inspiring and catalyzing 
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this youth generation towards mourning and remembering.  Thus in 1967, it was the very future 
of collective memory of the war and publicly mourning for the war dead that appeared to be at 
stake. Repeating what was steadily becoming a more common conversation, Trepte remarked 
that an honest, historically-informed understanding of the Second World War and the Third 
Reich on the part of young West Germans who did not live through it would only naturally lead 
them “to continually ask us older people, ‘Why did you all allow this?’ ‘Why did you all not 
resist with all your might so that in no case could the Second World War have broken out?’”583  
Interestingly, the image of youth „shaking their heads“ at their parents‘ and grandparents‘ 
failings, failings which had allowed the Nazis to remain in power and do so much harm for so 
long, was exactly what the VDK, as reflected in Trepte’s speech, thought would secure a 
peaceful future for the German peoples.  However, the leaders in Kassel did not imagine this 
confrontation with the past would take the form of protests, demonstrations, arguments and sit-
ins. 
Long before the generational conflict of the late 1960s heated up, VDK leaders had 
envisioned the youth work camps designed to renovate and maintain German military cemeteries 
in France and other former enemy nations as the site of such a sober reckoning.  When “a 
generation who, in light of the recent history of their nation, with the failures and guilt of their 
fathers, cannot yet be finished with [the history] that is truly so difficult, thereby also the access 
to the victims is made difficult….”584  The underlying assumption seemed to be that the 
“younger generation” would want to forget and ignore the Third Reich’s history and crimes, out 
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of disgust or passivity, which would tragically lead to a repeat in the future.  Having determined 
to push the youth to engage with this history via reburying the bodies of 18- and 19-year old 
young men (often the age of the VDK’s youth brigades), the VDK happily believed that this 
project, getting West German youth working side-by-side with other youth from other nations 
would naturally foster understanding and reconciliation. 
 
Remembering deaths, not wars 
 Granting for the differences in reception and experience among individual youths 
involved in these programs, as well as among West German audiences hearing of these activities 
on Volkstrauertag and elsewhere, there is ample evidence that some people did reach the 
outcome and impression desired by the VDK.  After all, if none of the parties involved or 
observing were satisfied, the program would not have existed for over a decade.  Still, the 
concentration on gravesites as impetus to a memory of the war and the dictatorship aimed at a 
full and honest reckoning of the past, understanding of guilt, and change for the future, did not 
please everyone.  This is all the more the case given that many, if not most, of the projects were 
recovering military graves.   
 Such a deeply paradoxical break, between shared desires for the outcome yet divergent 
opinions on means and methods, helps explain the otherwise surprising and anachronistic 
national Volkstrauertag ceremony in 1968, which featured a dramatic reading about the process 
of identifying and recovering the remains of dead German soldiers.  More specifically, the text 
“…once again has his name” chronicled the process of a grieving mother asking for help locating 
her missing-in-action son or his remains, which involved a complex research process on the part 
of the VDK, the Deutsche Dienststelle, as well as local parish authorities in Normandy, France.  
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The final scene, an emotional highlight for the audience, saw the mother laying flowers on her 
son’s grave, along with earth brought from home in Bamberg.  This finale was intended to be all 
the more touching to its audience via the dramatic explanation that this mother’s other two sons 
were also killed in action but had been deployed on the Eastern Front, meaning their remains 
were somewhere in the USSR, where the mother cannot visit them.  The mother even leaves 
flowers on a grave nearby her own son’s grave, because “perhaps…there are no relatives left to 
care for this grave.”585  Here, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else in the discussion of war 
graves, is the inherent tension over interpreting and valuing combat versus non-combat deaths 
(and moreover, the deaths of Victims of Nazi persecution) as more or less important made clear.   
Despite the drama arising from the mother endeavoring to complete the herculean task of 
navigating the multiple overlapping agencies charged with preserving information on missing, 
dead, presumed dead, and buried soldiers, critical observers could have easily inferred a 
comparison.  If this mother had the problem of too many bureaus and bureaucrats to consult for 
help, the drama “…once again has his name” largely ignored the problem of surviving next-of-
kin searching for information on their missing or dead civilian relatives.  Besides the civilian 
casualties of the war, there were also Displaced Persons whose families undoubtedly counted 
their own grief among the costs of the war.  Moreover, families of Jewish and other racial and 
social minorities who had faced persecution and death, faced a much more painful challenge of 
wading through fragmentary records of the International Tracing Service in order to locate their 
loved one’s fate.  Objections that these situations of missing non-military dead formed an equally 
important part of comprehending and bringing closure to the war were apparently not raised, at 
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least not within the VDK planning committee for 1968.  On the contrary, the 1968 
Volkstrauertag ceremony’s contents left only the conclusion that, if audiences (and younger 
Germans, in particular) would only consider the pain of families separated from their soldier 
sons, this would be enough to engender empathy also for victims of the Nazi regime for whom 
these soldiers fought.   
 The next year, the national Volkstrauertag ceremony again urged the youth to use 
encounters with the dead and the grief of their survivors as an inspiration toward maintaining 
peace although with somewhat less exclusive attention to Germans’ military memories.  The 
program presented textual descriptions of the August days of 1914, the disillusionment of the 
Western Front in 1916, followed by Hitler’s Seizure of Power in 1933 and then the violence that 
attended the Nazi regime, as well as the Eastern Front of 1941, Stalingrad in 1943, and finally 
refugees fleeing East Prussia in 1945.586  To this somewhat nationalist German-centric narrative, 
the program also added glimpses of the 20 July conspirators, the rounding up of Jews in Lidice, 
and even the emigration of surviving Jews from liberated concentration camps to Palestine in 
1945.587  The apparent design of these sketches was to build momentum for “social action” 
towards democracy and peace, in view of a memory of fascism and war.   
Hidden behind these designs was a growing fear on the part of VDK leaders that 
Volkstrauertag might appear less and less relevant to audiences, especially post-war-born 
audiences, nearly twenty-five years after the war’s end.  Moreover, this problem would surely 
only increase over time, with fewer and fewer individuals in future generations feeling the 
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emotional impact of lost family members whom they never met, therefore becoming less and less 
likely to feel called to mourn and remember before the graves.  “A seventeen-year-old in our 
time” might think that “Volkstrauertag is no longer necessary” because “we should live in the 
present and not in the past.”  If young West Germans took the position of “seeking to forget the 
war and all that is connected with it,” in order to more simply “engage themselves for peace,” 
they would surely be unsuccessful, according to the VDK’s logic.588  The notion of the youth 
rejecting the need to mourn over the bodies in order to preserve peace in the present, in effect, 
forgetting the war on the way to embracing peace, was the nightmare scenario that 1969’s 
Volkstrauertag ceremony was supposed to correct.   
Instead of taking the war lightly so long after the fact, the VDK argued on Volkstrauertag 
that youth working on gravesites projects abroad would learn that “[w]hat played itself out 25 
years ago may not repeat itself in your generation.”589  This would surely be the case because 
“youth” of 1969 “learn languages and care for friendships over the borders.”590  Interestingly, the 
1969 program did assume that such an appreciation of the experience of war (as measured 
through battlefield casualties and also the grief of survivors) would, somehow, feed a discussion 
among Germans over their role in the Nazi regime.  Quoting an unnamed Berlin politician, one 
1969 speaker concluded that “It is futile, and I find it is unjust, when the act of atonement is only 
expected from the young generation, without us older people being prepared to account for these 
times…”591  Perhaps conscious of the lingering disharmony among the war generation over how 
best to mourn and remember on Volkstrauertag, which had in fact been the case all along after 
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1945, the VDK seemed to hint that steering the future generations of West Germans toward a 
memory encouraging peace and democracy was West Germany’s only hope to survive in a world 
still at war. 
 
An elastic model of remembrance? 
 While the national Volkstrauertag ceremonies in Bonn worked hard to find the precisely 
balanced message, often fluctuating from year to year, local Volkstrauertag ceremonies did not 
strictly follow Bonn’s lead from one year to the next.  Instead of a universal concern with the 
physical remains of German soldiers or civilian dead, there is evidence of some middling-level 
VDK leaders and ceremony planners designing their ceremonies to depart from the Bonn model, 
placing even more, or in some cases, even less, emphasis on German suffering, especially the 
soldier and refugee experiences. This heterogeneity is all the more notable given that, despite the 
variety of emphases and tropes characterizing the conservative as well as more progressive 
examples of public mourning, Volkstrauertag everywhere seemed directed at heightening the 
public’s appreciation for peace and dedication to renouncing all future wars.  Whether relying on 
imagery of the Nazi dictatorship and its murder of Jews behind the Eastern Front, or invoking the 
suffering and loss of German soldiers fighting an unwinnable war in the service of the fatherland, 
audiences nowhere encountered a rose-tinted representation of the war years as something to 
remember fondly.   
 Thus the history of collective memory and public mourning in West Germany had 
become, by the late 1960s, a model of “levels” of memory operating to layer local specifics 
below more general national conclusions.  The survey of Volkstrauertag ceremonies up to now 
has revealed the degree to which the nationally-televised Volkstrauertag ceremony in Bonn was 
269 
 
strictly controlled by the Volksbund’s national leaders in Kassel, who were also subject to 
pressure, formal and informal, from influential political-, church-, and civil society leaders. 
Simultaneously, examples of Volkstrauertag ceremonies at the middling- and local levels 
(below) demonstrate the ability of local elites to adapt this model to suit the concerns of those 
lower-level leaders, whether this be addressing a lacking appreciation for Germany’s guilt and 
responsibility or an incomplete attention to the sacrifices of the soldiery.   Thus, if one 
community felt that insufficient attention was being directed at the Holocaust, their specific 
version of Volktrauertag could address this shortcoming.  Whereas if another village deemed a 
serious appreciation for soldiers’ sacrifices to be missing among the young people of the present, 
that local village’s Volkstrauertag could be molded to address this shortcoming.  
 
A heterogeneous holiday? 
The potential for state- and local level Volkstrauertag ceremonies to depart from the 
message of the Bonn ceremony throws into relief the potential for mixed messages to be 
circulated in conjunction with Volkstrauertag from year to year.  In 1962, the VDK chapter for 
Lower Saxony hosted the state’s own VTT ceremony in Hannover.  There Otto Benemann, the 
state’s Minister of the Interior, delivered a speech that from the very beginning presented the 
dual nature of “the dead” in conversations about the war, rather than hiding the victims of the 
Holocaust and war crimes behind a nebulous exploration of the problem of recovering and 
burying the “war dead” in general.  “In cities and villages of our land” people had gathered 
together “in order to remember those who forcibly lost their lives in the two world wars or 
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through the brutal violence of an inhuman dictatorship.”592  In one breath, Benemann asked the 
audience „Who among us does not mourn for a beloved person, for a good comrade, who gave 
up his life as a soldier in the war?  Who does not know of a friend, someone from our age cohort, 
who had to suffer death on account of his beliefs, his race, his political convictions.”593  Rather 
than invoking Stalingrad, Dresden, Tobruk or Normandy, the Lower Saxony VTT ceremony 
instead called attention to “the terror camps of Buchenwald and Dachau, of Bergen-Belsen and 
Sachsenhausen,” to the “gas chambers of Auschwitz, Maidanek and Treblinka.”594  This attempt 
to equalize the importance and weight of military dead with the victims of the Nazi’s racial 
persecution was the result of a sharply more critical memory, compared to the presentation about 
military cemeteries in France that was featured in Bonn.     
 The degree to which Volkstrauertag, by the 1960s, had become a heterogeneous holiday, 
an occasion for suggesting different (sometimes conflicting) memories to audiences in different 
places, is also attested to by the records of national television programming broadcast in 
conjunction with the holiday weekend.  This sort of public relations, though not appearing to be 
planned by the VDK, was nonetheless a subject of their interest, and documents survive 
indicating that in 1962 most of the television programming dealt with the history and memory of 
the war.  Titles such as “Das verlorene Bataillon [The Lost Battalion]” on Sender Freies Berlin, 
“Krieger, Helden, Opfer [Warriors, Heroes, Sacrifice]” on Deutsches Fernsehen, “Der Andere 
[The Other Soldier]” on Radio Bremen, „Kriegsgräberfahrt nach Norwegen [Visiting War 
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Graves in Norway]“ on Süddeutscher Rundfunk, „Die Toten mahnen [The Dead Admonish Us]“ 
by Manfred Hausmann on UKW II suggest a predominant interest with war, POWs, war graves, 
and prior Volkstrauertag speeches from the 1950s.595 What was missing was missing was 
anything that explicitly brings the Concentration Camps or the Nazi regime into discussion, 
except maybe “Der Tod hinter Stacheldracht [Death behind Barbed Wire]” on Deutsches 
Fernsehen, which could have reasonably presented the stories of Allied- and Soviet-held German 
POWs but also could have addressed Concentration Camp inmates.596   
Two years later, Volkstrauertag-themed programming similarly centered around the war, 
with many more programs listed for broadcast.  Although the exact contents are not clear from 
the VDK’s records, most of the titles (nearly twenty) appear to concern the general problem of 
finding meaning in death during wartime, while perhaps a fourth as many suggested coverage of 
the First World War or Second World War in particular.597  Once more, there seems to have been 
scant attention devoted in television or radio programming to remembering the Holocaust (or if 
such programs were in fact broadcast, they must have been thought unrelated to Volkstrauertag 
and thus omitted from the records).  The dearth of airtime devoted to remembering civilian 
victims of Nazi violence, at least as far as is discernable from these records, in 1964 is striking 
when considered alongside the much more critical contents of that year’s Bonn ceremony (see 
above). 
  What seems apparent is that, by the 1960s, the multitude of voices, memories, and “social 
actions” circulating in connection with Volkstrauertag meant that the VDK no longer possessed 
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a monopoly on interpretive authority, and moreover, such a hegemonic position may have 
become increasingly less tenable, since audiences could tune in to or tune out of whichever 
interpretation of West Germans’ duty to remember the past they felt most correct.  It should not 
be assumed, however, that the somewhat malleable Volkstrauertag was more likely to evolve 
from a traditional, conservative, military-centric spectacle towards a more critical, politically 
progressive reckoning with both the problems of the military past and the Nazi regime, despite 
the examples offered above.  In fact, as critics from within the VDK, the Protestant Church in 
[West] Germany, and the Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte pushed for more accounting for the 
history of German crimes and for recognition of the substantial body of non-military victims, 
Volkstrauertag ceremonies carried out at the lowest level of individual towns and villages 
preserved room for forces sympathetic to the old Volkstrauertag to continue its practice.  Thus in 
September 1964, the Lower Saxony state government announced that it would “involve itself 
more strongly in the events of Volktrauertag than up to now” and that, more specifically, it 
would “take greater influence on the organization of this state holiday.”598  When commenting 
further on the state government’s decision, the Interior Minister for Lower Saxony explained that 
his goal was that “the character of the memorial day for all victims of the war and violence” be 
“particularly meaningfully” articulated in the planned celebrations, so that “the memory of the 
earlier customary, and clearly not entirely forgotten, Heldengedenktag drifts further into the 
background.”599  Thus participants sympathetic to and skeptical of Volkstrauertag had by the 
                                                 
598 Der Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to the Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Düsseldorf, 
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1960s realized the potential for shaping their own messages on the annual day of mourning, 
beyond the best-laid designs of the VDK in Kassel.   
 
Lamenting disunity? 
It was this specter of the old Heldengedenktag hiding within the malleability of local and 
regional Volkstrauertag ceremonies that similarly raised alarms among critics of Volkstrauertag 
in Protestant circles.  Apparently not troubled by the prospect of baldly resurrecting these 
discredited past practices in the national ceremony in Bonn, the Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte 
wrote to the Chancellery of the EKD in September 1964 to acknowledged the problem of “how 
many pastors must deliver speeches at local ceremonies” on Volkstrauertag, and that these 
pastors faced audiences with very specific versions of history in mind.  These pastors “did not 
have it easy” in preparing their remarks, walking a fine line between nationalist or uncritical 
remarks about soldiers and death on one side and an acknowledgement of the Nazi regime’s 
crimes on the other, which was why the Hilfsstelle was offering to send the Church pamphlets 
for such pastors’ use in writing a balanced sermon of address.600  Another document from the 
Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte underlines the fact that they were comfortable with the national 
Bonn ceremony but were instead worried about the lower-level Volkstrauertag ceremonies.  In a 
memo from September 1966, Hilfsstelle officials reported an agreement with the VDK about 
making sure to mention and include these gravesites of civilian victims in any new VDK 
publications that pertain to war graves.  But even if elites in Kassel (and therefore the federal 
ceremony in Bonn) did adopt this position of a wider sense of victims and the war, the Hilfsstelle 
                                                 
 
600 Hilfsstelle fur Rasseverfolgte bei der Evang. Gesellschaft to the Kanzlei der Evang. Kirche, OKR von Harling, 
September 14, 1964, EZAB 2/2560. 
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für Rasseverfolgte admitted that they were still having trouble reaching a few communities in a 
few places, who were “trapped in the appearances of the world in 1925.”601  The Hilfsstelle für 
Rasseverfolgte hoped that its information campaign, as well as its flyers, could help pastors 
prepare Volkstrauertag sermons for congregations that will address the deficiencies in the 
national (or, rather, local) Volkstrauertag ceremonies year to year, and that pastors will be 
empowered “to remember the circa 25 Million victims of the Second World War at memorial 
ceremonies on Volkstrauertag.”602 
 Indeed, the senior leaders of the VDK were also realizing the potential for West Germans 
to take Volkstrauertag into their own hands and repurpose this moment of dedicated mourning 
and recollection for ends other than the comforting of surviving families and the preservation of 
military war graves.  In September of 1963, alarmed that the VVN might join the memorial 
activities in West Germany with the purpose of ennobling Communists who were persecuted 
during the war (and whose political activities were illegal in West Germany), the Kassel 
headquarters wrote to their state-level chapters, asking them to report whether or not they had 
been approached by the VVN and, if they had taken part in ceremonies, what was said and how it 
was received.603  The VVN, after all, had created and inaugurated the rival OdF memorial day in 
the GDR, which had subsequently been taken over by the SED itself.  Even if the VDK were 
sympathetic to the Communists’ plight (which is unlikely, since the OdF memory of the war 
                                                 
601 Hilfstelle für Rasseverfolgte bei der Evang. Gesellschaft to the Landeskirchlichenamt [Kassel], letter forwarding 
sample brochures critical of Volkstrauertag, September 21, 1966. EKKW C/1065. 1925 was the year the original 
War Graves Law from the Weimar Republic, the military-centric definitions of which heavily informed the Federal 
Republic’s understanding of “war” and “war graves,” much to the Hilfsstelle’s consternation. 
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603 Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge to all Landes- und Bezirksverbände, Rundschreiben 19/63, circular 
memorandum, April 9, 1963. VDK A.10-103. 
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ignored the military and even German civilians who were not Communist), the very possibility 
of alternative or revisionist versions of Volkstrauertag had long been feared by the VDK.   
This concern for unity in all practices and interpretations on Volkstrauertag went back to 
the Weimar Republic, and indeed had fueled the tenuous arguments over structuring the holiday 
and ensuring its recognition in state-level laws in both the 1920s and again in the 1950s.  This is 
the same sentiment that animated an editorial prepared by the VDK for publication in the 
Erlangen Kirchenblatt in November 1964, apparently responding to some criticism.  
Volkstrauertag was to “continually admonish our people,” so that Germans “will be unified” in 
remembering the “suffering for all victims of the monstrous catastrophe” but “unified also in the 
duty to keep alive the legacy of the millions of dead in active works and creations for a better 
future.”604  It was this unity of purpose that the VDK understood to stem from Volkstrauertag 
that was at stake if renegade ceremonies took the meaning of Volkstrauertag into their own 
hands.  After all, the key lesson to be learned from remembering the dead, commonly cited by 
the VDK in literature and on Volkstrauertag, was to “demonstrate the power of reconciliation, 
which arose from the graves of the dead and out of the suffering of women and mothers.”  In the 
VDK leaders’ minds, there existed a universally-applicable potential for reconciliation and 
therefore the realization of peace between all enemies, past, present, and future, into which 
Volktrauertag tapped.  Yet underlying this conviction was the unspoken assumption that all 
wars, from the most ancient of history, to the most recent Second World War, had operated in 
basically the same fashion: as contests between uniformed armies, fought over the demands of 
each nation’s own self-interest.  This inability or unwillingness to acknowledge the racial 
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dimensions to Germany’s launching of the Second World War, which would put the onus solely 
on Germany to “reconcile” with its enemies, seems to have been one main motivation for those 
dissenters who sought to reshape local Volkstrauertag ceremonies to include this dimension, 
thereby departing from the VDK’s universalist understanding of both war and how to remember 
it. 
 
“Excluding misrepresentation” 
 Interestingly, the supposition that centering memory on war graves and the youth’s 
involvement with them would lead to a securely peaceful future for Germans does not seem to 
have been shared in VDK leadership circles outside of Kassel.  In 1968, the VDK chapter in 
West Berlin organized its own local Volkstrauertag ceremony, where SPD politician Carlo 
Schmidt delivered the keynote address, in which he left behind the imagery of graves in calm 
manicured fields in favor of emphasizing the violence still present in the world in 1968.  Urging 
Berliners to remember “those who died their deaths for the fatherland, for any fatherland,” 
Schmidt insisted that such a designation extended not only to soldiers but also to “the deaths of 
partisans, who in the struggle for their freedom of their peoples, perhaps also for human dignity, 
met their deaths.”605  In almost a diametrically opposed message from what the national 
ceremony in Bonn had featured for years, the Berlin 1968 ceremony took the “the Millions of 
Dead, in the Concentration Camps, who were strangled on the gallows, who were stuck into gas 
                                                 
605 Carlo Schmidt, „Der Wille zur Versöhnung, Gedenkrede von Prof. Dr. Carlo Schmidt zum Volkstrauertag 1968 
bei der Feierstunde des Landesverbandes Berlin des Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge,“ copy of 
Schmidt’s West Berlin speech transcribed for the VDK’s records in Kassel, November 17, 1968, VDK A.100-32. 
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chambers” as the point of departure towards a discussion of the lack of peace and human rights 
that had resulted from the fall of the Nazi regime in 1945.606   
Indeed, Schmidt understood the point of Volkstrauertag as something larger than just 
German history.  Reaching beyond Europe, to “the dead who fell in foreign wars,” Schmidt 
invoked the memory “of Hiroshima, of Vietnam, and so many others still who are, along with 
their fates, chained to us.”607   For Schmidt, European affairs were connected to the rest of the 
world, meaning that the war that brought so many dead European victims by 1945 also gave rise 
to the violence of the Cold War and Decolonization.  Because “these wars are, of course, a run-
off of a political system, a key part of which we ourselves form,” violence and death for many 
victims across the world was the unsavory “opposite side of the question of good and evil.”  The 
conclusion for West Berlin audiences, themselves at the front line of the Cold War, as it were, 
was that Germans’ wartime suffering, even the suffering of the victims of the Holocaust and 
other Nazi crimes, was intimately connected to the suffering and death of victims across the 
globe, necessarily transforming Volkstrauertag from a German day of remembrance into a day 
for mourning humanity writ large.  The corollary to acknowledging the scale of suffering, 
already enormous in the European context but all the more so outside of it, was to charge the 
audience to “[p]rove through [their] actions in the present and in the future, that behind [their] 
mourning stood the will to prevent those events which had brought [West Germans] together 
today to mourn from happening ever again.”608 
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 The turn from remembering the past toward criticizing the present as inspiration for 
preserving peace in the world was also a feature of the local Volkstrauertag ceremonies in 
Bremen in 1968.  In a particularly visible departure from the “reconciliation-over-the-graves” 
pattern of national ceremonies on Volkstrauertag, which had often featured Franco-German 
cooperation at its core, a French student from Compiegne, Luc Rispal, delivered the speech to 
the German audience.  Rather than rehearsing the troubled history of Franco-German 
antagonism, Rispal instead declared that “the young generation” of the present could not base 
their commitment to peace in the present on the memory of “the events of the past, which are 
remembered on Volkstrauertag, and which they did not experience.”609  Rather, “in a moment 
when the conversation must be about Vietnam, about Biafra, about the Near East and 
Czechoslovakia,” the youth of 1968 “must refuse all acts of violence and confess that never 
again may the satisfaction of a politics of ambition produce so many dead and the fallen 
soldiers.”610  If Luc Rispal’s (and Carlo Schmidt’s) determination that Verdun and Normandy 
(and maybe even Auschwitz) were insufficient to tell the entire story of Volkstrauertag, such a 
conclusion were anathema to the Volksbund leadership in Kassel, who steadfastly understood 
1918 and 1945 as the key moments onto which Germans ought to focus their remembrance in 
order to secure a peaceful future.  De-emphasizing the two world wars, and thereby the German 
military and civilian victims killed by them, appeared to Kassel as a lapse in mourning and a 
threat to peaceful reconciliation.   
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While the VDK does not appear to have directly criticized the Bremen chapter for its 
locally-organized memorial activities in 1968, which rather drastically departed from the Bonn 
Volkstrauertag model, an internal document indicates that the local Bremen leaders saw 
themselves as striking out in a decidedly new direction, leaving the memory of soldiers and of 
their military cemeteries behind.  Whereas “[u]p to now, the schools [of Bremen] had sent 
representatives to the war grave sites” in the surrounding area, and the schools themselves had 
held memorial ceremonies on Volkstrauertag, these ceremonies “regretfully sometimes carried 
the character of Heldengedenktag.”611  “This interpretation of the memorial day is however not 
in our interests and the interests of the Volksbund” wrote the Bremen school leaders in this 
memo.  For this reason, Bremen’s 1968 Volkstrauertag celebrations dropped any mention of war 
graves as a source of reconciliation and adopted instead a new motto, “Admonishment to Peace! 
[Mahnung zum Frieden!],” which “excluded any misinterpretation.”612  This call to work for 
peace, rather than continue telling war stories (however grim or cautionary), was much more of a 
direct call to “social action” in the present based on the remembrance of death and destruction.  
The Bremen organizers apparently  understood the commemorative potential of war graves to be 
somewhat limited to suggesting only „reconciliation“ of former enemies nation-states, whereas 
peace as a world-wide goal required removing the limits on how West Germans understood 
Volkstrauertag and the history that demanded remembrance.    
 Indeed, the desire to move Volkstrauertag away from a simple linkage to the German 
military experience of the Second World War and towards a more global lesson about violence, 
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human rights, and peace was gaining currency in Bonn, too.  In October 1969, the 
Bundespräsident Gustav Heinemann expressed to his aides his preference that the Volkstrauertag 
ceremony in Bonn move away from a highly militarized pageantry, which Adenauer had largely 
inaugurated earlier in the decade.613  In addition to “a certain ‘dampening’ of the military 
elements of the wreath-laying,” Heinemann also wanted to see the “introduction of a wreath 
delegation for the Victims of the Dictatorship” too.614  While 1968 was by far not the first 
mention of remembering Holocaust victims and other victims of Nazi persecution on 
Volkstrauertag, the rolling back of military precedence suggested by Heinemann, himself a 
foremost critic of West German rearmament and the continuation of military tradition after 1945, 
echoes the efforts to reimagine Volkstrauertag and its meaning for contemporary West Germans 
seen in West Berlin and in Bremen.  
 In each of these examples, exceptions to the general trend for sure, planners behind these 
ceremonies and the speakers crafting the messages took advantage of the flexibility available to 
them in the Volkstrauertag model to draw their specific audience’s focus away from the keys of 
the old Bonn ceremony.  What had been, perhaps in 1961, a radical move to codify the Holocaust 
victims alongside German military and civilian casualties in public memorial consciousness had 
not apparently led to the sort of groundbreaking shake up in memory and present-day actions that 
the critics may have expected.  By the late 1960s, dissenters had learned they could tweak their 
messages to promote more critical soul-searching and indeed a general questioning of the value 
of the military and of warfare.  At the same time, these progressive voices did not see their views 
echoed consistently in the Bonn program and, furthermore, coexisted uneasily with more 
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traditionally conservative local leaders who saw 1961 as too radical a departure.  This is the 
reason so much concern circulated in reformist circles about unreformed Heldengedenktag 
ceremonies taking place out in the provinces.  Volkstrauertag, in order to encompass all of the 
history of the Second (and First-) World Wars, had rather clumsily become a listing of victims 
without consistently working to explain how each group of victims related to each other in the 
actual history of the Third Reich.  Thus on one holiday, different audiences across West 
Germany could choose which message and which memory to hear, perhaps even selecting one 
shaped in advance to meet that audience’s specific wishes. 
 
Conclusion: A peaceful discord? 
 Scholars often see the 1960s as a watershed moment for the history of (West) Germany, 
the point where external democratic political and social structures became internal democratic 
cultural values.  Although such a conclusion would not be incorrect, the processes of change 
over time were slow, uneven, and highly contested along the way.  More specifically to the topic 
of collective memory, the critical interrogation by “68ers” of their fathers’ wartime activities has 
come to symbolize for many the hour of German’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  Yet specialists 
on collective memory would still point out, however, that such “mastery” over Germans’ painful 
and haunting past was not complete in 1969 but continued to simmer quietly over the ensuing 
decades, erupting at moments of crisis or scandal, even into the present.  As this chapter has 
demonstrated, even the idea of a singular turn towards critically evaluating the Nazi era cannot 
be presumed to have taken root uniformly or without question across the Federal Republic.  By 
returning to the questions posed at the outset, a more nuanced set of conclusions become clearer 
about the scope and nature of changes to 1960s West Germans’ understanding of the Nazi past. 
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Firstly, contemporary political sensitivities as well as legal barriers to changes in 
commemorative practices must not be discounted from a discussion of collective memory and 
public mourning.  While it may be tempting to theorize “memory” as an ethereal cultural force or 
narrative structure at work connecting people to a past, the present discussion demonstrates that 
“memory” can and does carry material consequences.  In the case of West Germany’s annual 
memorial ceremony, the legal prescriptions for war graves carried within them shards of a 
particular memory of war, which in turn limited the types of victims whose deaths could be 
recognized and memorialized by the state.  At the same time, the relative willingness or 
reluctance of political leaders to reform these legal guidelines also served as a rough gauge for 
the degree of relevance these questions of history and remembrance had on West German elites’ 
day-to-day behavior.  Whereas the Volksbund could rather easily (by comparison) revise or alter 
the content of its national Bonn Volkstrauertag ceremony to push public opinion in one direction 
or another, the legislative process of reforming or simply revising which memories of which 
classes of dead victims would be preserved by the state for future generations was much more 
protracted. 
 At the same time as legal structures inhibited reform in West German collective memory 
practice, one could reasonably argue that it was just the sort of paradox provided by the War 
Graves Law that helped push critics into action.  With the internal logic of defining “war graves” 
laid bare by the Law, the Hilfsstelle für Rasseverfolgte could use the then-emerging detailed 
historical studies of the war, the Nazi regime, and the regime’s treatment of its enemies to 
forcefully argue against any separation of military casualties from civilian casualties when those 
casualties were deliberately targeted as part of the war effort.  Thus the very limitations the Law 
put on remembrance via categories of graves and victims helped catalyze calls to re-interpret this 
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history and include a more honest appraisal of the past.  In this way, we can interpret collective 
memory as a field of action wherein the players move between structural limitations on 
remembrance on one hand and the free agency to reinterpret meanings and question assumptions 
on the other. 
 Secondly, when critics such as the Hilfsstelle proposed alternative visions of West 
German public mourning, such ideas usually involved further emphasizing a more historically 
complete accounting for the persecution and murder of religious, ethnic, and political minorities. 
Of course, a complete account of this history was not everyone’s goal, least of all Protestant 
forces working to reduce the importance given to remembering German soldiers.  What is 
perhaps most notable is that a number of critics in the Protestant Church presented themselves 
not as activists working to stop Volkstrauertag but trying to stop a resurgent Heldengedenktag.  
Thus these critics may not have been so outraged at everything related to Volkstrauertag but 
perhaps only the most outrageous elements of the extreme outliers.  What is common across the 
criticisms of Volktrauertag and the proposals to modify it is an unspoken agreement that the 
fallen German soldier and his shell-shocked family on the home front were insufficient examples 
for explaining the history of war and death in the context of the Second World War.     
 Behind these prescriptions for a new way to remember the past, the principle of 
interpreting collective memory as an impetus to “social action” offers fruitful insights.  In the 
case of critics of public mourning in the 1960s, if these West Germans were fearful of, among 
other things, the return of Nazism, fascism, authoritarianism, and dictatorship, it is unsurprising 
that the ways in which they articulated their collective memory of the Third Reich period placed 
exceptional emphasis on the history of the fascist regime, the Germans who supported it, and the 
crimes they committed in its name.  In short, the “social action” implied by collective memory 
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and public mourning at any given time is a direct result of which portion of the complex national 
past is seen by the public to bear the most relevance to their contemporary lives.  Thus if war 
seemed the most pressing threat, the lesson might be to not create soldiers; if fascism was the 
threat, the lesson might be to prevent discrimination against minorities and prevent genocide.  In 
this way, different circles of rememberers could observe ostensibly the same collective past but 
draw different “lessons” to “learn.” 
 Thirdly, when it came to the implementation of the national Volkstrauertag ceremony in 
Bonn each year, both traditional and progressive understandings of the German past had the 
potential to influence the program.  This is because, as has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, 
the national Volkstrauertag program was not itself a monolith but instead was open to a degree 
of revision or adjustment from year to year.  Still, the national ceremony seems to also reflect the 
limitations of that very openness, since they VDK never really abandoned discussions of the 
military experience of the Second World War.  Indeed, on some occasions in the late 1960s, the 
military experience, by then the subject of controversy and revision, was the sole topic of the 
ceremony.  Thus devoting attention to the victims of the Holocaust and of war crimes seems to 
have been moments of exception, however regularly scheduled, to the more commonly expected 
military-centric program. 
 Behind this push-and-pull of the national Volkstrauertag ceremony appears a 
fundamental weakness in post-1945 public mourning and collective memory.  While the 
trajectory of Volkstrauertag up to this time had been one of expansion and inclusion of more and 
more victims, the Volksbund seems to have invested less effort into making sense of this 
increasingly complicated history.  While providing many glimpses of the reach of the war and 
the Nazi regime allowed more points from which to access the remembrance of the past, the 
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formula for the Totenehrung (read each year as one of the central elements of continuity – 
another continuity was the singing of the Kameradlied) simply acknowledged the many 
categories of dead victims, without also explaining to audiences how these different groups had 
affected one another in the real history of the war (this was left to the featured keynote speakers 
or dramatic works).  In this way, the VDK’s work to actively include all stories of those touched 
by the war (and not just settle for soldiers) became a means of passively letting the audiences 
figure out what these stories added up to on their own, based on the messages of one year’s 
programming versus another.  
Fourthly, despite this problem with the Bonn ceremony, by the 1960s, Volkstrauertag 
had also become a nation-wide phenomenon that realized a large degree of malleability from one 
local community to the next.  That is, the Bonn ceremony was no longer necessarily an indicator 
of remembrance and mourning in local West German towns and villages.  To be sure, the lock-
step organization and obedience of local VDK chapters had never been assured and, of course, 
the degree to which ordinary West Germans agreed with the VDK’s guidance is still open to 
question.  Whereas during most of the 1950s, the VDK was the only body working continuously 
to shape public mourning and collective memory of the war and the dead, by the 1960s, critical 
voices, some old and others new, worked with a new energy to undo Volkstrauertag or at least 
reimagine how it should take place on a local level.  Most interestingly, by the 1960s, there were 
apparently not only critics who thought Volkstrauertag was too traditional but also critics who 
saw it as too radically untraditional.  Thus local leaders pursued the ability to revise the 
(perhaps, centrist) Bonn message into a more conservative direction or into a more progressive 
one, based on local audiences’ sensibilities.   
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At the same time as West Germans could not uniformly agree on how to talk about their 
Nazi past and how to evaluate the deaths of so many, both at the hands of Nazi violence but also 
those in the service of it, it is striking to note that the 1950s consensus holding that peace was 
more desirable than war was not questioned.   The commitment to “peace” that remained a 
constant element, however, need to be unpacked and interrogated.  As much as “war” or 
“nationalism” had been reconsidered or at least opened to question in other decades, the meaning 
of “peace” seems to have been dependent on the circumstances in which it was invoked as a 
lesson to be learned from memory.  If the war generation understood “peace” as simply the 
absence of war, or the absence of any potential for future wars with Germany’s long-time 
antagonists, then perhaps West Germans needed to learn to reconcile its disputes and embrace its 
neighbors.  Similarly, if the 1960s youth understood “peace” to mean the absence of violence, 
the respect for human rights, and equality for all peoples, then an understanding of the Holocaust 
and an interrogation of life under a dictatorship would both be in order.  It was this notion of 
“peace,” much more so than “war,” that occupied West German attitudes across the 1960s when 
they gathered to publicly mourn all the dead. 
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CHAPTER SIX: “The consciousness of our people has changed” 
 
In early July 1970, a senior civil servant in the Interior Ministry of North Rhine-
Westphalia wrote to his colleagues in the other Land governments, expressing concern over the 
“far-reaching differences of opinion over the form and content” of the locally-organized 
Volkstrauertag ceremonies, citing tension “between military veterans’ unit associations, 
organizations of victims of Nazi persecution and resistance fighters, as well as associations of 
surviving family members of war victims.”615  That these diverse groups remembered the Second 
World War and the dead through unique and at times conflicting ways was not a new 
development, and the potential for one group’s interpretation of the past to offend another 
organization’s sensibilities was, after all, one side-effect of expanding Volkstrauertag to include 
so many and varied categories of war dead, all on apparently equal footing.  Indeed, it was not 
the tension over public mourning that alarmed this official but rather the possibility of that such 
divergent memories under Volkstrauertag’s umbrella would dissolve any nationally-observable 
moment of remembrance.  Indeed, this fracturing had already begun, as “this group stays away 
when the others march around with their flags, and the others do not take part when the 
ceremony does not restrict itself only to remembrance of soldierly sacrifice.”616   
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In 1970, three decades after the height of the Second World War, West German officials 
responsible for organizing official public mourning and collective memory of the dead found 
themselves in a situation awkwardly familiar to the earliest efforts to celebrate Volkstrauertag 
after 1945.  At the same time, this was not the same West Germany in 1970 as it had been in 
1945.  Beyond the political and economic successes of the intervening decades, the bumpy 1960s 
had seen intense conflicts over how to remember and discuss the Nazi period (though this had 
happened earlier, too, during the 1950s), with the nationally-organized Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies from year to year bluntly reminding audiences of the suffering endured both due to 
the war but also due to the Nazi dictatorship.  Yet tempting as it might be to see the history of 
public mourning as a unilateral success, another step in West Germany’s ladder upwards and 
onwards out of the mire of 1945, the irritation revealed in this official’s memorandum hints at 
the seemingly-unresolvable gap between different groups’ memories of the war.  The lingering 
existence of different collective memories, so emotionally charged and steadfastly held in 
opposition to others, could easily be described as West German political- and civil society’s 
long-running duel with the “past that will not go away,” no matter how often it is confronted.617  
 When concluding this dissertation on the history of public mourning in divided Germany 
after 1945, it is worthwhile to examine one final controversial episode over the place of 
Volkstrauertag in the Federal Republic, a fitting bookend that revisited many of the key 
developments discussed in the preceding chapters.  Two central questions will guide this brief 
investigation: Firstly, what do the discussions between governments and the Volksbund at this 
time suggest about the nature of West Germans’ attitudes toward public mourning in the early 
                                                 
617 This phrase refers, of course, to Ernst Nolte’s article in the FAZ in June 1986, igniting the Historikerstreit.  See 
Konrad H. Jarausch, “Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians,” German Studies Review, 
11, 2 (May 1988): 286-287. 
289 
 
1970s?  Secondly, despite the difficulties inherent in programming Volkstrauertag ceremonies 
that resonated with audiences at this time, was there any common element in West Germans’ 
collective memories of the past that all groups could agree was unobjectionable?   
 
Mourning with a “considerably altered character?” 
In April 1969, another movement began to reform practices of public mourning and 
collective memory in West Germany.  However, unlike protests or complaints lodged against 
Volkstrauertag in the past, this newest effort was led by the Interior Ministers of the state 
governments, not the Protestant Churches or lay Germans organizing at the grassroots level.  As 
early as the summer of 1968, the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers of the eleven federal 
states had begun discussing the question of “the standardization of the holiday laws,”618 
endorsing the “recommendation…for a reduction of the number of silent holidays [stillen 
Feiertage]” as one key goal of their project.  Outlining their intentions in more detail, Interior 
minister Weyer suggested that the “first step toward a wide-reaching standardization” of this 
type appeared to be “the suggestion of combining Volkstrauertag with one of the other silent 
holidays in November,” perhaps even resulting in “the combination of more than two silent 
holidays” together.619  While this early report did not clarify which of the other silent holidays in 
November  (Catholic Allerheiligen, Protestant Totensonntag, or even Buß- und Bettag) might be 
identified for consolidation, it was clear to the VDK that Volkstrauertag had already been 
                                                 
618 Following the legal traditions of the Weimar Republic, law codes regulating activities or restricted activities on 
Sunday and holidays were left to each individual federal state to legislate.  Thus while Volkstrauertag always played 
the part of a “national” memorial holiday, it was technically a holiday being observed by all the states at the same 
time, in unison. 
 
619 Willi Weyer, Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to the Vorsitzenden des Landesverbandes 
Nordrhein Westfalen [of the VDK] und stellv. Präsidenten des VDK, Herrn Bankdirektor Hatteisen, April 28, 1969.  
VDK A.100-139. 
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flagged by the state governments for some sort of change.  While they awaited more complete 
details, the VDK’s national leadership mulled over the best tactic to employ in meeting this 
challenge, whether that would be to object outright to any changes being forced on 
Volkstrauertag or instead maybe angling for the holiday’s relocation back into the springtime 
Reminiscere Sunday that had been taken away in 1952.620  The stage seemed set for some sort of 
rematch of that earlier controversy, with the Volksbund aiming high to regain its losses from the 
first round. 
In a larger sense, however, the stakes of this dispute over public mourning in 1969 
appeared much larger than they had been immediately after the war, when the emotional pain of 
these deaths had loomed much more immediately and irreducibly over bereaved family members 
and friends.  Now a generation removed from the events, the task of mourning these losses and 
remembering the war competed for West Germans’ attention with a range of many more 
concerns, worries, pleasures or pursuits.  While the 1952 Termindebatte had revolved heavily 
around political concerns, the least of which included the unseemly appearance of resurrecting 
Nazi-era memorial ceremony practices, the 1969 incarnation involved less straightforward 
worries about history and memory.  This time, the arguments lodged by the Interior Ministers for 
changes to the holiday did not reflect a concern with shaping or restricting speeches and 
ceremonies.  Instead, these efforts sounded much more bureaucratic and uninspiring, articulating 
both a desire to re-write legal regulations on “silent holidays” in the different Länder in such a 
way that West Germans everywhere shared a common calendar of holidays, as well as a hope to 
relax legal restrictions on the types of commercial activity that could take place on such 
                                                 
620 Dr. Füßlein, Beauftragte des Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge to Ministerialrat Dr. Fischler, note for 
records addressed to Fischler, May 5, 1969.  VDK A.100-139. 
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protected holidays.  In 1969, restricting how Germans mourned was not the governments’ 
problem; instead, there appears to have not been enough activity outside of public mourning and 
remembrance.   
In fact, the Ministers’ statement from May 1969 hinted that these rationales for 
consolidation and reform of the November holiday calendar could easily have been interrelated, 
given that they saw no problem lumping Volkstrauertag together with Totensonntag and even 
Allerheiligen, all on the same Sunday, allowing West Germans to more efficiently complete all 
of their annual secular and spiritual mourning exercises on the same day, thus freeing up some of 
the other November weekends for other pursuits.621  That economically-minded ministers could 
seriously suggest streamlining these traditional practices seems quite a world away from the 
context of late 1940s and early 1950s, when the VDK had argued that West Germans were then 
so emotionally wrought with sorrow and grief that they could not be stopped from continuing 
their Third Reich-era practices relating to mourning, out of sheer force of habit, which had 
prompted the federal government after all to intervene.  Now, nearly three decades after 
Germany’s invasion of Poland and the loss of the earliest casualties, the VDK’s Second Vice-
President, Klaus von Lutzau, concluded that it was “industry, mostly the hospitality industry, 
who find unbearable the laws restricting activities and commerce on holiday Sundays over the 
entire month of November.”622  That is, business leaders had complained that they could not 
serve the customers who were queuing up on these once-sacred Sundays, demonstrating that 
perhaps public mourning was becoming less important to West Germans.  Feeling itself once 
                                                 
621 Der Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein Westfalen to the Vorsitzenden des Volksbundes Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge, Landesverband Nordrhein Westfalen, May 14, 1969.  VDK A.100-139.  The point about 
freeing up holidays is my own. 
 
622 Auszug asu der Niederschrift über die offene Sitzung des [VDK] Präsidiums, transcript excerpt for Point 8, 
regarding the relocation of Volkstrauertag, May 20, 1969.  VDK A.100-139. 
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more backed into a corner, the VDK began searching for an answer to the consolidation question 
that would serve all parties favorably, hoping to arrive at an agreement that still preserved the 
special role played by Volkstrauertag as the day of civic mourning.   
Though it is important to point out that no one suggested discontinuing Volkstrauertag 
altogether, the other parties in the dispute (the state governments and the churches) had no 
problems imagining a future without Volkstrauertag as a standalone holiday.  In fact, the 
Protestant Church, which had long harbored suspicions or at least reservations about this 
mourning tradition, was not troubled at the prospect of Totensonntag sharing the same Sunday 
with Volkstrauertag.623  The Catholic Church was similarly enthusiastic about making this 
change, voicing no real Catholic preference on the subject of public mourning on Volkstrauertag 
or Totensonntag.624  Even some voices within the VDK reasoned that, if this consolidation were 
to become reality, the reduced number of mourning holidays might even translate into a boon for 
the Volksbund, because the “abundance” of “memorial days [Totentage] in November,” only 
worked to “detract from the publicity of Volkstrauertag,” meaning that offering the public one, 
not several, holidays set aside for remembrance and mourning could help the Volksbund focus 
the West German people on its message.625  If the public was indeed becoming less and less 
interested in such activities, a polyglot Sunday of several traditions might deliver more audience 
members who were already led to seek out emotional or pastoral comfort.  A more influential 
                                                 
623 Von Lutzau, 2. Bundesgeschäftsführer, Aktenvermerk, notes regarding conversation  between senior VDK 
officers and Bishop Kunst in Bonn, November 13, 1969.  VDK A.100-139.  In fact, the Protestant Church was not 
troubled at the prospect of Totensonntag sharing the same Sunday with Volkstrauertag, with only two of the smaller 
Provincial Churches objecting, three other wholeheartedly agreeing, and the rest ambivalent. 
 
624 Kommissariat der Deutschen Bischöfe to the Präsidenten des Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, Herrn 
Trepte, December 4, 1969.  VDK A.100-139. Presumably, if the motion had been to merge Volkstrauertag with 
Allerheiligen first, the Catholic leadership would have evidenced more interest in the question. 
 
625 Author unclear, “Zu Punkt 8 der Sitzung d. [VDK] Präsidiums am 20.5.1969,” supporting documents from May 
20, 1969 meeting of VDK executive council, regarding the relocation of Volkstrauertag. VDK A.100-139. 
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sentiment among VDK leaders, though, was the fear that any such relocation of Volkstrauertag 
onto another Sunday shared with another holiday “would considerably alter the character of 
Volkstrauertag.”626  To the national VDK leadership, one Sunday marking multiple mourning 
traditions was tantamount to discontinuing Volkstrauertag.   
Indeed, the Volksbund’s obstinate contention that its holiday could not be easily merged 
with another similar but confessionally-specific day of mourning sounded similar to their 
argument in 1952 but, upon closer inspection represented something novel.  Instead of couching 
its position in terms of concern for families’ emotional needs, in 1969 the Volksbund framed 
Volkstrauertag as something of a public or even state interest, marking quite a departure from the 
1952 episode.  Whereas back then the holiday had been presented as an outlet for organized 
grieving, reassuring the surviving next-of-kin that their hardships were not unnoticed, in 1969 
Volkstrauertag was meant as an occasion to lament the human costs of war and call instead for 
peaceful international relations.  Thus losing this moment of reflection in Volkstrauertag would 
have imposed a significant harm on the German people, a point articulated by Volksbund leaders 
who, in 1969, were defending their holiday using arguments not based on a preference for 
military tradition (one of their chief tools in earlier disputes).  This time they claimed instead that 
the VDK “not only held fast onto the heretofore tasks but also had moreover become active for 
peace,” a task that would be made more difficult “if now Volkstrauertag were to be consolidated 
with Totensonntag, since then the conversation would be completely about the dead again,” and 
assume a “gloomy voice,”627 instead of also pushing for some sort of larger message that West 
Germans could apply for their futures.   
                                                 
626 Ibid. 
 
627 Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die offene Sitzung des [VDK] Präsidiums, transcript excerpt for Point 8, 
regarding the relocation of Volkstrauertag, May 20, 1969.  VDK A.100-139. 
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Below all the bluster, it is not clear from these documents whether the West German 
people, or any sizable portion thereof, passionately supported the then-current Volkstrauertag 
tradition and how they might have demonstrated their support.  At the same time, by arguing that 
the unique social value in Volkstrauertag lay not in the occasion to mourn the dead but rather lay 
in the occasion to agitate for peace, the VDK’s actions seem to suggest that they thought that the 
legal rules restricting commerce and public activity were the only problem that the Interior 
Ministers sought to fix, not the holiday’s mere existence and message.  That is, Volkstrauertag’s 
history of providing fodder for nationalism or militarism, as well as its potential for such 
continued uses in certain traditionalist circles in West Germany, were seen by the Volksbund 
leaders as merely an aberration or distraction from the true purpose of their public mourning 
tradition, outcomes that could easily be avoided, even if the holiday were to return to the Sunday 
Reminiscere.628  
 
Misguided mourning or teachable moment? 
In fact, this problematic history behind Volkstrauertag was exactly what alarmed the 
Interior Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1970.  Although this worry was either absent or 
unmentioned in the Standing Conference’s earlier memos on the subject of holiday 
consolidation, suddenly it assumed center stage. Yet this civil servant was not raising suspicions 
about the large, carefully-managed ceremonies in large urban areas but instead pointing a finger 
at those held in provincial towns outside of national oversight.  Writing to his counterparts in the 
                                                 
 
628 Ibid. The discussion documented in this transcript reveals several points at which VDK leaders voice their beliefs 
that Volkstrauertag faced some number of determined antagonists who would willfully misunderstand the holiday as 
“Heldengedenktag” no matter what the VDK did to reform and modernize it. 
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other Länder, this minister surmised that the central VDK had been reasonably successful in 
insuring that the annual Bonn ceremony remembered both soldiers and civilian victims of the 
war, German and non-German, but, “in a country this big there are certainly ceremonies on 
Volkstrauertag, often not organized by the Volksbund but instead by the local military- and 
soldiers’ organizations,” which “overwhelmingly still hold onto the traditional pattern of 
remembrance ceremonies for Heldengedenktag.”629  As a result, the North Rhine-Westphalian 
government had “in recent years striven to promote the inner repositioning of Heldengedenktag 
into a day of unvarnished memory [illusionslosen Gedenkens] of all victims of the war and 
dictatorship.”630  Thus for this official, un-rented hotel rooms and un-sold consumer goods and 
services were not the lamentable outcome of unreformed or overly-traditional mourning 
ceremonies in small towns.  Rather, it was the potential for West Germans to fall prey to notions 
of warfare bringing only heroism and valor. 
Remarkably, the solution apparent to this minister was not the immediate censorship and 
clamping down on recalcitrant veterans and their supporters.  Asking other Interior Ministers to 
share their experiences and offer suggestions as to how much influence the Land government 
ought to exert over these ceremonies, this official rather hoped that the more responsible and 
carefully-managed ones in larger urban areas would serve as an “instructive” examples for the 
local ceremonies to emulate.631  Thus, while the discussions over consolidation had begun with 
                                                 
629 Der Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, to the Innenminister/-senatoren der Länder Baden-
Württemberg, Bayern, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Schleswig-
Holstein, mit Überdrucken für die Staatskanzleien, Nachrichtlich an den Bundesminister des Innern in Bonn / an den 
Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V, copy of letter relating to organizing Volkstrauertag, July  2, 1970.  
VDK A.100-139. 
 
630 Ibid. 
 
631 Ibid. 
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economic and legal reasons, just beneath the surface there had remained cultural fears about 
Germans’ un-reflected patterns of behavior.  That is not to say that economics were a cover to 
mask the state- and federal governments’ ulterior motives.  Indeed, this same memo from 
Düsseldorf reiterated the state’s interest in “initially reducing the number of silent holidays 
enjoying special legal protections” in November and thus relax the “economic disadvantages 
unavoidably bound up” with this situation.632  Yet the economic concerns were new in 1969, 
augmenting more long-standing worries that had been the subject of efforts in the mid-to-late 
1950s to reform the aesthetics of Volkstrauertag.  If censorship or at least leading the locals by 
the Bonn example had met with some success earlier, these officials seem to have believed that 
the remaining outliers could also be won over. 
It is important to note that in all of the correspondence and supporting documents related 
to these events preserved here, allegations of unreconstructed public mourning always appeared 
in the skeptics’ criticism as anecdotes or unsubstantiated claims, unreinforced by specific facts or 
reports from specific locales.633  Still, the ministers in this debate rendered a general picture of 
grassroots mourning practices with which the national VDK disagreed only partially.  At the 
same time as the Volksbund leaders fended off suggestions that the national Volkstrauertag 
ceremony was a problem, something worth being eliminated, they also admitted that there were 
in fact problems attributable to the flexibility model that Volkstrauertag had assumed over the 
1950s and 1960s (see Chapter V) and, simply put, ceremonies in large cities were nearly-
                                                 
632 Der Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to the Vorsitzenden der Ständigen Konferenz der 
Inninminister der Länder, Herrn Minister Schnur, Saarbrücken, copy of letter relating to Volkstrauertag’s relocation, 
August 3, 1970.  VDK A.100-139. 
 
633 Although ample evidence does exist, in the form of press clippings, that local Volkstrauertag ceremonies across 
West Germany presented a range of content and mnemonic emphases, from highly traditional and highly militarized 
to more pacifist (or at least un-militarized) and inclusive.  These documents are also preserved in the VDK archives 
in folder VDK A.100-89. 
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universally evaluated positively and accepted as unobjectionable by the VDK elites and 
government leaders whereas low-level local leaders seemed to present all-too-frequent mistakes 
or infelicitous invocations of the German past.  
Perhaps predictably, state-level VDK leaders brushed aside any suggestion that a tiny 
minority of outliers should dictate policy for the majority of well-meaning and carefully-nuanced 
memorial planners.  “Isolated misguided ceremonies” in small towns, wrote the Bavarian VDK 
leadership, such as those that might be “not modern enough,” or “those organized by veterans’ 
organizations,” simply “do not justify the consideration that the efforts at achieving a memorial 
day of the entire nation for all soldiers and civilian victims of world wars and dictatorships have 
failed.”634  That the bad apples should not ruin the rest of the bushel was also the message 
conveyed when the national VDK leadership in Kassel wrote to the Federal Minister of the 
Interior to plead its case for preserving Volkstrauertag as a stand-alone holiday, even though 
these officials could not guarantee that every memorial ceremony in every West German town 
would devote as much serious attention to “the thought of the admonition to peace in the center 
of the memorial ceremony” as the Bonn ceremony would.635  Indeed, even though Kassel issued 
“minimum standards for the instilling of meaning and formulation” of local ceremonies, it was 
still “not possible to force through a unified formulation of Volkstrauertag overall [of West 
                                                 
634 Der Vorsitzende, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, Landesverband Bayern, to the 
Bundesgeschäftsstelle des Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, copy of letter relating to Volkstrauertag’s 
relocation, July 24, 1970.  VDK A. 100-139.  
      Another example of this attitude can be found in Vorsitzenden des Landesverbandes Rheinland-Pfalz [of the 
VDK] to the Rheinland-Pfalz Ministerium des Innern, copy of letter relating to organizing of Volkstrauertag, August 
3, 1970.  VDK A.100-139. 
 
635 Dr.v.Gudenberg, Leiter der Gruppe Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, to the 
Bundesministerium des Innern, carbon-copy of letter passing along suggestions for Volkstrauertag from youth group 
in Kandel, August 20, 1970.  VDK A.100-139. 
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Germany].”636  A precise assessment of the degree to which Volkstrauertag did in fact vary from 
town to town across West Germany is not available from these materials.637  However, more 
crucial to the present study’s concern is the answer put forth for dealing with the problem, 
however large- or small scale: making Volkstrauertag into a teachable moment in the service of 
furthering peace.  
 In fact, the importance placed on teaching the population the desirability of peace, instead 
of returning to further warfare, served as the Kassel- and regional Volksbund leaderships’ central 
animus in defending against the governments’ suspicion that inconsistent Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies were begging to be reformed or restricted.  By sending out “the yearly publication of 
a printed Volkstrauertag service (prepared by the Volksbund),” “a suitable means is realized for 
supplying the local Volktrauertag ceremonies with adequately worthy contents.”638  At the same 
time, the senior VDK leadership also evidenced an awareness that questioning the morality and 
social value of death required of soldiers was still a sensitive issue.  This sensitivity was made 
more pointed given the need to explain history objectively while remembering emotionally 
attached family members’ contributions to that history.  That is, the Volksbund seem to have 
understood that local ceremony organizers could not simply read out bland or vague statements 
about the dead, their painful absence from the lives of their loved ones, and the necessity of 
                                                 
636 Ibid. 
 
637 That is, even with the preserved press clippings of especially controversial or especially warmly-received 
speeches or ceremonies, the Volksbund Archives undoubtedly contain outliers or exemplary specimens.  It is not 
clear from the finding aids or from the collection itself what criteria were applied in deciding examples to keep or to 
discard.  Therefore we have a limited sampling that may or may not be fairly representative, of a larger but still 
limited sampling of public mourning ceremonies across this time. 
 
638 Leopold Ankenbrand, der Landesvorsitzende, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, Landesverband 
Bayern, to the Bundesgeschäftsstelle des VDKs, July 24, 1970.  VDK A.100-139. 
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peace in the future to prevent similar losses from reoccurring.  Rather, it was necessary to 
explain the circumstances of these deaths, in order to most fully appreciate how peace and 
reconciliation would serve the future. 
 In the context of the entire span of this study, a relatively sudden conviction on the part of 
the Volksbund leadership that discussions (or invitations to such discussions) of individual 
responsibility for wartime activities for- or against the regime were now vital parts of public 
mourning, suggests that times had changed. Indeed, these issues had long been too sensitive a 
topic to broach, making it all the more extraordinary when the VDK national leadership wrote to 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior that, “the consciousness of our people has changed” and 
therefore in 1970 it was much easier to talk about how the „the terrible events of the National 
Socialist dictatorship, all the way to the Mass-gassing in the Concentration Camps, throw 
difficult shadows on the memory of the dead of the last war.”639  Far from advocating a reduced 
emphasis on the Holocaust or on the popular non-resistance to the Nazi regime, the Volksbund 
seems here to have envisioned itself as a mediator between audiences of different generations or 
political persuasions, not wanting to discontinue memorializing and caring for the remains of 
dead German soldiers and civilians but also now believing 
that one can only properly remember the dead of the war and dictatorship, when one 
acknowledges that in addition to the Fallen soldiers, who admittedly gave their lives 
because they served a higher good than their own selves, come the others those who were 
victims in the truest sense of the word [and] who were forced to die even though it was 
not their time to do so and also it served no meaningful purpose.640 
 
                                                 
639 Dr.v.Gudenberg, Leiter der Gruppe Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, to the 
Bundesministerium des Innern, carbon-copy of letter passing along suggestions for Volkstrauertag from youth group 
in Kandel, August 20, 1970.  VDK A.100-139. 
 
640 Ibid. 
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Those members of the West German public who were inclined to support this conclusion were 
those same ones who were unlikely to attend Volkstrauertag ceremonies in their community, so 
thought at least the Volksbund leadership.  Yet to those dedicated supporters of the holiday, who 
were seeking comfort and meaning out of the bereavement they felt, the VDK insisted that 
“when one wanted to understand the past and learn from it,” one must explain the history of how 
these different groups of victims met their deaths and why.641   
 
Mourning “in the spirit of peace and international understanding?” 
 While the Volksbund leadership tried passionately to argue that any differences in 
interpreting Volkstrauertag were minor, amply corrected for via efforts to inform Volkstrauertag 
“below” with sample materials from “above,” and not serious enough to discontinue the holiday, 
a second, separate, controversy arose within the senior Land-level leaderships of the VDK 
chapters and their national leadership over this very question.  Given that the government 
ministers were seriously considering a merger between Volkstrauertag and another “silent 
holiday,” a solution that would find Volkstrauertag stripped of its independent Sunday, the Land-
level chapters’ leaderships were maintaining a mostly-united front in support of their national 
leadership’s insistence on keeping the holiday on its own calendar date, even if that meant 
returning it to the springtime Reminiscere Sunday of old.  It was quite a surprise, then, when this 
bloc solidarity was broken by the Bremen chapter volunteering their support to the Bremen 
Senator for Internal Affairs for the proposal bringing about the merger.   
The Bremen Landesverband of the VDK had been much more critical of the traditional 
Volkstrauertag holiday and worked to re-imagine how to celebrate the holiday in recent years 
                                                 
641 Ibid. 
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(see Chapter V).  Already in April of 1968, Bremen had proposed renaming Volkstrauertag to 
somehow make “more precise emphasis of the day onto the admonishment for peace,” and not 
just peace for Germans but “peace in all the world.”642  Subsequently, the Bremen VDK chapter 
would also eventually break ranks with the other state-level chapters, coming out in support of 
merging Volkstrauertag with another holiday.643  The Bremen chapter’s move understandably 
angered the Kassel leadership, especially since the VDK’s national leaders had planned to assent 
to the merger of Volkstrauertag with another November holiday only as a fallback position, if no 
way remained to keep it independent.644  Bremen had thus shown the VDK’s hand too quickly.   
At the same time, the Kassel leadership faced just the sort of scenario with Bremen that it 
(the Kassel leadership) had assured the government ministers would not jeopardize 
Volkstrauertag as a whole – that one or two local bodies had different goals and ideas about 
public mourning than those presented in the Bonn ceremony.  Thus Bremen proved correct the 
contention that Volkstrauertag could not be the same everywhere while simultaneously 
demonstrating that the dynamic of center-periphery was not only one of ultra-conservative to 
more moderate contrast when it came to the politics of remembering the past.  That is, Bremen 
                                                 
642 Landesverband Bremen, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, „Diskission um eine Umbenennung des 
Volkstrauertages,“ transcribed copy of a report from the Brememn LV meeting of April 19, 1968; this copy was 
completed on September 4, 1968.  VDK A.100-139. 
 The West Berlin LV also makes a similar argument but did not appear to incur as much ire from Kassel as 
Bremen. Der Vorsitzende, Landesverband Berlin, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, to the Präsidenten des 
Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, August 25, 1970.  VDK A.100-139. 
 
643 Landesverband Bremen, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, “Der Vertretertag des Landesverbandes 
Bremen im Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge hat am 11. April 1970 folgende Entschliessung zur Vorlage 
an den Bundesvertretertag des Volksbundes über die Zusammenlegung des Volkstrauertages mit dem Totensonntag 
gefaßt,“ transcribed copy of proposal from LV Bremen over the merger of holidays, to be considered by the 
assembly of local VDK representatives, Septemnber 18, 1970.  VDK A.100-139.  This item was preserved as one of 
several position statements offered in support of Point 10 on the agenda for the VDK’s national assembly of local 
representatives on October 23, 1970.  
 
644 Der Präsident, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, to the Vorsitzenden des Landesverbandes Bremen, 
Herrn Senatspräsident Otto Schlicht, copy of letter from June 9, 1970; this copy was completed on June 29, 1970.  
VDK A.100-139. 
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was here pushing a more self-critical, more potentially offensive public mourning ceremony, to 
which Kassel strenuously objected.  This put Kassel in the awkward position of having insisted 
that certain outliers (those pursuing a more military-centric holiday) could be tolerated (albeit 
while the national VDK worked to convince them to adapt their ceremonies), whereas a second, 
smaller set of exceptions (those pursuing a more aggressively peace-focused holiday) had to be 
silenced for threatening the holiday’s existence.  Working from the logic outlined earlier in its 
dispute with the state government ministers, which held that Volkstrauertag on any Sunday other 
than its own separate Sunday was meaningless, the Kassel VDK leadership felt that Bremen’s 
pro-merger heterodoxy was more of an existential threat to public mourning than an out-of-touch 
veterans’ club in some small town in the countryside.   
 In a development similar to the divergence in national- and regional Volkstrauertag 
ceremonies of the late 1960s, Bremen’s eventual proposal put forward to the entire national 
Vertretertag grounded its suggestions for changes in Volkstrauertag in the desire for peace and 
the hope of preserving the holiday in some form, despite declining public interest in it.  These 
goals were nearly identical to those being pursued by the mainstream VDK leadership, only 
those leaders in Kassel were trying to accomplish this end via the route of holding fast to 
Volkstrauertag’s independence and necessity, rather than allowing for changes up front.  
Bremen, on the other hand, thought the best route forward was merging Volkstrauertag with 
Totensonntag, renaming the resulting holiday as “Totengedenktag” and dedicating this new 
holiday to remembering all the war dead “in the spirit of peace and international 
understanding.”645  In view of the fact that “the Interior Ministers and Senators, as well as the 
                                                 
645 Landesverband Bremen, Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, “Der Vertretertag des Landesverbandes 
Bremen im Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge hat am 11. April 1970 folgende Entschliessung zur Vorlage 
an den Bundesvertretertag des Volksbundes über die Zusammenlegung des Volkstrauertages mit dem Totensonntag 
gefaßt,“ transcribed copy of proposal from LV Bremen over the merger of holidays, to be considered by the 
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Protestant and Catholic Churches had spoken out in favor of a merger of Volkstrauertag and 
Totensonntag,” Bremen concluded, “it is necessary to preserve this memory [of the war dead]” 
through the only remaining means available – “only in the context of a general remembrance of 
the dead.”  While such a prospect had long been antithetical to the national VDK, going all the 
way back to the earliest post-war years, submerging wartime death into the more general 
conception of death was actually a solution in the Bremen leadership’s eyes.  This arrangement 
would mean that “wartime death would occupy a completely unique position” since “it affects 
young and old alike” in its violence and suddenness.  That is, if the youth and Volkstrauertag 
skeptics could not avoid pondering the issue of wartime death as something that could impact 
them in a future conflict, “the confession and admonition to peace” would naturally follow.646  
Once more, this antagonism within the VDK was motivated by choice of tactics, not 
disagreement on the ultimate goal of mourning. 
 
Sorrow from the past or plans for the future? 
  In a larger sense, nearly all parties in this debate seem to have shared a general 
agreement on the final outcome to which Volkstrauertag should lead the West German people.  
That none of the ministers, the VDK leaders, or other observers articulated a desire to mourn the 
war dead in a manner that granted uncritical or unqualified support for war means that at least 
some parts of the Volkstrauertag question could have been solved agreeably.  However, it 
appears no final agreement quickly came.  In January 1971, the North Rhine-Westphalian 
                                                 
assembly of local VDK representatives, Septemnber 18, 1970.  VDK A.100-139.  This item was preserved as one of 
several position statements offered in support of Point 10 on the agenda for the VDK’s national assembly of local 
representatives on October 23, 1970. 
 
646 Ibid.  
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Interior Ministry wrote again to the VDK, this time with a new minister in office who was much 
more supportive of Volkstrauertag and very sympathetic to the VDK.  Though this minister 
agreed on the importance of both a “Memorial Day to remember and to admonish [Gedenk- und 
Mahntag],” he did not think this mission necessarily warranted the holiday its own special 
calendar date, since there existed still the problem of having too many “stillen Feiertage” in 
November.  Over three years into this project of consolidating holidays, the only new proposed 
solution, beyond the simple merger of holidays or removal of holidays into other parts of the 
calendar year, was the VDK President’s suggestion for the “transformation of Volkstrauertag 
into a more-focused-on-the-future and less-filled-with-sorrow Day to Call for Peace 
[Friedensmahntag], without the character of a silent holiday.”647  Despite the appearance of this 
solution that might appease all parties, there was still no decision from Interior Ministers’ 
conference in January 1971. 
The impasse over reforming or maintaining public mourning practices seems to have 
centered on West Germany’s particular constitutional design.  Under the Federal Republic, 
despite the existence of a Federal Interior Minister, holidays were designated as affairs managed 
by the individual Land governments and their own respective Interior Ministries.  For this 
reason, noted the VDK’s Parliamentary observer and liaison representative, the Federal Minister 
would not dictate a common policy decision to his Land-level counterparts, since the Federal 
office was only responsible, indeed “only allowed” to design “regulation of a remembrance of 
the war dead at the federal level,” without the ability to enforce such rulings at any other level of 
governance.648  It was therefore highly ironic that the 1949 constitution, designed in part to 
                                                 
647 Der Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to the Präsident des Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge, Herrn Verwaltungspräsident Prof.Dr. Theile, January 6, 1971.  VDK A.100-139. 
 
648 Ibid. 
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restrict the powers of the federal government to force actions and policy on the state 
governments as a measure to limit the potential for another dictatorship, served to restrict the 
ability of well-meaning government and civil-society leaders to push West Germans into a 
somewhat more self-critical and complete collective memory of the dictatorship of which the law 
was afraid.  Moreover, the earlier 1952 decision to initially force the Volksbund and its local 
members to abandon Heldengedenktag-type ceremonies reminiscent of the Nazi past was, in the 
eyes this flustered VDK officer in 1972, a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.  At 
that time, noted the author dryly, “Dr. Lehr [the Federal Minister of the Interior in 1952] had at 
that time pressured the Volksbund against its will” to accept the new November date, in order to 
appease the political pressures of the moment. 
In the face of the apparent inability or unwillingness of the Federal government to force 
through a new regulation on the holidays, the eleven Land-level governments’ potential for 
arriving at a common agreement withered further away.  As of March 1971, only eight Länder 
had offered position statements on how to proceed with their joint holiday regulation but none of 
these eight were in favor of keeping the current arrangement, with Volkstrauertag on its own 
Sunday.  Beyond their collective dissatisfaction with the present mourning holiday arrangement, 
only one Land (West Berlin) actually favored merging Volkstrauertag with Totensonntag, 
leaving the rest simply expressing some preference for some sort of undefined consolidation of 
holidays.  Three Länder (Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg) in fact had not yet even submitted a 
position statement, still apparently exploring other options for how this matter could be 
resolved.649  Thus political and bureaucratic inertia (or idling down of inertia) seemed to be the 
                                                 
649 Der Beauftragte des Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge am Sitz der Bundesregierung, 
„Vertraulich/Aktenvermerk,“ confindential notes relating to conversations between VDK representatives and 
Interior Ministry representatives over holiday laws, March 12, 1971.  VDK A.100-139. 
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reason why an admittedly problematic practice of Volkstrauertag was to be allowed to remain, 
without strenuous efforts to regulate when, but also how, West Germans mourned their dead.  
Instead of collectively re-defining public mourning (again), the individual Land governments 
were left to proceed on their own, without a unified position on dates and regulations and 
restrictions to be legislated.650  
 
An incomplete resolution? 
The long-term outcome of this impasse in 1971 was the continuation of Volkstrauertag 
on the second-to-last Sunday of the Church Year calendar, surrounded by the other still-
independently-standing mourning holidays.  Still, this brief history of still-lingering conflict 
without clear and complete resolution is still valuable to the historian for the insight it offers.  If 
we return to the questions posed at the beginning of this section, a couple of firm conclusions 
appear that help more clearly characterize the state of West German public mourning in the early 
1970s.   
Firstly, on the question of West Germans’ attitudes towards the relative importance of 
public mourning practices, it appears that opinions were split.  Although the sources presented 
here do not include precise measures in the form of polling data, in the eyes of the VDK and 
some state governments, the public’s support for or interest in Volkstrauertag was dwindling.  
This hunch is all the more telling in that the VDK had an interest in keeping the public 
enthusiastic toward the holiday in order to leverage public sentiment into favorable political and 
                                                 
650 For example, Hesse adapted its holiday laws in May 1971, explaining that “it is at this moment not clear, when 
these far-reaching efforts [to negotiate new rules for the “silent holidays”] will be able to be successfully 
concluded.”  Hesse’s solution was to keep Volkstrauertag on the second-to-last-Sunday of the Church Year but to 
reduce the number of hours during which certain commercial or public activities could be held, so as to interfere 
slightly less with economic or other social pursuits unrelated to Volkstrauertag.  Hessischer Langtag.  7. 
Wahlperiode. Drucksache 7/463. [Dated 26.05.71]  Vorlage der Landesregierung betreffend den Entwurf für ein 
Viertes Gesetz über die Sonn- und Feiertage.      
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legislative treatment, thus one would not expect them to admit defeat very easily.  This was, after 
all, why the holiday law changes appeared so threatening to the Volksbund leadership: because 
Volkstrauertag already enjoyed only a tenuous grip on the public’s attention and anything to 
diminish the holiday’s profile relative to other similar holidays would only erode 
Volkstrauertag’s position.  This reality of a public generally less interested in mourning and 
remembrance may, in fact, help explain why the VDK made a greater effort to use 
Volkstrauertag as an opportunity to talk about peace, since this was a goal (perhaps unlike the 
goal of remembering the dead) that all West Germans in 1972 could agree was important.   
At the same time, we cannot fairly say that everyone (or even practically everyone) in 
West Germany believed that remembering soldiers’ deaths and grieving for their suffering was 
unimportant.  This is because there was still in 1972 clearly some (albeit apparently smaller) 
portion of the population who still sought out Volkstrauertag ceremonies, whether national or 
local, and who voiced a clear engagement with the on-going efforts to preserve the memory of 
the war.  In fact, these circles of West Germans who needed no coaxing or persuading to support 
Volkstrauertag appear to have themselves continued to see the holiday in terms of its older 
traditional mission of remembering primarily or even exclusively fallen soldiers.  Such an 
inclination probably made these traditionalists appear even more out-of-date or questionable to 
the rest of the public, for whom the holiday held little meaning and to whom these dedicated 
supporters of tradition appeared as die-hard conservatives.  Thus, instead of merely navigating 
between one side who wanted a holiday and the other side who did not want it, the VDK found 
itself floating between two preferred positions on the extremes that were potentially laden with 
political and emotional freight.  Locating a middle ground between those still-mourning families 
and the forward-looking descendant generations required the Volksbund to identify a way to 
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reach out to the interests of each side without offending the organized sensibilities of the other 
one.  In this way, the history of public mourning in West Germany mirrors and in fact pre-dates 
much of the lingering social tension over history and memory of the Third Reich seen in more 
recent decades.651  
Secondly, to the question of whether West Germans could articulate any common 
element of collective memory or public mourning across the gap that divided their views on the 
victims, it is readily clear that all sides did agree on the need for peace in the future.  That is, no 
matter how exactly different parties understood the war and represented it in their collective 
memory, any future return to violent conflict was unthinkable.  Given the massive scale of 
suffering and death, mourning for those lost, whether in combat, on the home front, or those 
whose deaths resulted from Nazi racial policy, those grieving seemed to understand that a 
resolution to preserve peace for the future would best protect against a repeat of such tragic 
events.  
 In fact, the usefulness of Volkstrauertag as an occasion for teaching the public the value 
of peace was recognized by both the Volksbund and by state government leaders, who called for 
this sort of “social action” in cases where they perceived local communities to have been 
mourning on Volkstrauertag in a way that insufficiently appreciated the seriousness and 
undesirability of war.  In the case of the state interior ministers, certain communities whose local 
Volkstrauertag variations were deemed too conservative for even center-right politicians spurred 
the project to reform and moderate Volkstrauertag as a national phenomenon, reducing the 
profile of the holiday in order to diminish the potential for any spilling over of the nationalism of 
earlier eras into the present.  At the same time, the VDK recognized the suitability of 
                                                 
651 For example, the “Bitburg Incident” in 1984, the Historikerstreit  in 1986, the re-dedication of the Neue Wache 
memorial in 1993, as well as the  Wehrmachtausstellung in 1996. 
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Volkstrauertag as a teachable moment for resisting such ultraconservative visions of Germany’s 
military past, arguing that the need to lead by responsible examples in how to mourn and 
remember made it more crucial to keep Volkstrauertag as its own stand-alone holiday.  In both 
cases, the action implied by mourning could only be peace.  Even in the national VDK 
leadership’s dispute with the provincial leadership in Bremen, both sides agreed on teaching the 
lesson of peace, only meeting friction on the question of calendar dates.  
 
 This friction between mourning the dead German victims and mourning the dead victims 
of German violence seems to have held steady across the decades following the end of the 1971 
controversy.  West Germany and then Re-Unified Germany continued to mark Volkstrauertag 
each year, largely following the standard formula of memorial speeches by political and cultural 
dignitaries as well as inclusion of classical or other high-brow musical selections, and capped off 
with the (sometimes updated) Totenehrung recitation.  In recent years, two processes have 
worked in opposite ways to reinforce the tension between those audiences anticipating a 
military-centric program and those hoping for a non-military ceremony: first, the generation of 
veterans and other survivors of the war is dying off, removing the most natural and emotionally-
invested demographic who would be likely to prefer a memorial focus on military deaths.  
Second, the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad to Afghanistan in support of anti-terrorism 
and peace-keeping missions has given rise to combat casualties, who are then available for 
inclusion in the annual Volkstrauertag ceremony, opening the door to new generations of 
soldiers’ families to expect a public mourning ritual informed by the discourses of sacrifice and 
bravery.652 
                                                 
652 Indeed, Alexandra Kaiser sees this as a problem, because remembering the Second World War dead had taken a 
long time to achieve a point where military deaths were not heroized but understood as tragically meaningless, 
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 A casual visit to Berlin on Volkstrauertag 2009 revealed a different sort of tension within 
the German population.  Rather than arguments on the streets or demonstrations for or against 
the holiday, Germans seemed split roughly along generational line in the degree to which they 
noticed or sought meaning in the holiday.  Across Unter den Linden from the Neue Wache 
memorial, Germans stood crowded on the sidewalk behind temporary barricades, wondering 
aloud why traffic was being diverted and why the police were heavily deployed.  The response 
from the (relatively few) elderly pedestrians was to explain impatiently that it was 
Volkstrauertag, the day to remember the “war dead.”  In response, the middle-aged adults and 
their children strained not for a glimpse at the monument and the soldiers but rather for 
Chancellor Merkel’s limousine, as she was to arrive to help lay a wreath.  The presence of 
soldiers (or really any visual acknowledgement to the Second World War Dead) was muted at 
best; only the Neue Wache wreaths and the flags at half-staff marked the day in Berlin as in any 
way different from another (aside from the traffic delays).   
 Inside the Reichstag, the Volkstrauertag ceremony was also a collection of cultural 
artifacts and fragments of different memories, lined up together to speak to different slices of the 
audience at the same time.  The familiar classical art music, speeches by political leaders, and 
inclusion of the Kameradlied (played by solo trumpet, not sung in unison) and the 
Deutschlandlied all bespoke continuities with the immediate post-war period and before.  The 
Totenehrung spoken by Federal President Kohler did invoke the older agreed-upon categories of 
German soldiers, civilian victims, and victims of the Nazi regime but also included people who 
                                                 
making it less likely for public mourning ceremonies to be taken to excess.  Whereas now, with the Bundeswehr 
dead being brought in to Volkstrauertag, the death of the soldiers is once more becoming a phenomenon regarded 
positively by German society, meaning that this attitude could bleed over into contemporary remembrances of the 
Second World War military dead, too.  At the same time, Kaiser leaves largely unexplored the issue of German 
attitudes toward peace, which do not necessarily align with the outward continuities apparent in Volkstrauertag over 
the post-war decades. Von Helden und Opfern, 408-409. 
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fought for human rights, victims of terrorism and also the Bundeswehr soldiers fighting in 
Afghanistan.  Moreover, the common thread identified in all of these victims’ experiences was 
their demonstration of the necessity of peace.  That is, even as different audiences were still, to 
some extent, hoping for different messages of mourning, at no time did the comfort extended to 
one group or another include praise for war or acclaim for the benefits of violence.  Instead, 
Germans, Europeans, the world as a whole, was urged to learn the lesson of protecting peace in 
order to protect lives and avoid the tragedy of having to mourn for so many dead again. 
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CONCLUSION  
Memory with “no clear answers:” German history, collective memory 
 and mourning the dead 
 
This dissertation set out to find out how Germans talked about and remembered their 
dead soldiers from the Second World War, in a context where those soldiers’ military service and 
deaths had served not a victory or even noble war aims but instead a fascist, racist dictatorship 
whose war effort failed.  Besides an incredibly high number of dead soldiers, the war had also 
delivered huge numbers of dead civilians, some of whom had been targeted by these very 
soldiers or other officers of the German state for destruction, others of whom were unlucky 
enough to have been incidentally caught up in the fighting.  It is common for modern nation 
states go to great lengths to officially mourn their dead soldiers in an effort to validate their 
deaths and service to the nation as positive contributions, something to which future generations 
should also aspire.  In recent decades, western states have also begun extending the apparatus of 
state-led or state-endorsed mourning to civilian victims of natural disasters or other man-made 
tragedies outside of military service.  For Germans after 1945, the possibilities for embracing 
their soldiers as exemplary servants to the state were restricted by the reality of the Nazi regime’s 
conduct and goals.  At the same time, Germans were still left with both military and civilian dead 
to bury, mourn, and remember while also rebuilding their society after their defeat. 
By examining public mourning ceremonies for the wartime dead, this study has also 
searched for moments when Germans talked about and interpreted their own (or their families’ 
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own) actions and experiences on one hand and how those life stories drove post-war Germans’ 
choices and actions in the present-day.  In doing so, this dissertation hoped to make a connection 
between the historical literature discussing Germans’ failed efforts at remembering the Nazi past 
on one hand and the attention given by scholars to documenting and exploring Germans’ 
peaceful recovery and rehabilitation among the states of Western Europe on the other, in an 
attempt to find out how the incomplete efforts to overcome the Nazi past in some areas paired 
with the successful efforts to learn from past mistakes in others.  After all, if Germans neglected 
a probing discussion of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, they at least did not repeat these 
episodes again.  Even in the case of Germany’s “second dictatorship” in the GDR, this came to 
power fundamentally differently and pursued completely separate goals, if no less brutally in 
certain cases than the Nazi regime.  Again, the end result seems clear from the outside: Germans 
somehow learned to avoid going to war again while they also learned to respect human rights 
and democracy.  This dissertation has contended that public mourning ceremonies offer a 
glimpse into how these cultural changes took place and why, illustrating how slow, uneven, and 
at time contradictory the process was.  
This dissertation has also aimed to contribute to the historiography detailing German 
efforts to rebuild or adapt their military institutions across the latter twentieth century.  By 
tracking public mourning ceremonies specifically created to mourn dead soldiers, and then 
examining how these boundaries were expanded or contracted over time, this study hoped to 
connect the history of Germans’ discussion of military institutions and soldiers’ deaths in the 
past to the prospect of returning to them in the present.  By comparing how Germans perceived 
the experience of war and the lessons to be learned from their own military history, it is possible 
to see Germans taking “social actions” to reform their society’s attitude towards war, in ways 
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that may not be visible to studies focusing solely on the roster of victims mourned or the attitude 
toward the Nazi past prescribed by these ceremonies to their audiences.  Indeed, the changes in 
Germans’ attitudes toward war seem to have transpired earlier than those associated with 
confessing and learning from the Nazi past. 
 Before surveying the major findings, it is worth re-stating the central questions posed at 
the beginning of this dissertation.  Firstly, how did official German public mourning ceremonies 
define or categorize the war dead after 1945 and whom did these ceremonies instruct audiences 
to mourn and remember?  Secondly, to what degree did the categories of dead victims being 
invoked at official mourning ceremonies change over time and how?  Thirdly, why did official 
mourning ceremonies revise their understandings of these different group of dead over time and 
to what degree did the reasons for such revisions change or remain the same?  Fourthly, what do 
these changes in official practices of memory and public mourning imply about German culture 
in the decades that followed the Second World War?  Unsurprisingly, the answers to these 
closely-related questions are in many ways overlapping and mutually reinforcing. 
 
Many faces of war 
For Germans recollecting and trying to understand the Second World War, no single 
category or understanding of “war dead” or “victims” seemed able to encompass the whole story.  
For every conversation about aerial combat, U-boot patrols, airborne jumps or digging foxholes, 
other survivors could talk about aerial bombing of civilian homes and armaments factories, stray 
bullets or tank rounds from encroaching Russian or Allied ground forces, eviction and expulsion 
from civilian homes, and of course the relatives who shipped off to war and never returned.  
Moreover, critically-minded German survivors as well as members of non-German survivor 
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communities could point out the violent toll that Germans arms wreaked on their enemies.  Last 
but not least, the racial, ethnic, and other social minority groups targeted by the Nazi regime had 
few representatives left in 1945 to remember their deaths but their absence from the post-1945 
period were just as undeniable.  After 1945, remembering the dead meant acknowledging the 
many faces of the war. 
 
Yet this reality was not acknowledged everywhere at once.  In West Germany after 1945, 
soldiers’ deaths from both world wars were still considered extremely important and the 
necessity of publicly mourning them was almost taken for granted.  To be sure, the late 1940s 
and early 1950s saw controversies over the structure and content of public mourning ceremonies 
but the major dispute was the question of whether to settle with only soldiers’ deaths or also 
recognize (German) civilians’ deaths as demanding of the state’s expressions of grief and 
remorse, too.  This change reflects in part the even larger scale of death and violence, with 
military deaths approaching 4.5 Million and civilian deaths 0.5 Million.  This altered emphasis in 
mourning also suggests that, for Germans, “war” was no longer considered a domain only for 
fighters but also for victims who were not part of the fighting.   
Of course, West Germans’ conceptualization of war as something larger than a battlefield 
only slowly grew to also recognize the racial policies of the Nazi regime, which themselves were 
deeply enmeshed in the war plans themselves.  While the majority of literature on Germans’ 
memory of the Third Reich and the Holocaust have rightly criticized this reluctance to 
acknowledge Holocaust- and other victims of German crimes on a level equal to German 
civilians or soldiers, the reasons given for why was so usually relate to guilt or an unwillingness 
to confront guilt, coupled with the immediacy of Germans’ own sufferings and the absence of 
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surviving racial victims to relate their stories.653  That is, Germans talked most often about what 
they themselves experienced and remembered, foregrounding their militarized society and the 
totality of its collapse in their collective memory.  If Germans were more likely to have 
personally encountered the war via their family members’ military service or their own civilian 
experience with violence, the prioritizing of soldiers’ deaths makes the most sense.  Moreover, 
when considering that these initial phases of negotiating a collective memory of the war took 
place under the threat of the Cold War’s nuclear arms and also within longer history of German 
public mourning for the wartime dead, the discussions around soldiers and their priority take on a 
more nuanced meaning.  
The conflict over memory in West Germany during the 1940s and 1950s centered around 
the question of mourning solely military dead versus also mourning non-military dead victims 
too.  Thus, while it is true that West Germans were largely content to avoid a painful or difficult 
conversation over victims of the Nazis or even victims of the regular armed forces, the fact that 
these same West Germans were navigating questions of legal designations for war graves and 
appropriations of funding for these graves reveals more than the value they placed on their own 
dead (instead of the dead with whom they did not identify).654  Simultaneously, West Germans’ 
conversations about how to remember the German victims of war outline newer ways of 
                                                 
653 For instance, see Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Berkeley, 2001) on West Germans’ concern with their own victimization; Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: 
The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge,MA, 1997) on the “multiple restorations” of East and West German 
elites memories of the Second World War through their own (narrow) experiences; Jeffrey K. Olick, In the House of 
the Hangman: The Agonies of German Defeat, 1943-1949 (Chicago, 2005) and Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals 
and the Nazi Past (New York, 2007) on Germans’ shame or guilt as influence on memory; See also Svenya 
Goltermann, “The Imagination of Disaster:  Death and Survival in Postwar West Germany” in Alon Confino, Paul 
Betts, and Dirk Schumann, eds, Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in Twentieth 
Century Germany (New York, 2008) on the inability to discuss trauma. 
  
654 This categorical preference for Germans over German victims is part of Gilad Margalit’s argument in Guilt, 
Suffering, and Memory.  Germany Remembers its Dead of World War II, Trans. Haim Watzman (Bloomington, 
2010). 
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recognizing the impact and human costs of war.  Certainly, some West Germans already 
skeptical of Volkstrauertag saw a drive to add more types of (German, war-) victims to public 
mourning efforts as a departure from the older, more traditionally established groups of victims 
deserving public mourning.655  At the same time, supporters of a more traditionally envisioned 
Volkstrauertag saw themselves as correcting a misallocation of emphasis and resources and not 
as self-conscious Nazis.656 At the same time, those critics who opposed a traditional 
Volkstrauertag often saw efforts to maintain these old habits and customs as automatically 
evidence of lingering Nazi sympathies.  Ultimately, though, the overall West German trend 
became increasing, not decreasing, the number of groups of dead victims to include. 
 
East Germany presents a different context in which to look for and interpret public 
mourning.  Amid a different set of rules than West Germany, here all German soldiers’ deaths 
were interpreted negatively, as efforts only to maintain the Nazi dictatorship in power.  The only 
combat deaths evaluated positively (at first) were those soldiers from the Red Army and also the 
antifascist fighters.  Thus similarly to the Nazis’ practices themselves, the GDR too, worked to 
shape memory and mourning practices in ways that bolstered the Party’s memory, instead of 
population’s memories.  Still there was a slow movement over time to lessen the stigma attached 
to German veterans and those who died in the Wehrmacht.657  Besides reducing the chances that 
                                                 
655 Axel Kapust makes an argument along these lines for the Protestant Church’s role in revising Volkstrauertag 
after 1945 in Der Beitrag der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland zum Volkstrauertag (Frankfurt am Main, 2004), 
143-144. 
656 Alexandra Kaiser is highly critical of West Germans who maintained older Nazi-era symbols and rituals in 
Volkstrauertag, even as they updated the rhetoric.  For her this history amounted to one of continuity in the respect 
for soldiers over all others. See Alexandra Kaiser, Von Helden und Opfern. Eine Geschichte des Volkstrauertages 
(Frankfurt/New York, 2010), 407-408 
 
657 Margalit also notes this phenomenon, See Margalit, Guilt, Suffering and Memory, 89-93. 
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these veterans or their survivors would object to the regime’s official mourning, these moves to 
situate the Wehrmacht into the official East German history of the war also relates to finding an 
East German military history to which the NVA could connect. Still, despite the official 
censorship and boundaries on public discourse, the Abteilung Gräberfürsorge also marked a 
different memory of different deaths in cemeteries, outside of the Party, returning to the (older) 
tradition of remembering German soldiers first and foremost.  Although their mission was to 
comfort and support the families of soldiers, it is not clear how much emphasis landed on non-
soldiers’ deaths.  All in all, though, the official efforts directed at remembering soldiers (Russian, 
plus Germans) plus party fighters resulted in a formula for public mourning in East Germany that 
enveloped slightly more types of survivors and deceased than the projects during the Weimar 
Republic, though not really reflecting the sort of reconsideration of war that West Germans saw. 
 
Both Germanys showed a dynamic of defining increasingly broader categories of dead 
victims as “war victims” or “war dead.”  Reluctant to confront the complete history of the Nazi 
period and the complete range of dead victims it left behind, each Germany nonetheless 
recognized a growing understanding of war and its reach beyond the combat zone.658  Whether 
framed as the suffering of German victims or antifascist fighters, each society jettisoned any 
strict reliance only on those who faced combat to define the boundaries of public mourning.  
Whereas most of the historiography on this point has framed this finding through the lens of 
asking after the absence of a Holocaust memory, this dissertation argues very strongly that 
                                                 
658 This is similar but not the same as the points Moeller and Biess make about masculinity becoming less identified 
with soldiers, as men become less identified as typifying this role.  That is, the assumption that there will always be 
wars and men will always need to fight them seems to slowly fall away, just as the notion of the home front as 
something distinct and isolated from the battle front also falls away.  See Moeller, War Stories, 121 and Frank Biess, 
Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton, 2006), 89-91. 
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Germans’ attention to understanding war as an event involving both soldiers and civilians is new 
and noteworthy, since earlier attempts to make a similar redefinition via public mourning after 
1918 did not achieve the permanent consensus on this point that was achieved after 1945.  
 
A remembered past shaped by the present 
It has become evident through this study that the relationship between an individual’s 
memory and even select groups’ collective memories on one hand and the collective memory 
endorsed by the larger society on the other is complex to say the least.  From the start, this 
dissertation has understood the ability of the individual to choose what elements of their own 
experience to remember and what to forget, initiating a process that, when magnified to the level 
of families and communities, allows for whole societies ultimately build a shared version of the 
past, based on the elements that are common enough to all, or nearly all, the participants.659  Yet 
some of the evidence relating to West Germans’ collective memory and public mourning 
practices presented above strongly suggests that collective memory formation need not always be 
a process of stories bubbling up from below.  Rather, the interaction between West Germans’ 
post-war contemporary concerns and the shifting emphases of their collective memories of the 
Third Reich and the war suggest another model for understanding collective memory formation, 
whereby larger external forces and contextual factors can also shape the selection and refining of 
memory from the top down.  That is, events after the fact can effectively shade certain elements 
of people’s past experiences as seeming most relevant to the concerns of the present-day, the 
                                                 
659 On the building up of memory from below and the contestation over what elements to keep and what to discard, 
see Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Identities (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 317-341; Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial 
Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 11, 7, 8, 11. 
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standpoint from which memory is being conjured.660  In the case of West Germans, the crisis of 
the Cold War and fear of renewed violence enhanced the degree to which memories of the 
Second World War seemed important to the present-day, as warnings of how terrible war would 
be if Germans allowed it to return.  The numerous examples offered above suggest that memory 
is not only a function of the experience of living through the past actions being recalled but also 
a result of the present moment, when the recollection happens. 
This somewhat revised understanding of collective memory formation across different 
social “levels” helps explain the changes in West Germans’ assumptions about public mourning 
exercises during the Occupation and even the early years of semi-sovereignty, when the 
Volkstrauertag holiday was pushed away from its Heldengedenktag iteration and even the older 
nationalist traditions of mourning.  During these early years, while under the close scrutiny of the 
Allies, the importance of rebuilding post-war Germans society to look and act differently from 
its Nazi predecessor shaped the ways more self-critical or politically-aware West Germans 
reacted to suggestions that Volkstrauertag resume right where it left off during the war years.  
Indeed, this imperative to depart from Nazi tradition helped explain the shift to include civilian 
victims of the war alongside military dead, an understanding of warfare which the Nazis had not 
recognized.  Despite the importance of offering comfort to surviving families, German church 
and political leaders understood the necessity of marking a “clean break” away from Nazi-tainted 
traditions, which is also why they were skeptical to allow the singing of the Kameradlied and the 
observance of Volkstrauertag on the springtime Reminiscere Sunday.  This need to appear 
                                                 
660 This is similar to the filtering of later versions of memory through earlier efforts to remember (or to forget), along 
the line of what Olick and Moses each present.  Alaric Searle and David Clay Large make similar points about 
popular attitudes towards the military in West Germany being filtered through the presence of former Wehrmacht 
generals or the threat of war in Europe at this time. See Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, 
and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 (West Port, CT, 2003) and David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: 
West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, 1996). 
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unconnected to morally-compromised and politically-untenable Nazi practices drove the 
reformist voices in the late 1940s and early 1950s to dispense with Nazi-era practices in favor of 
something that looked and acted quite different. 
By the mid-1950s, the Cold War and the alarming threat of nuclear weapons being 
deployed on German territory but without German direction exercised a much more far-reaching 
influence on German public mourning.  Just as the history of the Second World War and its 
effects on larger civilian populations had led West Germans to question the distinction between 
mourning military dead versus civilian victims of the war, the added threat of nuclear war’s far 
deadlier effects reinforced the tendency for Germans to collectively remember all elements of 
warfare negatively.  That is, even for those who had not experienced the war directly or who had 
been small children at the time, all aesthetic representations of warfare at the annual 
Volkstrauertag ceremonies depicted it in a negative light, coloring the remembrance of the 
Second World War and perhaps even all wars as hopelessly tragic and meaningless endeavors.  
Simultaneously, the history of the Third Reich seemed to have little relevance to the everyday 
choices of West Germans in the 1950s, allowing the memory of the Nazis to wilt into neglect, or 
at least grow dim in comparison to the importance attached to the war.  It was the necessity of 
peace and avoiding war became the most pressing contemporary policy goals to survivors and 
contemporary populations remembering the Second World War. 
In some ways, then, the question of why West Germans did not initially dwell on the 
memory of the Holocaust instead of their own casualties might be projecting outside perspectives 
onto a context where such concerns had no place.  That is, in the immediate aftermath of the war, 
there were tragically too few survivors of the Holocaust still in West Germany to share their 
stories of persecution.  Thus, this perspective was absent (because the Germans had removed the 
322 
 
people from Germany) leaving practically only memories of German experiences of the war to 
circulate within West German borders.  By the 1960s, the older generations who had survived 
the war or were born immediately after the war had grown accustomed to the contours of public 
mourning and collective memory framing a contemporary anxiety about war, and not the 
dictatorship.  Yet this exclusive attention to the history of the war, driven in part by the 
demographics of the survivors but also the post-war political context, allowed the younger West 
Germans in the 1960s to see this as a deliberate silence, which corresponded with their own (the 
youth’s) alarm over the prospect of a West Germany being run by unreconstructed fascists and 
authoritarians, many of whom had been Nazis and who had not been held accountable for their 
actions.  Thus if the ‘68ers were already worried about a return to fascism and authoritarianism 
in West Germany, this contemporary external pressure (fear of fascism) shaped their more 
critical memorial concerns and activities of the late 1960s and into the 1970s.  Of course, these 
critical youth also desired no resumption of war, so they did not object to the discourse and 
“social action” supporting peace, since they valued peace, too.  Yet it is ironic that the supporters 
of a more traditional, military-focused Volkstrauertag tradition and those preferring a new, 
radical, Holocaust-centric mourning tradition, each looked for largely the same outcome but saw 
each other as enormous antagonists blocking this important work.661 
 
                                                 
661 This confluence of interests in support of peace on all sides is what is largely missed by asking the question of 
where is the Holocaust.  Examples here are Gilad Margalit’s Guilt, Suffering and Memory, and Alexandra Kaiser’s 
Von Helden und Opfern.  It is also not really explained or interpreted by VDK literature which simple takes the goal 
of peace as self-evident, without explaining the conflict over how to achieve a peaceful society or the direction 
mourning needed to take in order to best guarantee the existence of peace.  See Thomas Peter Petersen,  Der 
Volkstrauertag: Seine Geschichte und Entwicklung (Bad Kleinen, 1998). 
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In the case of public mourning within the German Democratic Republic, it is less 
appropriate to discuss choices people made and agency that actors had to make choices, since the 
regime possessed outright censorship power.  Of course, individual East Germans and even some 
underground organizations within the GDR did ignore or work around the SED’s propaganda 
and restrictions.  Still, even if just considering the officially-approved rhetoric and messaging of 
the SED, the ability of external contextual factors to influence collective memory seems to be in 
play.  Of course, the East German leaders most straightforwardly articulated an official memory 
of the war and the Nazi regime that drew attention to the sufferings of Communists (and few 
others), wishing to emphasize their own (in their eyes) uniquely-qualified and morally-righteous 
position as leaders of the GDR.  Still, the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, which found East 
Germany divided from its western half (and also what was once really Eastern Germany no 
longer even German but now Polish), as well as the permanent occupation and supervision by 
Red Army detachments, worked as another example of external contemporary pressures to shape 
changes or modifications to the SED’s official memory.  In this case, the Party needed to 
somehow make the separation and control of their people by the Soviets, for whom the Germans 
had no warm feelings, appear justified as a logical lesson to be learned from remembrance.  
Similarly, the routine inclusion of Red Army dead soldiers, as well as anti-fascist resistance 
fighters, into official public mourning efforts left the absence of German soldiers from these 
traditions even more glaring when the final wave of released POWs returned home.  Moreover, 
when the East German regime began working to ramp up the NVA, a highly noticeable 
ideological adjustment was the state’s sudden warmth to the embrace of a far-distant East 
German, anti-fascist, military tradition, in order to rest its own contemporary credibility on this 
older history of German forerunners waging war.  Interestingly, the underground Abteilung 
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Gräberfürsorge was also responding to the absence of the Wehrmacht soldier from East German 
public mourning, well before the SED adjusted its commemorative posture.  Yet the Abteilung 
worked to mark graves and mourn the dead without (as best we can tell) encouraging more youth 
to proudly prepare for war.  Rather, this underground Protestant organization espoused, as much 
as can be determined, a commitment to stopping future wars and preserving peace, largely to be 
accomplished via reflection and mourning at the expansive gravesites. 
 
So to return to the question of how did these changes in categories of victims being 
remembered occur over time in each Germany, the circumstances on each side of the division 
make it difficult to draw conclusions that apply to each setting cleanly.  In each case, there 
existed a dynamism of broadening public mourning discourses and ceremonies, to incorporate 
more and different groups of wartime dead victims over time.  These changes were generally 
beginning from a more restricted understanding of the past, endorsed by the state- and society 
leaderships, but which left enough of a gap between its selective explanation of the war and the 
unacknowledged experiences of other segments of the population, who were either 
disempowered or absent, but whose stories were either too large or too significant to ignore.  At 
the same time, contemporary critics of these mourning exercises in the West pressured the 
officials in charge to make these changes when those critics, often of a different generation than 
those leaders, perceived circumstances in post-war West Germany as requiring a different set of 
“lessons” or reflections from the German past.  In East Germany, changes in the categories of 
victims also came about as products of contemporary current events, either the continued 
occupation and supervision of the GDR by the Red Army or the ramping up of military 
conscription to prepare the NVA for military action, pressuring the regime to modify the vision 
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of the past which they used to leverage for their claim to leadership.  None of this is to say that 
individuals’ personal experiences and recollections do not relate or carry weight in the collective 
memory of society.  Rather, these findings suggest that individuals do carry weight in how a 
society mourns its dead and remembers its past, because these larger patterns of continuity or 
change in remembrance rhetoric or practices can only result from groups of individuals making 
decisions to accept, ignore, or contest the narrative being offered to them.662 
 
Different visions of the past, one vision for the future 
This dissertation has interrogated beliefs and practices of public mourning and collective 
memory using a theoretical understanding of collective memory as a shared understanding of the 
collective past that inspires social action in to preserve or correct that understanding over time.  
The chief benefit of this methodological approach is the ability to ascribe some sort of 
explanatory power to the cultural phenomenon of collective memory, rather than limiting 
memory’s interpretive usefulness to documenting what people remember and interpreting the 
manifold factors that produced this memory.  Rather than viewing collective memory as 
something only to be explained by actions, this study has taken the stance that collective memory 
itself can then also explain other, subsequent actions.  At the same time, one of the chief findings 
at the end of this history has been that collective memory, and the public mourning exercises 
where memory is voiced, should also be seen as being in some ways informed and influenced by 
other contemporary events and choices, stemming from the audience’s lives after the events 
being remembered.  This more nuanced understanding of how Germans remembered and 
                                                 
662  This is the heart of “social action” described by Alon Confino in Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., The 
Work of Memory: New Directions in the study of German Society and Culture (Urbana, 2002). 
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mourned their dead still assumes public mourning ceremonies as cultural sites of upholding or 
renegotiating boundaries over victims, recognition of suffering, and the reasons behind why they 
died.  However, a more complete understanding of why Germans revised their understandings of 
the war dead over time, such as they did, calls for attention to the fears and anxieties expressed 
by Germans as they mourned, which reveal what these Germans thought might befall their 
society and their future descendants in the event the Second World War and its dead were not 
properly remembered. 
 
In the case of West Germans’ collective memory and public mourning, audiences and 
critics alike revised their understanding of the war dead because the more traditional definition of 
war dead (i.e. just soldiers) no longer served as a sufficient answer on its own.  The reasons for 
this shortcoming were manifold and doubtlessly varied to a person.  To begin with, civilians 
were by 1945 in no way safe from the violence that was directed at their armies, whether in 
terms of weapons systems’ increased ranges or the targeting of civilians, or at least targets of 
military significance located within civilian sectors, outright.  The boundary between armed 
combatants whose deaths somehow contributed to the national good, and unarmed non-
combatants whose deaths were unfortunate side-effects of pursuing this national good, was 
quickly dissolving and on a scale that could be noticed on a daily basis.  Yet the grief being felt 
by surviving families for victims who were equally dead was difficult to weight in favor of fallen 
soldiers.663  Furthermore, evidence of Nazi crimes and the Holocaust, while not immediately 
finding complete acknowledgment within West German public mourning, did make the 
                                                 
663 That is, eventually it became clear that these soldiers were dying without delivering a victory to Germany, 
making it harder to describe their deaths as possessing greater political or moral value to the regime than non-
combatants.  Konrad H. Jarausch, ed. Reluctant Accomplice: A Wehrmacht Soldier’s Letters from the Eastern Front 
(Princeton, 2011), 34-35 for one example. 
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continuation of Nazi-era practices worshipping the heroic soldier all the more suspect.  To be 
sure, the ennobling of soldiers was a tradition older than 1933 but critics of this practice had 
neither the patience for nationalism or for National Socialism, especially when the occupying 
Allies were watching and looking for signs of lingering Nazi sympathy.  That some proportion of 
the population accustomed to the older Volkstrauertag and Heldengedenktag practices still 
accepted their continuation as unproblematic demonstrates that even this seemingly logical 
adjustment was fraught with controversy.  
For those West Germans critical of ceremonies continuing to devote special attention and 
emphasis on soldiers’ deaths, as well as for those West Germans who still supported such a 
traditional practice, the discussions of whether and how to incorporate German civilians’ deaths 
into Volkstrauertag took place against the background of the Cold War.  The looming threat of a 
return to war, this time with nuclear weapons and this time fought without any Germans ability 
to steer the course of events, propelled a tendency to include calls for contemporary leaders and 
audience members to work for peace, even if these parties disagreed about soldiers’ and 
civilians’ relative importance in the history they were remembering.  For supporters of the older, 
more conservative and traditional pattern of mourning the war dead, any suggestion to reduce the 
emphasis on the military in public mourning was met with the fear that such a change would 
leave future generations without an understanding of the true dangers of war, and therefore an 
appreciation of how important peace really was.  That is, setting aside the extreme elements who 
saw no problem with continuing Nazi-era practices, those West Germans who wanted a strong 
military atmosphere to their public mourning thought that this aesthetic would serve to confront 
the present generations with a true picture of war’s lamentable effects on their families and 
society.  At the same time, West German critics who pushed for more inclusion of civilian 
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victims also acted out of concern for the same goal of promoting peace, but believed that this 
was best accomplished by presenting war as something not cleanly separable from the civilian 
world, restricted to the tidy map tables of the general staff.  Making civilians just as much a part 
of Volkstrauertag as soldiers would mean that anyone who called for war in the future would 
have to reckon with the potential civilian losses, as well as military ones, rendering the prospect 
too costly to entertain.  The fact that these two factions in apparent disagreement both felt the 
same calamity would result from incorrect memorial and mourning practices, shows that the 
possibility of war was something that had affected all West Germans in the past and naturally 
could do so again in the future.   
 Bound up with why West Germans made changes to their public mourning practices was 
these same West Germans’ assumptions about their post-war selves.  Setting aside the dichotomy 
of those West Germans in favor of emphasizing only the military dead versus those believing 
that civilian- and military dead were crucially important (discussed above), West German 
survivors of the war did not, on the whole, want to admit their support or at least passivity and 
non-resistance in face of the Nazi regime.  Rather, these survivors sensed that another 
dictatorship could not possibly come to pass in West Germany, either because West Germans 
had learned their lesson to not suffer fascism or because they believed the Nazis were an 
ahistorical exception to German history.  In either case, the supporters and critics of mourning 
and memory practices in the late 1940s and early 1950s believed there was no need to educate 
younger Germans or even each other about dangers of Nazism.  This left a consideration of West 
Germans’ lives under the Nazi dictatorship unnecessary in a mourning tradition designed, in part 
at least, to prepare contemporary West Germany for challenges it might face in the future.  War, 
on the other hand, seemed a real threat and one that had been a constant feature of the past 
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century-and-a-half of European history, making the possibility of another war and education on 
the importance of avoiding another war into an important element of public mourning.  That is, 
West Germans feared that those who did not remember and understand this history of war might 
easily fall into that trap again. 
 Publicly considering the possibility of another war that could result from an insufficient 
attention to past mistakes was a much easier pill for West Germans to swallow than imagining 
that the Nazi dictatorship could happen again.  This was because, considered in this light,  all of 
Europe had been at war with each other for the last couple of centuries, so Germans were thus 
normal in being the aggressors and losers in warfare, not terribly dissimilar from any of their 
European neighbors.  Following this logic, if Germans on the other hand considered themselves 
to be possessing some special flaw that made them uniquely suited for a Nazi dictatorship, this 
belief would then demand that public mourning and collective memory practices acknowledge 
and warn the public for the benefit of the future.  In this scenario, West Germans would have to 
admit that something was wrong with German culture and they would have to question how they 
became Nazis the first time, admitting some responsibility or flaws that contributed to the rise of 
the Nazi party and its hold on power.  From this perspective, explaining war appears to have 
been a much simpler and much less potentially incriminating path for memory and mourning to 
take. 
West Germans’ contemporary self-perception and anxieties also help explain changes in 
West German public mourning and memory into the 1960s, when West Germans finally did 
realize a more historically honest memory of the Holocaust.  By that time, the youth of 1960s 
were not so much terrified by war, though they and their elders still considered it a threat, but 
were rather more immediately worried about lingering authoritarianism and fascism steering the 
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Bonn Republic toward Weimar’s fate.  Though the ‘68ers believed theirs was the task of staving 
off a return to dictatorship, this fate could also have led Germans back to war.  Thus the political, 
social and cultural criticism of the larger 1960s that filtered into collective memory and public 
mourning practices shaded these activities to emphasize the threat of the future return to fascism 
or dictatorship, instead of looking at a failure of international relations or diplomacy, as the 
“lesson” to learn from the German past.  Still, in each case, whether the somewhat revised public 
mourning emphases of the 1950s or the more far-reaching changes called for in the 1960s, peace 
was an agreed-upon goal for all West Germans to realize, even if the ‘68ers understood the term 
differently than did their parents.  This was because, while the youth did see what they thought 
were the fundamental flaws in German culture requiring immediate repair this critical position 
called for the re-calibration of collective memory and public mourning to include German crimes 
and culpability but not to undo the emphasis on peace. 
 
To the question of why the East Germans changed their understanding of victims to be 
mourned over time, the answer looks quite different since, on this topic as with so many others, 
the GDR represents a different kind of change and continuity than does the Federal Republic.  
On one level, the GDR actually continued the older tradition of using state-sponsored collective 
memory and public mourning exercises to uncritically praise dead military heroes who fought 
and died to bring about the present status quo, in this case the SED regime.  At first glance this 
might not seem dissimilar to what nation-states ordinarily do for their military dead, and it looks 
quite similar to what the Nazi regime did to exalt the First World War dead as well as their fallen 
SS troopers.  Yet, as much as the GDR carried on this tradition unbroken, so too did it break 
away, since the Weimar- and Third Reich practices, indeed the nineteenth mourning traditions 
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also, circled around honoring soldiers and highlighting the combat experience of war, which was 
far from the history that the SED wanted to memorialize. 
The German Democratic Republic instead staged public spectacles, including parades 
and rallies, for the purpose of celebrating those aspects of German history that served to benefit 
the regime’s grip on power.  In the case of remembering the Second World War and mourning 
the dead, it was the OdF fighters who best fit this mission, even though these dead victims were 
not uniformed troops and were not always or even typically on the battlefield.  Instead, these 
were ideological defenders, who had not acted to protect the (Nazi) regime and the German 
people per se, but purported instead to fight in the best interests of the German people.  When the 
GDR did expand its mourning traditions, it began by reaching out to include the Red Army dead, 
to bolster and legitimate the Eastern Bloc military and political alliance.  Only eventually did 
(East) German veterans receive mention and only insofar as it helps ideological needs of linking 
the GDR present to a supposedly socialist or anti-fascist military past.  What is important to note 
here is that the dynamism in this case was not so much driven by popular demands or fears but 
instead operated to support the regime’s ideological claims on the past and the future. 
 In nearly all cases over the time span under study here, official SED remembrance was 
driven to, at some level, oppose or counteract individual East Germans’ and groups of East 
Germans’ memories of the Second World War as well as their understanding of the present.  
This goal of actively frustrating or suppressing East Germans’ memories might be characterized 
as similar to the West German goal of reforming military-centric mourning in order to make way 
for mourning German civilian victims and civilian victims of Germans, too.  Yet those West 
German processes were designed to augment older, more traditional practices with new ones, 
whereas the GDR began by ignoring tradition, rather than trying to minimize it, only slowly 
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adding more victims over time. When it came to the question of how ordinary East Germans 
were supposed to feel about their dead Wehrmacht soldiers, when the regime offered an answer, 
even then it was inconsistent: East Germans were either to see them as servants to the Nazis or 
victims of the Nazis, depending on what was needed by the regime.  Even in the underground 
Abteilung Gräberfürsorge, where East Germans created a separate space to articulate and 
organize based on memories of the Second World War outside the OdF narrative, it appears that 
East Germans here pushed a memory of soldiers, mostly.  It is unclear whether and to what 
extent German civilian- and Holocaust victims were acknowledged, but in response to the yes-
and-no nature of the change or continuity in mourning offered by the SED, the Abteilung 
Gräberfürsorge  answered with its own yes-and-no type of answer, approximating the early FRG 
years of focusing on soldiers and not others, even though the Abteilung was doing this at a time 
when different concerns had been animating the FRG in the late 1960s that are quite far removed 
from those of the late 1940s.  Even in this context, however, the East Germans were hearing a 
message about soldiers and sacrifices that emphasized peace, even if the Abteilung’s peace was 
not the same as the SED’s peace. 
 
Returning to the question of why did Germans in East and West revise their 
understanding of the war dead over time, there are some common answers we can identify.  The 
answers and definitions of “war dead,” indeed of how to conceptualize “war” itself that had been 
circulating and informing official mourning ceremonies in earlier post-war time periods (see 
above) were no longer satisfactory.  Certainly some survivors were content to mourn and 
celebrate soldiers but the expansive nature of both the war and the regime meant that many more 
survivors or families had stories to tell in addition to or beyond the battlefield history.  Moreover, 
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for the West German state, it was (domestically) politically dangerous to refuse to acknowledge 
the history of German victims and (internationally) perilous to ignore the history of the 
Holocaust and crimes.  In many ways, the diversity of classes of victims recognized in 
Volkstrauertag made generalizations difficult, if not impossible, because explaining how 
different groups related to each other would have brought speculation of guilt and responsibility.  
 In fact, the “peace” discourse appears to be the only way to find agreement between 
different memorial factions in West Germany.  The emphasis on remembering the past in a way 
that allowed different parties who suffered to each claim recognition and affirmation, without 
their suffering being too deeply questioned or problematical, seemed only possible if the “social 
action” implied by these competing memories was the same: working to preserve peace in the 
future.  At the same time, the GDR’s rhetoric also centered around “peace” as a goal, though it 
was certainly a different form of peace envisioned by that regime, and one that ignored the 
deaths of German soldiers and many civilian victims.  At the same time, the underground 
Abteilung Gräberfürsorge also praised peace while recognizing German dead outside of the 
Communist discourse.  In fact, the Abteilung seemed to be the only example of 1918 patterns of 
mourning victims being kept intact, although notably the praise for war was gone, leaving only 
praise of peace remaining.  Thus it appears that, however great the gaps were in different factions 
of Germans mourning different versions of the past in different post-war contexts, all Germans 
agreed that remembering the Second World War and its dead taught them to appreciate and 
pursue peace in the present and future. 
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Reformed mourning, reformed society 
Although “peace” appears to be the only way Germans could find discursive 
commonality and shared conclusions amid their wide-ranging lived experiences of the war and 
the dictatorship, this does not mean we should discount Germans’ pronounced support for peace 
as merely a rhetorical strategy.  Instead, it is a chief argument of this dissertation that Germans’ 
cultural appreciation for peace, and newfound distaste for war which was its consequence, was 
indeed the salient factor in the post-1945 history of public mourning in Germany.   As articulated 
above, West Germany saw public mourning practices no longer feature only dead soldiers, as 
part of an argument promoting the rejection of war, since civilian victims were thought to 
magnify and clarify the harshness of war and seriousness of threat of war.  A side effect of this 
nearly exclusive focus on the threat of war by West Germans was that Holocaust victims became 
subsumed in the process, either seen erroneously as merely other victims of total war like 
German victims, or at most as simply other victims of an aggressive Nazi regime who was 
conducting a war, making these victims also “just” war victims.  For West Germans, “peace” 
was the logical lesson to be learned from remembering this history, the key to preventing more 
death and destruction.  Therefore West Germans cautioned themselves against the sources of 
war, variously seen as outcome of nationalism, international power politics, cavalier political 
leaders, or imperialism and right-wing authoritarianism.  In East Germany, the pattern for official 
remembrance was that peace would naturally come about as a result of socialism, and that in 
order to successfully realize this end, the Western Imperialists had to be resisted.  Yet aside from 
the political goals, an end to actual violence and a determined effort to keep the peace were 
featured in public mourning on each side. 
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It is worth detailing the fact that “peace” may have been cover to not have to talk about 
the Holocaust.  The slowness to do this in the West and near-absence of these conversations in 
the East could be seen to speak in favor of an intentional absence of the Holocaust from memory.  
At the same time, eventual discussion in West (and reunified) Germany demonstrates a 
willingness over time to think seriously and critically about the German (Nazi) past.  
Furthermore, even as “silence” on Nazis was criticized and subject to revision, at no point did 
West Germany and East Germany openly reject the rhetoric of “peace.”  No one ever started 
calling for war, no one acclaimed further loss of life as a good and desirable end.  So it seems we 
can conclude they were seriously committed to “peace,” even after they also came to commit 
themselves to remembering the Nazis.  That is, peace was not a passing fad or mask, because 
when the shortcomings of the “peace” discourse were addressed, the “peace” part was kept even 
as other omissions were corrected.  Both of these elements, early and sustained commitment to 
peace and not war, plus a slow and halting incorporation of a memory of the regime and its 
designated victims into the war memory, fit well into the larger literature on cultural change of 
German society after 1945.  If Germans were more successful in some areas than others, no one 
seriously thinks they were (or are) on the verge of another right-wing dictatorship.664  Similarly, 
the results of memory and mourning deserving of scholars’ notice might not be the largely 
incomplete explanation of the Nazi past but rather the unambivalent commitment to peace.  If 
historiography has noted the former, why ought not also note the latter? 
 
                                                 
664 See Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilising Germans, 1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (New York, 
2006) for one wide-ranging survey of recovery and reform. 
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It is hoped that, in addition to addressing the specific history of collective memory and 
public mourning for the war dead in post-1945 Germany, this study will also contribute some 
more general insights to the field as a whole.  In the case of the history of memory during the 
early decades of the Federal Republic, some of these findings relate to what might be missed 
when specialists focus only on the gaps and imperfections in Germans’ collective memory, rather 
than the changes in the actual content over time.  Of course, it is important not to praise failure 
and the process of pointing out what Germans did omit from their discussions over memory help 
to more fully appreciate and analyze the reasons behind these decisions.  However, instead of 
only stopping with the problems, it is also possible and indeed advisable to try to evaluate the 
solutions that West Germans found as they discussed their national past.  Far from letting West 
Germans who hid their secrets off the hook, this interpretation, emphasizing West Germans’ 
outspoken aversion to violence and death as a product of experiencing the war and remembering 
the dead, suggests that people must and can make choices as to what their collective memory and 
public mourning practices say about the past.  Thus the historian can dig into the history of these 
very choices and why they were made, without simply noting what was present or absent.  
For the historiography on the German Democratic Republic, this dissertation offers fewer 
firm conclusions.  In part, this shortcoming results from the sources themselves which are 
uneven, more opaque and present less of a nuanced story than those on the West.  Nonetheless, 
the demonstration of East Germans leaving behind the official OdF memorial tradition, rather 
than accepting or rejecting it, adds to the research dispelling the notion that East Germans either 
completely accepted or completely rejected propaganda and state censorship.  At the same time, 
this underground body offers a glimpse of East Germans organizing for “social action,” thus 
taking an active role in opposition to their regime.  Yet at the same time, these proto-dissidents’ 
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actions must have ranked as passive resistance or accommodation to the regime at some level, 
because they appear to have been allowed to carry out their work for at least two decades, 
meaning that they could not have presented a stance that was too threatening to the regime and 
its official memory needs.  Other recent research has indeed revealed a certain dynamism within 
East German official collective memory and mourning exercises, especially with regard to dead 
German Wehrmacht veterans.  This small additional glimpse into how East Germans dealt with 
their past and with their present circumstances ultimately begs for more future research into how 
this underground operation worked on a day-to-day basis and how much accommodation versus 
friction they encountered from the regime. 
In addition to the historiography of post-war Germany, this dissertation has also aimed to 
offer an intervention into the methodological field of collective memory studies.  In particular, 
this study has set out to identify not only the way(s) in which Germans recollected their past, 
how this changed over time, and what elements of this recollected history were omitted or 
augmented, but it has also attempted to locate actors and groups making choices and taking 
“social action” to preserve, correct, or otherwise apply insight from memory of the past to the 
present day’s problems.  That is, this study has worked to present collective memory, and the 
public mourning ceremonies where memory was articulated and contested, as more than a set of 
narrative practices or cultural traces that were passively consumed or rejected.  Far from 
rejecting a study of symbols and tropes, searching for the ways in which memory and mourning 
motivate concrete actions, as the present study has done, only adds to the explanatory power of 
collective memory.  By helping reveal the connections between the content being remembered 
and context of that remembrance, scholars can enrich their understanding of what sort of past is 
transmitted between generations, as well as the degree to which the past or the present exerted 
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more influence on post-war populations.  After all, it was not only remembering the suffering of 
wars in the past but also experiencing the anxiety about more violence in the present that 
prompted post-war Germans to fashion a post-war society. 
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